PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency

montyp165

Junior Member
Re: PLAN Stragety in the Taiwan Strait

Are you saying that an invasion would be less destructive and kill less civilians than a blockade?

Also, your knowledge in the area of amphibious warfare could use a little more background. May I suggest a book called "Seapower In The Falklands"? That will tell you a bit about the challenges the British faced trying to land... 3,000 troops... against an inexperienced, but well equipped, enemy.

You had some ideas about what platforms could used to transport an invasion force. Try this-come up with what would be needed to fight on land and win, their numbers, how quickly it would need to be ashore, what it takes to supply them... and then work backwards and see what shipping could supply such a force. Don't forget the logistics for the ships. They need supplies too. And remember... they can only unload so fast.
And oh yeah... the world's most powerful navy-and their allies-may decide to attack your shipping before they unload... not to mention the enemy ashore.

Now you'll understand the depth of the challenge. Quite daunting.

There is a reason why the old saying 'those who fight most vigorously also fight most humanely' exists, because a rapid end to a conflict kills fewer people than an extended fight, of which Libya today is but one extant example. As for logistics the PLA is in a much better position than almost anyone short of the US in dealing with such issues and has the proper planning for it, so I wouldn't say it is as severe a situation as some would assume.

However, that does not appear to be the point that you were trying to make. That is nearly everbody will be won over by the promise of prosperity. 40+ % even 25% is a sizeable minority who care to differ wouldn't you think?
According to the article in Wiki the number who favour independence had increased.

I wouldn't trust wiki articles on anything political to begin with, but the thing is anything can change with the right sort of circumstances, so saying something is only ever one way is a conceptual fallacy. Continuous organization efficacy is much more important long term than mere ideological persuasion, both on the small and global scale.
 
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Hendrik_2000

Lieutenant General
First posted by Xinhui from CDF.As I said before it is futile for Taiwan to enter into arm race with China. Eventually the larger economy will win


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By Associated Press, Updated: Monday, May 9, 9:51 PM

TAIPEI, Taiwan — Taiwan is delaying the purchase of Blackhawk helicopters and Patriot air defense systems from the U.S. because of budgetary problems, a lawmaker said Tuesday.

The statement by Lin Yu-fang of the ruling Nationalist Party highlights concerns that Taiwan’s military has insufficient funds for its major initiatives, including a costly change to an all-volunteer force
.


The defense ministry is either delaying buying new items or postponing payments for existing programs due to the shortfall, Lin said. The procurement of six Patriot missile systems has been pushed back from 2014 to 2017 and 60 Blackhawk helicopters from 2016 to 2019 or 2020, he said.

Taiwan’s Defense Ministry had no immediate comment on Lin’s remarks.

The U.S. remains Taiwan’s most important strategic partner and is required by law to provide Taiwan with weapons of a defensive character.

Senior officials have expressed concern that the government is struggling to meet its planned schedule to terminate conscription and turn the military into an all-volunteer service in 2015 because of a budgetary shortfall amounting to several billion dollars.

Taiwan has an annual defense budget of $12.92 billion, but rival China is spending $92.57 billion on its military this year.

China claims Taiwan as its own, although the two sides split amid civil war in 1949. Beijing is determined to unify with Taiwan, by force if necessary.

Copyright 2011 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.












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Geographer

Junior Member
I'd like to make a comment regarding the cost of an all-volunteer military. An all-volunteer military may demand a higher defense budget it is cheaper on the overall Taiwan economy for two reasons. One is that there is an opportunity cost to drafting civilians into the army. A civilian that could be earning a salary and developing their career has to delay his career to serve in the military. Plus a conscript military disproportionately affects young men, that is not fair. It is more fair and efficient to tax the entire population to pay salaries high enough to attract volunteers.

The second reason is that a conscript army has short stints of service and thus the military must keep retraining new troops. Even wave of departing conscripts takes with it the training and institutional knowledge it gained in service. An all-volunteer military retains their training and knowledge for a longer time and reduces training costs.
 

