Naval Strategic and Operational Discussion

SampanViking

The Capitalist
Staff member
Super Moderator
VIP Professional
Registered Member
The PLAN's strategic operations will be and not exceed those operations in which they are confident in being able to succeed.

China's Navy is modernising and it is acquiring bulk, but! it is still at the beginning of a journey that its strategic competitors have been walking for a very, very, long time.
This means that the kind of activity which can be undertaken during peace time (global cruises - long distance courtesy visits etc) will be a million miles from those which can be undertaken under conditions of open hostility.

The USN and its allies have not only many decades of experience of modern naval warfare, they also have the "muscle" built up over decades, against a phase of modern warship construction that has only started to get going in the last decade, with much of the activity happening in the last few years.

So let us go back to what we know.
Currently the PLAN has commissioned Liaoning, its first Fixed Wing Air Craft Carrier and a vessel of a mid weight class. We also are led to understand that Liaoning is helping to train a Naval Aviation Corps for another Four Indigenous Carriers. It is also most likely that these Carriers are going to be based on the Liaoning and of similar size and capability.

This by next decade will give China a fleet of four of five mid size fixed wing carriers. By any standard this would be way to little to send head to head against the eleven Mega Carrier groups of the USN and the lesser groups of its Allies. This means that sending Chinese CVBG's to Cruise all the worlds Oceans and challenging the existing powers is not viable as the PLAN would be poorly supported outnumbered and outgunned by a vastly more experienced set of Navies.

This is clearly not going to be an option.

Instead just look at the other types of Capital ship currently known or believed to be under construction. We see Type 71 LDP's and we here rumours of LHD/LHA construction. These are all Amphibious Assault related Ships. We can also look at the main issues today in both the East and South China Seas and clearly the big issue is unresolved marine territorial disputes, usually involving small Islands. In short the kind of situation which may require and Amphibious Military operation to resolve.

I do not regard it as a leap of faith to connect all of the above and see an immediate future Strategic Objective of the PLAN to establish a number of Amphibious Assault Groups with Organic Air Cover to both promote China's local territorial claims and also to exert pressure on the USN and its regional Allies within the bounds of the 1st and 2nd if not all the way to the 3rd Island Chain, with the overall objective of locking as much of the USN into the Asia Pacific region as possible and reduce US operational capability in others.

For China this approach would be real win win as it would achieve the tying down of the USN, through a process of inception, training and development, that it will need to go through irrespective, if it seriously wishes to gain the experience and have the time to physically build bulk and muscle of a genuinely counterweight navel force for the mid century.
 

Jeff Head

General
Registered Member
Look, the Trans-Pacific Partnership has not been officially expanded yet. All of the negotiating partners are just that...negotiating.

As the TPP evolves and other nations either become members, or desire membership, the partnership will get together and review the applications and determine which new members are allowed to be a part. As I understand it, right now according to their own by-laws and policies, the current status is as follows:

Current Members: (2005)
Brunei
Chile
New Zealand
Singapore

Negotiiating for Membership: (In order of when applying)
United States (Feb 2008)
Australia (Nov 2008)
Peru (Nov 2008)
Vietnam (Nov 2008)
Malaysia (Oct 2010)
Mexico (Oct 2012)
Canada (Oct 2012)
Japan (Mar 2013)

Officially Interested Parties: (But not officially applying yet)
Taiwan (Sep 2013)
South Korea (Nov 2013)

Going back and forth, over and over again about the specific motivations of each of these countries and their representatives is useless at this point. Particularly when it leads to members accusing each other of being "phobic," about this that or the other.

On any issue, just because a person takes a certain side does not mean that they have a phobia of the others side, or that they necessarily view relationships only as a friend or foe. It is simply not that black or white, and none of us are in a position to make that type of definitive judgement about another based on a few posts on an internet forum.

Do not get drawn into the trap of viewing one another, and particularly of labeling one another, in that manner here on SD.

If you do, I can promise that warnings will follow, and if not heeded, then suspensions. That's just the way SD works. Read the rules.

