PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency

AndrewS

Brigadier
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Singapore is not in a position to disallow anything. If there's a conflict between China and the US and a country where the US is based tries to prevent the use of its facilities, the US will attack it. In Singapore's case I doubt things have to go that far since they operate F-35s, the US could just not send them the activation codes that morning. Personally, I find the idea that a fighter jet has DRM hilarious; that's peak America.

The idea that China could substitute Singapore's weapons is insufficient. Even if China could offer comparable capability - which it can't now and when it can the PLAAF and PLAN will have first dibs - Singapore would have to pay twice for its weapons or the replacement would happen over decades. That's a minor issue in the bigger picture; the major issue is that China would have to economically, politically, and militarily protect Singapore from American retaliation if Singapore turns coat.

Singapore has declined America's invitation to formally become a major non-NATO military ally, and we've seen enough recent statements from the government that they will formally remain neutral in any US-China war.

And even if the US did actually attack Singapore, the result would be to push Singapore directly into China's arms, which kind of defeats the purpose. Plus I can see both Malaysia and Indonesia putting significant pressure on Singapore to remain neutral, as an active war zone in the area is not good for Malaysia or Indonesia.

And from the Chinese perspective, a neutral Singapore is acceptable as China's goal for the region is for maritime trade to continue.
 

jvodan

Junior Member
Registered Member
Even more reasons for Singapore to switch to Chinese weapons. Aside from the things I already mentioned, it would be very easy for China to flatten certain parts of Singapore if Singapore is allowing US military to operate out of there. I'm sure Singapore knows that.

We are discussing a long game here and it would be gradual transition. I'm talking about 20 to 40 years from now. But the engagement with Singapore military needs to start sooner than that.


Their commitment to KF-21 program is pretty wishy/washy given the enormous investment they just made in Rafale/F-15. They are unlikely to have true access to stealth aircraft in the near future. China can definitely provide Tot and local production of J-31 to Indonesia just like it will probably do for Saudi Arabia.

That's something China can negotiate/settle with Indonesia, I'm sure.

I think most people know about that. I've personally known Chinese Indonesians who fled to Singapore due to the anti-Chinese riots of the 90s. But that should have no bearing on China's future relationship with Indonesia. A lot of ASEAN countries have Chinese populations that do well and then get persecuted by jealous locals. Don't let events of even 10 years ago affect your future decisions. Back in Kevin Rudd era, Australia was quite friendly with China. Funny how that turned out, huh? Indonesia is the regional heavyweight that is facing the most threat from Australia's grown naval presence. China should be actively courting Indonesia.
Indonesia currently does buy some military hardware from China, has large amounts of investment from China and trade with China.

Any form of security pact or understanding would be an impossible sell to the electorate.

Indonesia and ASEAN's main concern over Australia's military build up is. Any exchange between China and Australia will most likely involve ASEAN/Indonesian waters or airspace. The last thing they want is Chinese and Australia nuclear subs stalking each other in the region.
An alliance between Indonesia and China would bring eventually bring Australia and Indonesia in to conflict.
Indonesia will stay unaligned. Despite having a weaker Navy and less proficient airforce the shear size of Indonesia makes any concern over threats from Australia quite laughable. If you quote east Timor then check the history, bullied on the international stage re independence vote but not militarily. Had the leader been anyone then Habib I doubt the vote would have happen.
 

tphuang

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Indonesia currently does buy some military hardware from China, has large amounts of investment from China and trade with China.

Any form of security pact or understanding would be an impossible sell to the electorate.

Indonesia and ASEAN's main concern over Australia's military build up is. Any exchange between China and Australia will most likely involve ASEAN/Indonesian waters or airspace. The last thing they want is Chinese and Australia nuclear subs stalking each other in the region.
An alliance between Indonesia and China would bring eventually bring Australia and Indonesia in to conflict.
Indonesia will stay unaligned. Despite having a weaker Navy and less proficient airforce the shear size of Indonesia makes any concern over threats from Australia quite laughable. If you quote east Timor then check the history, bullied on the international stage re independence vote but not militarily. Had the leader been anyone then Habib I doubt the vote would have happen.

