PLA strike strategies in westpac HIC

Blitzo

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I think of the 09-IIIB/09-V as analogous to the 052D(L)/055. The 052D(L) is a competitive destroyer that inherited some limitations from its hull form and lineage, but it's still a thoroughly modern destroyer (AESA radars, UVLS, decent powerplant, etc.) The 055 I would say without hesitation is the most advanced and most capable destroyer in service anywhere in the world - monstrously powerful and sophisticated radar, wholly modern hull form with massive room for expansion, stupefying amounts of power from its engines, etc. Better yet is its future proofing for advances like IEPS and DEW/railguns, something the 052D has no hope of achieving.

I know I'm out on a limb here and most respected users think differently, but I think the analogy is nearly perfect. I expect the 09-IIIB to be China's first truly modern, competitive submarine that can hang in there but gives up a bit to the world leaders in the field. This means that we'll see production in numbers on this class if my view is correct, which is supported by the construction and expansion at Bohai. The 09-IIIB should be able to hold the fort for the near-to-medium term, even if it still isn't the PLAN's dream SSN.

The 09-V, whenever it emerges, I expect to be a wholly different story. If it's not a leader in SSNs, it's the leader. If this stretches credulity, think back to how Chinese surface shipbuilding looked 5-10 years before the Type 055 emerged.

I think this is a bit optimistic.

I've conveyed my dislike about using the surface combatant comparison in the past because it could be a misleading analogy.

But if we had to use it, I would say that 09IIIB is likely to be closer to be somewhere between 052C and 052D in terms of its relative competitiveness to other global SSN classes, and to other global DDG classes, respectively.

09V, could very well be somewhere between 052D and 055.


If we see large scale production of 09IIIB, then it might suggest that it is somewhat more competitive than that -- but at this stage I would be surprised if they built more than 4-6 of them in short order, and instead expect 09V to replace it fully (in the same way that we saw a short production run of the improved 052C restarts before they were fully replaced by 052D and then 055).
 

SEAD

Junior Member
Registered Member
To throw my hat in the ring as someone well acquainted with RAND and other similar think tanks, there isn’t much serious consideration within them of nuclear response to a Carrier’s destruction. Much of the literature published was exploratory, and was in the context of a much weaker China that couldn’t meaningfully respond to the escalation. I haven’t met a single soul who calls themself an SME on WESTPAC force employment and threat systems who would want to escalate to such a degree.
For China a simple way to solve the problem is just increase the number of warheads aiming at US to >1000. I believe they are doing it.
 

Tempest

New Member
Registered Member
I wish this was true. I don't advocate what I do because I like it, I do so because there's no other option. China doesn't have bases in Mexico and LatAm where it can generate a large volume of fire against US targets like factories and shipyards. It has to compensate for that by making what little volume it can generate count for a lot, and that means nuclear weapons of around 1kt yield (around the scale of the Beirut Explosion). Simple arithmetic shows that it takes 2,000 500kg bombs to have the same explosive yield (although, in practice 2,000 bombs would be far more destructive since they would be spread out). Plinking these targets with a few SLCMs - which would take valuable PLAN subs away from the western Pacific theatre - and HGVs just won't cut it.

I think something that's lost from all this is that I intend this as a deterrent. I would consider my idea's mission accomplished if it prevents the US from attacking military-industrial targets in China.
Believe it or not, even despite my job, I do actually quite respect this position. From a sheerly detached point of view devoid of all other variables, it is the correct approach actually.

However.

Reality isn’t quite so sporting as to allow only one set of variables in a vacuum. One of the most critical variables involved in this is the fact that, while it has plenty of its own issues, the US is still - to a reasonable degree- beholden to public sentiment. Everyday Americans are fairly bloodthirsty when it comes to how we think about war, because it’s a far off thing that most of us never experience. An attack on the PRC mainland is seen as an obvious, just course of action whereas an attack on CONUS infrastructure (or really on “core” or “deemed safe” US territory, assets, etc) - military or otherwise - is seen as abhorrent on a scale that can only be described as biblical. Attacks on the continental US are consistently met with gargantuan bipartisan support for extraordinarily aggressive responses. Pearl Harbor got us into WW2, and 9/11 was the opening shot in the GWOT. Even as far back as the USS Maine, the American public cried for blood at the (false) news of a Spanish attack on an ***American!*** asset in “our” sphere of influence.

