PLA Organization & Structure discussion

Totoro said:

Interestingly, if one assumes every heavy brigade of the PLA fields 112 tanks, and if we assume there are indeed 32 heavy brigades using tanks (38 total minus 6 amphibious assault ones that don't seem to use tanks) then we get a grand total of 3584 tanks in front line units. Assuming a few hundred more tanks in training units, active duty tank inventory of the PLA today may number little under 4000.

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I do doubt that PLA has 70 brigades these days, I think it closer to 60.
According to the linked document , USA is maintaining 14 Heavy BCT , so that is only about 1000 tanks, so in some sense we should doubt the fact that PLA maintains 32 Heavy brigades, there are only 13 combined armies , 32 would suggest more then 2 per army . It is not un-reasonable for the PLA , but still I doubt it , lower then 2 per army is more reasonable in my opinion , so maybe in the area of 20-24 heavy brigades , so more closer to 2K then 4K.


I think this is a good base line for a estimates , the US these days has about a half a million is active service, since a Chinese armored CBT has 4 maneuver compared to the US 3, and more brigades, they will have more people in the army.
Personally I think it might be 750K , but lower then a million , it was mentioned on CCTV that army now , for the first time is less then half of the overall active duty , which is 2 million.

The main issue, as usual with the PLA, is sources. I know of two and half sources. The half would be occasional US DoD publications on the PLA, but as those are not regular, I can't really remember when's the last time I saw those mention the overall size, number of units and so on. And Chinese own defense white papers, but those are even less regular and seldomly give our concrete figures.

Other two sources would be IISS Military Balance publication and China-defense.com/smf forum. The former is sort of respected, annual publication which kind of tries to be accurate and up to date, but is, ultimately, usually lagging behind in info. And it relies on open source data which could very well mean they actually use the data from sites like china-defense.com to make up or verify their own figures.

China defense forum, while an internet forum alright, has this really nice section about ORBATs, where many members contribute and seem to convey information from chinese language forums, provide images from each and every unit and so on. While surely not perfect, that source may actually be among the most up to date sources out there.

Anyway, let's take a look at what those two sources say.
IISS MB 2022 says PLA Army has 965 000 personnel. It says it has 13 Army groups and within them the following:
34 armored brigades
19 mechanised brigades
28 infantry brigades (including 2 air assault)
6 amphibious assault brigades

The CDF orbat doesn't mention personnel numbers anywhere. But it does say PLA has
13 army groups and within them a certain number of brigades. The ORBAT they offer is not complete as some of the identified brigades are not yet classified into categories. But personally, using the images available, I suggest the composition might be the one I mention earlier.
32 heavy (armored) brigades
27 medium (mechanized) brigades
12 light (infantry) brigades
6 heavy (amphibious) brigades

The cdf ORBAT also offers group army compositions and it seems those are almost always the same. Each group army has 6 combined arms brigades, 1 SF brigade, 1 Arty brigade, 1 AD brigade, 1 Eng. brigade, 1 support brigade.

So, the two sources, MB and CDF, actually aren't that far off in number of heavy brigades with tanks. 32 vs 34. And they both offer somewhat similar overall brigade numbers. 87 vs 77. Though the MB does go overboard there, which could be explained by the fact they tend to have information outdated by a few years in some regards.

We also have some official sources for nuggets of information. Chinese ministry of defense white papers. They don't offer much in terms of disclosed numbers but nevertheless, here's what the last published paper, the 2019 one, said:
PLA downsized to 2 million personnel, after 300 thousand were cut.
PLA Army downsized from 18 to 13 army groups (which both sources above also say)
Air force remained the same in numbers (possibly since the last reform?)
Navy and Rocket force increased slightly in numbers.
Army number movements not given. (though it could be implied that the overall cut went mostly towards army numbers)

Prior to that, we had the 2015 white paper which had no useful numbers information. And the 2013 white paper which was actually the most useful of them all.
Back then it was said Army's mobile operational units had 18 corps (group armies), plus some independent units, for a total of 850 000 personnel. (personal comment - this figure pertains to mobile (maneuver) operational units. So overall army numbers were surely higher then.

