Another round of analysis might suggest that an even higher cost multi mission
Perry class replacement would be prohibitive in comparison with the limited combat capability such ships deliver. The cost of the Australian
Hobart class destroyer program and recently released figures for the production of the Royal Navy’s Type 26 global combat ship (both European-style large frigate designs) support the supposition that a US-constructed medium capability combatant would cost at least $1 billion dollars a copy while providing about ½ the combat capability of the
Arleigh Burke class destroyer.
Some European states such as Denmark have built relatively inexpensive frigate-like ships, but made use of recycled, legacy equipment, outsourced key elements of construction to low cost, Eastern European builders, and sent the ships to sea without all of the equipment and armament in place; conditions the United States Navy would not duplicate.
The second course of action is the small, numerous fleet of 1000 ton, single mission frigates as proposed by members of the NPS faculty and the OSD Office of Net Assessment. This “New Navy Fighting Machine” (NNFM) concept is well detailed in force structure and operational concept, but significantly less in how it will be logistically supported when forward deployed. Its authors accept that there are limited numbers of combat logistics ships available to refuel and support a large force of single mission combatants, and only suggest that resources and support for them will inevitably be found if and when required.
The NNFM concept is at its heart operational and tactical, but does not address wider strategic concerns. It suggests that heavy lift ships, such as those they hauled the damaged frigates
Stark and
Samuel B. Roberts back to the U.S. from the Persian Gulf might be used to transport a substantial element of NNFM platforms to overseas locations.
The NNFM does not, however, suggest how this could be done in wartime against opposition. These small combatants would be, for all intents and purposes, strategically imprisoned within their regional environments and dependent on a large, and as of yet unbuilt logistics network. Those logistics ships would in turn require escort and protection, as would the regional bases and smaller logistics ships the NNFM would depend on for support during active combat operations. The NNFM also specifically says that small combatants should be “prepared to accept losses while achieving littoral water superiority”, a repetition of the same language that caused many in the Surface Warfare community to reject the larger LCS in the mid 2000’s.
This combination of logistics problems, lack of connection to wider U.S. Naval strategy, and accepted lack of survivability was rejected early in the LCS development process. It would do little good to revisit this concept in further analysis.
USS Fort Worth (LCS 3)
The last concept worth analytical consideration is that of the current LCS and its frigate variant. The Navy has, however, answered all of the chief criticisms of the program at different times over the last 12 years. Secretary Work states that the Navy (and presumably Congress at the time) accepted that the LCS would not have the same unrefueled range as the retiring FFG.
The high sprint speed was considered useful in moving the LCS rapidly within theater and to enable rapid concentration of multiple ships of the class from remote patrol locations.
LCS was expected to conduct antisubmarine operations and substantial rotary wing aviation facilities were considered absolutely necessary for that mission’s accomplishment. The smaller crew size was also well considered. The current
Cyclone class patrol coastal ships operate for extended period with a mere 28 person crew. There have certainly been many problems with elements of the LCS program. The initial cost of $220 million dollars platform was not realistic. Some of the equipment in both the sea frames and the modules was immature when programmed. The first two units (LCS 1 and 2) have very limited weight growth ability. PEO LCS is still "cleaning up" from significant program issues of the last decade. That said, there has been little outside analysis (beyond the examples presented here) supporting better ways the Navy could have solved the problem of multiple low level platforms reaching block obsolescence. While often decried in multiple venues, the analytical “virgin birth” of LCS was approved by senior Department of Defense officials with authority and responsibility over programmatic issues. Congress has endorsed the LCS program’s continuation on multiple occasions. It could be that LCS critics keep repeating the “virgin birth” accusation because they don’t like the result of those studies that were conducted.
LCS was built to a lower survivability standard than that of the
Perry’s from the perspective that unlike the frigate, it was not intended to sustain a hit and continue to fight due to its smaller physical size, and smaller crew available to conduct damage control. Network connectivity was also assumed to support survivability through advanced warning and the provision of an operational picture beyond that available from the LCS’ organic sensors.
Secretary Work points out that the current families of large naval ordnance (missiles and torpedoes) can just as easily sink a 10,000 ton
Ticonderoga class cruiser as it can an LCS. Survivability, as currently defined by the Navy in OPNAV Instruction 9070.1A, allocates only 1/3 of that concept to recovery from damage, and bases 2/3 on avoidance of attack and defeat of weapons that acquire a target vessel.
The
Perry class being replaced by the LCS is not the ship it was 15 years ago. It leaves service as globally deployable offshore patrol vessel with a heavy antisubmarine warfare capability. It is no longer a medium capable, multimillion warship as it was when first commissioned in the 1970's. There is no need to replace the 1979
Perry.
The recent Russian use of the
Gepard class frigates as launch platforms for a cruise missile strike on Syria will likely cause more criticism of the LCS concept and demands for more analysis.
The
Gepard’s are smaller than LCS, but have a much heavier armament than either LCS sea frame. Despite this difference, there is no need to demand that LCS or its frigate variant be immediately up-armed to perform the same capability as demonstrated by the
Gepard’s. The modular warship concept separates much of the ship’s potential armament in the form of modules in order to enable more upgrades and reduce both initial and long term costs of the LCS system. An LCS surface warfare or land attack module may eventually boast the same capabilities as the
Gepard. Modularity, hower, ensures that the LCS can continue to support new weapon systems throughout its lifespan, while frigates with dedicated weapon systems like the
Gepard langusih in growing obsolescence. Every Navy must designate missions for its warships incumbent with national requirements. Vessels of similar size and general appearance do not necessarily have the same missions. To assume that LCS must be able to perform every mission that like-sized warships built by other nations perform demonstrates a very immature understanding of seapower.
In short, the same questions now being asked by Congress regarding the LCS Program have been answered multiple times over the last dozen years. Another analysis of alternatives is not going to yield a different set of results, but will instead merely cost the taxpayers more money for the duplication of effort. LCS and its frigate variant still represent the best way forward for increasing the size of the U.S. surface fleet, and preserving multiple mission capabilities in a period of continuing financial constraints. There is no need to copy other small frigates like the
Gepard’s as the globally deployed and operational U.S. Navy has a fundamentally different set of tasks than regional fleets like that of Russia. The Navy needs to finalize the configuration and specifics of the LCS frigate variant, and Congress is well within its rights to demand those be submitted to the nation’s legislative body in an expeditious manner. The Navy needs to do a better job in educating members of the legislative branch in how the LCS concept will be implemented. Congress, however, needs to fund the frigate variant of the LCS to its full build in order to replace the now retired
Perry class frigates. It remains a variant of the LCS, not an entirely new class, and should not be subject to a complete repetition of the analysis of the last dozen years.