Thus, while conventional strikes on CONUS would be manageable (if extraordinarily escalatory, due to both sides getting a vote, reasonable or not) - a nuclear (tactical or otherwise) strike of any size or character would be immediately turned into a quasi-religious in fanaticism cassus-belli to draw blood. It is not realistically possible for the US GOV to resist the sheer weight of true public demand for overwhelming and decisive response across party, state, and ideological lines.

Does it make sense for the US to climb that escalation ladder? No. However, I can say with a high degree of confidence that we will. There currently exist vanishingly few operational schema involving nuclear first use against even austere American assets or installations that don’t call for prompt, symmetrical retaliation.

*This* is why people are telling you that using nukes as “just another weapon” is lunacy. Because while in a detached sense, they may well be, in a real sense - the use of nuclear weapons **will** open up Pandora’s box, no matter how well you personally are able to see that it isn’t reasonable for it to do so.
 

Mohsin77

Senior Member
Registered Member
This of course is ignoring the very real possibility that the US would respond with strategic nuclear exchange from the outset in which case both sides will lose.

That's not a possibility, it is a certainty, because the first strike was also strategic.

Nuking industrial targets within enemy territory is by definition a strategic nuclear strike.

It would be DEFCON 1, and cities will turn to glass and ash.

Again, let's be very clear about what you guys are talking about here.
 

Blitzo

Lieutenant General
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That's not a possibility, it is a certainty, because the first strike was also strategic.

Nuking industrial targets within enemy territory is by definition a strategic nuclear strike.

It would be DEFCON 1, and cities will turn to glass and ash.

Again, let's be very clear about what you guys are talking about here.

I was being somewhat technical for the sake of the discussion and because I used the word "strategic" to mean counter value (targeting military production leans much closer to counter force than counter value in my view) -- but certainly in a real world setting, the rapid end destination will be virtually guaranteed strategic nuclear exchange, after the kind of strike that Zeak envisions.
 

montyp165

Junior Member
If one looks on the Reagan era notions of nuclear conflict, the likelihood of a US preemptive nuclear attack would always be a greater probability than Chinese use of nukes on both a military and political level, and given the growing level of political instability in the US that likelihood will only increase with following administrations. As such, China's counterforce position needs to be predicated on ensuring that any such action by the US will inevitably lead to their total destruction first.
 

FairAndUnbiased

Brigadier
Registered Member
Believe it or not, even despite my job, I do actually quite respect this position. From a sheerly detached point of view devoid of all other variables, it is the correct approach actually.

However.

Reality isn’t quite so sporting as to allow only one set of variables in a vacuum. One of the most critical variables involved in this is the fact that, while it has plenty of its own issues, the US is still - to a reasonable degree- beholden to public sentiment. Everyday Americans are fairly bloodthirsty when it comes to how we think about war, because it’s a far off thing that most of us never experience. An attack on the PRC mainland is seen as an obvious, just course of action whereas an attack on CONUS infrastructure (or really on “core” or “deemed safe” US territory, assets, etc) - military or otherwise - is seen as abhorrent on a scale that can only be described as biblical. Attacks on the continental US are consistently met with gargantuan bipartisan support for extraordinarily aggressive responses. Pearl Harbor got us into WW2, and 9/11 was the opening shot in the GWOT. Even as far back as the USS Maine, the American public cried for blood at the (false) news of a Spanish attack on an ***American!*** asset in “our” sphere of influence.

Thus, while conventional strikes on CONUS would be manageable (if extraordinarily escalatory, due to both sides getting a vote, reasonable or not) - a nuclear (tactical or otherwise) strike of any size or character would be immediately turned into a quasi-religious in fanaticism cassus-belli to draw blood. It is not realistically possible for the US GOV to resist the sheer weight of true public demand for overwhelming and decisive response across party, state, and ideological lines.