Anyhow, watch the discussion and accusations. Right now I am simply saying this as another SD member and giving advise.

Again, a person can not agree with another, and can take a different view, without having a phobia of them...even if they are adament about their position. It could be based on principle. It could be based on experience. It could be based on knowlege that others are not privvy to. Any number of things could lead to a particular stance that does not include them being psycologically in fear of the other side.

On SD we have very specific indicators (in the rules) regarding racism, blood fueds, language, attacks (ad hominen), etc. that can get you in trouble. Avoid those and simply have an agreeable, rational discussion and try and keep emotion and labels and accusations out of it.
 
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Blackstone

Brigadier
Some very nice and well reasoned thoughts, Latenazy. Let's discuss them.

1) Because China has no incentive to join one unless it sees something in it for itself. By inviting China after all the other countries have joined you create that incentive (because the trading pot is bigger).
China has lots of incentives to join organizations it could set rules from the get go, especially important economic alliances that cover 50% of global GDP. Not inviting China to help set rules and calling it a “hedge” creates friction and sews mistrust; which is the exact opposite of stated US intentions.

2) By establishing the institution before inviting China, you make that multilateral framework function independent of China's cooperation. That way if China doesn't want to cooperate, it simply loses out. If it does want to cooperate, it has to play by rules all the other member nations agreed to instead of rules its crafted to help itself (which is different if China is invited in the earlier stages and has a greater say in how the rules work). It doesn't have the option of co-opting or reshaping the institution to its favour, or dismantling or compromising the institution if everyone else benefits at its expense.
My-way-or-the-highway wouldn't build cooperation and trust between the two biggest economic powers in the world. China's main problem with existing global order is it had no opportunity to the rules, and it wants a "new model of great power relations" to write some of the new rules.

And my point isn't to minimize that relationship, but to point out the different ways which that relationship is crafted and how that affects the behavior of the two countries, which in turn dictate how peaceful or tense that relationship is. It should also be noted that as China's influence grows, more and more of the US-China relationship will also be affected by each country's relationship with other country's. In the case of of a hedge strategy with TPP, the US's goal is to change the regional payoff structures to get China to prefer cooperating with its neighbors, because this eases potential security tensions China may have with US allies.

TPP as economic hedge? That doesn’t quite square with the fact China is already the biggest trading partner of most ASEAN countries, and a rival economic block might cause more tension and not less. As for “cooperating with its neighbors,” what do you propose? Keep in mind that balanced views of the past half dozen years in ESC and SCS would highlight two main themes; 1) generally speaking, China isn't the instigator, and 2) China overreacted to the instigators and made other countries in the region nervous about how it will use its new found power.

If it sent China the wrong message, then I don't think we would have seen the overtures to China joining the TPP we've seen on both the Chinese and US sides.
China asked to sit in on meetings so it could keep it's options open; US coaxed China to join TPP (on US terms) to maximize US options. Two elephants dancing the kabuki.

Abe is more of a smart pol and less of a true believer than a lot of people (especially many Chinese people) give him credit for.
Shinzo Abe is every inch the Japanese history revisionist he portrays himself to be. There are ample evidence to show his extreme views, one is he led a
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to downplay Japan's imperialist past.

He's really no different than some of the GOP who pay lip service to the crazies in the Tea Party so they don't get primaried. The political leadership in China, SK, and the US all know this, but they can't afford to be understanding, either in the public eye or the back door.
Have you been watching too much MSNBC?
 

Blackstone

Brigadier
As we have seen, the US does cooperate with China, and vice versa. Militarily, economically, and politically.

There are numerous examples, from joint exercises against pirates, to joint exercises right now involving the Syrian chemical weapons, to the upcoming RIMPAC exercises (which is a very big deal), to both nations denouncing certain types of regimes and behavior, to the huge trade agreements and deals between the countries, The US did not become the largest user of Chinese goods by accident or in a vacuum, or vice versa.

Clearly both countries do this in what they perceive to be their best immediate and long term interests...with trade offs between the two as they seem warranted.

Geo-strategically and politically this is going to continue. There are areas where the US and China can and will unite and work together. There will also be areas where the interests diverge and the chance for friction arises.

