this here is a great point. people always assume that declaring independence is a pre-condition for Beijing to make its move on Taiwan, this is a dangerous way of thinking for Taiwan's leaders because it breeds complacency. it makes absolutely no sense to tie its own hands and act in a way that is predictable or even dictated by its adversary. it is more likely that if Beijing sees an opportunity it will make its move regardless of whether or not Taiwan crossed any "red lines".
PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency
- Thread starter pugachev_diver
- Start date
Good ideas, but that's not quite what I meant. The PRC's own laws state that armed reunification is only on the table if a red line has been crossed. While there's nothing physically stopping them from ignoring that and going in whenever they want, violating your own laws is still incredibly harmful to your international image and will become a serious obstacle in trying to forge closer ties with other countries down the line. The PRC obviously considers this cost unacceptable, which is why it hasn't taken any military action despite clearly having the capability to do so in the past few years.
In my scenario, a declaration of independence is still a precondition for any action by the PRC. I was only pointing out how the PRC can start taking action as soon as soon as they know it's coming, rather than after the declaration is made and broadcast to the world. Any obvious move like deploying CBGs or massing troops along the coast will probably cause the declaration to be called off, which means you just went through all that effort for nothing. My questions are in essence:
1. How early of a warning can the PLA expect to get about a Taiwanese declaration of independence?
2. Given the aforementioned amount of early warning, what can the PRC do to prepare for armed reunification, without alarming the Taiwanese government (or anyone else, for that matter)?
Beijing likely has an ungodly amount of spies inside and also the ability to read whatever is physically logged on networks by the separatists at will using signal intelligence.
Years or at the worst, low dozen of months would probably be as far as they can see, since I doubt the ROC plans further ahead than that.
China can start by changing factories into producing military equipment. Routine air and navy exercises over the straits and the island could strongly discourage ROC from restarting the civil war, by showing their weakness and inability to fight back.
Given there's a few million Chinese ppl on the island, Beijing can probably not actually muster the political will to ever crush the Republic of China forces except if Taiwan was invaded or a Taiwan invasion is imminent by a 3rd country first and it became an issue of national defense. Or if Taiwan is unilaterally disturbing the peace. They can bluff with the military in order to keep Taiwan slowly declining, they could even levy severe economical sanctions but I don't think they can unprovokedly attack first.
Years or at the worst, low dozen of months would probably be as far as they can see, since I doubt the ROC plans further ahead than that.
China can start by changing factories into producing military equipment. Routine air and navy exercises over the straits and the island could strongly discourage ROC from restarting the civil war, by showing their weakness and inability to fight back.
Given there's a few million Chinese ppl on the island, Beijing can probably not actually muster the political will to ever crush the Republic of China forces except if Taiwan was invaded or a Taiwan invasion is imminent by a 3rd country first and it became an issue of national defense. Or if Taiwan is unilaterally disturbing the peace. They can bluff with the military in order to keep Taiwan slowly declining, they could even levy severe economical sanctions but I don't think they can unprovokedly attack first.
plawolf
Lieutenant General
You are clearly missing the point if you think declaring independence is the one and only red line. The Chinese law itself listed several other examples such as foreign invasion, natural disaster and civil unrest.
The point is and always have been that these red lines are for Beijing to define and interpret, and the effect can be cumulative instead of sudden.
Declaring independence is only the most explicitly stated and non-negotiable red line where China would have no choice but to kick off full armed reunification if crossed. However, it would be perfectly legal for China to decide enough is enough without a formal Declaration of Independence. This is why all the salami slicing by the US and Taiwan is so stupid and dangerous. Essentially every time they do it they are playing Russian roulette, and as time passes and Chinese overall power grows, more and more live rounds are added to the gun, so if they continue like this, it is inevitable that it will lead to armed reunification on Beijing’s terms and timetable.
Looking around the world, we have many examples of pairs of nominally independent countries that basically act as a single entity when it comes to foreign policy positions, geopolitics and security issues. They are also so heavily integrated on an economic, linguistic, and cultural level so as to be virtually indistinguishable outside of small nuances. I am referring to the relationship between Belarus and Russia, and between Canada and the US to an extent.
Obviously, in the case of Taiwan, the current domestic political environment basically equates a pro-independence position with an anti-China position. Part of this pattern of preferences is internally consistent, because China is the insurmountable hurdle preventing independence. But for pretty much every pro-independence Taiwanese, there is always this intrinsic disdain for China's political system, and foreigner worship. But this does not have to be the case on a philosophical level - one can plausibly advocate independence but want to maintain a strong bond between the island and the mainland on every level.
