ISIS/ISIL conflict in Syria/Iraq (No OpEd, No Politics)

SouthernSky said:

Let's turn that around and ask how much further would they have advanced without western intervention?

Click to expand...

asif iqbal said:

I see ISIS units everyday and I must say they are really nice and enjoy watching them my local store has so many ISIS units they are going for under £399!

Click to expand...

THE ROVING EYE
The Kobani riddle
By Pepe Escobar

The brave women of Kobani - where Syrian Kurds are desperately fighting ISIS/ISIL/Daesh - are about to be betrayed by the "international community". These women warriors, apart from Caliph Ibrahim's goons, are also fighting treacherous agendas by the US, Turkey and the administration of Iraqi Kurdistan. So what's the real deal in Kobani?

Let's start by talking about Rojava. The full meaning of Rojava - the three mostly Kurdish provinces of northern Syria - is conveyed in this editorial (in Turkish) published by jailed activist Kenan Kirkaya. He argues that Rojava is the home of a "revolutionary model" that no less than challenges "the hegemony of the capitalist, nation-state system" - way beyond its regional "meaning for Kurds, or for Syrians or Kurdistan."

Kobani - an agricultural region - happens to be at the epicenter of this non-violent experiment in democracy, made possible by an arrangement early on during the Syrian tragedy between Damascus and Rojava (you don't go for regime change against us, we leave you alone). Here, for instance, it's argued that "even if only a single aspect of true socialism were able to survive there, millions of discontented people would be drawn to Kobani."

In Rojava, decision-making is via popular assemblies - multicultural and multi-religious. The top three officers in each municipality are a Kurd, an Arab and an Assyrian or Armenian Christian; and at least one of these three must be a woman. Non-Kurd minorities have their own institutions and speak their own languages.

Among a myriad of women's and youth councils, there is also an increasingly famous feminist army, the YJA Star militia ("Union of Free Women", with the "star" symbolizing Mesopotamian goddess Ishtar).

The symbolism could not be more graphic; think of the forces of Ishtar (Mesopotamia) fighting the forces of ISIS (originally an Egyptian goddess), now transmogrified into an intolerant Caliphate. In the young 21st century, it's the female barricades of Kobani that are in the forefront fighting fascism.

Inevitably there should be quite a few points of intersection between the International Brigades fighting fascism in Spain in 1936 and what is happening in Rojava, as stressed by one of the very few articles about it published in Western mainstream media.

If these components were not enough to drive crazy deeply intolerant Wahhabis and Takfiris (and their powerful Gulf petrodollar backers) then there's the overall political set up.

The fight in Rojava is essentially led by the PYD, which is the Syrian branch of the Turkish PKK, the Marxist guerrillas at war against Ankara since the 1970s. Washington, Brussels and NATO - under relentless Turkish pressure - have always officially ranked both PYD and PKK as "terrorists".

Careful examination of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan's must-read book Democratic Confederalism reveals this terrorist/Stalinist equation as bogus (Ocalan has been confined to the island-prison of Imrali since 1999.)

What the PKK - and the PYD - are striving for is "libertarian municipalism". In fact that's exactly what Rojava has been attempting; self-governing communities applying direct democracy, using as pillars councils, popular assemblies, cooperatives managed by workers - and defended by popular militias. Thus the positioning of Rojava in the vanguard of a worldwide cooperative economics/democracy movement whose ultimate target would be to bypass the concept of a nation-state.

Not only this experiment is taking place politically across northern Syria; in military terms, it was the PKK and the PYD who actually managed to rescue those tens of thousands of Yazidis corralled by ISIS/ISIL/Daesh in Mount Sinjar, and not American bombs, as the spin went. And now, as PYD co-president Asya Abdullah details, what's needed is a "corridor" to break the encirclement of Kobani by Caliph Ibrahim's goons.

Sultan Erdogan's power play

Ankara, meanwhile, seems intent to prolong a policy of "lots of problems with our neighbors."

For Turkish Defense Minister Ismet Yilmaz, "the main cause of ISIS is the Syrian regime". And Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu - who invented the now defunct "zero problems with our neighbors" doctrine in the first place - has repeatedly stressed Ankara will only intervene with boots on the ground in Kobani to defend the Kurds if Washington presents a "post-Assad plan".

And then there's that larger than life character; Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan, aka Sultan Erdogan.

Sultan Erdogan's edicts are well known. Syrian Kurds should fight against Damascus under the command of that lousy fiction, the reconstituted (and to be trained, of all places, in Saudi Arabia) Free Syrian Army; they should forget about any sort of autonomy; they should meekly accept Turkey's request for Washington to create a no-fly zone over Syria and also a "secured" border on Syrian territory. No wonder both the PYD and Washington have rejected these demands.

Sultan Erdogan has his eyes set on rebooting the peace process with the PKK; and he wants to lead it in a position of force. So far his only concession has been to allow Iraqi Kurd peshmergas to enter northern Syria to counter-balance the PYD-PKK militias, and thus prevent the strengthening of an anti-Turkish Kurdish axis.

