It isn't in China's interests to play in America's hand by falling into a conflict with India. The fundamental reason Sino-Indian relations have been poisoned is through British malice via the London-drawn border lines. Getting bogged down by Western divide and conquer a second time in South Asia at this critical period of challenging Western hegemony would be potentially catastrophic.
That said, there is a non-zero chance that the far future will see conflict between China and India. The latter, after all, is a lower riparian country and an often forgotten tension in South Asia is that of water usage rights. As long term climate change renders South Asia more and more prone to heat waves, water demand on the sub-continent will significantly increase.
One key facet of the Indian geostrategic aim in claiming Aksai Chin is that it can act as a springboard on the Tibetan plateau in projecting onto and potentially seizing the Third Pole. All of the great rivers of continental South, South-East and East Asia (the Indus, the Brahmaputra, the Mekong, the Chang Jiang/Yangtze, the Huang He/Yellow) all have their source from China's Third Pole. While China's maritime geography, constrained by the first island chain, is unfortunate, the Third Pole makes China's western geography supremely advantageous through its upper riparian control.
Even if India refrains from actual invasion of the Third Pole, the mere threat that the Indian control of Aksai Chin poses alone could act as leverage in its water rights negotiations with China.
This is why, after half a century since the Sino-Indian war, India still has not "seen reason" and buried the hatchet with China by settling the claims in the Himalayas. This is also why the chances of any settlement on the matter in the near term is less than optimistic. With no settlement on the border issue, achieving stable and positive Sino-Indian relations is also unlikely given that repeats of clashes like Galwan could be incited by the Indian side at any time, tanking any reconciliation efforts like Galwan did to the past mildly tepid detente of the 2010s.
For China's part, it can only anticipate that the Indian challenge is a long term threat to the Third Pole that will only increase as time goes on. For now, in the midst of challenging American hegemony, China is studiously avoiding the matter as overtly antagonizing India would firmly entrench it in QUAD to China's detriment and risk giving Indian jingoists the impression they could potentially settle the matter now while China is bogged down with the West.
However, at that time, China should make it emphatic that any encroachment onto the Third Pole (of which Aksai Chin is the first slice of the salami) is a scenario that would merit nuclear reprisal onto India and that the only way to settle India's water usage security will always be through the channel of dialogue with China.
That said, there is a non-zero chance that the far future will see conflict between China and India. The latter, after all, is a lower riparian country and an often forgotten tension in South Asia is that of water usage rights. As long term climate change renders South Asia more and more prone to heat waves, water demand on the sub-continent will significantly increase.
One key facet of the Indian geostrategic aim in claiming Aksai Chin is that it can act as a springboard on the Tibetan plateau in projecting onto and potentially seizing the Third Pole. All of the great rivers of continental South, South-East and East Asia (the Indus, the Brahmaputra, the Mekong, the Chang Jiang/Yangtze, the Huang He/Yellow) all have their source from China's Third Pole. While China's maritime geography, constrained by the first island chain, is unfortunate, the Third Pole makes China's western geography supremely advantageous through its upper riparian control.
Even if India refrains from actual invasion of the Third Pole, the mere threat that the Indian control of Aksai Chin poses alone could act as leverage in its water rights negotiations with China.
This is why, after half a century since the Sino-Indian war, India still has not "seen reason" and buried the hatchet with China by settling the claims in the Himalayas. This is also why the chances of any settlement on the matter in the near term is less than optimistic. With no settlement on the border issue, achieving stable and positive Sino-Indian relations is also unlikely given that repeats of clashes like Galwan could be incited by the Indian side at any time, tanking any reconciliation efforts like Galwan did to the past mildly tepid detente of the 2010s.
For China's part, it can only anticipate that the Indian challenge is a long term threat to the Third Pole that will only increase as time goes on. For now, in the midst of challenging American hegemony, China is studiously avoiding the matter as overtly antagonizing India would firmly entrench it in QUAD to China's detriment and risk giving Indian jingoists the impression they could potentially settle the matter now while China is bogged down with the West.
However, at that time, China should make it emphatic that any encroachment onto the Third Pole (of which Aksai Chin is the first slice of the salami) is a scenario that would merit nuclear reprisal onto India and that the only way to settle India's water usage security will always be through the channel of dialogue with China.