Hendrik_2000

Lieutenant General
The idea that US can pick up and destroy missile based in the interior of China is just ludicrous . Here is an excellent analysis by James Holmes
James Holmes is an associate professor of strategy at the US Naval War College
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Writing in Orbis, the journal of the Foreign Policy Research Institute at the University of Pennsylvania, former American Institute in Taiwan chairman Richard Bush takes stock of cross-strait affairs. Bush issues a guardedly optimistic verdict on the island’s future while observing that ‘dysfunctional politics’ hampers efforts to meet pressing challenges. In passing, he speculates about ‘one area in which China may be showing restraint—the deployment of short-range ballistic missiles,’ or SRBMs. As evidence, he proffers the Pentagon’s annual reports on Chinese military power. Last year, the authors refrained from upping their estimate of the number of missiles positioned opposite Taiwan. They pegged the total at 1,050-1,150 birds in both the 2009 and 2010 reports. (Spokesmen in Taipei typically give a higher figure. 1300 is an estimate bandied about on the island.)

Bush maintains that the evident pause in new Chinese Second Artillery Corps SRBM deployments ‘is less significant than it seems.’ Just so. He notes that People’s Liberation Army (PLA) rocketeers have an increasing array of cruise missiles at their disposal. For example, the PLA added some 100 cruise missiles to the inventory in 2009-2010, a sum not included in SRBM figures. Bush also points out that ‘China’s ability to frustrate US intervention to defend Taiwan increases apace,’ meaning that Beijing is increasingly comfortable with its strategic position vis-à-vis prospective foes. Why add surplus capacity? And the Second Artillery has continued upgrading the quality of its missile force, boosting its birds’ accuracy and lethality. In short, the PLA has apparently kept augmenting its combat capability despite the lull in fielding new SRBMs. There’s more to combat strength than raw numbers of weapons.

Let me add to Bush’s sound military analysis. The Defence Department’s China reports usually include a map of Asia depicting the ranges of various ballistic missiles fielded by the PLA. Colour-coded swathes of the map show the areas adjoining China’s borders that can be reached by missiles stationed along the frontier. The width of this belt equals the range of a given missile. This is an excellent way to chart the growing capability of such weaponry as the Second Artillery’s new CSS-5 antiship ballistic missile, or ASBM. A glance at the map reveals that truck-fired ASBMs positioned along the frontier could strike well beyond the ‘first island chain,’ throughout the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca, and well into the Indian Ocean. Indeed, the entire Bay of Bengal and parts of the northern Arabian Sea now fall within the ASBM threat arc.

But the Pentagon’s map misleads in a way.

That is, the map implies that Chinese missiles are located at fixed sites around the periphery. In reality, they can remain well inland while retaining their ability to strike at important targets, whether on Taiwan, at US bases in Japan, or on the high seas. If Chinese commanders contented themselves with menacing shipping in the waters immediately surrounding Taiwan, they could do so from ASBM launchers positioned hundreds of miles inland. Or, they could have it both ways. Since mobile ballistic missiles are mobile, the Second Artillery can reconfigure its missile deployments with relative ease. This increasingly flexible capability means that the PLA could conduct strikes on Taiwan with far more birds than the SRBM figures suggest. The force will only become more flexible as Chinese weapons engineers refine their hardware, further extending the range—and thus the combat punch—of PLA missiles.

PLA commanders derive a host of benefits from holding part of the missile force well inland. Concealment is an obvious advantage. Detecting and targeting mobile launchers within vast territories is a challenge the US military has never fully solved—witness the largely fruitless ‘Scud hunt’ in western Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War, or the minimal damage inflicted on Serbian ground forces in Kosovo during NATO’s 1999 clash with Slobodan Milosevic’s regime. China’s sheer geographic size magnifies the survivability of the force. By exploiting China’s massive strategic depth, furthermore, PLA commanders can play head games with antagonists. Striking at coastal sites is one thing for an American president—sending US warplanes into action over China’s deep continental interior, or even ordering cruise-missile raids into the hinterland from US Navy warships, is another thing entirely.

In effect, Beijing can dare an enemy to attack targets well inland—and risk escalating a limited maritime conflict to a full-blown war whose perils and costs could far outstrip that enemy’s presumably limited political goals. The PLA could deter intervention through this simple expedient. Bush, it seems, may understate the scope of the Chinese missile threat to Taiwan and its friends. Along with many US and Asian strategists, moreover, he may be setting a false standard by which to measure the Chinese threat to the island. As the Second Artillery improves the range of its missile force, PLA commanders could withdraw part—or eventually all—of the SRBM force from opposite Taiwan without sacrificing much striking power. Beijing could fan impressions that peace is breaking out in the Taiwan Strait while preserving and expanding its military options. That’s a win-win solution for Beijing.


While maps enlighten, then, they can also obscure subtle operational and strategic realities.