At the same time Sultan Erdogan knows ISIS/ISIL/Daesh has already recruited up to 1,000 Turkish passport holders - and counting. His supplemental nightmare is that the toxic brew laying waste to "Syraq" will sooner rather than later mightily overspill inside Turkish borders.

Watch those barbarians at the gates

Caliph Ibrahim's goons have already telegraphed their intention to massacre and/or enslave the entire civilian population of Kobani. And yet Kobani, per se, has no strategic value for ISIS/ISIL/Daesh (that's what US Secretary of State John Kerry himself said last week; but then, predictably, he reversed himself). This very persuasive PYD commander though is very much aware of the ISIS/ISIL/Daesh threat.

Kobani is not essential compared to Deir ez-Zor (which has an airport supplying the Syrian Arab Army) or Hasakah (which has oil fields controlled by Kurds helped by the Syrian Arab Army). Kobani boasts no airport and no oil fields.

On the other hand, the fall of Kobani would generate immensely positive extra PR for the already very slick Caliph enterprise - widening the perception of a winning army especially among new, potential, EU passport holder recruits, as well as establishing a solid base very close to the Turkish border.

Essentially, what Sultan Erdogan is doing is to fight both Damascus (long-term) and the Kurds (medium term) while actually giving a free pass (short-term) to ISIS/ISIL/Daesh. And yet, further on down the road, Turkish journalist Fehim Tastekin is right; training non-existent "moderate" Syrian rebels in oh-so-democratic Saudi Arabia will only lead to the Pakistanization of Turkey. A remix - once again - of the scenario played out during the 1980s Afghan jihad.

As if this was not muddled enough, in a game changer - and reversing its "terrorist" dogma - Washington is now maintaining an entente cordiale with the PYD. And that poses an extra headache for Sultan Erdogan.

This give-and-take between Washington and the PYD is still up for grabs. Yet some facts on the ground spell it all out; more US bombing, more US air drops (including major fail air drops, where the freshly weaponized end up being The Caliph's goons).

A key fact should not be overlooked. As soon as the PYD was more or less "recognized" by Washington, PYD head Saleh Muslim went to meet the wily Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) leader Masoud Barzani. That's when the PYD promised a "power sharing" with Barzani's peshmergas on running Rojava.

Syrian Kurds who were forced to abandon Kobani and exile themselves in Turkey, and who support the PYD, cannot return to Syria; but Iraqi Kurds can go back and forth. This dodgy deal was brokered by the KRG's intel chief, Lahur Talabani. The KRG, crucially, gets along very well with Ankara.

That sheds further light on Erdogan's game; he wants the peshmerga - who are fierce enemies of the PKK - to become the vanguard against ISIS/ISIL/Daesh and thus undermine the PYD/PKK alliance. Once again, Turkey is pitting Kurds against Kurds.

Washington for its part is manipulating Kobani to completely legitimize - on a "humanitarian", R2P vein - its crusade against ISIS/ISIL/Daesh. It's never enough to remember this whole thing started with a barrage of Washington spin about the bogus, ghostly Khorasan group preparing a new 9-11. Khorasan, predictably, entirely vanished from the news cycle.

In the long run, the American power play is a serious threat to the direct democracy experiment in Rojava, which Washington cannot but interpret as - God forbid! - a return of communism.

So Kobani is now a crucial pawn in a pitiless game manipulated by Washington, Ankara and Irbil. None of these actors want the direct democracy experiment in Kobani and Rojava to bloom, expand and start to be noticed all across the Global South. The women of Kobani are in mortal danger of being, if not enslaved, bitterly betrayed.

And it gets even more ominous when the ISIS/ISIL/Daesh play on Kobani is seen essentially for what it is; a diversionary tactic, a trap for the Obama administration. What The Caliph's goons are really aiming at is Anbar province in Iraq - which they already largely control - and the crucial Baghdad belt. The barbarians are at the gates - not only Kobani's but also Baghdad's.

Pepe Escobar is the author of Globalistan: How the Globalized World is Dissolving into Liquid War (Nimble Books, 2007), Red Zone Blues: a snapshot of Baghdad during the surge (Nimble Books, 2007), and Obama does Globalistan (Nimble Books, 2009).

He may be reached at [email protected].

(Copyright 2014 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)

Click to expand...

solarz said:

Unless ISIS is somehow finally defeated, slowing their advance does not change the outcome.

Click to expand...

SouthernSky said:

It furthers a potential outcome.

In the very least, captured Iraqi heavy weaponry by ISIS needs to be targeted and destroyed.

Click to expand...

TerraN_EmpirE said:

That's the bare minimum at best. This is a cancer, a Ebola epidemic of political socioeconomic threat that will break Iraq, has broken Syria and threatens to drag the entire region into a dystopian state of never ending war, religious persecution, sexual slavery, and barbarism. At this point however what is being done to combat this is little more then photo ops a bombing here just barely enough to scratch the surface.

Click to expand...

