Ladakh Flash Point

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Sardaukar20

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China wants India to pull back from the Kailash range.
Joint statement issued after talks makes no mention of "troop pull back" or "status quo ante"

By Ajai Shukla
Business Standard, 23rd Sept 20

Late on Tuesday evening, a full day after the conclusion of the 6th round of talks between Indian and Chinese military commanders, the two sides issued a joint statement that agreed to “earnestly implement the important consensus reached by the leaders of the two countries, strengthen communication on the ground, avoid misunderstandings, stop sending more troops to the frontline, refrain from unilaterally changing the situation on the ground and avoid taking any action that might complicate the situation.”

Notably, the statement made no mention of any of India’s core concerns: a troop pull-back by China and a reversion to the status quo ante of April.

Senior government sources say that, during Monday’s talks, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) hardened its stance, conveying to the Indian Army that it must vacate 5-6 tactically dominating heights it occupied south of the Pangong Tso lake. Only after that would the PLA consider any further withdrawal from areas that the Chinese have occupied.

On August 30, after the PLA began expanding its territorial hold south of the Pangong Tso, the Indian Army occupied “blocking positions” on the Kailash Range on Aug 30, in its first offensive action since the PLA trespassed across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in May.

These mountaintops are strung out, north-to-south, on the Kailash Range. They include the tactically vital Point 5167, Bump, Magar Hill, Rezang La, Reching La and Mukhpari.

By occupying these features, the Indian Army can observe Chinese activities across Pangong Lake, in the Spanggur Gap and on PLA-held features such as Helmet and Black Top. Indian control of these heights makes it difficult for the PLA to consider any westward advance into the India-held Chushul Bowl.

Indian military officers in Monday’s talks, including the outgoing commander of the Leh corps, Lieutenant General Harinder Singh, and his designated successor, Lieutenant General PGK Menon, flatly refused to withdraw from their advantageous positions, pointing out that these heights were all on territory that India had traditionally controlled and patrolled.

The Indian delegation, which also included the Ministry of External Affairs’ official in charge of the China desk, demanded the PLA withdraw from points of intrusion such as Pangong Tso, Gogra-Hot Springs and the approaches to Chushul. It is unclear whether the Indian side has also demanded a Chinese withdrawal from Depsang, where PLA troops have penetrated about 15 kilometres into India – the deepest point of intrusion.

Given this disagreement, the PLA delegation led by the South Xinjiang Military District chief, Major General Liu Lin, declined to discuss any pull back by Chinese troops.

With that, there remains little to show for the apparent consensus between the two foreign ministers – S Jaishankar and Wang Yi – who met in Moscow on September 10. In a five-point joint statement they agreed “the current situation in the border areas is not in the interests of either side… [and] that the border troops of both sides should continue their dialogue, quickly disengage, maintain proper distance and ease tensions.”

Instead of disengagement, the two sides have deployed an estimated 35,000 to 40,000 soldiers each along the LAC.

In the north, in the Depsang area, Indian planners say there are about 5,000 soldiers on the Indian side of the LAC, backed by another 5,000 on the Chinese side, equipped with tanks and air defence guns. Over time, the PLA has built roads and tracks to supply the troops that have crossed the LAC.

To the south of Depsang, the PLA has pulled out of the Galwan River valley but remains poised on the LAC with an estimated 8,000-9,000 soldiers along India’s Patrolling Point (PP) 14, PP 15, PP-17 and PP-17A (Gogra Post).

Another 2,000-3,000 Chinese soldiers are deployed across the LAC from PP-18 to PP-23 in the Ane Le area.

South of Ane La, on the north bank of Pangong Tso, where the PLA has pushed the LAC westwards by about eight kilometres, Indian officials estimate there are about 2,500 Chinese soldiers on the north bank and another 10,000 on the south bank, facing off against Indian soldiers on the Ladakh Range.

Finally, there is a major build up of about 250 tanks and other armoured vehicles in the Spanggur Lake area.

In a worrying development for the Indian Air Force (IAF), Indian planners are evaluating the veracity of reports that the PLA has already deployed a regiment of state-of-the-art S-400 air defence missiles opposite the Chumar area; and another regiment is being moved into the Depsang sector.