We can only hope, and work together, to the best of our collective ability to make the former far outnumber and outweight the latter.

In the mean time, both nations themselves depend heavily on open sea lanes to move commerce, material, and resources to and from their countries, and for their allies. As a result, they both have and will continue to have capable and strong navies to protect those sea lanes and the commerce, material, and resources flowing on them...from whatever the threat.

Well said, Jeff. Concise and to the point.
 
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Equation

Lieutenant General
For China this approach would be real win win as it would achieve the tying down of the USN, through a process of inception, training and development, that it will need to go through irrespective, if it seriously wishes to gain the experience and have the time to physically build bulk and muscle of a genuinely counterweight navel force for the mid century.

True for now, but who needs this when China is developing hypersonic weapons and better submarines to counter all those surface ships? Therefore all those "gain experience" will become mute.
 

latenlazy

Brigadier
First, no matter how you spin the situation, coercion and control are negative reinforcements to begin with, regardless of whether the media are trade agreements or military deployments. Second, the nations involved are all playing geopolitics for their own interests, including the US. It is only disinformation to purposefully label US's interests as "friendly" and China's interests as "unfriendly". Third, the nations involved, including the US, are also liable of acting "friendly", so that the situation would become conducive for China to return the favor. Negative reinforcements are only conducive to unwelcoming responses.
In the study of political science, coercion is specifically the use of force to influence another. Using a trade pact to entice a country to behave one way is not coercive by any means. I also did not label US interests as friendly or Chinese interests as unfriendly. Both can be friendly OR unfriendly. I'm simply pointing out that in this case the US is trying to use a regional trade pact and their presence to disincentivize aggression. I'm not saying that China as it is now is aggressive, or that it will be in the future, but that the US is checking for that possibility. This is similar to China's militarization. I do not see it as China being aggressive, but as China hedging against the US in case the US decides to be aggressive towards it. That's why it's called hedging. Until there's a more fundamental sense of trust between the two countries, both countries will hedge against the other.

On the contrary, for example, TPP is led by the US, so any cost should primarily be "self-inflicted" by the US. Let's place liability where liability is due.
As I laid out earlier the TPP is not led by the US, and China doesn't necessarily lose out for not being part of the TPP (As I mentioned earlier, while China hasn't been lobbied to join, it hasn't been excluded either). How is any other country liable if China upsets its neighbors and drives them closer to another power?

The problem is that, in the genuine spirit of cooperation, it isn't primarily upto the US to define what are "good" or "bad" as conforming to US's interests. But rather, the terms should be negotiated among all participants including China. It is also disinformation to label maintaining US's interests as "good cop" and otherwise "bad cop". Apparently the US has yet to learn what it takes to foster cooperation in a multipolar world.
I was not labeling the US interests categorically as "good cop". It's a relative expression. If the US pisses off some countries and that drives them towards China, then in that situation China would be the "good cop" (and this does happen, especially in Latin America).

I think we can all agree that cooperation is good and aggression is bad.

If China becomes a part of the TPP, they will get their say in the negotiations. I was simply pointing out that for the US to want to use the TPP as a means of establishing their relationship with China's neighbor to incentivize China not to act aggressively, it will first need to strengthen the multilateral framework.

The above comment is similar to a habitual HS bully (the US) who doesn't know how to tacitly approach a potential friend (China) and falls back to negative reinforcements (pre-negotiated terms without China) as if they were perversely "attractive enough" for a potential friend.
How? I'm simply saying that it's China's choice whether to join the TPP or not. If it wants to join, good for it. If it doesn't, then it clearly sees its interests better served otherwise. If it's the latter, then the US's hedging strategy fails.

Similar to the perverse logic of a habitual HS bully.

