Keyboard Warrior Syndrome 101: Talk tough on the internet, advocate war crimes, and blame operational and strategic failures on stuff like collateral damage considerations. I wanna see these people in a real fight and set a 20 second timer for the crying to start.
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As for "Lessons" from Ukraine, I had an email exchange with an American analyst recently, below is a copy/paste of my response to him which sums up Russia in Ukraine at a high level (it doesn't have every detail of the clusterfuck, which would require an entire book to be written):
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This is a classical conventional conflict, in which Russia has failed to apply classical conventional power. Again, it wasn't the Javelins, it was Russia's complete lack of effective combined arms application.
Russia based everything around their light BTG organization, which necessarily required them to use heavy supporting arms. But there were no heavy supporting arms and no air superiority. The RuAF was basically MIA, their artillery was used tactically instead of operationally (and not nearly at the volume required), and their cruise missile inventory was being rationed from the start. Russia was striking operational targets on Day 30 which should've been hit on Day 0.
BTGs aren't designed to break through resistance on their own. They need 1 of 2 conditions met (preferably both):
A) Neutralize tactical threats with Artillery+CAS on contact
B) Destroy the operational capability of the enemy before contact (i.e. the enemy's Logistics/C4I/AFBs etc.)
If Russia had accomplished either A or B (ideally both), its offensive would have succeeded. But it accomplished neither. So when the BTGs met resistance, the advance stalled, and because the enemy was still operational, their lines of communication became exposed. This is why the offensive in the North failed and Russia had to pull back.
The real failures were operational and strategic, which makes the tactical domain irrelevant. Javelins don't even enter into it. Maybe if they had done Operations well, and were still unable to deal with the few remaining Javelins on contact, you can consider the effect of ATGMs etc. but we didn't even get there. Operationally everything was done incorrectly, and strategically they launched at the wrong time, without knowing their own weaknesses and the enemy's strengths. This far outweighs tactical problems like Javelins (which by the way, aren't magic weapons, even IR smokescreens neutralize them.)
Offense requires a lot of skill i.e. great commanders who can come up with a valid war plan, and a well trained rank and file that can execute on their own initiative. Everyone (including Western analysts) had assumed Russia knew the basics of conventional warfare and had the tools to impose its will on Ukraine in a couple of months. Literally no one expected them to be this clueless, not even the Ukrainians.
The only way to fix these problems for Russia is to rebuild its entire Officer Training pipeline. They need to produce much better commanders who can recognize problems and come up with effective and elegant solutions to them. This is something most militaries in the world need to do actually, because this is a problem that most (if not all) militaries have, which is why most offensives usually fail, or are completely inefficiently planned and executed.