The Russian S-400 missile regiments, which can accurately strike Indian aircraft at ranges out to 400 kilometres, would allow the PLA to substantially neutralize the IAF’s advantage in air power.

The joint statement left the path for dialogue open, mentioning that the two sides agreed to hold the 7th round of Military Commander-Level Meetings as soon as possible.” No date has been fixed for the talks.
So in Shukla's view:

1) India flatly refuse to withdraw from any 'advantages heights' captured from the Chinese side. Because its their 'traditional Indian territory'.

2) But India demands PLA to withdraw from all 'occupied' areas.

It seems that he and India thinks the whole place is theirs. I think the negotiations are going nowhere. India is still playing bully with China.

If nothing progresses. Perhaps in time, the PLA should send a task force to evict the invading Indian soldiers. This task force must be covered by air and long range support. If these Indian soldiers open fire, then they must be swiftly wiped out. Record this firing incident and prepare to announce it in public if India goes nuts. Then we shall see if India truly wants this war.
 

Bright Sword

Junior Member
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So in Shukla's view:

1) India flatly refuse to withdraw from any 'advantages heights' captured from the Chinese side. Because its their 'traditional Indian territory'.

2) But India demands PLA to withdraw from all 'occupied' areas.

It seems that he and India thinks the whole place is theirs. I think the negotiations are going nowhere. India is still playing bully with China.

If nothing progresses. Perhaps in time, the PLA should send a task force to evict the invading Indian soldiers. This task force must be covered by air and long range support. If these Indian soldiers open fire, then they must be swiftly wiped out. Record this firing incident and prepare to announce it in public if India goes nuts. Then we shall see if India truly wants this war.

So called "capturing" heights makes good headlines but do heights really matter in this day and age?
1. If heights are for observation then drones with rotating cameras can pretty much do the same thing guided from down below.
2. If heights are for firing positions then fire-finder radar, drones, or aerostat balloons can do the same thing. With co-ordinates known and coupled with Baidou GPS a ground based artillery or missile crew can pretty much hit anything when firing "out of sight" beyond a mountain range ( keeping a 45 degree angle of the barrels or rocket launch racks). If the enemy artillery observer is sitting on the heights trying to direct counter battery fire he is toast if his communications RF emissions are pinpointed by radio location.
3. Supplying food and water to the occupying troops sitting on a bare cold icy mountain top is no easy task.

Ultimately what is gained by "capturing " heights when an enemy can observe you and dislodge you easily?
 
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siegecrossbow

General
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So called "capturing" heights makes good headlines but do heights really matter in this day and age?
1. If heights are for observation then drones with rotating cameras can pretty much do the same thing guided from down below.
2. If heights are for firing positions then fire-finder radar, drones, or aerostat balloons can do the same thing. With co-ordinates known and coupled with Baidou GPS a ground based artillery or missile crew can pretty much hit anything when firing "out of sight" beyond a mountain range ( keeping a 45 degree angle of the barrels or rocket launch racks). If the enemy artillery observer is sitting on the heights trying to direct counter battery fire he is toast if his communications RF emissions are pinpointed by radio location.
3. Supplying food and water to the occupying troops sitting on a bare cold icy mountain top is no easy task.

Ultimately what is gained by "capturing " heights when an enemy can observe you and dislodge you easily?

India doesn’t have that many drones.
 

Waqar Khan

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Our Syndicate did an analysis of scenarios arising out of current standoff in Ladakh..with the title 'Whither Ladakh'
Read the article and comment.
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As freezing Himalayan winters approach and both sides of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) become infested with troops, tanks, artillery, logistic convoys and buzzing jets, the Indian army hunkers down to watch her forces get sucked into the mountains, valleys and gorges. There is anxiety and an element of fear in the Indian military war rooms; ill-prepared and disillusioned commanders huddling to make urgent contingency plans under pressure of losing precious time.

