Just throwing in my hat here -- I fully agree with
@ZeEa5KPul's statements on this matter.
I think everyone's perceptions of how the PLA would react to this Pelosi visit (if she does indeed visit) has been calibrated based on assumptions that the PLA has escalation superiority and that anything short of using lethal military force in anger, would result in a significant net negative impact on China's geopolitical interests.
There are two fundamental questions that people on opposing sides of this discussion seem to be on the opposite sides of:
1. At present, between the US military and the PLA, which side holds escalation dominance in context of the geopolitical priorities of each side vis-a-vis Taiwan?
2. If China does use lethal military force in anger, would the potential variety of outcomes of such a course of action be more beneficial or more damaging to China's long term geopolitical interests versus if China did not use lethal force in anger? (note -- "not using lethal force in anger" does not equate with "not carrying out a significant display of military force")?