PLA strike strategies in westpac HIC

Deleted member 24525 · Aug 24, 2023

ashnole said:
as if PLA has a cheat code or something that gives them tens of thousands of missiles

Yes they literally do it's called 1/3 of the world's manufacturing value added

as if they won't strike back in kind and simply eat missiles lol

So you call the idea of China being able to produce 10,000+ missiles magical thinking but also believe shooting down a majority of said missiles is just something the US can do at all, let alone with minimal effort as you seem to be implying?

As if they don't have intelligence agencies that won't pre-warn them of a PLA 'bolt from the blue' strike

Most of the launchers and bombers are already where they would be in the lead up to a first strike. The only detectable activity would be an increased maintenance tempo and some assets being shifted around, but nothing exceeding the intensity of preparations for a normal military exercise. Washington does not have an all seeing eye, it is not privy to the private thoughts of a handful of Chinese political elites. It is possible and actually very likely they would not see a first strike coming.

Blitzo · Aug 24, 2023

ashnole said:
No one's talking here about US invading PRC or vice-verse. All I'm saying is that in all of these hypothetical scenarios posters post here make it seem like it's a child's play for the PLA to destroy the s### out of US' & its allies' military bases within the FIC. As if they don't have intelligence agencies that won't pre-warn them of a PLA 'bolt from the blue' strike, as if they won't disperse their military assets, as if they don't possess air defence & countermeasures capability, as if every missile in a PLARF/PLAAF missile salvo will find its target, as if PLA has a cheat code or something that gives them tens of thousands of missiles and as if they won't strike back in kind and simply eat missiles lol. Come on guys!

It's not so much that it is child's play, so much as even with all of the considerations you described, the balance of fires, geography, and dispersal is one which is in the PLA's favour, and where the trend continues will depend on how much each side invests in their systems and fires.

Much of this is better suited in the PLA fires/HIC thread, so I'll move some of these posts over there in a little bit.

Biscuits · Aug 24, 2023

ashnole said:
US (USAF bombers and long-range hypersonic missiles) can also come at China from different vectors. Over Bay of Bengal overflying Myanmar, over the Tibetan plateau overflying their major non-NATO ally Pakistan. There are a lot of options to open up various other sectors to stretch the PLA, options that surely won't be limited to a predictable easterly direction.

Are you delusional? Pakistan helping US invade China? Lmao.

Also US better have a good explanation for a neutral party like Myanmar when their planes crash into Myanmar buildings.

It's not as if China has any shortage of weapons to put on those sectors.

US is as close to having hypersonic missiles (even if just primitive Kinzhal equivalents) as China is to having Type 096s. I'd prefer if future hypotheticals are kept out of a current debate.

Blitzo · Aug 24, 2023

aqh said:
A lot of people talk about how Guam and the 1IC and 2IC chain are like "onions" or layers the PLA but what they don't realize is that after a few weeks of conflict the US will be facing an onion of defences in the pacific that they would have to get through to be able to actually break up a blockade of Taiwan.

Lets say its 2030 :
In the first few weeks the PLA would seek to destroy all forward deployed US/JP assets in the 1IC. This includes Okinawa, most of Japan's bases and any US naval assets that are within 1000 Km of the Chinese coast. They will absolutely be able to accomplish this due to the fires and sensor complex they have built over decades.

After this is taken care of the PLA can have a couple dozen warships, destroyers, frigates with at least 100-150 carrier based aircraft of mostly J-35s and just under a thousand J-20s supplied by YY-20 with standoff weapons and of course land based fire generation capability that the US won't have anything near an equivalent to that will be a wall of sorts that the US would have to get though just to break up a blockade of Taiwan. Even if they do get through that wall they will then have to face the aforementioned fires and ISR complex in the 1IC and the closer and deeper they go they face exponentially more land based fires and they give the PLA more accurate targeting data and their fires and defences are exhausted from going through that wall AND are further away from their main supply base Guam meaning they will mainly reply on a vulnerable aux fleet.

Whilst this is happening Guam is getting hammered and saturate with HGVs, CJ-100s, DFs etc which if the Americans loose then they will loose their central nervous system.

Basically just imagine if your the US. After your FOBs in Japan/ Okinawa are destroyed you have to make sure you miraculously can get through a wall of defences whilst under heavy land based fires , after you do get through this you face exponentially more fires.

There is a lot of this which I think is reflective of how things may go down if the balloon went up, but stating all of this in so confident of a manner in context of having an informational deficit (i.e.: not having done the operations research ala patchwork) doesn't come across very well.

I understand the overall westpac conflict scenario is one that you've stewed over for ages but you need to introduce some caution into the way that you are writing rather than conveying it as if it is preordained and guaranteed.