In a previous article on “Chinese Cold Start in Ladakh,” we argued that the Chinese were able to create a military ecosystem in the inhospitable terrain and weather of Ladakh sector, ensuring a quick assembly of forces by using rail, road and air transportation systems and unnerving the opponent. The Chinese military had virtually paralysed the Indian political and military leadership and the third largest military spender of the world seems to have no utility of its military in defending the border of the so-called Asia Pivot.

In another piece published in The Express Tribune on “Brass Tacks of Indian Military Leadership”, we highlighted that despite the passage of four months of Chinese incursions, Indian army commanders, from Army Headquarters to Brigades, had miserably failed to mount a suitable tactical or operational response, which indicates a poorly trained and demoralised chain of command. While giving credit to Col Babu and his subordinates who lost their lives in the boulders of Galwan River, Indian intelligence establishment and military leadership have been thoroughly exposed for its poor foresight, bad planning, lack of decision-making and paralysis of the entire chain of command.

Some of the Western and Indian opinion-makers and defence analysts have discussed the future scenarios. We have also tried to glean through Chinese media so as to peep into minds of Chinese politico military leadership. This paper looks ahead, mainly covering strategic and operational options available to both sides and how the coming winters would test the leadership.

Strategically, China is in a comfortable military position, PLA has reclaimed 1,000 square kilometres in four sectors including Depsang Plains, Gogra, Galwan and Pangong Tso Lake and have increased pressure along five additional but critical pain points of Chushul-Darbuk, Himachal, Sikkim, Doklam and Arunachal Pradesh. Chinese echo system across the LAC houses major upgraded airbases, heliports, drone and quadcopter hubs, field hospitals and state-of-the-art logistic bases. PLA and People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) have conducted live firing exercises regularly and Chinese military media has displayed a smart, robust and technically superior force, which could be unleashed across the LAC within hours.

Apparently, Chinese diplomatic and military engagement and talks with Indian counterparts have made it clear that de-escalation is only possible if the Indian army withdraws beyond the Mao claim line of 1959, which the PLA after routing the Indian army, reached in 1962 war and from which PLA graciously pulled back — that’s almost 15 to 30 kilometres behind the current holding line of Indian 14th Corps.

The Indian army neither mounted any tactical or operational response in the past four months nor displayed any will to fight. Indian Godi media has tried to build a fake facade of bravado and rhetoric. Most of their defence analysts have been busy in projecting basic SOPs, defensive deployments and logistics build-up as military operations. While this may be politically motivated to cover the faux pas by military commanders and to keep the 1,300 million poor Indian population in good humour, no one is willing to buy the Indian military narrative of so-called mirror deployment as military operations. Let us discuss some military scenarios:

Scenario 1; status quo: Indian politico military leadership absorbs the shame and contends with an extended standoff, implying that LAC becomes something similar to the Indo-Pak Line of Control (LoC). Indian leadership would try to convince the public that since the LAC is a perception line, India has held the ground and not lost something worthwhile — after all Ladakh’s freezing mountainous desert has no economic potential.

This scenario has serious implications for Indian prestige in the comity of nations. After all, India as the new darling of the West is being projected as the Asian pivot, which is supposed to become the lynchpin in the next cold war against China. For China, it will be a win-win situation, as she has achieved her immediate objective of discrediting India through an astute and classic Sun Tzu manoeuvre, without firing a shot. This scenario will also set the future stage — China will emerge as the pre-eminent military power in the region and beyond having exposed the third largest military in the world for being unable to defend few boulders and mountains in Ladakh. Since the status quo will have to be quietly agreed by Indian politico military leadership, it will allow China to come back again and push India for Mao’s claim line of 1959, so practically status quo scenario does not help India in any way and keeps its military permanently deployed on the new LoC.

Militarily, India will have to bear a humongous cost of deploying almost a third of its army and half of its air force along the new Himalayan LoC, military equipment wears out fast in harsh terrain and India will have to spend billions of additional dollars on maintaining current force posture.

Scenario 2; limited conflict, short of limited war (Kargil redux):
Either by design or default or due to miscalculation, a tactical military commander, under pressure, launches a military operation across the LAC. This could lead to snowballing effect and start a shooting conflict, short of a limited war.

