PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency

ChongqingHotPot92 · Sep 21, 2023

Sinnavuuty said:
The naval air blockade plan for months before disembarkation seems more assertive to me, because the PLA would have strategic surprise, not during the landing, but in the preparation of the first air attacks, this allows the PLA to visualize the entire American and allied response while the Chinese contingency of Taiwan would be underway, as would the mobilization of ground units after the start of the first attacks.

The problem is that during such air-naval blockade, the PLA warships implementing such blockades would be extremely vulnerable to adversaries' surprise attacks, not mention the blockades would give the QUAD sufficient time to mobilise. The end result would still be a war of attrition.

Sinnavuuty · Sep 21, 2023

ChongqingHotPot92 said:
The problem is that during such air-naval blockade, the PLA warships implementing such blockades would be extremely vulnerable to adversaries' surprise attacks, not mention the blockades would give the QUAD sufficient time to mobilise. The end result would still be a war of attrition.

The air-naval blockade also means air support for vessels during the blockade, including creating an NFZ around the blockade of Taiwan, regardless of its magnitude. If an enemy vessel is approaching, will it be a warning target or a real target that can be attacked, if there is a need for such an act, furthermore, considering China's ISR capabilities, I highly doubt these surprise attacks, unless they are the underwater threats.

We are in a dilemma.

China will not be able to hide the pre-preparation of the attempted landing in Taiwan, as soon as this movement and concentration in China were taking place, do you really think that the QUAD will stay put, waiting for China to attack, if it really is the will of all of them go to war against China to defend Taiwan? They will also be preparing and mobilizing, which further shortens the time lag for China to conquer Taiwan, so I would highly doubt this week-long lag before the QUAD mobilizes.

As I said, we have two situations in which the QUAD will hypothetically intervene.

China carrying out all the pre-preparation for the amphibious assault and mobilization of ground units, denouncing its real intentions, this can be put in months or weeks of anticipation of recognition by the QUAD, I don't think that all the QUAD countries will stand by while China is preparing to invade Taiwan, if the intention is really to go to war against China over Taiwan.

Or

China carries out the entire air-naval blockade on Taiwan for weeks or months before landing, wearing down the entire ROCA, simultaneously waiting for the full american and allied response, which ensures the PLA manages the escalation, recognizing whether Taiwan's allies will intervene or not .

In any case, in both scenarios, the PLA would be in a war of attrition, the difference is that in the first scenario, ground units would have already been deployed to invade Taiwan and in the second scenario they would not, the contingency up to this point in this last scenario it would essentially be air-naval.

ChongqingHotPot92 · Sep 21, 2023

Sinnavuuty said:
China carries out the entire air-naval blockade on Taiwan for weeks or months before landing, wearing down the entire ROCA, simultaneously waiting for the full american and allied response, which ensures the PLA manages the escalation, recognizing whether Taiwan's allies will intervene or not .

Aha I see what you mean. Maybe the all-out incapacitation strike I mentioned earlier would have to part of the blockade then. This means the blockade would happen at the same time as PLAAF and PLARF conduct massive SEAD and standoff strikes until all ROCA's SAM units and military airports (and all ROCAF fighter jets) were put out of action. And once the SEAD/standoff strikes were successful, then use thermobarics and cluster munitions to take out the ROC ground forces (such as the armour columns stationed in Hukou and other cases) and remaining warships. Then you got the issues of Taiwan's own ballistic and cruise missiles, which could still target the Mainland's railway, roads, ports, airports, and other dual-use infrastructures. The massive missile and airstrikes against Taiwan would then happen while PLAN warships and aircrafts surround the Island.

Now, assuming all of the ROCAF, ROCN, and cruise missile units were neutralised within the first 8 hours of conflict (if PLA were successful), and the Island of Formosa becomes fully surrounded by PLAN vessels whilst Taipei still refuses to surrender albeit lacking all offensive means to fight back? By this time hundreds of thousands of both guided and unguided ordnances have been dropped on Taiwan with roughly 30,000+ ROC military and 10,000+ civilian deaths (yes, in just 8 hours, and the civilian toll could be higher given the close proximity of military bases to highly-clustered villages and apartments), (whilst the PLA loses about 30-40 warplanes, 4-5 warships, and dozens of armour vehicles/mobile missiles launchers on the Mainland to Taiwan's cruise missiles) but the ROC Government still insists on waiting for US and Japanese reinforcements to arrive.