*rollseyes* All countries "bully" when it fits their interests if they can get away with it. To assume that China, as any country, has left that option off the table would be naive. If you're interested in looking for moral equivalence, then there's really no point to this discussion, because I'm not. I'm simply explaining how the US is trying to use the TPP as a strategy to encourage China to cooperate with its neighbors and discourage China from being aggressive with them. Whether you think that's good or bad is your decision. It doesn't change the mechanics of the behavior, which is all I'm discussing about.
Habitual HS bullies would also gladly consider their targets as "willing and receptive" as well, in order to justify their aggressive behaviors toward others.
...China's foreign and commerce ministers have both said they're looking into the TPP and may consider joining. You still need to answer how a regional trade pact is an act of aggression.

The above comment is misguided again as China would prefer, for example, earlier participation in the negotiation of the TPP terms, instead of being purposefully excluded. Nothing even close to China trying to "dictate" the TPP terms. On the other hand, the US is indeed trying to impose the pre-negotiated terms with coercion for self-serving interests.

If China preferred earlier participation they would have done so! Maybe no one has actively lobbied China to join, but no one has excluded China. A lack of lobbying is not the same as an act of exclusion.

What are opponents for, if such were consider as "friendly".
I JUST said China isn't being treates as an opponent.

Then there is nothing to complain about China as the game of geopolitics is played by all sides serving their own interests, which also means China is entitled to as much maneuver as the US does. And as mentioned earlier, unwelcoming proposals would receive what else but unwelcoming responses. The US deservingly received what the US asked for.

I'm not complaining about anything, and I agree that both countries have whatever right to maneuver as they wish. I have not said anything contrary to that. Also, the US hasn't excluded China on TPP, and China hasn't rejected the proposal.

The more you single-mindedly complain about China not conforming to US interests, the more it shows that you are indeed working on the premises of China-phobia.
If you want to interpret my points as complaining about China not conforming to US interests, then there's nothing I can really do about that. But that isn't what I'm doing at all.
The above is yet another example of China-phobia, when conforming to US's interests is relabeled as "cooperation" and imposing pre-negotiated terms with coercion is relabeled as "encouragement and welcoming". With such perversed logic, as mentioned earlier, the US deservingly received what the US asked for.
*facepalm* I'm not saying that China should conform to US interests. I'm saying that the US is trying to change the landscape to change what actions China can take to serve its own interests. I did not assert whether this is preferable, fair, or attribute any normative quality to that.
As mentioned earlier, then there is nothing to complain about China as the game of geopolitics is played by all sides serving their own interests. It is only fair for the US to take as much favor in return for what are being dished out.
And as I've said repeatedly, I'm not complaining about anything.

The above comment is ignoring the fact that, for example, the TPP terms were pre-negotiated and purposefully excluding China's participation in the negotiation. If such were considered as "friendly", then the US shouldn't mind to move a step back and let China take a "friendly" lead in the TPP. This is yet another example of working on the premises of China-phobia.
The TPP terms are not pre-negotiated. They are under negotiation. And every time a new country enters, they are re-negotiated again. Nothing is set in stone. It's just preliminary talks to scope out interests. China isn't excluded. It just hasn't displayed any interest to join until recently. Get your facts straight first.
A habitual HS bully would be unable to consider their aggressive behaviors as perverse either. But the simple fact is that, such persons would immediately complain when they can't get what they want.
At this point you're just setting up strawmen.
There is mainly one facet in your above comments ----- US-centric in an "uncooperative" multipolar world, where China isn't necessarily acting along with US interests. And conforming to US's interests is relabeled as "good" while otherwise relabeled as "bad" and hence, China-phobia become the working premises, which would naturally produce recurring suggestions of negative reinforcements.
Um. If that's what you got from my post, then either I need to work on my communication skills or you need to work on your reading comprehension.
 
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Jeff Head

General
Registered Member
True for now, but who needs this when China is developing hypersonic weapons and better submarines to counter all those surface ships? Therefore all those "gain experience" will become mute.
First, that would be moot, not mute...hehehe, although I guess, from a certain perspective, you might consider them without "voice," too! LOL!.

However, there will, at the same time, be counters to hypersonic weapons and their enabling technologies, even better submarines to counter the other submarines, surface ship with new, effective ASW capabilities, etc., etc. which will make the experience amassed relevent.