This scenario has drastic implications for Indian military as the conflict may expand to entire LAC across the Himalayas, from Daulat Beg Oldie to Arunachal Pradesh. China has already considered this scenario and the pressure on additional four pain points mentioned above has been maintained to stretch the Indian army. China has publicly claimed that she does not recognise Arunachal Pradesh and it is actually South Tibet. PLA and PLAAF’s military echo system allows it to launch pin pricks and reclaiming the Mao claim line of 1959; Chinese military had displayed in 1962 that it had the will and wherewithal to conduct a multi-directional advance in the Himalayan terrain, PLA of 2020 is an efficient war machine and its ability to rout Indian army should not be downplayed.

Limited conflict could also see some maritime operation in the Indian Ocean, disrupting Indian trade and commerce and losses of Indian navy. The financial cost of this conflict could cripple Indian economy, which is trying to survive at 24% quarterly negative growth

This scenario could also cause further losses of India and set the stage for disintegration of Indian Union as oppressed communities like Khalistanis, Nagas, Kukis, Gorkhas, Naxals, Dravidians and Kashmiris may find an opportunity to get rid of Hindutva cabal sitting on the Raj Path.

In a nutshell, Indian military options are no more than Zugzwang options, that is, choosing the least bad option from a set of bad options. Does the Indian military have the stomach and the will to choose any of these options?


Published in The Express Tribune, September 26th, 2020.
 
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Sardaukar20

Captain
Registered Member
So called "capturing" heights makes good headlines but do heights really matter in this day and age?
1. If heights are for observation then drones with rotating cameras can pretty much do the same thing guided from down below.
2. If heights are for firing positions then fire-finder radar, drones, or aerostat balloons can do the same thing. With co-ordinates known and coupled with Baidou GPS a ground based artillery or missile crew can pretty much hit anything when firing "out of sight" beyond a mountain range ( keeping a 45 degree angle of the barrels or rocket launch racks). If the enemy artillery observer is sitting on the heights trying to direct counter battery fire he is toast if his communications RF emissions are pinpointed by radio location.
3. Supplying food and water to the occupying troops sitting on a bare cold icy mountain top is no easy task.

Ultimately what is gained by "capturing " heights when an enemy can observe you and dislodge you easily?
Absolutely correct. Capturing heights for observation or for tactical reasons is so 1960s. A drone is way superior for that kind of mission. Of course the Indian Army don't seem to get it. These heights have little military value against the PLA of 2020. Drones can easily observe and direct munitions on these places easily.

The sticking point for China is that these heights that the IA are occupying are within Chinese territory. So its a matter of sovereignty, not military tactics. The PLA won't give a damn if IA soldiers sat on heights on the Indian side of the border and look down on them from there.

Another flawed Shukla's view of the Chinese S-400s:
In a worrying development for the Indian Air Force (IAF), Indian planners are evaluating the veracity of reports that the PLA has already deployed a regiment of state-of-the-art S-400 air defence missiles opposite the Chumar area; and another regiment is being moved into the Depsang sector.

The Russian S-400 missile regiments, which can accurately strike Indian aircraft at ranges out to 400 kilometres, would allow the PLA to substantially neutralize the IAF’s advantage in air power.

Well it doesn't matter if this alleged S-400 deployment is true or false.

1) First of all he seems to think that the S-400s are the only Chinese SAM system that could threaten the IAF. What about all those HQ-9s and its medium and short ranged brethren already deployed in the area? He seems to forget that the HQ-9s are paired with superior AESA radars than the S-400s PESA radars. And while HQ-9s have shorter max range than S-400s, they are deployed at substantially high altitudes. So the max range could be further than on paper. And the PLA have practiced using them at these altitudes. Off course, the S-400s could perform better there, but Shukla is giving no credit to the other Chinese SAMs in the area. A big strategic miscalculation.

2) Second, what IAF 'advantage in air power'? Sure the IAF is formidable, but having an advantage over the PLAAF of WTC? What is he smoking? I think this matter have been discussed a lot in this thread already. So, no need to go further. But a quick word for Shukla: the Pakistan Airforce in 2019 didn't even "feel" anything of that IAF "advantage in air power". What do you have to say about that?