PLAN figure was given clearly as 235 000. As was PLAAF at 398 000.

So it's logical to deduce that PLAN figure today is higher than that. 250 or 300 thousand? Less? Who knows. And PLAAF may have remained roughly around 400 thousand.

MB 2022 estimates the following: 965 000 army, 260 000 navy, 395 000 AF, 120 000 rocket force, strategic support force 145 000 and "other" 150 000.

MB 2013 had the following figures: 1 600 000 army, 255 000 navy, 300-330 thousand air force, 100 000 rocket force. (no other service was mentioned)

Knowing that 300 thousand were cut since then and there was restructuring - where rocket forces and navy grew a little and strategic support force was created by taking out personnel from all branches - it's not unreasonable to suppose that today's personnel figures are indeed something like this:
260-300 000 navy
400 000 air force
120 000 rocket force
? to 150 000 strategic support force

leaving some 1 050 000 for army and whatever joint command personnel there might be. If that joint command personnel is indeed 150 000, as MB 2022 suggests, then the army would be left with 900 000 personnel today.

But ultimately, we're in need of much better sources.

wssth0306 said:

I do doubt that PLA has 70 brigades these days, I think it closer to 60.
According to the linked document , USA is maintaining 14 Heavy BCT , so that is only about 1000 tanks, so in some sense we should doubt the fact that PLA maintains 32 Heavy brigades, there are only 13 combined armies , 32 would suggest more then 2 per army . It is not un-reasonable for the PLA , but still I doubt it , lower then 2 per army is more reasonable in my opinion , so maybe in the area of 20-24 heavy brigades , so more closer to 2K then 4K.

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I think this is a good base line for a estimates , the US these days has about a half a million is active service, since a Chinese armored CBT has 4 maneuver compared to the US 3, and more brigades, they will have more people in the army.
Personally I think it might be 750K , but lower then a million , it was mentioned on CCTV that army now , for the first time is less then half of the overall active duty , which is 2 million.

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The US doesn't have to face any large land Army on its borders, so the US Army can be sized and equipped as an expeditionary force.

In comparison, China is close to many countries with significant Armies plus has Taiwan planning as well.
China having a land army with 1 million personnel comprising 70+ Brigades doesn't seem excessive when you look at the sizes of neighbouring armies.

Army personnel strength (active)
India: 1,237,000
North Korea: 950,000
South Korea: 420,000
Vietnam: 482,000
Russia: 280,000
etc etc

AndrewS said:

The US doesn't have to face any large land Army on its borders, so the US Army can be sized and equipped as an expeditionary force.

In comparison, China is close to many countries with significant Armies plus has Taiwan planning as well.
China having a land army with 1 million personnel comprising 70+ Brigades doesn't seem excessive when you look at the sizes of neighbouring armies.

Army personnel strength (active)
India: 1,237,000
North Korea: 950,000
South Korea: 420,000
Vietnam: 482,000
Russia: 280,000
etc etc

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Like I stated , I do agree it is plausible , but it also means that PLA thinks that they might need to respond to more then 1 theater at a given time. From that standpoint , 78 brigades might be a bit low , if China is expecting 2 theater war .

Totoro said:

But ultimately, we're in need of much better sources.

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I agree ,I am however surprised that a group army is that big , a 12 brigade formation ? that bigger then what corps used to be with 9 brigades. It also means it is unlikely in my opinion that they are indented to be used as a combined group army.
In war time it is more likely that the theater command will command brigades directly or combine them into task forces , and not just send out a combined army as it is.
One hell of a sight though , if we ever get to see a whole group army been mobilized . one of them holds as much man and gear as the collation task force in desert storm.
Though if one is been mobilized , that a war that I do not wish to see.

wssth0306 said:

I agree ,I am however surprised that a group army is that big , a 12 brigade formation ? that bigger then what corps used to be with 9 brigades. It also means it is unlikely in my opinion that they are indented to be used as a combined group army.
In war time it is more likely that the theater command will command brigades directly or combine them into task forces , and not just send out a combined army as it is.
One hell of a sight though , if we ever get to see a whole group army been mobilized . one of them holds as much man and gear as the collation task force in desert storm.
Though if one is been mobilized , that a war that I do not wish to see.