Does it make sense for the US to climb that escalation ladder? No. However, I can say with a high degree of confidence that we will. There currently exist vanishingly few operational schema involving nuclear first use against even austere American assets or installations that don’t call for prompt, symmetrical retaliation.

*This* is why people are telling you that using nukes as “just another weapon” is lunacy. Because while in a detached sense, they may well be, in a real sense - the use of nuclear weapons **will** open up Pandora’s box, no matter how well you personally are able to see that it isn’t reasonable for it to do so.
Which is why a strategic arsenal capable of wiping both them and their allies is needed, so there will be no illusions. They can get as mad as they want but if they push the button then the whole world gets sent back to medieval times and China wins by default in medieval times.
 

Tempest

New Member
Registered Member
This assumes that the US is waiting for China to use tactical nuclear weapons first so that it feels permitted to use its own. I'm sure you're familiar with the criminal record the US calls a history, when did it ever hesitate to do something it felt was in its interest and it could get away with it? When China reaches the point in its military development when its regional conventional overmatch is clear, the US will equip its submarines and bombers will tactical nuclear weapons and use them at will.

We don't even have to go that far. Trump had a proposal to equip SSBNs with new tactical nuclear missiles. Biden recently defunded it but that's just back-and-forth haggling. It's going to get adopted eventually without a single iota of the hesitation you display. The US seems fine with threatening China with tactical nuclear weapons - I feel fine as well and want to threaten them right back in exactly the same way.

The US also had a policy of using tactical nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union in the early Cold War (The First Offset). Once again, where's the hesitation?

You misunderstood me, I don't advocate the use of tactical nuclear weapons against US treaty allies like Japan if their territory is used to launch attacks against the Chinese homeland, I advocate their total obliteration. The US, being armed with strategic nuclear weapons, can't be attacked in this way; Japan can. The US can huff and puff all it wants about treaties and nuclear umbrellas, but will it go through with it on the day? Will it retaliate when it knows that doing so will lead to its destruction? No.

My proposals, quite aside from the risks they entail, are barbaric and evil - but that's what one must be when one has an enemy like the US. These people need to understand that Chinese territory is inviolable and what the consequences of messing with it are.

I've said it before and I'll say it again, the US would adopt a posture like mine without hesitation. The moment America feels sure China would defeat it in a conventional conflict in the western Pacific is the moment the US deploys tactical nuclear weapons on every platform that can host them. No hesitation.

Finally, having conventional overmatch and a potent strategic deterrence that is primarily counter value in nature is having an escalation ladder with missing rungs. There should be parity between China and the US at the strategic level at minimum. Counter value or counter force is just a detail to be worked out later. More importantly, if the US has an overmatch at the tactical nuclear level then it has escalation dominance since it can drag the conflict up into levels where China would have no response.

This has to be addressed whether or not you like my ideas about tactical nuclear weapons on enemy homelands. That's just a detail, ceding a critical part of the escalation ladder isn't.

No, absolutely not. The geography and basing of US forces is exactly what we're trying to change, not an immutable given. As I said, if China has the conventional capacity to rout the US quickly enough that it suffers marginal damage, then all's well that ends well. But it's never going to be that clean because the US won't hesitate to use nuclear weapons if it faces conventional defeat. What then?

If China pushes the US back to Hawaii and the US can still generate inordinate force from Hawaii, then Hawaii has to get handled. China must seize the US's Pacific holdings and use them to project force against the US homeland if the US is doing the same to China. Only perfect symmetry is an acceptable state of affairs. If the US has n submarines and m stealth bombers conducting x attacks against China, then China better have n submarines and m stealth bombers conducting x attacks against the US.

Only those assets near China and its SLOCs are relevant. US troops in Europe are meaningless militarily, at best they can be used to exert political pressure on European countries to sanction China. That would be a hit in the pocketbook, but the war we're considering is long past that and China in the future won't require any critical technological inputs from Europe or anywhere else. If anything, those US troops are pinned in Europe since their withdrawal leaves the field open to Russia.

For SLOC protection, I have in mind that China would be able to base assets in the Indian Ocean and into the Mediterranean.