Its amusing to see a 'well respected' Indian military strategist thinking like that. Gives everyone relief that India is not going to win any war with China anytime soon.
 

Waqar Khan

Junior Member
Registered Member
Absolutely correct. Capturing heights for observation or for tactical reasons is so 1960s. A drone is way superior for that kind of mission. Of course the Indian Army don't seem to get it. These heights have little military value against the PLA of 2020. Drones can easily observe and direct munitions on these places easily.

The sticking point for China is that these heights that the IA are occupying are within Chinese territory. So its a matter of sovereignty, not military tactics. The PLA won't give a damn if IA soldiers sat on heights on the Indian side of the border and look down on them from there.

Another flawed Shukla's view of the Chinese S-400s:


Well it doesn't matter if this alleged S-400 deployment is true or false.

1) First of all he seems to think that the S-400s are the only Chinese SAM system that could threaten the IAF. What about all those HQ-9s and its medium and short ranged brethren already deployed in the area? He seems to forget that the HQ-9s are paired with superior AESA radars than the S-400s PESA radars. And while HQ-9s have shorter max range than S-400s, they are deployed at substantially high altitudes. So the max range could be further than on paper. And the PLA have practiced using them at these altitudes. Off course, the S-400s could perform better there, but Shukla is giving no credit to the other Chinese SAMs in the area. A big strategic miscalculation.

2) Second, what IAF 'advantage in air power'? Sure the IAF is formidable, but having an advantage over the PLAAF of WTC? What is he smoking? I think this matter have been discussed a lot in this thread already. So, no need to go further. But a quick word for Shukla: the Pakistan Airforce in 2019 didn't even "feel" anything of that IAF "advantage in air power". What do you have to say about that?

Its amusing to see a 'well respected' Indian military strategist thinking like that. Gives everyone relief that India is not going to win any war with China anytime soon.
I think,Col Ajai Shukla makes a fine point..Pakistan responded within 24 hours to IAF tree strike in Balakot on 27th Feb 2019 and shot down two Indian jets with Abhinandan as a solid proof..this was called Operation Swift Retort and PAF did it in broad daylight..Why Indian Military failed to up the ante after that is a proof that Pakistani Military strategists had appreciated that a hard slap on Indian Military's face will draw no further response,so PAF re-established the status quo on Pakistani terms.Swift retort was ,probably,studied by PLA and PLAAF in detail and PLA's Cold Strategy against Indian army in Ladakh was a result of this analysis.
 

ougoah

Brigadier
Registered Member
Indeed the fact that India stopped acting and responding after PAF handed IAF such an obvious defeat (however not so obvious to Hindutva), was proof enough that PAF was vastly superior to IAF in the way that IAF and Indian military leadership were not even confident in escalating towards attrition which may lead to nuclear exchanges. So essentially it was all proof that PAF was superior to IAF at the very least in limited engagements. Even all out, the PAF should be able to take on just about all of IAF if we're honest. The Su-30MKIs are almost useless against JF-17 and F-16. It's like a Su-27SK/J-11A against a Gripen C ;) (with the Gripen dominating the larger older fighter). So long as those MKIs are swatted long range by JF-17 and F-16, IAF has nothing to throw against the PAF except sheer numbers. Those Rafales could not come fast enough for IAF.

They have nothing that would give them superiority in the air even over the JF-17 + 1990s and 2000s F-16. These guys somehow think they stand half a chance against PLAAF. Sorry IAF does not enjoy any advantage except for more numbers of fighters positioned in the region and more airfields at a lower altitude. These won't translate to superiority over regional PLAAF assets and it seems like the Indians know it well enough.

CCP may have not expected the IAF to be so weak back in 2019 and Xi Jinping probably also didn't expect the Indian response to the Ladakh dispute to be as weak as it was with Modi even going as far as to deny losing territory using the typical bhakt word games. Of course India wasn't intruded into. It merely lost half of the territory it has been claiming for the last 70 odd years, in a region that has always been under dispute since the founding of both nations.
 
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