HighGround · Aug 24, 2023

ashnole said:
No one's talking here about US invading PRC or vice-verse. All I'm saying is that in all of these hypothetical scenarios posters post here make it seem like it's a child's play for the PLA to destroy the s### out of US' & its allies' military bases within the FIC. As if they don't have intelligence agencies that won't pre-warn them of a PLA 'bolt from the blue' strike, as if they won't disperse their military assets, as if they don't possess air defence & countermeasures capability, as if every missile in a PLARF/PLAAF missile salvo will find its target, as if PLA has a cheat code or something that gives them tens of thousands of missiles and as if they won't strike back in kind and simply eat missiles lol. Come on guys!

The U.S. military absolutely expects to eat missiles in any Pacific scenario. Missile defense is hard. If we knew that our missile defense was impervious, we wouldn't be investing into redundancy. We'd just buy more missile defense.

We're doing both, which should tell you about what the U.S. military expects to happen.

aqh · Aug 25, 2023

There is a lot of this which I think is reflective of how things may go down if the balloon went up, but stating all of this in so confident of a manner in context of having an informational deficit (i.e.: not having done the operations research ala patchwork) doesn't come across very well.

I understand the overall westpac conflict scenario is one that you've stewed over for ages but you need to introduce some caution into the way that you are writing rather than conveying it as if it is preordained and guaranteed.

Very fair points by Blitzo so I want to justify my position and show this is just beyond common sense and doesn't require patchwork esq experience to understand.

Lets look at a 2030 scenario ORBAT for the PLA & US military specifically within the 1IC. I will allow the US in this scenario to surge 50%+ of their expected ORBAT here and show why its a stupid idea and that China's sensor/fires and A2/AD complex is so strong that it would be suicidal for the US to do so which is why I expect them to pull their air and naval forces IRL behind the 1IC and would hence have to go through onions of PLA defences to help Taiwan.

US forces :
AIR: I expect the US to have 1100+ 5th gen aircraft by this time. Lets assume 600 are within the 1IC across bases and 5 CVNs (5 CVNs is around 250 and 350 distributed around bases). AWACS : 90 E2-ds and 16 E-7s (if they can keep on schedule) so 50 within the 1IC. EW craft - F-15 EX 175 in the 1IC. I'm not including bombers here as one of the main advantages of B-21s is to loiter behind lines from far away protected bases using offboard sensors.

The US will be working off around 3 air bases : Okinawa , Yokota , Misawa. These bases will be crammed full of aircraft and juicy targets for the PLARF.

NAVAL :

Lets assume that 40 Destroyers and 12 frigates that are a mix of old PESAs and AESAs are here. Also lets assume some Virginias SSBNs. Also the aforementioned 5 CVNs

PLA Forces:
AIR: 1000ish J-20s give or take a couple dozen. minimum 500+ J-16s. 80-100 KJ-500s and 30-40 other AWACS. 100+ J35s

NAVAL: 65 Destroyers with AESAs minimum and 40-60 frigs. A few 09Vs and all the corvettes with all their ASW.

Land based fires : Thousands of land based BMs as the US decided to get close and many more GLCM. Seeing as they are within the 1IC China doesn't need to use YJ-21s but can use shorter ranged missiles of which stockpiles are larger. The US doesn't nor will even with the Prsm have anything even *close* to this level of land based fire generation capability within land.

Land based sensors : OTH radars and shorter tracks for UASs as opposed to US UASs and a single TACOMAR in Paula much further away with therefore weaker sensor capabilities give China a sensor advantage beyond organic sensor capability of platforms. When you include satellites being focused on west pac the sensor advantage for China is substantial.

Base dispersal : Unlike the US which has its eggs in very few baskets China is much more dispersed across 160-200 + bases. A JASSM that hits a PLA base will have marginal effects compared to a CJ-10 that hits Kadena.

SAMs and IADs : China's coastal SAM and IADs system is extremely extensive and they can retreat back and go their for resupply under lots of safety. US IADs within Japan and Okinawa is nowhere nearly as strong.

In short the balance of fires and sensors in the 1IC by 2030 MASSIVELY favours China. They can rely not just on platforms but a plethora of land based capabilities that will overwhelm the US. If the US does decide to contest within the 1IC their ships will be oversaturated by land ASBMs and air delivered YJ 12s. They will make the kill chain and sensor picture many times easier for China as they will present themselves close to the coast. I therefore believe the US isn't suicidal enough to fight the PLA right off its coast and this doesn't require incredible amounts of CONOPS experience to see.

Blitzo · Aug 25, 2023

aqh said:
Very fair points by Blitzo so I want to justify my position and show this is just beyond common sense and doesn't require patchwork esq experience to understand.