In fact, the experience gained with those existing technologies and equipment will help enable the development of countering strategies and technologies.

...and, IMHO, both sides will dance that dance into the forseeable future. It's the nature of the beast.
 

Equation

Lieutenant General
First, that would be moot, not mute...hehehe, although I guess, from a certain perspective, you might consider them without "voice," too! LOL!.

However, there will, at the same time, be counters to hypersonic weapons and their enabling technologies, even better submarines to counter the other submarines, surface ship with new, effective ASW capabilities, etc., etc. which will make the experience amassed relevent.

In fact, the experience gained with those existing technologies and equipment will help enable the development of countering strategies and technologies.

...and, IMHO, both sides will dance that dance into the forseeable future. It's the nature of the beast.

LOL...oops you're right my friend! I meant "moot".

Now as to your response, I say it's far easier and cheaper with a inundated offense with missiles than it is with a defense with counter measures and ASW, plus many future countries will approach this method than an expensive tried and true complete blue navy fleet. I always believe "speed wins because it kills" concept of battle strategy.
 

latenlazy

Brigadier
China has lots of incentives to join organizations it could set rules from the get go, especially important economic alliances that cover 50% of global GDP. Not inviting China to help set rules and calling it a “hedge” creates friction and sews mistrust; which is the exact opposite of stated US intentions.
On the bolded part, exactly! What the US is trying to do is to reduce China's influence on the rules (we don't know net balance just yet) while still making it an attractive package. Note that the US hasn't actively done anything to tilt the scale against China. All that's happened is that more players have jumped into discussions before China has, so whenever China enters its say its influence is automatically diluted relative to what influence it would have had if it joined earlier. It's important to note that exclusion is not part of this strategy. The TPP hasn't invited anyone who hasn't displayed interests in joining first. Otherwise, it would only be fair to say Canada, Australia, Japan, SK, etc etc don't get to help set the rules as well, which is just not the case. When China joins, they will get their say. Every time a new member joins terms will get negotiated and re-negotiated. It just won't be as big a say as if they had joined when there were fewer members, and this is not an actively deliberate machination of the US as it is just a consequence of when China has decided to join.

It just so happens that something like the TPP didn't interest China until it looked like bigger economies like Australia, Japan, and SK considered joining. Note that increasing the number of parties before China joins also has a positive effect on both its survivability and China's willingness to make an agreement work, because the more members join, the more lucrative the agreement, which in turn makes accepting less power more acceptable (so long as the benefits of having a bigger deal outweigh the costs of having less influence).

My-way-or-the-highway wouldn't build cooperation and trust between the two biggest economic powers in the world. China's main problem with existing global order is it had no opportunity to the rules, and it wants a "new model of great power relations" to write some of the new rules.
All foreign policy decisions, as conditions narrow down your decision tree, eventually boil down to a limited set of scenarios which have their costs and benefits. For that to qualify as "my way or the highway", those scenarios would have to be actively imposed by another power. I do not think the US is imposing the TPP on China, nor is it rejecting China from the TPP, so I wouldn't call "my way or the highway" a fair characterization here.

In the case of this TPP strategy and the US's broader engagement and outreach strategy with East Asia, the decision making power is still left to China. All the US is trying to do is to change the environment by which China makes its decisions. This is not a one sided game by any means. China is also trying to exert this same pressure on the US.

I agree with you that that is precisely China's problem with the world order. If we're talking broader Sino-American relations, there's going to have to be some acknowledgement of that reality on the part of the US as the power balance continues to shift between the two powers. I think from the US's point of view however, if the US is too meek and just concedes power and authority without competing, it enables China to pursue more aggressive behavior without cost (which is exactly what enabled the US the kind of aggression we've seen since the end of the Cold War), but if it competes using its coercive arm, it risks escalation and establishing winner take all norms. That's why something like the TPP is so important to US strategy. Strengthening (non military) multilateral ties with China's neighbors is a way to set the rules of competition in a way that doesn't risk direct conflict but can also steer China away from taking too aggressive an approach (which is often the path of least resistance when it comes to a bigger country getting what it wants) in establishing their "new rules". The US isn't deliberately trying to contain China, but it is trying to set up a regional environment where if China makes certain choices they can risk containing themselves.