One question I have pondered for a long time is this, and it is entirely hypothetical. If the cold logic driving Beijing's need to take Taiwan is one of security and geography, would it be willing to settle for something akin to the relationship between Russia and Belarus? In fact, one can argue from a security perspective that this is preferrable to the current arrangement, because de facto control is surely more advantageous than de facto autonomy. Again, purely hypothetical, but I have never heard any sort of answer or contemplation of that pathway.
Edit: I do NOT support independence, please don't attack
Obviously, in the case of Taiwan, the current domestic political environment basically equates a pro-independence position with an anti-China position. Part of this pattern of preferences is internally consistent, because China is the insurmountable hurdle preventing independence. But for pretty much every pro-independence Taiwanese, there is always this intrinsic disdain for China's political system, and foreigner worship. But this does not have to be the case on a philosophical level - one can plausibly advocate independence but want to maintain a strong bond between the island and the mainland on every level.
One question I have pondered for a long time is this, and it is entirely hypothetical. If the cold logic driving Beijing's need to take Taiwan is one of security and geography, would it be willing to settle for something akin to the relationship between Russia and Belarus? In fact, one can argue from a security perspective that this is preferrable to the current arrangement, because de facto control is surely more advantageous than de facto autonomy. Again, purely hypothetical, but I have never heard any sort of answer or contemplation of that pathway.
Edit: I do NOT support independence, please don't attack
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i think beijing should be careful with the idea of pegging its actions to taiwan's independence declaration. taiwan will either never do it, being satisfied with de facto independence, or it will only do it with ample preparation. beijing does not have to act or react in a predictable manner, in fact it is better advised not to.
Article eight deals with non-peaceful action, and is the article which has caused the most controversy and attention. It states that the State shall use non-peaceful and other necessary means under these alternative conditions:
- if "Taiwan independence" forces, under whatever name and method, accomplish the fact of Taiwan's separation from China,
- or if a major event occurs which would lead to Taiwan's separation from China,
- or if all possibility of peaceful unification is lost.
plawolf
Lieutenant General
Simply, no way in hell.Looking around the world, we have many examples of pairs of nominally independent countries that basically act as a single entity when it comes to foreign policy positions, geopolitics and security issues. They are also so heavily integrated on an economic, linguistic, and cultural level so as to be virtually indistinguishable outside of small nuances. I am referring to the relationship between Belarus and Russia, and between Canada and the US to an extent.
Obviously, in the case of Taiwan, the current domestic political environment basically equates a pro-independence position with an anti-China position. Part of this pattern of preferences is internally consistent, because China is the insurmountable hurdle preventing independence. But for pretty much every pro-independence Taiwanese, there is always this intrinsic disdain for China's political system, and foreigner worship. But this does not have to be the case on a philosophical level - one can plausibly advocate independence but want to maintain a strong bond between the island and the mainland on every level.
One question I have pondered for a long time is this, and it is entirely hypothetical. If the cold logic driving Beijing's need to take Taiwan is one of security and geography, would it be willing to settle for something akin to the relationship between Russia and Belarus? In fact, one can argue from a security perspective that this is preferrable to the current arrangement, because de facto control is surely more advantageous than de facto autonomy. Again, purely hypothetical, but I have never heard any sort of answer or contemplation of that pathway.
Edit: I do NOT support independence, please don't attack
A Declaration of Independence would essentially be irreversible, especially if China signs on with a Belarus-Russian like security agreement framework.
But a security agreement, no matter how iron-clad, can always be ripped up at any time.
There is simply no way in hell Beijing would agree to that, especially not now nor going forwards.
The Belarus-Russian deal is only the best of a bad situation for Russia since Belarus has already attended independence during Russia’s moment of weakness. That is never something anyone with any sense would agree to if they can help it. And China very much can help it.
If China was stupid enough to allow such a deal, it would only be sowing the seeds for its own version of the Ukraine war decades into the future.
Taiwan’s geographical positioning makes it fundamentally important for China’s national security. That’s just a reality of life. That is why America covets it so much and why China will not budge one inch on its sovereignty. Not unless America simply lost all means and/or will to try to threaten China. Which is basically not going to happen before the Taiwan issue is resolved once and for all.
solarz
Brigadier
Actually what China is doing is *normalizing* the deployment of forces to start armed reunification. Look at what's permanently posted in range of Taiwan, the regularity of exercises conducted, and the number of recon/patrol flights. All of that is designed to lull TW into complacency.
solarz
Brigadier
There's also the matter of Taiwan being the last vestige of the civil war. The national narrative does not allow for an independent TW. It would be akin to the Soviet Union choosing to dissolve itself.