TerraN_EmpirE said:

That's the bare minimum at best. This is a cancer, a Ebola epidemic of political socioeconomic threat that will break Iraq, has broken Syria and threatens to drag the entire region into a dystopian state of never ending war, religious persecution, sexual slavery, and barbarism. At this point however what is being done to combat this is little more then photo ops a bombing here just barely enough to scratch the surface.

Click to expand...

1 The Long War Journal: Jihadist training camps proliferate in Iraq and Syria



Written by Bill Roggio & Caleb Weiss on October 24, 2014 12:37 AM to 1 The Long War Journal
Available online at:

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

Map of known provincial locations of training camps run by the Islamic State, the Al Nusrah Front, and allied jihadist groups since 2012. Map created by Caleb Weiss and Bill Roggio.

Since the Syrian civil war began in the spring of 2011, the Islamic State, al Qaeda, and other allied jihadist groups have operated more than 30 training camps inside Iraq and Syria. While global jihadist groups have primarily used camps to indoctrinate and train fighters for local insurgencies as part of the effort to establish a global caliphate, in the past al Qaeda has used its camps to support attacks against the West.

The Long War Journal has compiled information on the camps from jihadist videos, news accounts, and US military press releases that note airstrikes against the training facilities. It is unclear if all of the training camps are currently in operation. In addition, this analysis is compiled using publicly-available evidence. It is likely that some training camps are not advertised.

Since the beginning of 2012, a total of 38 camps have been identified as being operational. Of those camps, 28 are in Syria, and 10 are in Iraq.

The Islamic State, the al Qaeda splinter group that was disowned by al Qaeda's general command in February 2014, operates the largest number of training facilities, with nine camps in Iraq and 12 more in Syria.

In Iraq, the Islamic State has operated three camps in Anbar province, three in Salahaddin, two in Ninewa, and one more in Kirkuk.

In Syria, the Islamic State has run six facilities in Aleppo province, two in Deir al Zour, and one each in Hasakah, Raqqah, Latakia, and Damascus.

The Al Nusrah Front, which is al Qaeda's official branch in Syria, has run seven camps in the country; two each in Deir al Zour and Aleppo, and one each in Idlib, Homs, and Daraa. The camps in Deir al Zour and Raqqah are thought to be no longer operational after the Islamic State took control of the areas. The Al Nusrah Front camps are also likely the same camps used by the so-called Khorasan group, which is led by senior al Qaeda leaders and is embedded within Al Nusrah. Al Qaeda's Khorasan group seeks to conduct attacks against the West.

Ten more camps are run by jihadist groups allied with the Al Nusrah Front. Nine training facilities are in Syria, and one, run by Ansar al Islam, is in Iraq. Two of the camps in Syria are operated by Jaish al Muhajireen wal Ansar and Junud al Sham. In September 2014, Jaish al Muhajireen wal Ansar was listed by the US as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist group, and Murad Margoshvilli, the leader of the Junud al Sham, was named a global terrorist.

Training for insurgencies and for terrorist attacks

In the past, al Qaeda has used its network of camps not only to train fighters to battle in local insurgencies, but also to identify potential recruits as well as support a host of allied jihadist groups.

The 9/11 Commission Report detailed how al Qaeda used its sanctuary in Afghanistan prior to the attacks on the US to operate camps and expand its ties to jihadist groups throughout the world:

The alliance with the Taliban provided al Qaeda a sanctuary in which to train and indoctrinate fighters and terrorists, import weapons, forge ties with other jihad groups and leaders, and plot and staff terrorist schemes. While Bin Ladin maintained his own al Qaeda guesthouses and camps for vetting and training recruits, he also provided support to and benefited from the broad infrastructure of such facilities in Afghanistan made available to the global network of Islamist movements. U.S. intelligence estimates put the total number of fighters who underwent instruction in Bin Ladin-supported camps in Afghanistan from 1996 through 9/11 at 10,000 to 20,000.
In addition to training fighters and special operators, this larger network of guesthouses and camps provided a mechanism by which al Qaeda could screen and vet candidates for induction into its own organization. Thousands flowed through the camps, but no more than a few hundred seem to have become al Qaeda members. From the time of its founding, al Qaeda had employed training and indoctrination to identify "worthy" candidates.

Al Qaeda continued meanwhile to collaborate closely with the many Middle Eastern groups -- in Egypt, Algeria, Yemen, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, Somalia, and elsewhere -- with which it had been linked when Bin Ladin was in Sudan. It also reinforced its London base and its other offices around Europe, the Balkans, and the Caucasus. Bin Ladin bolstered his links to extremists in South and Southeast Asia, including the Malaysian-Indonesian JI [Jemaah Islamiyah] and several Pakistani groups engaged in the Kashmir conflict.

While al Qaeda was building its network, some senior US military leaders tasked with assessing the threat of al Qaeda dismissed its network of camps in Afghanistan as rudimentary facilities not worthy of attention. According to the 9/11 Commission Report:

Members of the Small Group found themselves unpersuaded of the merits of rolling attacks. Defense Secretary William Cohen told us Bin Ladin's training camps were primitive, built with "rope ladders"; General Shelton called them "jungle gym" camps. Neither thought them worthwhile targets for very expensive missiles.
Today, US officials clearly view the camps in Iraq and Syria as a direct threat to US national security. US and allied countries have targeted this network of training camps in Iraq and Syria in air and cruise missile strikes.