TPP as economic hedge? That doesn’t quite square with the fact China is already the biggest trading partner of most ASEAN countries, and a rival economic block might cause more tension and not less. As for “cooperating with its neighbors,” what do you propose? Keep in mind that balanced views of the past half dozen years in ESC and SCS would highlight two main themes; 1) generally speaking, China isn't the instigator, and 2) China overreacted to the instigators and made other countries in the region nervous about how it will use its new found power.
I wouldn't characterize it as an economic hedge. For the US, the hedge part of the TPP is in building stronger relationships with China's neighbors. The US is using the TPP to position itself and this trade deal as an alternative to bilateral interaction with China. For example, if you have the TPP and the US, even with all the trade these countries have with China, having this alternative trade pact means that if China does something egregious you now have space to respond to the dispute y squeezing off trade or interaction through bilateral channels and steer them towards the multilateral one, where a smaller country may be able gain allies in a dispute and strengthen their hand. With a legitimate multilateral framework, China now needs to consider potential blow back if it acts too one sided or aggressively because its neighbors now have other options in who they get to deal with and profit from. This is also why China should (and probably is) interested in joining. If they don't, then they risk isolating themselves entirely, especially if the TPP becomes the backbone for something more comprehensive (though I wouldn't put money on that possibility). However, what China can't do is to prevent something like the TPP from happening or growing, because it's being propped up by the other superpower. One could use this to say that the US is imposing its interest on China, but it would only be fair to point out that the US is also giving China's neighbors options in the event that China is imposing itself on its neighbors. There's always a degree of subjectivity to qualifying such claims of course, so I won't get into that so much.

As of right now, I would say that China certainly does cooperate with its neighbors to a great extent (building up other country's infrastructure, buying their agricultural products, tourism, aid, etc), but it also can impose itself on its neighbors (water rights, island disputes, political influence). For the US, hedging isn't so much an indictment of China's current activities as it is an uncertainty (and for some in the US foreign policy establishment mistrust) of China's future ones. As countries grow more powerful the impulse to use aggression and make things one sided becomes more powerful, something which the US itself is not immune to. That's what the US is worried about with regards to China, particularly because it has certain relationships in East Asia that it's tied to. Using trade relations to hedge this possibility doesn't have the hangover effect that stationing more troops in East Asia would, so it's a good way to execute the idea of "trust but verify".

With regards to the East and South China Seas, I would say that in some cases China has been the instigated and in others it has been the instigator. The current row over the Diaoyu/Senkaku situation was clearly triggered by Japan (I think for domestic political reasons), but in the South China Seas what I'm seeing is a deliberate strategy on China's part to intimidate Vietnam and the Philippines.

My read of what's going on is that if China isn't trying to normalize its presence and gradually push out the two country's claims entirely, then it is certainly trying to strengthen its hand when it finally agrees to go to the table. All the while, China is preventing ASEAN from collectively siding against it by building cooperative relationships with other countries that have overlapping claims in ASEAN, but who are more likely to cut nicer deals like Malaysia and Brunei. With those countries, the disputed areas are smaller. Furthermore, they've probably decided that it's better to divide up the wealth of that territory with China than compete or find agreement with several other powers, especially with regards to the oil and gas fields (You don't need control over the entire area of the field, just a portion because you can drain the rest of it). In this way they're squeezing the Philippines and Vietnam's options.

Why target those two? Well, for one, because the area in dispute is much bigger, which increases the worth of the territory and the significance of who controls the area. Secondly, two countries have always had bad relations with China and have been trying to use the US to hedge against China, which ties into China's security reasons for controlling the SCS. If those two countries maintain control over portions of the SCS while trying to draw in the US as a security partner that functionally gives the US greater naval authority in the SCS.

China asked to sit in on meetings so it could keep it's options open; US coaxed China to join TPP (on US terms) to maximize US options. Two elephants dancing the kabuki.

