ISIS/ISIL conflict in Syria/Iraq (No OpEd, No Politics)

delft

Brigadier
From The Washington Post:
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U.S.-backed Syria rebels routed by fighters linked to al-Qaeda

By Liz Sly November 2 at 10:25 PM

BEIRUT — The Obama administration’s Syria strategy suffered a major setback Sunday after fighters linked to al-Qaeda routed U.S.-backed rebels from their main northern strongholds, capturing significant quantities of weaponry, triggering widespread defections and ending hopes that Washington will readily find Syrian partners in its war against the Islamic State.

Moderate rebels who had been armed and trained by the United States either surrendered or defected to the extremists as the Jabhat al-Nusra group, affiliated with al-Qaeda, swept through the towns and villages the moderates controlled in the northern province of Idlib, in what appeared to be a concerted push to vanquish the moderate Free Syrian Army, according to rebel commanders, activists and analysts.

Other moderate fighters were on the run, headed for the Turkish border as the extremists closed in, heralding a significant defeat for the rebel forces Washington had been counting on as a bulwark against the Islamic State.

Moderates still retain a strong presence in southern Syria, but the Islamic State has not been a major factor there.

A senior Defense Department official said the Pentagon “is monitoring developments as closely as possible” but could “not independently verify” reports from the ground. The official was not authorized to comment publicly and spoke on the condition of anonymity.

Jabhat al-Nusra has long been regarded by Syrians as less radical than the breakaway Islamic State faction, and it had participated alongside moderate rebels in battles against the Islamic State earlier this year. But it is also on the U.S. list of terrorist organizations and is the only group in Syria that has formally declared its allegiance to the mainstream al-Qaeda leadership.

A Jabhat al-Nusra base was one of the first targets hit when the United States launched its air war in Syria in September, and activists said the tensions fueled by that attack had contributed to the success of the group’s push against the moderate rebels.

“When American airstrikes targeted al-Nusra, people felt solidarity with them because Nusra are fighting the regime, and the strikes are helping the regime,” said Raed al-Fares, an activist leader in Kafr Nabel, in Idlib.

“Now people think that whoever in the Free Syrian Army gets support from the U.S.A. is an agent of the regime,” he said.

Fleeing rebel fighters said they feared the defeat would spell the end of the Free Syrian Army, the umbrella name used by the moderate rebel groups that the United States has somewhat erratically sought to promote as an alternative both to the Assad regime and the extremist Islamic State.

Among the groups whose bases were overrun in the assault was Harakat Hazm, the biggest recipient of U.S. assistance offered under a small-scale, covert CIA program launched this year, including the first deliveries of U.S.-made TOW antitank missiles. The group’s headquarters outside the village of Khan Subbul was seized by Jabhat al-Nusra overnight Saturday, after rebel fighters there surrendered their weapons and fled without a fight, according to residents in the area.

Hussam Omar, a spokesman for Harakat Hazm, refused to confirm whether American weaponry had been captured by the al-Qaeda affiliate because, he said, negotiations with Jabhat al-Nusra are underway.

Harakat Hazm, whose name means “Steadfastness Movement,” had also received small arms and ammunition alongside non-lethal aid in the form of vehicles, food and uniforms from the United States and its European and Persian Gulf Arab allies grouped as the Friends of Syria alliance. Scores of its fighters had received U.S. training in Qatar under the covert program, but it was also not possible to confirm whether any of those fighters had defected to the al-Qaeda affiliate.

Another Western-backed group, the Syrian Revolutionary Front, on Saturday gave up its bases in Jabal al-Zawiya, a collection of mountain villages that had been under the control of the pro-American warlord Jamal Maarouf since 2012. A video posted on YouTube showed Jabhat al-Nusra fighters unearthing stockpiles of weaponry at Maarouf’s headquarters in his home town of Deir Sunbul.

In a separate video, Maarouf, addressing the Jabhat al-Nusra leadership, said he fled along with those of his men who had not defected, “to preserve the blood of civilians, because you behead people and slaughter them if they do not obey you.”