Now you have a situation where the Taiwanese population become more determined to fight. The PLARF's conventional missiles units are running low on ammo (all DF-11s, 15s, and 16s expended). The PLARF's fighter and bomber units need to regroup in airports deep inside China to avoid surprise attacks against their former airports. On Taiwan, dozens of HF-2E and Yun Feng missile managed to survive and are waiting for orders to strike at the PLA's high-value targets. Finally, US (just reached DEFCON-2 without saying US forces would intervene), Japanese, and Aussie air units (all armed with JASSM-ERs) are being redeployed throughout the Pacific (but all within ranges to use their JASSM-ERs against China) with three countries' leaders refusing to disclose whether they would intervene militarily. PLA naval vessels west of Taiwan enforcing the blockade suddenly found themselves surrounded by unidentified submarines within torpedo ranges.

For Xi and CMC sitting in the Western Hill's command bunker, should they just declare that they have "taught the Taiwanese separatists a lesson" and call off subsequent military operations? Or proceed and risk WWIII with most of the PLAN and PLAAF risk being annihilated, while transports vessels sunk with their tanks and thousands of marines onboard?

I don't the CMC having any good options anyway. The most China could achieve is to bomb Taiwan back to the stone age, so Taiwan no longer has the economic, industrial, and military might to pursue political independence (but it still does not prevent Taiwan from unilaterally declaring independence even after being flattened). However, an amphibious conquest of Taiwan seems too suicidal to me. Maybe the mere threat of Taiwan being bombed to waste (including Taiwan's so-called silicon shield) could be a more effective deterrent against Taiwanese de jure independence as opposed to actually trying to defeat/conquer the ROC once and for all.

OTCDebunker · Sep 21, 2023

aqh said:
A lot of the hand wringing about "muh amphib operations difficult. China will never succeed" is fair if you look at warfare from WW2- Desert storm. However times have changed. To explain this further we need to understand how war was fought for most of the 20th century and how that is rapidly changing in the 21st century.

For land warfare in the 20th century there were 3 combat arms in the ground force which are : infantry, tanks/armour and artillery. This then makes 2 broad parts of land warfare that are interconnected which is : firepower and manuvere. Firepower is almost entirely done with artillery and manuvere is done with infantry and armour in conjunction.

Arty and firepower is easy to understand. Just shoot more shells more accurately then OPFOR and you can create greater effects. The initial role of arty should be to do counter battery to prevent enemy firepower (their artillery) from destroying your maneuverer elements (your tanks and infantry). If you have spare firepower left over you should use it on OPFOR manuvere elements (their armour/infantry) and attriting/fixing them - which is why for offensive pushes you should have much more arty than OPFOR as you need to not only to defang enemy arty but also make life hell for their armour and infantry. Firepower is at the rear whilst manuvere elements take a frontal role .

With regards to Manuvere elements which are armour and infantry this is where a lot of hand wringing about flexible "mission command" and whatnot comes from. You want these elements to be able to make offensive decisions on the fly whilst also being well trained in actual usage of their weapons. There are 3 steps for your manuvere elements to employ :

(1) Choose one of the 7 maneuverer unit formations :
1) Column. 2) Line. 3) wedge . 4) Echelon(left or right). 5) Vee. 6) Diamond. 7) Box.

(2) Choose a Movement Technique:
1) Traveling 2) Traveling overwatch 3) Bounding overwatch.

(3) Choose one of the 5 forms of maneuverer : 1) Frontal attack. 2) Penetration. 3) Envelopment 4) Turning movement. 5) Infiltration.

Whosever armour and infantry can cycle these 3 elements quicker and better than OPFOR will win the manuvere element.

However modern warfare is changing rapidly. Modern land warfare is effectively becoming very similar to air and naval warfare in that its becoming about a sensor-shooter complex.

The proliferation of modern sensors (drones) and prompt cheap precision fires (cheap pgms, suicide drones, HIMAR GMLRS/Excalibir) is changing modern warfare. Instead of having to wait for hundreds of thousands of shells to create effects on OPFOR and fixing them then neutralising them with manuvere the better army will be able to deploy numerous UAS's to find OPFOR and then immediately cue/direct a PGM. This should be able to be done quicker and cheaper than a logistically burdensome artillery supply chain and an expensive training regimen.