Since Aug. 7, when the US air campaign against the Islamic State began, the US has targeted multiple Islamic State training centers in 11 airstrikes. Islamic State training camps were hit in US airstrikes in Mosul on Sept. 18; Raqqah, Abu Kamal, Dier al Zour, and Hasakah on Sept. 22; Raqqah on Sept. 27; Manbij on Sept. 29; again in Raqqah on Oct. 3 and Oct. 8; near Kobane on Oct. 10; and near Fallujah on Oct. 23.

The US has also targeted training camps run by the Al Nusrah Front. On Sept. 22, the opening day of US airstrikes in Syria, the US launched 46 cruise missiles at eight different targets associated with the al Qaeda branch. In a press release announcing the strikes, the US military said it targeted more than one training camp associated with the "Khorasan Group," which is merely a name for a cadre of established Al Nusrah Front leaders and al Qaeda operatives who are coordinating attacks against the West. [See LWJ reports, Senior al Qaeda strategist part of so-called 'Khorasan group' and Al Qaeda leader claims key operative in so-called 'Khorasan group' was killed.]

Abu Yusuf al Turki, an Al Nusrah Front commander with experience in Turkey and Afghanistan who trained fighters how to become snipers, was killed in the Sept. 22 airstrikes. Al Turki, whose real name is Ümit Yaşar Toprak, was involved in a 2004 plot to assassinate former President George W. Bush during a NATO summit in Istanbul. He also fought in Afghanistan. [See LWJ report, Al Nusrah Front trainer suspected of plotting against 2004 NATO summit killed in US airstrikes.]

List of Islamic State training camps in Iraq:

The Islamic State is known to operate training camps in the Hamrin Mountains. The Hamrin Mountains extend from Diyala province to Salahaddin province.
The Islamic State operates a training camp near Haditha. On Aug. 21, 2012, the Islamic State (then known as al Qaeda in Iraq) released an extremely graphic video showing graduates from this camp killing dozens of Iraqi policemen in a nighttime raid. This camp is known as the "Sheikein Camp".
In late 2013, an Obama administration official said that al Qaeda in Iraq (now known as the Islamic State) "has a presence in terms of camps and training facilities" in Anbar province.
The Islamic State is also known to operate training camps in Samarra. On Feb. 10, 2014, 22 Islamic State fighters were killed in a training camp near Samarra while receiving instruction on how to make bombs for suicide attacks.
An Islamic State training camp in Ninewa was announced on July 22, 2014. Eight squads of 11 to 13 men were shown in pictures of this camp. The Islamic State released a video of a training camp in Ninewa province on Oct. 12, 2014. The video showed over 100 recruits in the camp, but it is unclear if it is the same camp.
On Sept. 18, 2014, US Central Command said airstrikes targeted an Islamic State training camp "southeast of Mosul."
On Oct. 3, 2014, the Islamic State released photos from the "Shaykh Abu Omar al Baghdadi Camp" in Kirkuk. The pictures showcased a graduation of a cadre of fighters.
On Oct. 23, 2014, US Central Command said it targeted an Islamic State training facility near Fallujah, Iraq.
On Oct. 24, 2014, US Central Command said it targeted an Islamic State training facility near Baiji, Iraq.
List of Islamic State training camps in Syria:

The Lions of the Caliphate Battalion, a group that has sworn allegiance to the Islamic State, posted pictures of a training camp on social media in late 2013. The group was based in Latakia province and it is unclear if the camp is still operational.
The Shaykh Abu al Nur al Maqdisi Brigade, an Islamic State group mainly comprised of Gazans, released photos of a training camp in Syria earlier this year. The camp was likely in Aleppo, but it is unclear if the camp is still operational.
On Jan. 25, 2014, a video was released on YouTube showing a training camp belonging to Sabiri's Jamaat. This group is comprised mainly of Uzbek and Dagestani fighters and has since sworn allegiance to the Islamic State.
On May 8, 2014, the Islamic State released a video from the "Zarqawi Camp" on the outskirts of Damascus. The camp is named after the founder of al Qaeda in Iraq (now known as the Islamic State), Abu Musab al Zarqawi. This camp also hosts a section for the "Zarqawi Cubs"; "cubs" refers to children trained to wage jihad.
The Islamic State released pictures of a training camp in Aleppo on July 26, 2014. The pictures showed scores of fighters after graduating from the camp.
In early September 2014, the Islamic State released photos from the "Shaddad al Tunisi camp" in Aleppo province. The camp trains children and teens.
On Sept. 23, 2014, US Central Command said that US and coalition aircraft targeted Islamic State "training compounds" in the vicinity of Raqqah, Deir al Zour, Abu Kamal, and Hasakah.
On Sept. 29, 2014, US Central Command said that US and coalition aircraft targeted an Islamic State training camp near Manbij in Aleppo province.
On Oct. 10, 2014, US Central Command said that US and coalition aircraft targeted an Islamic State training camp near Kobane in Aleppo province.
List of training camps belonging to the Al Nusrah Front:

