PLAN ASW Capability

Iron Man

Major
Registered Member
I can see numerous civilian applications for SQUIDs which will drive up volumes. So the SQUID electronics could shrink to the size and cost of a smartphone.

Then it would definitely be cheap enough to create a huge array or tripwire of SQUID sensors.
The SQUID sensor itself may (or may not) become cheap but the huge arrays needed to make a 6km-ranged SQUID a useful sensor would be ridiculous, I don't care how cheap the SQUID itself is.
 

AndrewS

Brigadier
Registered Member
The SQUID sensor itself may (or may not) become cheap but the huge arrays needed to make a 6km-ranged SQUID a useful sensor would be ridiculous, I don't care how cheap the SQUID itself is.

No it isn't.

We're basically talking about a fibre-optic submarine cable which has powered SQUID sensors along its length.

The Solomon Islands cable is estimated at USD 100 Million for 4000 km of cable. That compares to USD 300 Million for a single Type-54A Frigate.

For China, the most obvious place to start such a tripwire would be the 100km gap into the Bohao Bay Bastion.
Another would be the 200km from the Shandong Peninsula to North Korea.
 

Iron Man

Major
Registered Member
No it isn't.

We're basically talking about a fibre-optic submarine cable which has powered SQUID sensors along its length.

The Solomon Islands cable is estimated at USD 100 Million for 4000 km of cable. That compares to USD 300 Million for a single Type-54A Frigate.

For China, the most obvious place to start such a tripwire would be the 100km gap into the Bohao Bay Bastion.
Another would be the 200km from the Shandong Peninsula to North Korea.
You have no way to demonstrate that a SQUID cable and accessories is equivalent to a length of fiber optic cable or that it would even use a fiber optic cable to transmit data, and I'm too lazy to calculate how much cable is required to cover an area of ocean with a 6km range detector. We are now definitely both talking out of our depth here.
 

AndrewS

Brigadier
Registered Member
You have no way to demonstrate that a SQUID cable and accessories is equivalent to a length of fiber optic cable or that it would even use a fiber optic cable to transmit data, and I'm too lazy to calculate how much cable is required to cover an area of ocean with a 6km range detector. We are now definitely both talking out of our depth here.

Your comments here betray a lack of basic understanding of submarine cables and their history, yet you categorically assert that future SQUID sensor technology would be of no use in fixed installations in the ocean.

It's obvious that you would use fibre optic cables to transmit data on the seafloor.

In the old days, communications cables (on land and in the ocean) used electrical cables.
Yet these have all been replaced with fibre optics because electrical cables use a lot more power, need more repeater stations, and have less bandwidth.

Furthermore, the latest sonar sensors are no longer electro-mechanical pressure sensing devices. Instead, the Virginia class now use fibre-optic pressure sensors in their sonar domes.

Personally, I find it best not to hold an opinion at all, unless there is a chain of logic/reasoning to back up it up.

And did you miss the part where I gave examples of where short SQUID tripwire cables would be of use? Just look at a map, and you can see how they could form part of a tripwire for a Bohai Bay bastion strategy.
 

Iron Man

Major
Registered Member
Your comments here betray a lack of basic understanding of submarine cables and their history, yet you categorically assert that future SQUID sensor technology would be of no use in fixed installations in the ocean.

It's obvious that you would use fibre optic cables to transmit data on the seafloor.

In the old days, communications cables (on land and in the ocean) used electrical cables.
Yet these have all been replaced with fibre optics because electrical cables use a lot more power, need more repeater stations, and have less bandwidth.

Furthermore, the latest sonar sensors are no longer electro-mechanical pressure sensing devices. Instead, the Virginia class now use fibre-optic pressure sensors in their sonar domes.

Personally, I find it best not to hold an opinion at all, unless there is a chain of logic/reasoning to back up it up.

And did you miss the part where I gave examples of where short SQUID tripwire cables would be of use? Just look at a map, and you can see how they could form part of a tripwire for a Bohai Bay bastion strategy.
Oh, and now you're suddenly not only an expert on underwater sonar detection but also have access to the costs of SOSUS-type networks LOL. To you it is just a bunch of fiber optic cables. To me it is not only the costs of the cabling, but the costs of laying and maintaining, the ground stations that would have to be built, the manning, etc. and all of this in the context of 6km range cables which in order to cover a region of ocean would have be spaced every 12km, probably more than an order of magnitude more cabling than is required for SOSUS. You are also now trying to advantage yourself by confining the discussion to a chokepoint like the Bohai Bay entrance whereas the rest of us have been talking about far wider applications, e.g. Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea. You also are inaccurate here when you falsely accuse me of allegedly asserting that "future SQUID sensor technology would be of no use in fixed installations in the ocean". Where did I say that? If you cannot follow the conversation perhaps you should remove yourself from it. I said that a 6km range SQUID sensor is impractical for fixed undersea installations. I also said that the current SQUID is a starting point for future SQUID applications, which clearly means that I think SQUID could have a future in SOSUS-type networks IF its range can be improved; I had mentioned something like an order of magnitude, but IMO probably even more range will be required for this kind of application.
 

AndrewS

Brigadier
Registered Member
Oh, and now you're suddenly not only an expert on underwater sonar detection but also have access to the costs of SOSUS-type networks LOL. To you it is just a bunch of fiber optic cables. To me it is not only the costs of the cabling, but the costs of laying and maintaining, the ground stations that would have to be built, the manning, etc. and all of this in the context of 6km range cables which in order to cover a region of ocean would have be spaced every 12km, probably more than an order of magnitude more cabling than is required for SOSUS. You are also now trying to advantage yourself by confining the discussion to a chokepoint like the Bohai Bay entrance whereas the rest of us have been talking about far wider applications, e.g. Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea. You also are inaccurate here when you falsely accuse me of allegedly asserting that "future SQUID sensor technology would be of no use in fixed installations in the ocean". Where did I say that? If you cannot follow the conversation perhaps you should remove yourself from it. I said that a 6km range SQUID sensor is impractical for fixed undersea installations. I also said that the current SQUID is a starting point for future SQUID applications, which clearly means that I think SQUID could have a future in SOSUS-type networks IF its range can be improved; I had mentioned something like an order of magnitude, but IMO probably even more range will be required for this kind of application.

