All Navies of any consequence have accidents.
The PLAN included. we d not have to lok back to far to fnd them either.
Indian Military News, Reports, Data, etc.
- Thread starter bd popeye
- Start date
The PLAN included. we d not have to lok back to far to fnd them either.
kwaigonegin
Colonel
It is extremely important to maintain a checklist of things and procedures to be done before undocking and not to miss any vital point which will lead to delay or accidents in undocking.
Before water is pumped into the dock, there are a few checks that must be made. Bottom plugs must be closed and sea chests should be in full working condition. Also, ballasting of the ship must be done. This is to ensure that the ship does not have an even keel draught (the aft draught is usually greater than the forward draught).
The pump room, which is usually located at the forward end of the dock controls the amount of water being pumped out of the dock. This is also referred to as ballasting the dock.
The gangway is lifted sometimes by means of a crane once the dock personnel have cleared the ship. Fire hydrants and all shore connections are disconnected.
The forward and aft ends of the ship are attached to shore based mooring lines which are winch controlled.
A crane lifts these lines and places them on the deck so that they can be attached. These help to control the movement of the ship as it leaves the dock so as to ensure it leaves smoothly.
Following things must be checked by dock engineers and deck officers before water is filled up in the dock:
Undocking a ship is not rocket science . 99% of accidents happen because of human errors. There are checklists and procedures to follow as listed above. Error in judgement, error in training or just good ole fashion not giving a shiat or laziness/incompetence!
Of course there could be mechanical failures but in this case I think it's more human error than unforeseen mechanical failure. Even some mechanical failures can be avoided if proper checks are conducted as specified.
If I'm IN I would thoroughly investigate this accident as to prevent future occurrences. This is a very serious accident especially with fatalities that should not have happened!
Before water is pumped into the dock, there are a few checks that must be made. Bottom plugs must be closed and sea chests should be in full working condition. Also, ballasting of the ship must be done. This is to ensure that the ship does not have an even keel draught (the aft draught is usually greater than the forward draught).
The pump room, which is usually located at the forward end of the dock controls the amount of water being pumped out of the dock. This is also referred to as ballasting the dock.
The gangway is lifted sometimes by means of a crane once the dock personnel have cleared the ship. Fire hydrants and all shore connections are disconnected.
The forward and aft ends of the ship are attached to shore based mooring lines which are winch controlled.
A crane lifts these lines and places them on the deck so that they can be attached. These help to control the movement of the ship as it leaves the dock so as to ensure it leaves smoothly.
Following things must be checked by dock engineers and deck officers before water is filled up in the dock:
- All Departments in charge to confirm that repairs assigned under their departments are completed successful with tests and surveys are carried out
- Check rudder plug and vent and also check if anode are fitted back on rudder
- Check hull for proper coating of paint; make sure no is used.
- Check Impressed Current Cathodic Protection system (ICCP) anodes are fitted in position and cover removed
- Check Anodes are fitted properly on hull and cover removed (if ICCP is not installed)
- Check all double bottom tank plugs are secured
- Check all sea inlets and sea chests gratings are fitted
- Check echo sounder and logs are fitted and covers removed
- Check of and rudder are clear from any obstruction
- Check if anchor and anchor chain is secured on board
- Check all external connection (shore water supply, ) are removed
- Check inside the ship all repaired overboard valve are in place
- Secure any moving item inside the ship
- Check of all tank and match them with the value obtain prior entering the dry dock
- Check and trim of the ship. Positive GM should be maintained at all time
- If there is any load shift or change in stability, inform the dock master
- Go through the checklist again and satisfactory checklist to be signed by Master
- MCPO or CPO would sign the Authority to Flood Certificate
- When flooding reaches overboard valve level, stop it and check all valves and stern tube for leaks
- Instruction to every crew member to be vigilant while un-docking
Undocking a ship is not rocket science . 99% of accidents happen because of human errors. There are checklists and procedures to follow as listed above. Error in judgement, error in training or just good ole fashion not giving a shiat or laziness/incompetence!
Of course there could be mechanical failures but in this case I think it's more human error than unforeseen mechanical failure. Even some mechanical failures can be avoided if proper checks are conducted as specified.
If I'm IN I would thoroughly investigate this accident as to prevent future occurrences. This is a very serious accident especially with fatalities that should not have happened!
Lethe
Captain
Clearly the issues underlying India's recent naval mishaps need to be identified and addressed irrespective of where they arise, but it should be noted that most incidents have actually occurred or been traced to the industry side of things, rather than the Indian Navy itself.
Maybe nowadays they do, not so much in the past.
Maybe nowadays they do, not so much in the past.
Hendrik_2000
Lieutenant General
From diplomat speculation on the cause of tip over
Anatomy of an Accident: Why INS Betwa Tipped Over
How did a 4,000 ton Indian warship tip over while undocking?
By Abhijit Singh
December 09, 2016
Betwa Tipped Over"
India’s maritime woes are manifesting in multiple ways. In an unprecedented earlier this week, an Indian naval warship, the INS Betwa, slipped off her dock-blocks in a ship repair facility in Mumbai, suffering extensive damage. A Brahmaputra-class guided missile warship, the Betwa was in the process of undocking when the unfortunate incident occurred, killing two sailors and injuring another 15.
It is crushingly embarrassing for the navy and the Western Naval Command to face the ignominy of a 4,000-ton warship turning turtle in a dry dock. The fact that the mishap is only the latest in a long list of serious accidents involving Indian naval ships and submarines is an unsettling truth that naval commanders are finding hard to come to terms with.