In 2013, the Al Nusrah Front released a video showing a training camp in the Homs region. The video featured trainees learning how to fight in hand-to-hand combat. It is unclear if this camp is still operational.
On March 17, 2014, the Al Nusrah Front released videos from two training camps in eastern Syria. These camps were named the "Ayman al Zawahiri camp" and the "Abu Ghadiya camp." It is unclear if these camps are still operational.
On May 27, 2014, the Al Nusrah Front released photos from a training camp in Daraa province in southern Syria. The facility, dubbed the "Ibn Taymiyyah camp," trains children.
On Sept. 22, 2014, the US launched 46 cruise missiles at eight locations in Aleppo that included Al Nusrah training camps. These strikes also targeted camps belonging to the "Khorasan Group." It is likely that a sniper camp run by al Qaeda veteran Abu Yusuf al Turki was also targeted in these strikes.
On Oct. 10, 2014, the Al Nusrah Front released photos from one of its training camps in Idlib. On Oct. 18, a video was released from the same camp. On Aug. 24, 2014, the Al Nusrah Front released photos from another training camp in Idlib.
Sayfullah Shishani's Jamaat, a Chechen-led group within the Al Nusrah Front, is known to operate camps in Aleppo province to train fighters to become snipers and use other weapons.
List of training camps belonging to other jihadist groups in Syria or Iraq:

On July 23, 2013, the Islamic Front's Ahrar al Sham released a video of one of its training camps in Daraa province in southern Syria. The video showed dozens of recruits at the camp.
On Sept. 7, 2013, the Islamic Front's Ahrar al Sham released a video of a training camp in Raqqah province. It is likely that this camp is no longer operational as the Islamic State controls most of Raqqah.
On Oct. 6, 2013, the Syrian group Harakat Fajr al Sham al Islamiya released a video of a training camp that was presumably in Aleppo province. This group has since joined the al Muhajireen Army, Harakat Sham al Islam, and Katibat al Khadra (the Green Battalion) to form the Ansar al Din Front.
In late December 2013 and again in March 2014, Ansar al Islam touted the "Shaykh Rashid Ghazi Camp" in northern Iraq by posting pictures and a video of the camp on Twitter. Ansar al Islam, while based in Iraq, is also known to operate in Syria.
On March 25, 2014, the Islamic Front's Ahrar al Sham released a video of a training camp presumably in Aleppo in northern Syria. The camp is said to be a "special forces" training facility. A follow-up video was posted to YouTube on Oct. 20, 2014.
On April 2, 2014, the Chechen group Jaish al Muhajireen wal Ansar (the Muhajireen Army) released a video of a training camp in Aleppo. The video showed, along with traditional training, instruction in the manufacture of bombs. This group may run more than one camp in Aleppo. Al Muhajireen was designated a terrorist group by the US State Department in September 2014.
On June 3, 2014, the Uzbek Imam Bukhari Jamaat released video of a training camp in Aleppo province. This group is allied with the Al Nusrah Front, the Muhajireen Army, and the Seyfuddin Uzbek Jamaat (a unit with ties to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan) within Al Nusrah.
In early August 2014, a Chechen-led group named the Jamaat Ahadun Ahad, or the "Group of the One and Only," released a video of a training camp in Latakia. Little is known about this group, as it apparently prefers to have a minimal social media presence so as to avoid the jihadist infighting and focus on battling the Assad regime.
On Aug. 13, 2014, the Islamic Front's Jaish al Islam released a video of a training camp in Damascus. The video shows scores of recruits training in the camp.
Junud al Sham, a Chechen-led group based in Latakia headed by Muslim Shishani, is known to operate training camps for foreign fighters, according to the US State Department. Junud al Sham also runs a training center for children in Latakia, according to From Chechnya to Syria.

Click to expand...

After victory in key Iraqi town, time for revenge

After helping government forces break Islamic State's grip over a strategic town just south of Baghdad on Saturday, Shi'ite militias decided it was time for payback.

A Reuters witness saw the fighters in green camouflage uniforms scream and swear at members of the Islamist group as they kicked and struck them with rifle butts in Jurf al-Sakhar.

As the angry crowd of militiamen around the unarmed militants swelled, shots rang out. The three men lay soaked in blood in the dirt with gunshot wounds to the head.

"Those dogs are Chechens. They don't deserve to stay alive. We took confessions from them and we don't need them anymore," said one of the Shi'ite militiamen.

The victory could allow Iraqi forces to prevent the Sunni insurgents from edging closer to the capital, sever connections to their strongholds in western Anbar province and stop them infiltrating the mainly Shi'ite Muslim south.

Asked why the three men were executed, an army officer in Jurf al-Sakhar said: "We don't need them anymore. Why should we keep them alive?"

Responding to the same question, a senior member of a local Shi'ite militia said: "When we liberated Jurf al-Sakhar we found the skeletons of innocent people they killed and never buried. They should face the same fate."

