Mountain Cat light amphibious ATV

Heliox

Junior Member
Registered Member
I think another factor that can't be discounted in a helicopter insertion scenario is the proliferation of manpads. We've already seen the heavy loss of helicopter in Ukraine due to man pads to the point that helicopter assaults were only seen at the very beginning of the war, I don't see how this will be different in Taiwan unless you conduct all ops at night which is very ill advised seeing the terrain images you're posting.

Arguments about the "heavy losses" aside, Yes, MANPADS can never be discounted so everyone goes low to cut down acquisition oppo. Also lots of vids from Ukraine of how ridiculously low helos fly.

As for nightops, all modern rotary wing forces train for this with something like this ...
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I have no doubt the PLA does similar.
 

Heliox

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I've never seen the Mountain Cats depicted as operating in sub-tropical or densely wooded environments. All promo videos I have seen so far invariably depict flat, arid tundra or desert environments, which leads me to believe they are intended for central Asia, not some southeast Asian jungle.

I don't disagree other than to say there are no absolutes. The formation I was in operates 4x4s that go in underslung but they are not for the stealthy recon elements but for the go-loud main body. I also stated in an earlier post that I think they will excel in the flat plateaus despite the lack of protection.

The long post was in reply to a scenario postulated as "They can certainly land troops and ShanMao at night time somewhere in Taiwan and not be detected (assuming they've already bombed it for a couple of weeks). They cannot use APC/IFVs because only ShanMao is designed to fit in the bellies of Z-8L and Mi-17s. With UCAV help other the top, I think they and UCAVs can help clear out the guarding force next to port or beach front ahead of an actual landing operation."

I thought I'd just add my personal experience pointing out (i) the constraints of trying to remain undetected and (ii) the terrain in Taiwan cos it seems people have a very different idea of what it is. There is very limited scope for use of wheeled mini-atvs in heavily forested areas.
 

tankphobia

Senior Member
Registered Member
They are armored against small arms fire. They don't have to be dropped by helicopters close to enemies. These ATVs can cover long distances on their own, so why would they be dropped off within earshot of adversaries?

I see these as great for counter terror operations in certain parts of central Asia. Terrains there are favorable and transports can land unseen and unheard on unprepared runways that lie miles and miles away from a terrorist camp or outpost. A few companies of light infantry can then move swiftly on these armored ATVs to close in on the terrorists.
I think they fill the same role as sand buggy in other militaries and thats great, but their nature (open top troop transport) limits them in the despicted scenario (mass assualt).

To re-iterate, I like the concept and functionality of the shanmao as a special ops vehicle, I just don't see it in a mass assualt role when everyone else is tending towards heavier MRAPs rather than going lighter.
 

supersnoop

Major
Registered Member
Why isn’t anyone thinking more for African countries (Toyota War) or fast response against an adversary like Boko Haram. Low cost, can pack a variety of firepower, continental desert/plains-grasslands terrain.
 

tphuang

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Let me start off by stating that this is what I trained for and have ground experience in.

I spent 15 years (2.5 active and the rest reserves) in a formation that specialises in amphib and heliborne ops. I was mainly doing Terminal Guidance (not quite TAG but similar) so I spent a lot of time doing small unit ops linking the bigger formations, often in the "opfor" rear area.

The above doesn't mean I'm right and you're not ... though I do struggle to wrap my head around your, to me, rather cavalier take on the above. I suppose there is always more than one way to skin a cat so I welcome your explanation of your POV.

Meantime, here's mine ...



I come from Singapore. It is no secret that our planning and training is an unstated focus on a conflict with Malaysia (even if just simply by virtue of it being the only "land" border we have).

Malaysia has a Volunteer Corp or Home Guard of almost 3 million members (less than 1% armed). Whatever their peacetime and other duties are, the one duty of theirs that is pertinent to this discussion and that my unit specifically takes into account is their role in wartime - which is to act as eyes and ears for the military in their rear area.

(remember the Taiwanese rich guy who wanted to privately fund training of 3million volunteers? people poo-poohed on that cos they approach it from the POV of trained and armed resistance but ... as a civilian ISR network?)

I can assure you that even if there is no electricity and fuel, ground level ISR provided by these volunteers is a factor you need to take into account. Do not for a moment think that their SOP does not take into account loss of modern comms. In this case, their intel may not be instant but it will still remain a present threat and you should never, never discount the ability of a patriot on a bicycle and his ability to bring grief, in the form of a military response onto you. (or a goatherd calling the local garrison onto a scud hunting patrol, but I digress)

I am also not debating the PLA's ability to achieve total, as in literally 100%, destruction of electricity, fuel and C3 except to state that one never gameplans success to be contingent on the above. You plan on the enemy having all of the above and then attempt to degrade them to increase chance of mission success. A plan reliant on total loss of fuel and C3 will be so totally screwed by even a single digit percentile retention of the above. The actual effect on the ground may be the same at the end but the direction of approach and mindset is vastly different.



It's also an open secret that the Singapore Armed Forces actually conducts training exercises in Taiwan. I have 3x2weeks of experience extensively walking the hinterlands of Southern Taiwan on military opex, the exact kind of areas you have any chance of an unobserved, helo insertion into.

And once on the ground in the hinterland, this is the kind of terrain your mini-ATV has to account for ...
View attachment 101411

Yes, we don't go through the forest 24/7 but even if take backroads/firetrails, we have to be ready to melt 15m+ into the treeline with any hint of oncoming. I don't quite see any ATV getting deep enough (or quietly enough) into that to be unnoticed.
View attachment 101412

and sometimes, like sometimes-too-often, you have to crossgrain the elevation #justbecause (eg, we have to bypass the village on that spur but still continue on the metal road) and it can get like this. Don't quite see any vehicles getting up/down the last slope. ...
View attachment 101413

Again, this is from the perspective of a small unit, behind lines, striving to remain unobserved which like I said, I spent quite a bit of time doing, even in Taiwan. The above pics are all internet sourced pics of Taiwan. I can't exactly use my own pics taken during OPEX but #trustmebro, it's similar. My observation is that outside of the heavily settled coastal region, the interior of Taiwan gets very hilly, very undergrown, very fast. Shanmao may be a mountain cat but it'll definitely struggle a fair bit to go where the legs are going.

Time and place for everything mate, time and place.
Hmm, no electricity, internet, phones, 2 weeks of food going bad and possible water poisoning. An army and police force that has been targeted by drones for 2 weeks and every important infrastructure building have been destroyed by pch191. None of the taiwanese armored vehicles are even moving because they are out of fuel. Every taiwanese troop movement is getting watched from above by Chinese attack helicopters and drones.

I have traveled around Taiwan my friend drove me around quite a bit. Not advocating landing on east side but rather west coast around where they look to seize a beach front ahead of an actual invasion, so the shan mao don't need to be doing much driving. They can entirely land near intended area at night time and defeat defense ahead of a large amphibious operation.
 

by78

General
Leaving Zhuhai.

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Builder

New Member
Registered Member
Do you think guys, that this 40 mm cta gun variant will once be in service in the PLA
air assault brigades or will this stay only for export?
 

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