Is this not a time of tension? And insofar as the surge goes, there has been increased deployment of J-11s and a few JH-7 and H-6H (apparently not H-6K as previously thought). Granted, there are some strike elements in the mix, but within the overall deployment picture, it has mostly been air-to-air assets that were mobilized. Whether the PLAAF will play a supportive or an organic interdiction role remains to be seen (and hopefully never seen).
Our discussion isn't an IAF vs PLAAF comparison but rather that of the deployed assets relevant to this conflict, so it's not worth bringing up the 100+ H-6Ks in the PLAAF inventory or even its other strike platforms. I don't think we need a discussion to understand that the IAF, as a whole, does not match the PLAAF in either technology or quantity. AFAIK the PLAAF forward-deployed H-6H and JH-7 aircraft are each in single-digit quantities. The 200-km-range KD-88s do not have TERCOM or DSMAC capabilities that allow it remain low during cruise so as to avoid IAF radar. Neither do the KD-63/B ALCMs that the H-6Hs carry.
And I was mistaken in believing that the H-6 variant deployed at Kashgar was the CJ-10-capable "K" version; they were in fact the much older "H" iteration that is only compatible with the 200-km-range KD-63B.
So in this respect the Rafales and their complementary Storm Shadows do give the IAF a strike advantage against the PLAAF hardware in the region. And while the PLAAF is certainly capable of reaching targets within India, that alone doesn't preclude the IAF from hitting critical PLAAF/PLAGF infrastructure deep within China. This alone might sway the perspective which PLA brass holds of India's forces.
Again, this isn't a discussion about the IAF vs PLAAF as a whole. I agree that 5 Rafales (even 36 for that matter) do not put a dent in the technology and numerical advantage that the PLAAF enjoys over its Indian counterpart, but within the realm of the Ladakh standoff things are less lopsided. A good analogy would be the Argentinian air force vs the RAF during the Falklands war.
One could argue that the PLAAF could merely deploy more forces in the region should the need arise, but so far we haven't seen a significant shift of their higher-end units to southern airbases (correct me if I'm wrong). No massive buildup of J-16/J-10B/C/H-6K have occurred in regions close to Hotan AB or Kashgar AB. Additionally, if conflict does break out at a moment's notice, PLAAF aircraft deployed elsewhere might not make it in time to have as major of an influence as they would've had they been deployed to Hotan/Kashgar in the first place.
I think you make a valid point regarding any counterattacks the PLAAF might mount (reminds me of IAF's response to PAF during the 65 war), but that prospect has to be weighed against the amount of interest each nation has in sustaining such a conflict as well as the acceptable damage that each military is willing to bear.
An IAF surprise strike, or even a "riposte" in response to a PLA/AF operation, could put a major dent in the PLA's ability to conduct operations as effectively as some SDF/PDF members believe they could.
So, none of this really adds anything more to what I wrote, which I had specifically bookended with these two parts:
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In so far as being "invulnerable" to a surprise air attack is concerned, there are few nations that border each other which are "immune". A limited scope, high intensity cross border strike with limited objectives is not difficult to do and the nature of contemporary offensive weapons and the relative permeability of modern IADS + CAP + AEW&C means it is quite feasible to conduct one or even multiple probing attacks that manages to catch a tactically unprepared enemy off guard."
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So if your argument is that the IAF has the potential to carry out some sort of surprise first strike, I'm not in disagreement with that, in so much as that carrying out cross border surprise first strikes is not exactly difficult in this day and age.
But in so far as the force on force balance of A2A, A2G, and airborne force multipliers go -- unless your hypothetical first strike is able to render the bulk of the WTC's air fields inoperable for a significant period of time (and frankly they'd probably have to hit CTC as well) -- the resultant PLA combat air surge in terms of the quality of capabilities they bring to the table but also the quantity of capabilities they can field, would be capable of a significant riposte outstripping the scope of what the IAF's own rather limited strike capabilities are able to offer. "
You're basically asking if a surprise aerial offensive might be able to cause damage to the PLA's posture in the WTC, in which case the answer is obviously yes, but that's bordering on a strawman argument considering how viable it is to conduct surprise aerial offensives in this day and age.
The ability to thwart and counterattack these sort of surprise offensives becomes one of strategic/political assessments of the opfor's intentions and threat that it poses at any given time informed by strategic and political intelligence, which in turn determines your own readiness level and deployment patterns.
WRT a few of the other points you've brought up, which don't really alter the arguments I raised before;
- Yes, we've seen temporary deployments of combined aerial forces to the region in the recent past. Not a permanent fixture, which goes to show what the strategic perception of the risk of conflict and threat index is. In June they deployed forces of J-16s, J-11Bs, with AEW&C and standoff jamming support when things were slightly more dicey.
- H-6Ks have the combat radius and the weapons range to operate from other theater commands and still hit targets hundreds of km inside Indian borders. Obviously they would be relevant in any such contingency even without being directly based in the relevant TC.
- The only reason I described the totality of the PLA's H-6K fleet in this context is because you seem to be bringing the entire IAF's modern strike capable fleet into this discussion.
If you don't want to bring in air force versus air force comparisons (or in the PLA's case, even in event of a true contingency only a fraction of their overall fleet would be relevant in this event), that's fine, but the PLA doesn't normally deploy a significant air force in being in the WTC normally out of deliberate choice, so your assessments of each side's strategic options and calculus should be done so in that context.
So going back to your previous post that I replied to, where you claimed that you doubt the PLAAF might be able to steamroll the IAF if the standoff turned hot, well... your only argument for it is basically a surprise attack, but you seem unsure if it would be small in scale or large in scale.
If it's smaller in scale, then the scale and speed of rapid PLA riposte would be something to behold even with a relatively small fraction of its total force.
If it's larger in scale, then you'd have to hope that Chinese strategic and political intelligence didn't catch wind of it first (and you'd even have to have the political and military stomach for it in the first place), and even assuming everything in the operation went right, you are now facing a PRC that is going to organize a heck of a counter attack in that direction that is willing to shift much more of its assets from other TCs into the west than in the small scale scenario. And great, if you're India, you've now started a large scale war where China will seek its pound of flesh.
In both scenarios, the units that the PLA would be allocating its counter attack with would be derived from elements of its out-of-region air force, because that's the way their strategic deployment in the region is organized.
And in both scenarios, but especially in the large scale scenario, the political stomach to fire the first shot and attempt a surprise offensive is hardly something that one can just handwave like it's a persistent possibility to always be on the lookout for. You have intelligence services for a reason.