No, I just need China to be a comprehensive peer of the US and I think that's eminently achievable. I think China's going to be much more than just a US peer, but peer will do for the purposes of this discussion.
This is disconcerting to read. You’re very much approaching this from one and only one side of the equation. Chinese soil may well be inviolable, big whoop. Not much Chinese soil left to violate anyways if Chinese overreaction and callous, wanton nuclear weapon employment results (and it will) in strategic nuclear exchange.

The US does not want to get in a nuclear war. I’m more than happy to attest to that on behalf of the entire IC and the entire military OA field here. Absolute *nobody* thinks nuclear war is a good idea, short of literal suicidal people and abjectly delusional madmen. The reason why the US would not use nuclear weapons first is simple: doing so would obviously prompt an equivalent or greater reaction from the PRC. If the US decides to try its hand at nuking an SCS island, well the PLA certainly wouldn’t have any restraint from doing the very same to Guam or to much of Okinawa. This duality, the notion that “if we both get into a strategic nuclear exchange, neither of us will be better off, so we should avoid it as much as we possibly can” forms the absolute bedrock upon which all nuclear strategy rests on.

You can call your notional nuclear war fighting an “evil” or “barbaric” idea all you want. You won’t find me having moral qualms with anything to do with war. After all, my entire career is to create analytically, mathematically “optimal” force employment schema that kill as many human beings and destroy as much valuable fruit of human labor as possible in as short of a period of time as possible. All of war is abhorrent. My critique lies in that your proposal is downright **bad**. To “obliterate” Japan should it host strike aircraft would **immediately** alienate the entire world, result in gargantuan effort to destroy China (far beyond anything resembling what would happen in a non nuclear scenario), and would prompt nuclear release from US forces due to the PRC clearly being willing and able to existentially threaten US partners as well as the US itself with nuclear annihilation.

To give an example of what it would be like, imagine if the United States were to initiate hostilities by blowing the 3 gorges dam, threatened to nuke North Korea if it hampered USAF-K operations, and then actually did so, eviscerating the entire country, when North Korea ignored the warning. ***Obviously*** China would be forced into a position where nuclear retaliation is the only option. Just as much as you feel that “uoooh our soil is untouchable guys we’re super serious,” the United States feels the *exact same way*. Just as China would not let itself be cowed by threats of tactical nuclear strikes by the US if it were to move on Taiwan, so too would the US absolutely never consider allowing it’s policy to be dictated by threats from a nation actively nuking the US homeland.

I think your fundamental misconception here is one of empathy. You’re unable to see the US as anything other than big scary mean angry country which will be valiantly made to stand down in the face of overwhelming and resolute PRC commitment to total territorial integrity. However, while we’re certainly not sunshine and rainbows, you simply *must* stop and actually consider the other side when you’re considering these things. Again, no matter how much the PRC seeks to “teach consequences” or how much you wish to approach this from a “values” centric position, it won’t change the fact that the US will undoubtedly and overwhelmingly respond to nuclear weapon usage on US soil with nukes of their own.

The US will not begin to haphazardly start playing atomic frisbee with Chinese military assets because it is losing. We know that just as we would respond to nuclear weapons with nuclear weapons, so too would China respond to nuclear weapons with nuclear weapons. The moment one side reaches into that box, both will continue digging deeper and deeper until the total capability of both are employed, which is in no way in either side’s interest. For all their greed and corruption, US politicians are very much self interested, and seek to retain wealth and power. Condemning the entire world to nuclear Armageddon does not a good time make, least of all for the elites.
 

Mohsin77

Senior Member
Registered Member
but certainly in a real world setting, the rapid end destination will be virtually guaranteed strategic nuclear exchange

And as such, this issue should be separated from discussions on conventional war.

It is a black hole which has already derailed the thread.
 

Blitzo

Lieutenant General
Staff member
Super Moderator
Registered Member
This is disconcerting to read. You’re very much approaching this from one and only one side of the equation. Chinese soil may well be inviolable, big whoop. Not much Chinese soil left to violate anyways if Chinese overreaction and callous, wanton nuclear weapon employment results (and it will) in strategic nuclear exchange.