In terms of people screeching that "REEE AMPHIB OPERATIONS IMPOSSIBLE. TAIWAN NUMBA 1" they are looking at warfare through a 20th century lens. In the 20th century where the PLA wouldn't have access to very powerful sensors that can direct very cheap pgms to destroy the ROCs tank artillery etc then sure trying to land millions of shells across a hundred mile strait would be pretty difficult but the thing is China with their gargantuan ISR complex over Taiwan providing 24/7 coverage can simply cue thousands of piston based suicide drones, PHL 16 guided 370mm and the KD series pgm. They can do all of this from the comfort of the mainland without having to land a single troop in Taiwan and destroy the majority of the ROCs tanks, artillery and forts for the infantry for the ROC. In short weapons have gotten a lot more technologically advanced over the past few years due to rapidly advancing sensors and more accurate fires being available. There is nothing stopping the PLA in the first few weeks to destroy as much of Taiwan's force as possible such that they would be entirely reliant on infantry which can be cleaned up as soon the PLA lands as infantry without supporting arms are sitting ducks.

I believe that a part of the reason why the westoids and their ilk are so obsessed with this foolishness that the PLA, PLAN, and PLAAF can't amphibiously assault Taiwan successfully during an AR campaign is because of their continued belief in both the superiority of their aircraft carrier battleground doctrine and also their submarines.

Funny because they don't even realize that's why they THINK that China can't amphibiously assault Taiwan...they just repeat the brainwashing but don't even know the details.

Ironically, it's their own military that proves that the aircraft carrier battleground doctrine has likely be rendered obsolete since at least the 80s and possibly even into the 70s.

Falklands War (yes I know their real name is Malvinas Islands) a British sub sank an Argentinian warship and then the war promptly ended once the Argentines realized that there was no way to prevent submarines from sinking the rest of the Argentinian navy and thus putting the actual Argentinian homeland at risk of invasion.

This puts us about 30-40 years after the theory that aircraft carrier battlegroups were the new face of warfare was proven during the Pacific campaign of WW2. Which is roughly 30 years after WW1 when they doctrine of Dreadnoughts dueling with gigantic guns was still the prevalent way of warfare.

If we follow this trend then it means that even submarines were rendered obsolete sometime in the 2010s...which is exactly when we saw China and her hypersonic missiles perform flawlessly in simulations.

So basically ever 30-40 years or so naval warfare undergoes a complete and total fundamental revolution in the theory and doctrine itself.

We went from having gigantic ships armored and armed to the teeth with gigantic guns shooting at each other with little to no finesse to what's essentially sailing miniature airfields to submarines that can confidently attack and sink surface warfare ships at will with no fear of reprisal and now to extreme high speed, long range, and smart technology munitions that can take down ships with no defense against them.

I have to admit that I'm still not 100% optimistic that USN aircraft carriers can just easily be sunk with the press of a button and a hypersonic, but I would absolutely not put any faith that the wars of tomorrow...whenever America finally loses its sanity and fires the first shot would look like WW2 aircraft carrier battles except with stealth fighter jets instead of propeller P51 Mustangs.

sr338 · Sep 21, 2023

ChongqingHotPot92 said:
Technology has indeed changed, and it is not POSSIBLE for PLA to win in a Taiwan contingency, but I think it is a matter timing, overwhelming firepower within an extremely short span of time (hours, not even days), COMPLETE incapacitation of blue forces (especially air defences) within hours before reinforcements (from US and Japan) could mobilize, and capture of key landing spots (especially ports for unloading armour) BEFORE the arrival of reinforcements. If the PLA cannot achieve all of these objectives within hours after the first barrage, China could risk losing the war before it even starts. In other words, the PLA would need to completely establish new status quos in Taiwan within a few hours completely to its favour. Or the situation would just turn into a war of attrition (with full US, Australian, Japanese, and Indian involvement, so two front war for China) lasting months before returning to status quo ante bellum. The current ROCA strategy is for Taiwan to last for at least a week, and the PLA's job is to stop that within a matter of hours. Otherwise as soon as the QUAD gets its forces in order and start flying to toward Taiwan (in Jai Hind's case, open up a new front in the Himalayas), it would be game over. . Thus, I believe it is possible to win, but the first wave of attack better punch above its weight, or else...

As with amphibious landings, the PLARF and the PLAGF's PCL-161 units (and PLAAF units as well) would need to closely coordinate with the landing force to "clean" the proximities of each landing sites and ports with cluster and thermobaric munitions. The amount of joint force collaboration and firepower needed in this scenario would be unprecedented even for the US military.

Honestly, the speed, firepower, and joint-force collaboration needed in this scenario would be unprecedented in human history. Definitely extremely challenging for the PLA, but it is not impossible.