The loss of northern Idlib province could prove a crippling blow to the moderate rebels, whose fight against Assad’s regime began in 2012 and has since been complicated by the rise of rival Islamist groups with goals very different from those of the original revolutionaries.

Idlib was the last of the northern Syrian provinces where the Free Syrian Army maintained a significant presence, and groups there had banded together in January to eject the Islamic State in the first instance in which Syrians had turned against the extremist radicals.

Most of the rest of northern Syria is controlled by the Islamic State, apart from a small strip of territory around the city of Aleppo. There the rebels are fighting to hold at bay both the Islamic State and the forces of the Assad government, and the defeat in Idlib will further isolate those fighters.

Perhaps most significant, it will complicate the task of finding Syrian allies willing to join the fight against the Islamic State, said Charles Lister of the Qatar-based Brookings Doha Center.

“The United States and its allies are depending very strongly on having armed organizations on the ground to call upon to fight the Islamic State, and now those groups have taken a very significant defeat,” he said.

Although some groups have already been receiving U.S. support, it was never sufficient to tilt the balance of power on the ground, Lister said. “This sends a message that Western support doesn’t equal success,” he added.

The limited assistance program already underway is expected to be supplemented by a bigger, overt, $500 million program to train and equip moderate rebels that was first announced by President Obama in June and that has become a central component of the U.S. strategy to confront the Islamic State.

But U.S. officials have said it could be months before the program starts, and longer before it takes effect, thereby giving an incentive to the moderates’ foes to challenge them before any significant help arrives.

Although the administration has long voiced its support for the rebel fighters, direct U.S. aid to them has been slow and scant, with weapons shipments and a CIA training program limited by the need to vet the fighters for any ties to militants.

More extensive aid to the rebels has also been withheld in the interest of promoting a negotiated political solution that would remove Assad from power while leaving Syrian institutions, including the military, intact.

In public remarks last week, national security adviser Susan E. Rice acknowledged that the U.S.-backed rebels “are fighting a multifront conflict, which is obviously taking a real toll on them.” The expanded military train-and-equip mission, Rice said, “is, in the first instance, going to enable them to fend off ISIL, but it is also designed and originated with the concept of trying to help create conditions on the ground that are conducive to negotiations. And that means helping them in their conflict against Assad as well.”

Meanwhile, the extension of the air war to Syria in September has drawn widespread complaints from moderate rebels that their goal of ousting the Assad regime is being shunted aside in the effort to fight the Islamic State, which is also known as ISIL. Anecdotal evidence that the airstrikes have indirectly aided the Assad government in its efforts to crush the rebellion has further fueled resentment.

Besides southern Syria, where the Islamic State has not established a significant foothold, moderate groups are also still fighting in scattered pockets around Damascus. But the U.S. campaign against the Islamic State is focused on the northern part of the country, where the group has entrenched itself across vast areas of territory for more than a year.


Suzan Haidamous in Beirut and Karen DeYoung in Washington contributed to this report.

Liz Sly is the Post’s Beirut bureau chief. She has spent more than 15 years covering the Middle East, including the Iraq war. Other postings include Africa, China and Afghanistan.
The moderate terrorists will not help US "negociate" with Syria. Better forget about regime change and save more Syrian deaths.
 

broadsword

Brigadier
It is not anyone's wish to have ISIL in your neighborhood, especially when some among the minority Muslims come out in support of them. It is actually happening in several countries. In Australia, some were caught before they could carry out their plot to behead innocent people.
 

Franklin

Captain
This article may in part help to explain why the Islamic State is such a formidable military force. During the US occupation of Iraq both the ex Ba'athist generals and the future leaders of the Islamic State were locked up in the same prison. And there they came together in a devils pact to work with each other. Now these Iraqi generals may not be the best generals in the world but they are better than the current crop of generals in the Iraqi army in Baghdad and those up north in Kurdistan. They are equal if not better than the generals under Bashar al-Assad. The Iraqi generals have more combat experience than the Syrian ones as they were fighting the Americans the whole time during the occupation. Its a combination of having experienced commanders with fanatical troops under them and the modern weapons they were able to get their hands on.