The US does not want to get in a nuclear war. I’m more than happy to attest to that on behalf of the entire IC and the entire military OA field here. Absolute *nobody* thinks nuclear war is a good idea, short of literal suicidal people and abjectly delusional madmen. The reason why the US would not use nuclear weapons first is simple: doing so would obviously prompt an equivalent or greater reaction from the PRC. If the US decides to try its hand at nuking an SCS island, well the PLA certainly wouldn’t have any restraint from doing the very same to Guam or to much of Okinawa. This duality, the notion that “if we both get into a strategic nuclear exchange, neither of us will be better off, so we should avoid it as much as we possibly can” forms the absolute bedrock upon which all nuclear strategy rests on.

You can call your notional nuclear war fighting an “evil” or “barbaric” idea all you want. You won’t find me having moral qualms with anything to do with war. After all, my entire career is to create analytically, mathematically “optimal” force employment schema that kill as many human beings and destroy as much valuable fruit of human labor as possible in as short of a period of time as possible. All of war is abhorrent. My critique lies in that your proposal is downright **bad**. To “obliterate” Japan should it host strike aircraft would **immediately** alienate the entire world, result in gargantuan effort to destroy China (far beyond anything resembling what would happen in a non nuclear scenario), and would prompt nuclear release from US forces due to the PRC clearly being willing and able to existentially threaten US partners as well as the US itself with nuclear annihilation.

To give an example of what it would be like, imagine if the United States were to initiate hostilities by blowing the 3 gorges dam, threatened to nuke North Korea if it hampered USAF-K operations, and then actually did so, eviscerating the entire country, when North Korea ignored the warning. ***Obviously*** China would be forced into a position where nuclear retaliation is the only option. Just as much as you feel that “uoooh our soil is untouchable guys we’re super serious,” the United States feels the *exact same way*. Just as China would not let itself be cowed by threats of tactical nuclear strikes by the US if it were to move on Taiwan, so too would the US absolutely never consider allowing it’s policy to be dictated by threats from a nation actively nuking the US homeland.

I think your fundamental misconception here is one of empathy. You’re unable to see the US as anything other than big scary mean angry country which will be valiantly made to stand down in the face of overwhelming and resolute PRC commitment to total territorial integrity. However, while we’re certainly not sunshine and rainbows, you simply *must* stop and actually consider the other side when you’re considering these things. Again, no matter how much the PRC seeks to “teach consequences” or how much you wish to approach this from a “values” centric position, it won’t change the fact that the US will undoubtedly and overwhelmingly respond to nuclear weapon usage on US soil with nukes of their own.

The US will not begin to haphazardly start playing atomic frisbee with Chinese military assets because it is losing. We know that just as we would respond to nuclear weapons with nuclear weapons, so too would China respond to nuclear weapons with nuclear weapons. The moment one side reaches into that box, both will continue digging deeper and deeper until the total capability of both are employed, which is in no way in either side’s interest. For all their greed and corruption, US politicians are very much self interested, and seek to retain wealth and power. Condemning the entire world to nuclear Armageddon does not a good time make, least of all for the elites.

What Zeak desires is a form of strategic equality, where the US is as equally incapable or capable of striking targets on Chinese soil (in this case, with conventional means) as China is incapable or capable of doing to US soil (again, with conventional means).

His argument is that the threat of tactical nuclear weapons on US soil could deter the US from striking targets on Chinese soil, which of course as multiple people have argued including myself, is either a cheque that China is unable to cash if push comes to shove -- or alternatively it is the express bus to strategic nuclear armageddon if China does somehow make the strange decision to use tactical nuclear weapons against US soil.

Needless to say, the strategic equality that Zeak desires is not something achievable in the foreseeable future by virtue of the long term peacetime geostrategic positioning of PLA and US forces in the region and the world.


And as such, this issue should be separated from discussions on conventional war.

It is a black hole which has already derailed the thread.

I think the topic of how conventional strikes could be conducted, defended against -- and also deterred -- sits within the purview of this thread topic.

But I think there is a constructive resolution to the discussion about why threatening to use tactical nukes is not feasible, which can help to set this proposal aside so it doesn't get brought up again either in this thread or other threads.
 
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