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Well, a Standard Group Army would then be 6 ground combat brigades plus 6 "support" brigades

That would be 3-4 divisions which is what you would expect from a Corps-sized formation with all its supporting elements.

My gut says that an entire Group Army would be used as a single unit.
If you look at the possible operating locations and the sizes of the potential opposing armies, a Group Army with 50k-60k soldiers doesn't look that impressive. So I don't see any point in not committing an entire Group Army.

And in any case, it's always better to have too much military force than not enough, which will minimise casualties and result in a swifter conclusion, and which should work out cheaper overall as well. Ideally you want a 3:1 level of superiority in terms of forces.

Plus there are 3 group armies in Central Theatre Command and 1 in Shandong which are solely held in reserve.

AndrewS said:

Well, a Standard Group Army would then be 6 ground combat brigades plus 6 "support" brigades

That would be 3-4 divisions which is what you would expect from a Corps-sized formation with all its supporting elements.

My gut says that an entire Group Army would be used as a single unit.
If you look at the possible operating locations and the sizes of the potential opposing armies, a Group Army with 50k-60k soldiers doesn't look that impressive. So I don't see any point in not committing an entire Group Army.

And in any case, it's always better to have too much military force than not enough, which will minimise casualties and result in a swifter conclusion, and which should work out cheaper overall as well. Ideally you want a 3:1 level of superiority in terms of forces.

Plus there are 3 group armies in Central Theatre Command and 1 in Shandong which are solely held in reserve.

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There are 4 in Central Theatre if I remember correctly, and 1 in Shandong is reserve for the Korean peninsula , I doubt that it will be moved to other theater unless the situation is dire .

You do want a 3:1 advantage for offensive operations , but there is only 2 that might actually happen and need a combined group army to respond to, meaning a engagement that other side committed a division sized force in the next 20 years.
Either Taiwan or Korea, India and Russia are unlikely to do so in the short to medium term.
Which bring me back to the original point , I don't think both will happen at the same time, therefor 34 heavy Brigades sound like too much investment , that money and manpower should go to the navy and air force, or maybe even the PAP if internal security is a major concern.

wssth0306 said:

There are 4 in Central Theatre if I remember correctly, and 1 in Shandong is reserve for the Korean peninsula , I doubt that it will be moved to other theater unless the situation is dire .

You do want a 3:1 advantage for offensive operations , but there is only 2 that might actually happen and need a combined group army to respond to, meaning a engagement that other side committed a division sized force in the next 20 years.
Either Taiwan or Korea, India and Russia are unlikely to do so in the short to medium term.
Which bring me back to the original point , I don't think both will happen at the same time, therefor 34 heavy Brigades sound like too much investment , that money and manpower should go to the navy and air force, or maybe even the PAP if internal security is a major concern.

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The latest list I have is only 3 Group Armies in Central Theatre Command. And as you say yourself, the Group Army in Shandong is in reserve because it doesn't cover any land borders.

If you look back to the past, Shandong used to be part of the Jinan Military District which was the strategic reserve. And remember there was a debate about Shandong becoming part of Northern Theatre Command instead of Central Theatre Command. But the argument was settled for Northern Theatre Command because of the Air Force and Naval units stationed in Shandong opposite Korea.

So if you have 4 Group Armies in reserve, you can easily justify deploying a single reserve Group Army as an entire unit to an active ground combat zone.

Staying on the defensive in ground combat is a losing proposition, as your opponent can decide where and when they want to concentrate their forces and achieve overwhelming local superiority. This results in the attacking force suffering few casualties whilst the defending force is wiped out. Conversely, if the Chinese Army were to deploy more forces, they would have that advantage.