Islamic State, made up of Arab and foreign fighters, swept through the north of Iraq in June and controls large parts of the west as well.

Its fighters hold swathes of territory in neighboring Syria and the group seeks to create an Islamic caliphate in the heart of the Middle East.

The group has threatened to march on Baghdad, home to special forces and thousands of Shi'ite militias expected to put up fierce resistance if the capital comes under threat.

Jurf al-Sakhar looked like a ghost town. Many residents had fled the fighting. Islamic State fighters had for months used skilled snipers and roadside bombs to prevent Iraqi security forces and Shi'ite militias from advancing.

During that period Islamic State used secret tunnels built by Saddam Hussein to evade United Nations weapons inspectors to move and store weapons and supplies.

Iraqi forces brought in helicopter gunships and used rockets to build up pressure on the militants, who finally fled on Saturday.

DEAD SNIPER DANGLES FROM TREETOP

There were rows of abandoned houses in Jurf al-Sakhar, some still burning. Black smoke hung over the town, surrounded by farmland, irrigation canals and swamps which had made it difficult for Iraqi forces to make headway.

An Islamic State sniper who had attached himself with a rope to the top a date tree was slumped over and swinging back and forth after being hit by machinegun fire from a helicopter.

"This terrorist stopped us from making advances for the whole day and killed a lot of us," said another militia fighter who also asked not to be named, pointing to the insurgent's rifle on the ground.

"We could not stop him, only a helicopter could."

The bodies of more than 50 Islamic State fighters were scattered across Jurf al-Sakhar, on streets, in trenches, near houses and on the beds of pickup trucks, many of them charred.

The dead included 15 militants whose hands were tied behind their backs, lying in farmland.

The stench of death was everywhere as flies covered bodies.

Asked why government forces had not buried the bodies of men who were killed a day before, an Iraqi army colonel said: "Those terrorists do not deserve to be buried. Let the dogs eat their flesh. Many of our men were killed by them."

But then came a reminder of the determination of Islamic State militants to expand their reach to Baghdad in pursuit of a powerful caliphate.

As Iraqi government soldiers and militias savored their victory and were taking photographs of the bodies, mortars fired by Islamic State fighters who had fled to orchards to the west rained down on the town.

The blast hit the militiamen, killing dozens and scattering body parts. Soldiers who moments before were celebrating now screamed out in fear.

"Run to the ditch. Mortars. Mortars," yelled a militiaman. An army officer shouted at local militia leaders, berating them for advancing too fast, before helicopters had wiped out any pockets of resistance.

"OK, let's retreat," one of the militiamen shouted.

Click to expand...

Will Seif al Islam Lead the Expulsion of the ISIS Affiliate, Al Fajr Libya?

Time Will Tell

With the Abu Baker al-Siddiq Brigade, Zintan, Libya

A second interview by this observer with Seif al Islam Gadhafi, formerly the heir apparent to his father Moammar, was sought and finally arranged as a follow up to an earlier one focusing of my interest in the Imam Musa Sadr case. That case involves a great crime against a great man and conciliator and his historic cause, and exposes those who betrayed him in Lebanon and two other countries while swearing their personal devotion and shedding crocodile tears over the past 36 years. That research is nearing completion and publication awaits DNA results from body samples more credible than the ones offered by the Bosnia laboratory two years ago and immediately demonstrated to be fraudulent. The story of why that particular lab was chosen and by who goes to the essence of the current stonewalling campaign with respect to informing the public about what exactly happened to Imam Sadr and his partners on 8/3l/1978 in Tripoli, Libya. It also identifies who instructed Gadhafi to kill them over the strong objections from the PLO’s Yassir Arafat who spoke with Gadhafi and tried to save the trio of Lebanese Shia.

But our discussion soon turned to other subject as Seif’s jailers may have taken seriously my joke that if they extended the original 20 minutes I was granted to two hours, I would deliver to them 10 US Visas and they could fill in any names the might choose. Truth told, of course I could not even get myself a passport renewal as former US Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman reportedly sneered at a US Embassy Christmas party a few years back, “Lamb will serve ten years hard time in the Feds for hobnobbing with terrorists (Hezbollah in those days…who knows today?) when we get him back home.” I admit that Jeff and I both have a problem with Hezbollah. His is because Hezbollah just may liberate Palestine and mine is that Hezbollah needs to do more in Lebanon and use 90 minutes of Parliament’s time, where it has the power, to grant Palestinian refugees in Lebanon the right to work and to own a home. But that is also another story and Hezbollah continues to report that they are ‘working on the problem but it’s politically complicated.”

Meanwhile, Da’ish (IS) is metastasizing fast in Libya through its main affiliate al Fajr Libya (Libya Dawn) and plans to add Tripoli, to its Islamic Caliphate along with Baghdad, Damascus, Amman and Beirut during the coming months and if necessary, years. This, according to Seif al Islam and representatives of the Zintan brigades based southwest of Tripoli as well as two representatives of other tribes and militia moving toward supporting the still vital Gadhafi regime remnants.