James Holmes is an associate professor of strategy at the US Naval War College. The views voiced here are his alone.
 

cirvine11

New Member
From the Seattle Post Intelligencer. I'm not yet allowed to post a link.
Anyway-action (ASBM) meets reaction (Carrier based armed strike drones). Already the ASBM is bringing danger to mainland China. There is no alternative to sea based power projection driving the enemy from the seas.

"
YOKOSUKA, Japan (AP) — The U.S. is developing aircraft carrier-based drones that could provide a crucial edge as it tries to counter China's military rise.

American officials have been tightlipped about where the unmanned armed planes might be used, but a top Navy officer has told The Associated Press that some would likely be deployed in Asia.

"They will play an integral role in our future operations in this region," predicted Vice Adm. Scott Van Buskirk, commander of the U.S. 7th Fleet, which covers most of the Pacific and Indian oceans.

Land-based drones are in wide use in the war in Afghanistan, but sea-based versions will take several more years to develop. Northrop Grumman conducted a first-ever test flight — still on land — earlier this year.

Van Buskirk didn't mention China specifically, but military analysts agree the drones could offset some of China's recent advances, notably its work on a "carrier-killer" missile.

"Chinese military modernization is the major long-term threat that the U.S. must prepare for in the Asia-Pacific region, and robotic vehicles — aerial and subsurface — are increasingly critical to countering that potential threat," said Patrick Cronin, a senior analyst with the Washington-based Center for New American Security.

China is decades away from building a military as strong as America's, but it is developing air, naval and missile capabilities that could challenge U.S. supremacy in the Pacific — and with it, America's ability to protect important shipping lanes and allies such as Japan and South Korea.

China maintains it does not have offensive intentions and is only protecting its own interests: The shipping lanes are also vital to China's export-dependent economy. There are potential flash points, though, notably Taiwan and clusters of tiny islands that both China and other Asian nations claim as their territory.

The U.S. Navy's pursuit of drones is a recognition of the need for new weapons and strategies to deal not only with China but a changing military landscape generally.

"Carrier-based unmanned aircraft systems have tremendous potential, especially in increasing the range and persistence of our intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance operations, as well as our ability to strike targets quickly," Van Buskirk said at the 7th Fleet's headquarters in Yokosuka, Japan.

His fleet boasts one carrier — the USS George Washington — along with about 60 other ships and 40,000 sailors and Marines.

Experts say the drones could be used on any of the 11 U.S. carriers worldwide and are not being developed exclusively as a counterbalance to China.

But China's reported progress in missile development appears to make the need for them more urgent.

The DF 21D "carrier killer" missile is designed for launch from land with enough accuracy to hit a moving aircraft carrier at a distance of more than 900 miles (1,500 kilometers). Though still unproven — and some analysts say overrated — no other country has such a weapon.

Current Navy fighter jets can only operate about 500 nautical miles (900 kilometers) from a target, leaving a carrier within range of the Chinese missile.

Drones would have an unrefueled combat radius of 1,500 nautical miles (2,780 kilometers) and could remain airborne for 50 to 100 hours — versus the 10 hour maximum for a pilot, according to a 2008 paper by analysts Tom Ehrhard and Robert Work at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Work is now an undersecretary of the Navy.

"Introducing a new aircraft that promises to let the strike group do its work from beyond the maximum effective firing range of the anti-ship ballistic missile — or beyond its range entirely — represents a considerable boost in defensive potential for the carrier strike group," said James Holmes of the U.S. Naval War College.

Northrop Grumman has a six-year, $635.8 million contract to develop two of the planes, with more acquisitions expected if they work. A prototype of its X-47B took a maiden 29-minute flight in February at Edwards Air Force Base in California. Initial testing on carriers is planned for 2013.

Other makers including Boeing and Lockheed are also in the game. General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc. — the maker of the Predator drones used in the Afghan war — carried out wind tunnel tests in February. Spokeswoman Kimberly Kasitz said it was too early to divulge further details.

Some experts warn carrier-based drones are still untested and stress that Chinese advances have not rendered carriers obsolete.

"Drones, if they work, are just the next tech leap. As long as there is a need for tactical aviation launched from the sea, carriers will be useful weapons of war," said Michael McDevitt, a former commandant of the National War College in Washington, D.C., and a retired rear admiral whose commands included an aircraft carrier battle group.

Some analysts also note that China may be reluctant to instigate any fighting that could interfere with its trade.

Nan Li, an expert at the U.S. Naval War College's China Maritime Studies Institute, doubts China would try to attack a U.S. carrier.