See, no one's excluding anyone :p.

Shinzo Abe is every inch the Japanese history revisionist he portrays himself to be. There are ample evidence to show his extreme views, one is he led a
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to downplay Japan's imperialist past.
Some politicians are very good at faking it till they make it. I don't think Shinzo Abe is faking it per se, but I think he's a smart and capable enough Pol to do his own political math and weigh the blowback he gets from adopting those views in public. What's convinces me that he's not simply just being inflammatory and pushing Japanese ultra-nationalism for its own sake is because I see the political math behind it. There's a lot of value in Japan to having a base that doesn't vote on the economy.

Have you been watching too much MSNBC?
I do watch a lot of MSNBC, but that's not why I think the Tea Partiers (or at least many of them) are crazy. I have actually done political work and met these people. They're very nice well meaning people who have some rather...controversial beliefs about what is factual.
 
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Blackstone

Brigadier
On the bolded part, exactly! What the US is trying to do is to reduce China's influence on the rules (we don't know net balance just yet) while still making it an attractive package. Note that the US hasn't actively done anything to tilt the scale against China. All that's happened is that more players have jumped into discussions before China has, so whenever China enters its say its influence is automatically diluted relative to what influence it would have had if it joined earlier. It's important to note that exclusion is not part of this strategy. The TPP hasn't invited anyone who hasn't displayed interests in joining first. Otherwise, it would only be fair to say Canada, Australia, Japan, SK, etc etc don't get to help set the rules as well, which is just not the case. When China joins, they will get their say. Every time a new member joins terms will get negotiated and re-negotiated. It just won't be as big a say as if they had joined when there were fewer members, and this is not an actively deliberate machination of the US as it is just a consequence of when China has decided to join.
China will not get to make any rules at all, because it takes unanimous consent of existing members to extend membership to new ones.

It just so happens that something like the TPP didn't interest China until it looked like bigger economies like Australia, Japan, and SK considered joining. Note that increasing the number of parties before China joins also has a positive effect on both its survivability and China's willingness to make an agreement work, because the more members join, the more lucrative the agreement, which in turn makes accepting less power more acceptable (so long as the benefits of having a bigger deal outweigh the costs of having less influence).
Yes, you're spot on TPP might eventually force China to accept less influence to join. Ergo, China sees TPP as containment and not hedge.

All foreign policy decisions, as conditions narrow down your decision tree, eventually boil down to a limited set of scenarios which have their costs and benefits. For that to qualify as "my way or the highway", those scenarios would have to be actively imposed by another power. I do not think the US is imposing the TPP on China, nor is it rejecting China from the TPP, so I wouldn't call "my way or the highway" a fair characterization here.
We'll just have to agree to disagree on this point.

In the case of this TPP strategy and the US's broader engagement and outreach strategy with East Asia, the decision making power is still left to China. All the US is trying to do is to change the environment by which China makes its decisions. This is not a one sided game by any means. China is also trying to exert this same pressure on the US.

I agree with you that that is precisely China's problem with the world order. If we're talking broader Sino-American relations, there's going to have to be some acknowledgement of that reality on the part of the US as the power balance continues to shift between the two powers. I think from the US's point of view however, if the US is too meek and just concedes power and authority without competing, it enables China to pursue more aggressive behavior without cost (which is exactly what enabled the US the kind of aggression we've seen since the end of the Cold War), but if it competes using its coercive arm, it risks escalation and establishing winner take all norms. That's why something like the TPP is so important to US strategy. Strengthening (non military) multilateral ties with China's neighbors is a way to set the rules of competition in a way that doesn't risk direct conflict but can also steer China away from taking too aggressive an approach (which is often the path of least resistance when it comes to a bigger country getting what it wants) in establishing their "new rules". The US isn't deliberately trying to contain China, but it is trying to set up a regional environment where if China makes certain choices they can risk containing themselves.
You just made a fair case for TPP as containment and not merely hedge.


