Look, at the end of the day conditions can change quickly and competent procurement should take into account both current and future needs. There is always a way to balance cost and readiness if enough thought is put into it. If night fighting capabilities at a limited budget was truly something they wanted to solve, complete sets of equipment could easily be rotated between units for regular familiarization training. This would keep units in a semi-ready state that could be scaled up when needed with just a few weeks of work up training. Proper handguard rails would be worth it just for that. It's also very optimistic to assume that there was any some sort of grand strategy behind certain short sighted decisions in rifle procurement lol, when complacency is a much more realistic explanation. I'm sure you of all people are aware of the many stories from former PLA themselves of how backwards many in Ground Force leadership are.On the one hand, I agree to an extent. On the other hand, if we rank the most pressing traditional domains of warfare/service branch for the PRC, from highest yield to lowest yield to seek maximal funding in, in terms of its strategic priorities and regional challenges:
- Air/Naval/Missile/Cyber/Space/Joint Logistics
....
....
....
....
- Ground
And if we were to separate the major components needed for a successful ground warfare military, from highest yield to lowest yield in context of its major pressing ground priorities to seek maximal funding in, I would say:
- Fires/recce/C4I/EW/logistics/supply
- Mechanization/motorization/rotary support/organic AAD
....
....
- Infantry
Of course, having competent infantry is somewhat important in the prior aforementioned domains (Air/Naval/Missile/Cyber/Space/Joint Logistics) for the purposes of things like base security and counter-SOF efforts, and in theory all warfare is multidomain and joint to an extent as well...
... but it is undeniable that infantry fitout is probably the lowest yield priority for the PLA in ground warfare, while ground warfare itself is the lowest yield domain/service branch for the PLA overall. Infantry fitout is thus the least important of the least important.
So sure, having most of infantry incapable of nightfighting is a critical shortcoming, but if it gets to the stage where infantry being incapable of nightfighting becomes significantly relevant to the PRC warfighting effort, then chances are everything else has already gone poorly for the PLA as a whole and the conflict is basically already over.
Now, I do agree that I think the PLA should be well funded enough that I think they can probably proliferate night fighting equipment a bit more widely in a slightly more standardized manner than they have in the past.
E.g.: SOF, recce units, could probably standardize to have it as part of their curriculum and TOE. But I'm not unsympathetic to the reasoning for why standard line infantry have yet to receive stuff like NODs and IR lasers.
If there's one thing that sticks out to me from talking to guys who have fought against an enemy without modern night fighting capabilities, it's how much shit they were able to get away with. How many paragraphs of justifying mediocrity would it take to console the parents of sons who ended up on someone else's highlight reel that goes viral on IG reels?