"I am a skeptic of such an interpretation of Chinese strategy," he said. "But I do think the X-47B may still be a useful preventive capability for worst-case scenarios."

The Air Force and Navy both sponsored a project to develop carrier-based drones in the early 2000s, but the Air Force pulled out in 2005, leaving the Navy to fund the research.

Adm. Gary Roughhead, chief of naval operations, said last summer that the current goal of getting a handful of unmanned bombers in action by 2018 is "too damn slow."

"Seriously, we've got to have a sense of urgency about getting this stuff out there," he told a conference. "It could fundamentally change how we think of naval aviation."
 

Afrikkkan101

Just Hatched
Registered Member
*If* China were to invade Taiwan, what kind of amphibious force would it need?

How big would it have to be? I don't know much about these kind of operations, but they are the most fascinating.. Amphibious warfare is the rarest, most complex kind. I have done a lot of searching, but couldn't really find anything on this.. Taiwan is a pretty big island with a population of 23,000,000. Taiwan has 290,000 active soldiers, modern equipment, with support from the West... I was just interested if China were to go for a amphibious assault, what kind of naval force would be required for such an event? China is building 3 LHD, 2 LPD, and has 26 LST in its arsenal... I don't think that would be enough.. If you had to guess what kind of ampih fleet would be required, what would it look like on paper?
 

EDIATH

Junior Member
Re: PLAN Stragety in the Taiwan Strait

Are you saying that an invasion would be less destructive and kill less civilians than a blockade?

Also, your knowledge in the area of amphibious warfare could use a little more background. May I suggest a book called "Seapower In The Falklands"? That will tell you a bit about the challenges the British faced trying to land... 3,000 troops... against an inexperienced, but well equipped, enemy.

You had some ideas about what platforms could used to transport an invasion force. Try this-come up with what would be needed to fight on land and win, their numbers, how quickly it would need to be ashore, what it takes to supply them... and then work backwards and see what shipping could supply such a force. Don't forget the logistics for the ships. They need supplies too. And remember... they can only unload so fast.
And oh yeah... the world's most powerful navy-and their allies-may decide to attack your shipping before they unload... not to mention the enemy ashore.

Now you'll understand the depth of the challenge. Quite daunting.

Two other considerations apply before one uses Falkland as a simply analogy here. There is distance, the difference between two scenarios is pretty obvious, therefore a more appopriate analogy here would be Normandy instead of Falkland. Also GB did not have much time preparing for the Falkland war, while PLA has been spending half of a century preparing for crossing the 100-mile-strait at the door step. Arguably ROC has been equally committed to defending the position, however, the offensive party always leaves the defenders guessing about their plans, a huge advantage in wars, which is further augmented by modern methods.

Considering the greatly enhanced firepower, high speed vehicles, and improved logistic means employed for modern amphibious warfares, the relatively narrow Taiwan strait may not provide much obstacle against a massive landing force after all.
 

delft

Brigadier
There will be no invasion of Taiwan unless the Taiwan government does something really stupid. They will know when they do that, so they cannot be surprised by the timing of the invasion.
 

Mr T

Senior Member
Re: PLAN Stragety in the Taiwan Strait

Not if the other 50% will spy on you.

The idea that 50% of the population would spy for China in the aftermath of an invasion is fanciful. Sure a couple would, some people always do. But the vast majority of Taiwanese would be hostile, either openly or in secret.

Ireland is no comparison to Taiwan. there is no religion fanatism ever in Chinese history.

You clearly have no understanding of the Troubles. It wasn't over religion, it was over political repression. Religion became a convenient dividing line.

Chinese are practical people and not ideoloque.

1. Who said that Taiwanese were Chinese?
2. If Chinese people would fight for their independence even in the face of a superior enemy, Taiwanese would do too.

Ryukyu was brutally subjugated by Satsuma clan in 1879. Fastforward do any Okinawan today still feel as citizen of Ryukyu or Citizen of Japan?

You're comparing apples to oranges. Okinawa was a small, feudal island when it was taken over. Taiwan is a large, functioning modern state with democratic elections. You can't compare the two. But if you want to ride out over a century of internal conflict and all the suffering that will come with it, it's on your head.

I don't believe there is any chance of conflict unless Taiwan people lost their mind and vote independence. They have to settle the dispute peacefully and open dialoque for eventual reunification.

Doesn't this show the problem? There won't be war if Taiwan doesn't declare independence, but in the same breath we're told Taiwan has to unify. What if Taiwan doesn't declare independence but then tells China there will be no unification?
 
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