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SinoSoldier
Colonel
They can if they wanted to. Retrofit the Kuznetsov with MiG-29Ks, escort her with a few Kalibr-laden Gorshkov FFGs, bring along a few Yasen-class or Oscar-class SS(G)Ns, complete with a few guided missile corvettes, and they would have a decent fleet capable of land attack missions.
Unfortunately I don't foresee any significant combat capability for the PLAN's carrier groups until (1) they can get the CV-17 in service and (2) the improved J-15B enters production, which won't be 2020 at the very earliest.
plawolf
Lieutenant General
Is your hypothetical Russian fleet supposed to participate in or deter the expected western military strikes against Syria?
Also, when Russia could certainly put together a fleet as you described, that fleet won’t be even in the same league as this PLAN fleet in terms of displacement or capabilities.
But it was only a side comment not meant to be taken too seriously. So let’s get back on topic.
SinoSoldier
Colonel
Yeah, but this PLAN fleet is for parade purposes and nobody realistically expects such a massive armada to congregate as a single unit in wartime.
Back on topic: I do strongly feel that the PLAN has been fairly lackluster in its development of its carrier air wings. It's been almost a decade since the J-15 first flew and the PLAN has barely 24 airframes for training and use. By the time CV-17 enters its service life, it would be doing so without an initial air component. "PB19980515" has mentioned that the J-15B might fly in late 2019, along with the 5th-generation J-XY, but IMHO that is too long a wait when China's neighbors are building F-35 squadrons.
The first Gorshkov hasn't even entered service nevermind "a few."
PLAN's carrier aviation is in no rush to adopt new fighters considering AEW&C isn't ready. AEW&C won't be ready until CATOBAR is ready, and that's going to take a while. Without AEW&C, whatever super duper fighter China puts on carriers will be target practice for NATO carrier air wings, and China doesn't need better fighters against anyone else that could meet a Chinese CSG.
Lethe
Captain
While acknowledging China's growing strength, the inevitability of that strength provoking hedging responses by other nations, and the ability of other nations to take actions that force China's hand, I am not confident that China has pursued an ideal path to date in terms of calibrating its strength to its actions and managing the perceptions and responses from other nations. That is not to say that I think China has done poorly in these respects, only that pathways leading to better outcomes -- specifically lower levels of strategic hedging by other nations -- may have been available. Specifically, I question the value of China "flexing its muscles" while it remains clearly inferior to the United States across the various dimensions of national power. Such behaviour seems calculated to provoke hedging responses from smaller powers in the form of increased military spending and the formation and reinforcement of strategic relationships that threaten Chinese interests (e.g. the USA-Japan-India-Australia 'Quad' or the US-Vietnam rapprochement).
We can debate whether China miscalculated on its timing (though probably best not done in extenddd fashion in this thread, so this will be my only response on this matter), but the point is a flex was coming at some point, and we all should have expected it.
I would contend that China was going to sart getting hedge responses from its neighbors regardless of whether it chose to flex as soon as it became evident what kind of military capabilities they were reaching for. One could also argue that if China hadn’t flexed neighbors it has disputes with would have been motivated to try to bake in their claims earlier and more aggressively as it became clearer China’s was well on the road to attaining miliary supremacy over them, to increase the cost of uprooting their positions, and that’s was another consideration it had to balance in its security calculus. Indeed, rightly or wrongly, they saw the activities of some ASEAN countries as examples of the latter, and Obama’s announcement of a pivot as an example of the former. Some of the potential risks we could cite in China’s security environment are flex neutral, and some are actually risks that come from *not* flexing. China being less assertive doesn’t necessarily equate to its neighbors being more complacent, or being more trustful, or putting off hedging positions.
I don’t think efforts such as Quad or US rapproachment with Vietnam will prove to be effective answers. In addition to the lead time challenges of reactive coordination, even as the more proactive countries in the region have become visibly antsy about Chinese power they still also have to balance an economic relationship which is still largely positive. Part of effective strategy is execution speed and comprehensiveness, and China has acquired quite bit of asymmetric advantage on that front compared to the answers its strategic competitors can mount in the short term, which is why despite the ire Beijing seems to be illicting from its neighbors they have largely been successful at hardening and reinforcing their strategic positions. We will see how the rest plays out, but sometimes waiting for a “perfect” time in the short term is imperfect strategy, and over the long term the fundamentals tend to speak for themselves.
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MwRYum
Major
What China had learned over the years is that: what the others want simply to have China remain inferior, invalid and incompetent, any improvement on their own part will be viewed negatively by the US and those who look up to the US (which pretty much mean "everyone else"), thus China reckoned instead of being so mindful of what the others think (and got nothing done), better to do things their own pace (but "accelerated", for China is playing the "catching up" game, after all).
That said, there's no such thing as "pathways leading to better outcomes", by your standard, that'd be in China's favour. In the end, it can't be just because there's such a big gap between PLAN and the USN, China should simply give up and go home. And if it provoke arms race, then? Well...if it was such a hassle to squeeze those 0.1% GDP extra for them to compete with China whie China is "just doing its own thing", guess who'd bleed white first? Remember: what China is doing today is first dealing with those 20 years of inaction and neglect.