It all depends on the costs yes. But given the deployment of SOSUS and fibre optic cables, we can extrapolate that underwater SQUID sensors could be viable. And not just in chokepoints, but as part of larger tripwares/arrays.
 

Iron Man

Major
Registered Member
It all depends on the costs yes. But given the deployment of SOSUS and fibre optic cables, we can extrapolate that underwater SQUID sensors could be viable. And not just in chokepoints, but as part of larger tripwares/arrays.
I think the bottom line is neither of us have any clue what the actual costs of your 6km SQUID hydrophone array will be. And that's a fact.
 

Red Moon

Junior Member
It all depends on the costs yes. But given the deployment of SOSUS and fibre optic cables, we can extrapolate that underwater SQUID sensors could be viable. And not just in chokepoints, but as part of larger tripwares/arrays.
With an irregular grid of these tripwires you would divide the entire coastal area into 10 or 20 blocks. You would have real-time information on how many and specifically which subs are in each block, even if you don't know exactly where within the block. Pretty cool, and certainly worth the effort.

However, if such (non-SQUID) tripwires already exist in the northern European region, maybe such a grid does not have to wait for this technology?
 

Hendrik_2000

Lieutenant General
As I said now that PLAN capital ship grow by leap and bound PLAN start serious ASW program with more and more arrows in her quiver
Even if this posted on NI but the gist of the article is interpretation of senior Chinese scientist interview with SCMP
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China's Navy Could Soon Have a New Weapon to Kill Navy Submarines

China may soon have a new weapon to help defend itself against enemy submarines.

by
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As Elsa B. Kania, an expert on Chinese AI and defense innovation at the Center for a New American Security, noted on Twitter, “That [a] senior [scientist] is willing to discuss a *classified* military program for an English-language publication surprises me. Assuming that Lin Yang is not about to be charged under China’s National Security or Counterespionage Laws, he must have received official permission.”

China may soon have a new weapon to help defend itself against enemy submarines.

For years, many have commented on Beijing’s lack of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities. The Department of Defense’s 2016
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China’s military, for instance, noted that Beijing “continues to lack either a robust coastal or deep-water anti-submarine warfare capability.”

This was not a major problem when China’s naval strategy was largely aimed at denying adversaries access to its coastlines. In recent years, however, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has begun deploying bigger, more advanced ships as it pushes to become a blue water navy. These ships also make great targets for enemy submarines—something that hasn’t gone unnoticed among China’s neighbors and the United States—creating a greater urgency for Beijing to strengthen its ASW capabilities.

One component of this can be found in
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by the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post . On July 22, the SCMP reported, citing Chinese artificial intelligence (AI) researchers, that “China is developing large, smart and relatively low-cost unmanned submarines that can roam the world’s oceans to perform a wide range of missions.” One of these missions is almost certain to be ASW.


The report said that the robot submarines are not intended to fully replace manned submarines. And, at least for now, they will not make entirely autonomous attack decisions. That is, a military officer must approve whether to attack another ship.



Still, the article noted that “the robotic subs are aimed particularly at the United States forces in strategic waters like the South China Sea and western Pacific Ocean.”

China already has small unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs). These are severely limited, however. Besides having limited range and payload capabilities, they are launched from another ship or submarine.

The researchers who talked to SCMP noted the new robotic submarines—which China hopes to deploy by 2021, the one-hundred-year anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party—are much larger and more autonomous.

“They station in dock as conventional submarines,” the report said. “Their cargo bay is reconfigurable and large enough to accommodate a wide range of freight, from powerful surveillance equipment to missiles or torpedoes.”


The larger boats are also powered by diesel-electric engines and other sources that give them greater endurance.


One of the most attractive features of AI-enabled submarines is their low cost. As the SCMP article notes, manned submarines must have a high level of stealth to ensure survival, while also taking care of various safety and comfort level issues for its submariners.

These AI boats won't have to worry about many of these issues. Thus, China can build and deploy a lot of them to perform reconnaissance missions, target other submarines or surface ships, and even possibly to ram into other ships. This will be especially useful in waters near China where the boats can be programmed and learn to operate in the familiar terrain.



One curious part of the SCMP report is the sudden transparency. The People’s Liberation Army has a well deserved reputation for opacity in military developments. Yet, this article interviewed Lin Yang, a chief scientist at 912 Project—a “classified” program to develop the AI-enabled submarines—on the record.

As Elsa B. Kania, an expert on Chinese AI and defense innovation at the Center for a New American Security,
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, “That [a] senior [scientist] is willing to discuss a *classified* military program for an English-language publication surprises me. Assuming that Lin Yang is not about to be charged under China’s National Security or Counterespionage Laws, he must have received official permission.”

Kania makes the case that this permission was likely granted for signaling purposes, and could enhance Chinese deterrence. At the same time, she notes it is nearly impossible to confirm the level of maturity or actual capabilities of these submarines. It is therefore possible China is revealing details about this program to make it seem more advanced than it is in reality.

Still as Kania
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, “The PLA recognizes a potential opportunity to undermine current U.S. dominance in undersea warfare.” In that regard, it is interesting to note that the Department of Defense’s latest annual report on China’s military did not mention Beijing’s relative weakness in ASW, and China has
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to strengthen its ASW capabilities.
 
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