How the Islamic State evolved in an American prison

In March 2009, in a wind-swept sliver of Iraq, a sense of uncertainty befell the southern town of Garma, home to one of the Iraq war’s most notorious prisons. The sprawling Camp Bucca detention center, which had detained some of the war’s most radical extremists along the Kuwait border, had just freed hundreds of inmates. Families rejoiced, anxiously awaiting their sons, brothers and fathers who had been lost to Bucca for years. But a local official fretted.

“These men weren’t planting flowers in a garden,” police chief Saad Abbas Mahmoud told The Washington Post’s Anthony Shadid, estimating that 90 percent of the freed prisoners would soon resume fighting. “They weren’t strolling down the street. This problem is both big and dangerous. And regrettably, the Iraqi government and the authorities don’t know how big the problem has become.”

Mahmoud’s assessment of Camp Bucca, which funneled 100,000 detainees through its barracks and closed months later, would prove prescient. The camp now represents an opening chapter in the history of the Islamic State — many of its leaders, including Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, were incarcerated and probably met there. According to former prison commanders, analysts and soldiers, Camp Bucca provided a unique setting for both prisoner radicalization and inmate collaboration — and was formative in the development of today’s most potent jihadist force.

In all, nine members of the Islamic State’s top command did time at Bucca, according to the terrorism research firm Soufan Group. Apart from Baghdadi himself, who spent five years there, his deputy, Abu Muslim al-Turkmani, as well as senior military leader Haji Bakr, now deceased, and the leader of foreign fighters, Abu Qasim, were incarcerated there, Soufan said. Though it’s likely that the men were extremists when they entered Bucca, the group added, it’s certain they were when they left.

“Before their detention, Mr. al-Baghdadi and others were violent radicals, intent on attacking America,” wrote military veteran Andrew Thompson and academic Jeremi Suri in the New York Times this month. “Their time in prison deepened their extremism and gave them opportunities to broaden their following. … The prisons became virtual terrorist universities: The hardened radicals were the professors, the other detainees were the students, and the prison authorities played the role of absent custodian.”

It’s a scenario that has long confounded law enforcement: How do you crack down on extremism without creating more of it? From the radicalization of white supremacists in U.S. prisons to Britain’s disastrous bid in the 1970s to incarcerate Irish Republican Army members, the problem is nothing new: Prisons are pools of explosive extremism awaiting a spark.

And at Camp Bucca, there was no shortage of sparks. As news of Baghdadi’s tenure at Bucca emerged, former prison commander James Skylar Gerrond remembered many of them. “Re: Badghadi,” he wrote on Twitter in July, “Many of us at Camp Bucca were concerned that instead of just holding detainees, we had created a pressure cooker for extremism.” He worked at the prison between 2006 and 2007, when it was glutted with tens of thousands of radicals, including Baghdadi.

Many were guilty of attacking American soldiers. But many more were not — simply being a ‘suspicious looking’ military-aged male in the vicinity of an attack was enough to land one behind bars,” according to the Times opinion piece. Shadid reported as much in 2009, confirming that many viewed it “as an appalling miscarriage of justice where prisoners were not charged or permitted to see evidence against them [and] freed detainees may end up swelling the ranks of a subdued insurgency.”

That this subdued insurgency eventually caught fire isn’t much of a surprise. At the height of the Iraq troop “surge” in 2007, when the prison was glutted with 24,000 inmates, it seethed with extremism. Inhabitants were divided along sectarian lines to ameliorate tension, a military report said, and inmates settled their disputes according to Islamic law. “Inside the wire at these compounds are Islamic extremists who will maim or kill fellow detainees for behavior they consider against Islam,” the military report said.