Very little up to now. Most recently, they bought a few UCAVs. Before that, they didn't buy anything for many years. I think starting from toward end of this decade, China will become Indonesia's biggest military provider. And maybe just as importantly, China will become the largest military provider to the Muslim world. Which along with high tech access that China will provide here will most likely significantly increase China's influence over Indonesia and other Muslim countries without pissing off locals.

As Indonesia continues to grow, I see it having greater ambition to itself in the region rather than just being weaker neighbor to Australia. China obviously would need to resolve its SCS disputes with Indonesia. But long term, if China becomes the largest military provider to Indonesia, the 2 countries military will obviously get a lot tighter. Maybe there won't be an alliance, but I see the two countries getting a lot closer for the reasons above. Anyhow, I'm way off topic here.
 

MarKoz81

Junior Member
Registered Member
So I was thinking about Taiwan recently and...wait... what? Singapore? Indonesia? Han in Malaysia?

Robin Williams meme.jpg

As I was saying... my three cents on:

PRC's contingency response to Taiwan's de facto declaration of independence in the mid 2020s.

The specifics are important as any Mainland-initiated military action has better options. The images below are thumbnails.

1. Theatre of operations


01_Taiwan_context.jpg

This is Republic of China (Taiwan) with the exception of Pratas Island and Taiping Island in the Spratlys Archipelago. In this scenario I assume that Taiwanese declaration of independence retains claim to all the territory currently within jurisdiction of Taipei. It is not a valid claim and in itself will present a separate legal case for intervention as Kinmen and Matsu may lay counter-claims. In the bottom right corner Taiwan is superimposed over Donbas region for comparison of the spatial extent of operations. However the population of Donbas is about 1/5 to 1/4 of that of Taiwan (23m).

2. Population distribution


02_Taiwan_population.jpg

Population is the factor that needs to be controlled and the only factor over which the US has a viable claim in its own sphere of influence. To achieve victory in shortest time possible Taiwan needs to be controlled with the lowest possible number of people under direct control of invading PRC forces.

The east coast has the lowest density as well as total of population of all the non-mountainous areas of the island. In the bottom left corner I indicated populations of the respective counties in the most important landing zone near Hengchun. The area is approximately 25km wide and 40km long and has less than 100k people living in one medium city and several small towns and villages along the coast. It is the most important location as it enables secure transit through the Luzon Strait for PLAN.

3. Political division


04_Taiwan_elections.jpg

The results of local elections indicate chosen mayors/magistrates. The results of legislative elections indicate Legislative Yuan delegates. After the period of DPP dominance the region slowly leans back toward independent candidates which are always best options for collaboration. It is also important to remember that a binary system can be harmonized to retain control (this is the purpose of two-party pseudodemocracies - to exert one-party control while presenting a superficial electoral choice to the population) but trinary systems are inherently chaotic an the side with the greater brute-force computing capability will be able to better predict outcomes for optimal planning or brute force them through other means (financial etc).

4. Proposed solution


Usually when an invasion scenario is imagined it involves a cross-strait assault with the attack focusing on the western coast. This is the island's geography heavily favours a flaking maneuver - that is an assault on the eastern coast and the adjacent islands.

As the primary aim of all military operations on Taiwan is effective de-escalation achieved in shortest possible amount of time the benefit of such operation is clear:

  • Establishment of A2/AD assets on the eastern coast to physically cut off Taiwan from allies as well as - crucially, as demonstrated in the Russian invasion of Ukraine - information sources. China needs to erect a physical wall of interference between Taiwanese forces and US and Japan to disrupt the former's ability to acquire sufficient battlespace awareness.

  • Valid political claim of recapturing Taiwan as domestic parameters for victory conditions don't involve eliminating all "pockets of resistance". In physical terms China only needs Taiwan to the extent that UK needs Cyprus - to facilitate sea and air control. In political terms an "Republic of Taiwan" government in exile can exist and will exist as the US will establish one as soon as it is necessary. As long as physical security of the island is not disrupted it is not a significant problem.

  • Enabling full spectrum of operations to be employed against Taiwanese forces as opposed to just aerial and amphibious assaults. This also allows for greater flexibility in planning since land-based forces do not have the same constraints as sea-based forces. It allows for repeated freeze/thaw cycle to be employed and used to divide local authorities and military.