Libya may be the lowest hanging ripe fruit within easy reach of Da’ish (IS) and its growing number of affiliates, according to US Ambassador Deborah Jones during a recent visit to the US Embassy in Malta, to discuss her own problems in Libya which include the 8/31/14 take-over by al Fajr Libya (FL) of the US embassy compound barely a month after it was evacuated and moved to Tunisia for the second time since February of 2011. Secretary of State John Kerry reassured the media in Washington recently that “the embassy was not really closed, but had moved out of Libya”. One Religion Professor at Tripoli University joked last week that “Kerry is correct, the US embassy is here but it’s in a state of occultation. We can’t see it but it’s around and watches us.” A Libyan photographer who was at the embassy compound when Al Fajr Libya (FL) arrived reported that the Da’ish (IS) affiliate had moved into buildings inside the embassy complex claiming that they would ‘protect it’ as they carted off boxes of documents for ‘safe keeping.’ FL is described by a former Dean at Tripoli U. as between al Nusra and Da’ish (IS) with a fragile partnership between the two and presenting to the public “ A Good cop-Bad cop tag-team with differences to be worked out once all the infidels are vanquished.

Libya, as with the Arab Maghreb, is on the cusp of a new wave of Islamist groups, and is moving beyond al-Qaeda of Bin Laden, Zawahiri, and Abdelmalek Droukdel, to Baghdadi’s ISIS and its widely perceived logical offshoot ISIM being planted in North Africa and the Sahel. The threat of the Da’ish (Islamic State is already deeply anchored and expanding in the now lawless Libya, according to UN envoy Bernardino León. Several Libyan organizations recently announced their loyalty to IS leader Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi. This has confirmed a speculation that IS has penetrated Libyan public institutions. The Ansar al-Sharia group, affiliated with ISIS, has declared authority during the last several days over the coastal city of Darna which is located strategically between Benghazi and the Egyptian border – just 289 km (179 miles) and 333 km (206 miles), respectively.

Countless militia are forming, merging, changing names and lying low as perceived interests dictate. Soldiers of the Caliphate in Algeria was retitled, revitalized and repackaged to enhance its appeal on social media as has the Furqan Brigade of the AQIM in Tunisia. Ansar Al-Sharia is another one becoming very active.The Uqba bin Nafi Brigade, has just declared allegiance to ISIS as has the Islamic Caliphate in the Islamic Maghreb. al-Ummah Brigade, which operates out of Libyan coasts and airports, another is Al-Battar is attracting pro-ISIS elements. Majlis Shura Shabab al-Islam (the Islamic Youth Shura Council), or MSSI. According to Libyan sources and journalist Adam al-Sabiri, writing in Al Akbar, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi asked these elements to deploy to the Libyan front to counter the attacks by the Libyan army led by Khalifa Haftar as part of Operation Dignity seeking to “purge Libya of terrorists.”

Libyan friends, some from three years ago, advise that more people have been killed in the past three years than during the 2011 revolution and they now fear a Somalia-like “failed state” given all the weapons, lawlessness, and growing number of Islamists. The South of Libya has not been spared the lawlessness, as tribal battles continue for control of a lucrative smuggling trade. Friends point out that the country no longer even bothers to celebrate the National Holiday commemorating the 10/23/2011 “total liberation of Libya.” “It’s a cruel joke” my friend Hinde advised as she explains that many Libyans yearn for the stability of the Gadhafi days. “Maybe wanting to turn the clock back is the same in Iraq and Egypt and Syria?” she wondered.

“The rampant regional, ideological and tribal conflicts are worse than the rule of the dictator,” said Salah Mahmud al-Akuri, a doctor in Benghazi. “Some Libyans are looking back to the old regime.”

Amidst all the chaos, Libyan Prime Minister Abdullah Al-Thinni claimed last week that groups loyal to the IS, such as al Fajr Libya, are presently in control of the city of Derna and other Libyan towns and have begun summoning townspeople to public squares to witness declarations of fealty to Da’ish (IS), even beginning their signature public executions. Libya’s “government” claims that its “army” is preparing to expel Fajr Libya (FL) and retake the capital, as more militia rush to join FL. Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thani’s said in a statement this week that he gave orders to the government forces to “advance toward Tripoli to liberate it and to free it from the grip of al Fajr Libya”. The Libyan embassy in Washington told a House Foreign Affairs committee staffer that they expect that residents in Tripoli will launch “a civil disobedience campaign until the arrival of the army.” Walking around the former “Green Square” this observer saw no signs of this rather he observed citizens stocking up on necessities or packing their cars. Later, Thani added, military forces in the strife-torn country “have absolutely united to also recapture Libya’s second city Benghazi from the local IS affiliate, al Fajr Liyba (FL). Leading one to wonder whether the Libyan “army” will fare better than Maliki’s did in Mosul and Anbar.