>within hours before reinforcements (from US and Japan)
Those reinforcement won't survive the hour. Are you implying that USN and JAP has any chance of surviving against PLA within 2000km of the Mainland? That's some high level cope.

ChongqingHotPot92 · Sep 21, 2023

sr338 said:
>within hours before reinforcements (from US and Japan)
Those reinforcement won't survive the hour. Are you implying that USN and JAP has any chance of surviving against PLA within 2000km of the Mainland

sr338 said:
? That's some high level cope

all the satellites and air assets used to guide the DF-21D and DF-26 kill chains must be fully functional. Even one of them being sabotaged by the US and its allies could ruin the kill chains. This is another risk and difficulty because the fragility of the kill chains mean that these two types missiles are use or lose weapons. You better shoot them out because your satellites are destroyed by SM-3s and THAADs.

luosifen · Sep 21, 2023

ChongqingHotPot92 said:
all the satellites and air assets used to guide the DF-21D and DF-26 kill chains must be fully functional. Even one of them being sabotaged by the US and its allies could ruin the kill chains. This is another risk and difficulty because the fragility of the kill chains mean that these two types missiles are use or lose weapons. You better shoot them out because your satellites are destroyed by SM-3s and THAADs.

There's a lot of mistakes in your beliefs about how a China-US war would unfold that I don't even know where to start, but that China must take over Taiwan before the US takes action or it loses is probably the biggest. The US is limited by geography and tyranny of distance in terms of the forces it can commit to the region, and PLA ISR is built with distributed redundancy and backups such that knocking out a single or even multiple sensors won't break that kill-chain. For the US to use those missiles you mentioned for anti-satellite mission? That's limited high end munitions they won't have available for defending against retaliatory strikes from PLARF fires, not to mention PLASSF can maneuver those sats away from getting hit when they detect launch against them. You also don't seem to be aware PLASSF has replacement sats on standby ready for launch in such contingencies either?

War of attrition is also something the US doesn't want to fight, they aren't the bigger industrial power that can win the numbers game in war production anymore.

montyp165 · Sep 21, 2023

luosifen said:
There's a lot of mistakes in your beliefs about how a China-US war would unfold that I don't even know where to start, but that China must take over Taiwan before the US takes action or it loses is probably the biggest. The US is limited by geography and tyranny of distance in terms of the forces it can commit to the region, and PLA ISR is built with distributed redundancy and backups such that knocking out a single or even multiple sensors won't break that kill-chain. For the US to use those missiles you mentioned for anti-satellite mission? That's limited high end munitions they won't have available for defending against retaliatory strikes from PLARF fires, not to mention PLASSF can maneuver those sats away from getting hit when they detect launch against them. You also don't seem to be aware PLASSF has replacement sats on standby ready for launch in such contingencies either?

War of attrition is also something the US doesn't want to fight, they aren't the bigger industrial power that can win the numbers game in war production anymore.

To expand on this very point, China has the means to do to the US what the US did to Imperial Japan which also includes actively contesting space superiority through anti-sat operations, that's what the naysayers are in absolute ignorance/denial about.

supersnoop · Sep 21, 2023

montyp165 said:
To expand on this very point, China has the means to do to the US what the US did to Imperial Japan which also includes actively contesting space superiority through anti-sat operations, that's what the naysayers are in absolute ignorance/denial about.

Plus without any meaningful way to defend space, you are putting at risk decades of orbital infrastructure which is arguably more important in maintaining a global military presence for the US to just *maybe* win a regional conflict.

Also as mentioned, the PLA would still have localized networks in place, but the US control structure would be more dependent on satellites (ie drone control)

montyp165 · Sep 21, 2023

supersnoop said:
Plus without any meaningful way to defend space, you are putting at risk decades of orbital infrastructure which is arguably more important in maintaining a global military presence for the US to just *maybe* win a regional conflict.

Also as mentioned, the PLA would still have localized networks in place, but the US control structure would be more dependent on satellites (ie drone control)

In addition, the PLA can prep and replace lost satellites at a much faster rate than US forces can as Chinese industry can source and build everything needed internally whereas even US sats need external supply chains for construction of components; this isn't even taking into consideration Chinese industrial iteration and production upscaling can occur much faster as well.

PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency

ChongqingHotPot92

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Sinnavuuty

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ChongqingHotPot92

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OTCDebunker

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sr338

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ChongqingHotPot92

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luosifen

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montyp165

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supersnoop

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montyp165

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