And the last estimates I saw (admittedly some decades ago) was that both the Air Force and Navy each had a larger budget allocation than the Army.

And from a mission perspective, China can now achieve air and maritime superiority over Taiwan, so the next priority is improvements to the long neglected Chinese Army for a Taiwan ground campaign.

Significantly more Chinese Air Force and Navy forces likely won't make much difference in terms of a Taiwan campaign.
Nor would they deter the US from intervening, once the 300-odd ICBM silos are completed in China.

AndrewS said:

The latest list I have is only 3 Group Armies in Central Theatre Command. And as you say yourself, the Group Army in Shandong is in reserve because it doesn't cover any land borders.

If you look back to the past, Shandong used to be part of the Jinan Military District which was the strategic reserve. And remember there was a debate about Shandong becoming part of Northern Theatre Command instead of Central Theatre Command. But the argument was settled for Northern Theatre Command because of the Air Force and Naval units stationed in Shandong opposite Korea.

So if you have 4 Group Armies in reserve, you can easily justify deploying a single reserve Group Army as an entire unit to an active ground combat zone.

Staying on the defensive in ground combat is a losing proposition, as your opponent can decide where and when they want to concentrate their forces and achieve overwhelming local superiority. This results in the attacking force suffering few casualties whilst the defending force is wiped out. Conversely, if the Chinese Army were to deploy more forces, they would have that advantage.

And the last estimates I saw (admittedly some decades ago) was that both the Air Force and Navy each had a larger budget allocation than the Army.

And from a mission perspective, China can now achieve air and maritime superiority over Taiwan, so the next priority is improvements to the long neglected Chinese Army for a Taiwan ground campaign.

Significantly more Chinese Air Force and Navy forces likely won't make much difference in terms of a Taiwan campaign.
Nor would they deter the US from intervening, once the 300-odd ICBM silos are completed in China.

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On the contrary , more Air and Sea assets are what needed to get on the island , consider how overwhelming the US were compared to the Japanese at 1945 , but even them decided that taking the island even without a rebellious local population was too costly .


Both parts of this operation will be hard , landing on it , holding it , both would require overwhelming and constant , air and sea dominance.
Consider about 30% Coalition sorties in the fist gulf war went for the SEAD operation alone and still yet had planes shot down, I don't think that it can be determined that PLAAF is has the capability to do so against a better equipped and prepared enemy, and with PLAAF lacking the constitutional knowledge to do so , the bigger the scale the air operation will be , the bigger the gap between PLAAF and USAF.
The same goes to the rest , the Allies during ww2 had more then 1 landing to learn , before attempting the most complicated military operation to date , and PLA will need to succeed in one that is both bigger , and more difficult .
So is getting on the island and staying there .

A staff officer for the PLAN who worked on the 1996 Taiwan crisis said that in order to hold the beach head , they need to be able to land a full brigade in the first hour , and a full crop in the first day to have a good chance of winning , and back then , it would be impossible even if all ships that was available to the navy was put into this operation , even today , with all of the landing crafts PLA has, it lacks the supply ability to maintain a group army on the island without capturing a port .
( I will link you if I can find it )

I think fundamentally you are underestimating how difficult a cross channel invasion is , it was , and still is , the most complected operation type of conversional warfare , and given the population size and how well equipped Taiwan is , I don't think it will be a exaggerating to say that an successful invasion of Taiwan that is willing to fight , will be the most difficult operation every carried out by any military , and we cannot assume that Taiwan doesn't have the will to do so.

So in my opinion , significantly more PLAAF and PLAN assets , training is precisely what a invasion of Taiwan will need.

These are interesting discussions but do not factor in the divisions in Xinjiang MD nor the PLAN MC and PLAAF Airborne Corps, which add further maneuver units to the ORBAT. Also, are the Tibet MD CABs part of a Group Army (77th?) or do they report direct to PLAGF central command?