The nature of the regional geography and higher priority strategic directions means the PLA will never deploy the majority of its combat aviation force to the western strategic direction during peacetime, but that they retain the potential to surge aircraft and munitions into the theater during times of tension or conflict.
Is this not a time of tension? And insofar as the surge goes, there has been increased deployment of J-11s and a few JH-7 and H-6H (apparently not H-6K as previously thought). Granted, there are some strike elements in the mix, but within the overall deployment picture, it has mostly been air-to-air assets that were mobilized. Whether the PLAAF will play a supportive or an organic interdiction role remains to be seen (and hopefully never seen).
In so far as the aircraft capable of strike are concerned, I'm slightly confused as to your weighting of respective IAF and PLAAF A2G strike capabilities.
While the IAF's Rafales are able to carry Storm Shadows, and they are a capable powered stand off strike capability (though of course rather limited in quantity), the rest of the IAF lacks powered stand off strike munitions at all (unless you count the handful of Su-30MKIs with Brahmos integration, and sure, for the purposes of discussion why not include them).
OTOH, the PLA has some, what 100+ H-6Ks each carrying six KD-20 ALCMs with stand off range that we can even conservatively put at over 1500km, and then there are all of the PLA's JH-7As, J-16s and J-10B/Cs are all KD-88 compatible as well? This isn't to say that it wouldn't be nice if all of the PLA's tactical fighters were compatible with a 500km+ range stand off missile as well, but the 200km range offered by KD-88 and the sheer variety of platforms it is integrated on makes it a very flexible weapon as well.
And of course this is ignoring ground based launch systems (whether it be GLCM or perhaps more messily, SRBMs/IRBMs, so for the purposes of discussion perhaps ignore these for now).
Our discussion isn't an IAF vs PLAAF comparison but rather that of the deployed assets relevant to this conflict, so it's not worth bringing up the 100+ H-6Ks in the PLAAF inventory or even its other strike platforms. I don't think we need a discussion to understand that the IAF, as a whole, does not match the PLAAF in either technology or quantity. AFAIK the PLAAF forward-deployed H-6H and JH-7 aircraft are each in single-digit quantities. The 200-km-range KD-88s do not have TERCOM or DSMAC capabilities that allow it remain low during cruise so as to avoid IAF radar. Neither do the KD-63/B ALCMs that the H-6Hs carry.
And I was mistaken in believing that the H-6 variant deployed at Kashgar was the CJ-10-capable "K" version; they were in fact the much older "H" iteration that is only compatible with the 200-km-range KD-63B.
So in this respect the Rafales and their complementary Storm Shadows do give the IAF a strike advantage against the PLAAF hardware in the region. And while the PLAAF is certainly capable of reaching targets within India, that alone doesn't preclude the IAF from hitting critical PLAAF/PLAGF infrastructure deep within China. This alone might sway the perspective which PLA brass holds of India's forces.
Even in terms of AEW&C, the PLA could afford to deploy just a quarter of its total fleet of KJ-2000s+KJ-200s+KJ-500s and it would outmatch the entire IAF's current AEW&C fleet, and we are not even considering the use of other force multipliers here like ELINT/SIGINT or stand off jamming platforms.
In terms of tactical combat air, I don't think anyone would dismiss the capability of AESA equipped Rafales with Meteors, but again it's a matter of scale.
Having 36 AESA equipped fighter jets or order with a modern high end BVRAAM in service is neat in TYOOL 2020, but the PLA has 300ish AESA equipped J-16s and J-10Cs that are PL-15 compatible (leaving aside J-20s for sporting reasons). And all of this doesn't consider the role that J-11Bs and J-10As would play of course, which field the PL-12 which are less capable than PL-15 or Meteor, but still very much in the "superior-to-R-77-category" that forms the bulk of the IAF's BVRAAM inventory, and of course the effectiveness of which is multiplied further by the depth and scale of your AEW&C fleet.
Again, this isn't a discussion about the IAF vs PLAAF as a whole. I agree that 5 Rafales (even 36 for that matter) do not put a dent in the technology and numerical advantage that the PLAAF enjoys over its Indian counterpart, but within the realm of the Ladakh standoff things are less lopsided. A good analogy would be the Argentinian air force vs the RAF during the Falklands war.
One could argue that the PLAAF could merely deploy more forces in the region should the need arise, but so far we haven't seen a significant shift of their higher-end units to southern airbases (correct me if I'm wrong). No massive buildup of J-16/J-10B/C/H-6K have occurred in regions close to Hotan AB or Kashgar AB. Additionally, if conflict does break out at a moment's notice, PLAAF aircraft deployed elsewhere might not make it in time to have as major of an influence as they would've had they been deployed to Hotan/Kashgar in the first place.
So if your argument is that the IAF has the potential to carry out some sort of surprise first strike, I'm not in disagreement with that, in so much as that carrying out cross border surprise first strikes is not exactly difficult in this day and age.
But in so far as the force on force balance of A2A, A2G, and airborne force multipliers go -- unless your hypothetical first strike is able to render the bulk of the WTC's air fields inoperable for a significant period of time (and frankly they'd probably have to hit CTC as well) -- the resultant PLA combat air surge in terms of the quality of capabilities they bring to the table but also the quantity of capabilities they can field, would be capable of a significant riposte outstripping the scope of what the IAF's own rather limited strike capabilities are able to offer.
I think you make a valid point regarding any counterattacks the PLAAF might mount (reminds me of IAF's response to PAF during the 65 war), but that prospect has to be weighed against the amount of interest each nation has in sustaining such a conflict as well as the acceptable damage that each military is willing to bear.
An IAF surprise strike, or even a "riposte" in response to a PLA/AF operation, could put a major dent in the PLA's ability to conduct operations as effectively as some SDF/PDF members believe they could.[/QUOTE]