“Sharia courts enforce a lot of rules inside the compounds,’” one soldier quoted in the report said. “‘Anyone who takes part in behavior which is seen as ‘Western’ is severely punished by the extremist elements of the compound…. It’s quite appalling sometimes.’”

Prison commanders such as Gerrond observed the growing extremism. “There was a huge amount of collective pressure exerted on detainees to become more radical in their beliefs,” he told Mother Jones. “… Detainees turn[ed] to each other for support. If there were radical elements within this support network, there was always the potential that detainees would become more radical.”

But the unique setting at Bucca, which thrust together Saddam Hussein’s Baathist secularists and Islamist fundamentalists, set the stage for something perhaps worse: collaboration. At the prison, the two seemingly incongruous groups joined to form a union “more than a marriage of convenience,” Soufan reported.

Soufan found that each group offered the other something it lacked. In the ex-Baathists, jihadists found organizational skills and military discipline. In the jihadists, ex-Baathists found purpose. “In Bucca, the math changed as ideologues adopted military and bureaucratic traits and as bureaucrats became violent extremists,” the Soufan report said.

From the ashes of what former inmates called an “al-Qaeda school” rose the Islamic State. Indeed, when those inhabitants freed in 2009 returned to Baghdad, The Post reported, they spoke of two things: their conversion to radicalism — and revenge.

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thunderchief

Senior Member
This article may in part help to explain why the Islamic State is such a formidable military force. During the US occupation of Iraq both the ex Ba'athist generals and the future leaders of the Islamic State were locked up in the same prison. And there they came together in a devils pact to work with each other. Now these Iraqi generals may not be the best generals in the world but they are better than the current crop of generals in the Iraqi army in Baghdad and those up north in Kurdistan. They are equal if not better than the generals under Bashar al-Assad. The Iraqi generals have more combat experience than the Syrian ones as they were fighting the Americans the whole time during the occupation. Its a combination of having experienced commanders with fanatical troops under them and the modern weapons they were able to get their hands on.

It seems to me this is somewhat simplistic. They didn't name those supposed generals. Also , how old would they be now ? Saddam fell in 2003, it's more then decade since then. Some of the officers from old Iraqi army could have joined ISIS, but I don't think they hold such significant positions to determine overall strategy of their military force .
 

shen

Senior Member
Hmmm... why is it that US-backed factions (FSA, Iraqi Army) surrender or flee so readily?

according to the article quoted by delft, factions allied with the Americans are seen by the locals as traitors/collaborators. they lose fighters, support and suffer in morale.
 

Scratch

Captain
I'm also not so sure about generals, but Colonels and Majors would sound quiet realistic. They could have seen some fighting in the Iran-Iraq war, the first & second gulf war an the early years of the insurgency. They'd be in their mid 50s by now. And a few of those would be sufficient, I guess, to oversee the training, equipping and tactical leadership of a "Batallion" or so.
Isn't there one infamous ba'athist colonel that the current al-Baghdadi made his war advisor, or something like that?

On the running away theme. I guess the people we like to win and support are neither any kind of fanatics, normally, nor have they (had time to built) a strong, ideological (in lack of a better english word) and historical bond towards the nation or entity they're fighting for. It tends to work rather well when you have a militia defending their tribe and historical home area.
 

solarz

Brigadier
On the running away theme. I guess the people we like to win and support are neither any kind of fanatics, normally, nor have they (had time to built) a strong, ideological (in lack of a better english word) and historical bond towards the nation or entity they're fighting for. It tends to work rather well when you have a militia defending their tribe and historical home area.

I think that's a big problem. If they aren't even able to inspire their own men to stand their ground, then how the hell can they be expected to inspire an entire country to work together?
 

Scratch

Captain
It is a big problem. The entire idea of statehood, in the form of a nation state, is not one that has grown with many of these people over time. In many places that are of interest here, I feel a little like the population to a large extent is opportunistic rather than dedicated when it comes to service for their "nation".
Often times, those nations' boudaries also don't necessarily reflect where the people affected see themselves belonging to.
 
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