  • Enabling a defensive tactical posture which makes it more difficult for Taiwanese defenders since it requires them to change the preferred tactic and go on the offensive.

5. Necessary area of control


03_Taiwan key locations.jpg

Red indicates the areas that need to be put under PRC control for de-escalation to become military viable.

Letters A-H denote the adjacent islands which are captured as staging grounds and outposts and as facilitators of the blockade. Numbers 1-7 denote roads linking east and west coasts. From what I've found in public sources there are only those seven roads linking both parts of the island. Blocking them off effectively prevents any reinforcements to be sent to counter the landing forces. What's important any disruption of transit needs only to be temporary. It can be achieved by something as simple as timed mines deployed by cluster warheads in missiles. The time necessary is between 24 and 72 hours. Once the areas in red are secured and naval task forces are deployed to support them negotiations on Taiwan's surrender can commence.

This scenario has a minimum requirement of 10 amphibious/aerial battlegroups - 7 for securing the roads numbered 1-7 and three for captue/controlling of main population centers - Hualien, Taitung and Hengchun. Interestingly it seems that none of the battlegroups needs to exceed 2000 soldiers in its initial stage which means that those assaults can in theory be performed with the currently developed amphibious assets and require only minimal expansion of airborne capacity. Specifically from my initial estimate (which might be wrong) for viability it needs just:
  • 3 Type 075 (Hualien, Taitung, Hengchun)
  • 10 Type 071 (1, Hualien, 2, 3, 4, 5, Taitung, 6, 7, Hengchun)
  • 24 072A and 072III (2-3 at each location)
  • special forces and aerial assaults supporting air/amphibious landings
Naturally this scenario assumes a sufficient mobilized response prepared in advance to support these and other landings.

And that leaves me thinking if it is just a coincidence or did I accidentally follow PLA's contingency thinking since this is where the amphibious capabilities seem to have converged at the moment. Obviously there are practical implications to training, skill development etc and they are under three separate Fleets but also it just so happens that this is the exact number of assets necessary for this exact plan while PLAN is busy preparing for a larger leap in capabilities in the near future... but not before the end of 2020s.

Am I just imagining things? Or did I just walk in on the PLAN commander and his mistress in the storage room?
 

Mohsin77

Senior Member
Registered Member
What SAM failures? What happened?

S-300s tried to splash Israeli Vipers over Syria on May 13 and failed. It's another in the long list of failures for advanced SAMs recently, mostly against CMs. US Patriots keep failing in Arabia against Yemeni CMs, S-400s failed in Syria already against Tomahawks etc. And now this, against 4th gen Vipers.

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gelgoog

Brigadier
Registered Member
Russian sources are saying they launched long range air defense missiles from two bases. The Israeli fighters attacked Syria from the sea. That the Israelis did not warn Russia before the strike via the deconfliction line as usual. And that one short range Syrian air defense battery was attacked. There were also claims one Israeli aircraft was shot down over the ocean. I read nothing about which type of fighters did the attack.

None of this has been confirmed officially.

As for your other comments. The S-400 did splash two aircraft in the Ukraine conflict at least.
 

Mohsin77

Senior Member
Registered Member
From what we know so far, Ukraine is also a bad result for SAM effectiveness. CMs haven't had problems penetrating SAM cover, while UCAVs have been blowing up SAM batteries. As for the vaunted S-400s in Ukraine, that's 2 kills in 4 months, and we don't actually know what the success/failure ratio is. I'm betting when the analysis reports come in, they won't show a rosy picture that lines up with SAM marketing brochures.
 

tphuang

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Stationary Surface air missiles batteries without short range air defense system and ew unit are mince meat when they don't have air cover. However, they really should do better against low altitude cruise missiles. The real world interception probability have been a lot worse than what's demonstrated in testing. In the event of china and Taiwan situation, taiwanese stationary Sam will be completely at plaaf's mercy. I think they are going to intercept very fuel ballistic missiles or rockets that will be coming over. Based on what we saw in Ukraine, ucavs make mince meat of shorad. A lot of us though shorad would be a real problem in any Taiwan scenario, but I am changing my thought on that front based on what we have seen in Ukraine. Gj2 would be a real problem for Taiwan.
 
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