As of right now, I would say that China certainly does cooperate with its neighbors to a great extent (building up other country's infrastructure, buying their agricultural products, tourism, aid, etc), but it also can impose itself on its neighbors (water rights, island disputes, political influence). For the US, hedging isn't so much an indictment of China's current activities as it is an uncertainty (and for some in the US foreign policy establishment mistrust) of China's future ones. As countries grow more powerful the impulse to use aggression and make things one sided becomes more powerful, something which the US itself is not immune to. That's what the US is worried about with regards to China, particularly because it has certain relationships in East Asia that it's tied to. Using trade relations to hedge this possibility doesn't have the hangover effect that stationing more troops in East Asia would, so it's a good way to execute the idea of "trust but verify".
TPP is part of a package that includes military, diplomacy, and black ops. Taken in totality, the package looks and smells like containment. Japan, the Philippines (our old allies), and Vietnam (our new best friend) all think containment. So does China.

With regards to the East and South China Seas, I would say that in some cases China has been the instigated and in others it has been the instigator. The current row over the Diaoyu/Senkaku situation was clearly triggered by Japan (I think for domestic political reasons), but in the South China Seas what I'm seeing is a deliberate strategy on China's part to intimidate Vietnam and the Philippines.
China is definitely pushing its weight around in the SCS, but the Genesis of the current standoff is actually UNCLOS. Vietnam and the Philippines filed claims under UNCLOS, which disrupted the "status quo," and China overreacted to their claims by unleashing the 5 Dragons (reformed as the new China Coast Guard) and asserting the dreaded 9-dash lines. It's been colorful fireworks ever since.

My read of what's going on is that if China isn't trying to normalize its presence and gradually push out the two country's claims entirely, then it is certainly trying to strengthen its hand when it finally agrees to go to the table. All the while, China is preventing ASEAN from collectively siding against it by building cooperative relationships with other countries that have overlapping claims in ASEAN, but who are more likely to cut nicer deals like Malaysia and Brunei. With those countries, the disputed areas are smaller. Furthermore, they've probably decided that it's better to divide up the wealth of that territory with China than compete or find agreement with several other powers, especially with regards to the oil and gas fields (You don't need control over the entire area of the field, just a portion because you can drain the rest of it). In this way they're squeezing the Philippines and Vietnam's options.

Why target those two? Well, for one, because the area in dispute is much bigger, which increases the worth of the territory and the significance of who controls the area. Secondly, two countries have always had bad relations with China and have been trying to use the US to hedge against China, which ties into China's security reasons for controlling the SCS. If those two countries maintain control over portions of the SCS while trying to draw in the US as a security partner that functionally gives the US greater naval authority in the SCS.
Vietnam pinpricks China every chance it gets, and China slaps Vietnam just because. The two just don't get along, and that's too bad for Vietnam, because no one in the world can help Vietnam against China but Vietnam. Simply put, when China is strong, Vietnam is screwed, and when China is weak, Vietnam can carve out some space for itself. China is on the ascend.

Bravely bold Philippines, rode forth from Cam Ranh Bay
He was not afraid at all, oh brave Philippines
He was not at all afraid, to be killed in nasty ways
Brave, brave, brave, brave, Philippines...

Some politicians are very good at faking it till they make it. I don't think Shinzo Abe is faking it per se, but I think he's a smart and capable enough Pol to do his own political math and weigh the blowback he gets from adopting those views in public. What's convinces me that he's not simply just being inflammatory and pushing Japanese ultra-nationalism for its own sake is because I see the political math behind it. There's a lot of value in Japan to having a base that doesn't vote on the economy.
One can tell a lot about a person by the friends he or she keeps. Here's one of Abe's close friends for your reference:

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“These are Abe’s cronies, they agree with his revisionist views, and now he’s putting them in positions of power and influence,” says Kingston. “What they don’t realize is that the right-wing revisionists are not convincing many people in Japan, and they are not convincing people outside Japan. What they are doing is creating a huge diplomatic problem.”


I do watch a lot of MSNBC, but that's not why I think the Tea Partiers (or at least many of them) are crazy. I have actually done political work and met these people. They're very nice well meaning people who have some rather...controversial beliefs about what is factual.
You're the one!
 
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