Lets look at a 2030 scenario ORBAT for the PLA & US military specifically within the 1IC. I will allow the US in this scenario to surge 50%+ of their expected ORBAT here and show why its a stupid idea and that China's sensor/fires and A2/AD complex is so strong that it would be suicidal for the US to do so which is why I expect them to pull their air and naval forces IRL behind the 1IC and would hence have to go through onions of PLA defences to help Taiwan.

US forces :
AIR: I expect the US to have 1100+ 5th gen aircraft by this time. Lets assume 600 are within the 1IC across bases and 5 CVNs (5 CVNs is around 250 and 350 distributed around bases). AWACS : 90 E2-ds and 16 E-7s (if they can keep on schedule) so 50 within the 1IC. EW craft - F-15 EX 175 in the 1IC. I'm not including bombers here as one of the main advantages of B-21s is to loiter behind lines from far away protected bases using offboard sensors.

The US will be working off around 3 air bases : Okinawa , Yokota , Misawa. These bases will be crammed full of aircraft and juicy targets for the PLARF.

NAVAL :

Lets assume that 40 Destroyers and 12 frigates that are a mix of old PESAs and AESAs are here. Also lets assume some Virginias SSBNs. Also the aforementioned 5 CVNs

PLA Forces:
AIR: 1000ish J-20s give or take a couple dozen. minimum 500+ J-16s. 80-100 KJ-500s and 30-40 other AWACS. 100+ J35s

NAVAL: 65 Destroyers with AESAs minimum and 40-60 frigs. A few 09Vs and all the corvettes with all their ASW.

Land based fires : Thousands of land based BMs as the US decided to get close and many more GLCM. Seeing as they are within the 1IC China doesn't need to use YJ-21s but can use shorter ranged missiles of which stockpiles are larger. The US doesn't nor will even with the Prsm have anything even *close* to this level of land based fire generation capability within land.

Land based sensors : OTH radars and shorter tracks for UASs as opposed to US UASs and a single TACOMAR in Paula much further away with therefore weaker sensor capabilities give China a sensor advantage beyond organic sensor capability of platforms. When you include satellites being focused on west pac the sensor advantage for China is substantial.

Base dispersal : Unlike the US which has its eggs in very few baskets China is much more dispersed across 160-200 + bases. A JASSM that hits a PLA base will have marginal effects compared to a CJ-10 that hits Kadena.

SAMs and IADs : China's coastal SAM and IADs system is extremely extensive and they can retreat back and go their for resupply under lots of safety. US IADs within Japan and Okinawa is nowhere nearly as strong.

In short the balance of fires and sensors in the 1IC by 2030 MASSIVELY favours China. They can rely not just on platforms but a plethora of land based capabilities that will overwhelm the US. If the US does decide to contest within the 1IC their ships will be oversaturated by land ASBMs and air delivered YJ 12s. They will make the kill chain and sensor picture many times easier for China as they will present themselves close to the coast. I therefore believe the US isn't suicidal enough to fight the PLA right off its coast and this doesn't require incredible amounts of CONOPS experience to see.

I don't disagree with the spirit if what you are saying, but the extent of confidence you are expressing needs receipts.
The reason patchwork's writings on this matter were accepted was due to having said receipts when challenged by others.

For example, of this is correctly fires dependent, and some sort of informed estimate for order of battle and magazine size (reloads) for various types of fires, the respective capabilities of the fires and defenses and bases.

Using strong words like "suicidal" and "overwhelm" and "oversaturated" is just unnecessary for the argument you're trying to make and it just raises the expectations for the evidence you're expected to provide.
Something more circumspect like "by the end of the decade the PLA's ability to contest air and sea control and wage system of systems warfare in 1IC distances is likely to be significantly greater than it already is today".

aqh · Aug 25, 2023

Hmm ok fair enough. I will admit I don't have classified access to current levels of missile stockpiles or time travelling abilities to predict what the balance of forces will look like.

Deleted member 24525 · Aug 28, 2023

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This is really bizzare. I do not understand why DOD seems so fixated on this idea of having some way to immediately impose costs on China after a first strike, no matter how modest the costs actually are.
The question of how, in a post first strike environment, to actually get substantial combat power in theater and then logistically sustain it for many months is like this mammoth in the room that I have not seen them publicly acknowledge .
Am I missing something? Do these drones factor into a conflict in some way that I am not seeing?

vincent · Aug 28, 2023

Boltzmann said:
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This is really bizzare. I do not understand why DOD seems so fixated on this idea of having some way to immediately impose costs on China after a first strike, no matter how modest the costs actually are.
The question of how, in a post first strike environment, to actually get substantial combat power in theater and then logistically sustain it for many months is like this mammoth in the room that I have not seen them publicly acknowledge .
Am I missing something? Do these drones factor into a conflict in some way that I am not seeing?

Replicators are truly horrifying

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PLA strike strategies in westpac HIC

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