According to students and staff at Tripoli University, (known as Fatah University during the Gadhafi decades) a few of whom this observer first met in the summer of 2011, and who lived the political events in their country since while some of their friends and relatives, as in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, are preparing to leave and start a new life somewhere. Hasan, a Gadhafi supporter I was with nearly daily three years ago in Tripoli still curses what, “NATO| did this to our country. The Gadhafi regime was changing as you know Franklin, but the reformers were prevented from making the changes that Seif al Islam and his associates got their father to agree to. Remember when Saif said “My father wants to live in a tent where he is most happy and write a history of the Jamahiriya (land of the masses). He will offer advice but have just a ceremonial role out of politics? You remember that? We believed Seif didn’t we?. Anyhow, khalas!, Libya is finished! NATO gave it to Da’ish just as they gave Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria to Iran.”

Libya is now moving beyond al-Qaeda of Bin Laden, Zawahiri, and Abdelmalek Droukdel, to Baghdadi’s ISIS and its widely perceived logical offshoot Islamic State in the Islamic Maghreb (ISIM-Damis) now expanding in North Africa and the Sahel. Former rebels who fought against Gadhafi have formed powerful militias and seized control of large parts of Libya in the past three years. Back in mid-august of 2011, the late American journalist Marie Colvin and I stood on the balcony of the Corinthia Hotel opposites the still empty Marriott where some kid was practicing sniping from the roof, at my expense, as I pointed out to Marie a body floating just off the beach of the Mediterranean across the road. We walked over and examined it and decided while it was dressed in religious garb the man may have been an army deserter; there were increasing numbers in those days, because of his military style boots. We alerted some militia guys driving along the corniche who said they would report the body and before long an ambulance did arrive. Two of the militia waded out waist deep and pulled in the bloated body to shore, unlaced his tan leather boots while holding their noses from the stench. They then threw the new boots in the back of their pick-up and drove off with no more than a smiling ‘shukran habibis’ (thanks dears). Later that day Marie and I counted a column of 143 pickups with AK-47 jubilant fist waving rebels entering along the coastal road toward downtown Tripoli having come from battles in the east around Misrata. In the next few days we discussed how there seemed to be countless ‘free-cigarettes, $200 on the first of each month and your personal Kalasnikov’ militia popping up like mushrooms after a summer rain. Three years ago one of their battle cries was “Death to Gadafi—Yes to Freedom!” Today one hears around Tripoli another slogan from the lips of young men many of whom may be the same, chanting, “Death to the kafirs (disbelievers,” or infidels) Yes to Islam!Abas (that’s all!”

Seif el Islam still resides at his cell in Zintan which, even though jail is jail, has been upgraded from when he was captured in the Sahara making his way toward Niger and his finger was cut off as a warning.

Seif, has proposed talks and is ready to participate in bringing together Libya’s warring parties and aiding the transition to what he claims he was working on before the February 17, 2011 uprising in Benzhazi which quickly spread.

Seif’s team would likely include his father’s cousin and confident Ahmed Gaddaf al-Dam, former Deputy Foreign Minister Khaled Kane, long-time Libyan diplomat, the widely respected Omar el Hamdi now is Cairo, and Seif’s sister Aisha, now living with his mother and children in the Gulf.

Seif has no illusions of returning Libya to the past, but argues that elements of the former regime deserved to be heard. “We were in the process of making broad reforms and my father gave me the responsibly to see them through. Unfortunately the revolt happened and both sides made mistakes that are now allowing extreme Islamist group like Da’ish to pick up the pieces and turn Libya into an extreme fundamentalist entity in their regional plans.”

With respect to Seifs trials, whether ins the Tripoli courthouse or at the International Criminal Court in the Hague, the odds of either happening anytime soon, ior at all, are fading as negotiations for an arrangement are reportedly progressing.

A solution is being sought, according to sources at the Justice Ministry in Tripoli because there are many problems with Seifs case which was supposed to begin earlier this year, and the case has been criticized by a number of international actors. Not least for which how Libya and the ICC have handled their cases. For example, Human Rights Watch has accused the Libyan government of failing to provide adequate legal representation and the ICC it has been unable to compel the Libyan government to allow it access — just one of many challenges to the ICC’s legitimacy in recent years. Meanwhile it is likely that Seif’s jailers, who increasing respects and admires him, may have other ideas that would enhance their own standing in Libya. In addition, certain NATO countries are said to be privately discussing with Washington, Paris London and Bonn the idea of finding a role for Seif and certain of his associates and family members in “the new Libya.”

According to Seif, and former regime officials, several NATO countries have sent messages claiming they did not intend for his father to be killed but were searching during the summer of 2011 for a refuge for his father in Africa. Seif does not believe them.

Seif al Islam still has substantial influence among tribes still loyal to Gaddafi as well as former regime officials in the army and government. The delegation Seif could assemble, including Ahmad Gadaff al-Dam, would benefit from the latter’s still strong connections with Arab governments, Morocco, Egypt, Algeria, Saudi Arabia and the UAE as well as some European countries.

More on this and other subjects related to Seif and the growing international recognition over the need for expulsion of Islamists from Libya, and a possible significant role for Seif, are expected to be discussed publicly soon.

Click to expand...