Iranian Military News, Reports, Data, etc.


Khalij e Fars

Junior Member
Registered Member
First stage of Iranian response to act of nuclear terrorism in Natanz:

Background:

  • Natanz hosts 5000 IR-1 centrifuges and approx. 1000-2000 other more advanced variants such as IR-2m, IR-4, IR-6 and many others.
  • The recent act of nuclear terrorism at Natanz only affected the old and relatively primitive IR-1 centrifuge designs.

Response:
  • Iran will replace all the affected IR-1 centrifuges with newer, more advanced models (1000 more advanced centrifuges are already being installed).
  • This will include the installation of many more IR-6 models that are 10x as powerful as the IR-1 models (by SWU capacity). NB. Under the JCPOA Iran is only permitted to operate IR-1 centrifuges. There are currently c. 200 IR-6 centrifuges operating in Natanz (these were not affected).
  • Iran will enrich uranium to 60% for the first time from tomorrow. This will begin immediately and is a huge step beyond the current 20% limit. 60% enriched uranium is used in nuclear propulsion for warships and submarines. Iran recently announced a large project to develop nuclear propulsion and a lot is being invested into this project.
Other parts of the response may not be announced openly.
 
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Khalij e Fars

Junior Member
Registered Member
An Israeli-owned ship has been targeted in the Persian Gulf. Damage unknown. Allegedly hit by a missile.

Background: Israel instigated a "tanker wars" conflict by attacking Iranian ships delivering fuel to Syria.
 

Khalij e Fars

Junior Member
Registered Member
isn't that slow? I thought they could enrich at a much faster pace
This rate of production is intentionally limited (because the goal is not weapons, but medical isotopes, to gain experience and restore leverage in JCPOA negotiations), so only a small number of advanced (IR-4 and IR-6) centrifuges are being used to enrich to 60% (most centrifuges are enriching to 3-5% and 20% since these have more practical use for Iran).

Even so, approx 10-15kg uranium enriched to 90% is needed for a nuclear weapon. So 1.5kg p/w is sufficient for c. 5 nuclear weapons per year, if scaled to 90%. This is just a small signalling measure to restore deterrence and leverage, not a breakout to a bomb. So all considered, that is not a "slow" rate at all.

Important to remember that even enrichment at 20% was a hard red line for the West that could lead to UNSC-sanctioned military action (with a global coalition) against Iran in previous years/decades.
 

silentlurker

Junior Member
Registered Member
This rate of production is intentionally limited (because the goal is not weapons, but medical isotopes, to gain experience and restore leverage in JCPOA negotiations), so only a small number of advanced (IR-4 and IR-6) centrifuges are being used to enrich to 60% (most centrifuges are enriching to 3-5% and 20% since these have more practical use for Iran).
Even for medical isotopes 1.5kg per week is quite a bit when you consider doses are often measured in micrograms.
 

ougoah

Major
Registered Member
Iran's enrichment goals are for weapons and why shouldn't it be striving for that. That at least is entirely understandable. I don't think anyone has delusions about Iran's goals for enrichment even if they are genuinely not for weapons, it is going to be forever considered that way.

Wouldn't Iran simply scale up that production if they wanted greater material?
 

voyager1

Senior Member
Registered Member
Iran's enrichment goals are for weapons and why shouldn't it be striving for that. That at least is entirely understandable. I don't think anyone has delusions about Iran's goals for enrichment even if they are genuinely not for weapons, it is going to be forever considered that way.

Wouldn't Iran simply scale up that production if they wanted greater material?
I mean thats Iranian narrative. You know, when you do "illegal" stuff on the world stage, you still have to present a reason, in order to save "face".

Same thing with Israel and their nuclear weapons. The whole SCS issue is the same as well.

Even so, I still think their enrichment is too slow. Dunno, maybe they want to keep their cards for better leverage during the negotiations?
 

Khalij e Fars

Junior Member
Registered Member
Even for medical isotopes 1.5kg per week is quite a bit when you consider doses are often measured in micrograms.
Stockpiles of 20% and 60% enriched uranium are currently mainly for leverage as bargaining chips to concede in negotiations to restore JCPOA (but both also have valid medical/propulsion uses also).
Iran's enrichment goals are for weapons and why shouldn't it be striving for that. That at least is entirely understandable. I don't think anyone has delusions about Iran's goals for enrichment even if they are genuinely not for weapons, it is going to be forever considered that way.

Wouldn't Iran simply scale up that production if they wanted greater material?
Wrong. If Iran wanted to develop a nuclear weapon it could have done it a long time ago.
I mean thats Iranian narrative. You know, when you do "illegal" stuff on the world stage, you still have to present a reason, in order to save "face".

Same thing with Israel and their nuclear weapons.
Wrong on multiple points:

1) Nothing illegal about enriching uranium. Iran, as an NTP signatory, has a legal right to enrich uranium for civilian purposes.
2) If you mean "illegal" as contrary to voluntarily agreed JCPOA restrictions, these are time-limited and Iran is permitted to take countermeasures to another party's non-compliance pursuant to Art. 36 JCPOA.
3) Israel's nuclear weapons are not deemed illegal by the international community: they never presented a reason to "save face" as you say, and the world did nothing. This is not a world of law, it's a world of rules made and imposed by the strong on the weak.
 

silentlurker

Junior Member
Registered Member
3) Israel's nuclear weapons are not deemed illegal by the international community: they never presented a reason to "save face" as you say
I agree with most your points, but clearly they went out of their way to have some deniability by testing out in the middle of nowhere instead of underground in Israel
 

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