As expected, an official inquiry is underway, but given the ship’s size and nature of the accident, it may be several weeks, perhaps even months, before the report is rendered, identifying causes and fixing responsibility. There are many aspects that the board will need to consider. Officials will have to closely examine the undocking plan and ascertain the exact sequence of events leading up to the accident. There are important questions surrounding the distribution of weight on the ship, positioning of personnel on board for necessary checks, and the possibility of a violation of procedures. In the main, the inquest will focus on identifying particular lapses that led to the failure of the hull support mechanism, and whether there was an infringement or subversion of prescribed protocols.
Given the foggy nature of the information at hand, any post-accident analysis would seem highly premature. However, even at the risk of faulty diagnosis, it may still be worthwhile to consider likely possibilities of where things may have gone wrong.
A ship’s undocking is a delicate process and always carried out in a carefully controlled environment. The essential principle followed is simple: allow water to fill the dock in calibrated fashion to allow the ship placed on dock blocks to float itself, without too much external intervention. Weight calculations are scrupulously done, and ballast conditions properly ensured to let the process take place gradually and organically.
Rarely does an undocking procedure dramatically unravel, unless one of the following three conditions occurs. If the dock blocks are improperly assembled or even in poor material condition, they could — in theory — give way, especially at the time when ship’s hull is just beginning to float, causing it to shift on the blocks. Such a possibility, however, is improbable because dock managers and engineers are known to be scrupulous about the quality and assemblage of dock blocks, as well as other supporting infrastructure that supports the ship’s hull during dock-repairs.
The more likely scenario is that the weight calculations were slightly — even if not substantially — off the mark; not enough to be alarming, but sufficient to cause a slight weight imbalance as the ship began lifting off the blocks. As opposed to cargo vessels that have a U-shaped hull, warships have a V-shaped bottom that makes trim (difference between the draft forward and aft) a critical requirement. It is important during the undocking of a ship for the front portion to lift first before letting the aft section float. If the reverse happens, there is likely to be excessive stress on the blocks holding the hull.
Speaking to the media after the incident, Defense Minister Manohar Parrikar that a weight imbalance may have been the reason behind the accident. When a ship undergoes refit, he stated, a lot of machinery is removed; as a result, the balance gets disturbed. The resultant shift in the center of gravity, he suggested, could have caused the accident. The Betwa, however, is not the first ship in refit to have its internal machinery removed. It happens every time a ship is docked for an extended duration refit. Even so, a strict account is kept of the weight and placement of equipment removed and relocated, and also of the resulting load displacement; every time a ship is undocked, personnel involved in the operation have a clear idea of actions needed to keep the vessel on even keel.
There is also a third possibility that the port (left) side of the ship was somehow heavier than the starboard (right), causing the ship to become imbalanced and topple over. This again is an unusual occurrence because weight calculations are made well in advance and correct load distribution certified before the undocking procedure gets underway.
Interestingly, while the captain of the ship is responsible for its safety in harbor and at sea, the dock master assumes responsibility when the ship enters a dry dock. It rests on the latter to orchestrate a safe dry docking and undocking operation, for which he has a trained crew and specialized dry dock equipment. He is mainly responsible for planning, coordination and execution of the entire operation.
This is not to suggest that the ship’s crew is free of all responsibility. Experts say that in a freak one-off, a sea-inlet valve on the port side may not been improperly secured by personnel on board, resulting in the ingress of water during the dock’s flooding, causing a weight imbalance. But this seems unlikely because bottom compartments are always being inspected for leakages during an undocking.
Maybe things got complicated when the water leaking into the ship was noticed after the bottom had been set afloat. This would have required the rear end to be settled back on the block by pumping out water from the dock. If the hull wasn’t positioned on its keel blocks properly then a loss of meta-centric height could have unbalanced the ship.
For some, there are other explanations. As one ship engineer pointed out after the accident, an important requirement for smooth undocking is consistent alignment – making sure the ship is kept still and pointing in one direction. This is accomplished with the help of heavy ropes that keep the ship aligned to the median line. If the water was filling in too rapidly, or if there were strong wind gusts, experts say, the ship’s forepeak could have laterally shifted away from the center, causing excessive strain on the dock blocks.
One suggestion has it that the timing of the incident – 1:50 p.m. — may have something to do with “” Dockyard workers are known to be finicky about lunch timings and sometimes take up to a two hour break for the afternoon meal. They may have been rushing through the undocking procedure with an eye toward lunch hour, or maybe they returned from late from their meal and were in the middle of the undocking procedure when the realization dawned that the tide had turned unfavorable, resulting in a temporary stall in proceedings. By then, the strain on the blocks, or an imbalance in weight, had taken a toll.
And yet, all explanations on offer are at best informed speculation. At the moment, a “technical evaluation” is underway in naval dockyard Mumbai to assess damage to the ship and set it upright. Apparently, foreign experts are being flown in to offer advice on how to salvage the ship. The Chief of Naval Staff (CNS) Admiral Sunil Lanba has expressed his resolve to get Betwa back on its keel and serviceable in quick time.
Anatomy of an Accident: Why INS Betwa Tipped Over
How did a 4,000 ton Indian warship tip over while undocking?
By Abhijit Singh
December 09, 2016
Betwa Tipped Over"
India’s maritime woes are manifesting in multiple ways. In an unprecedented earlier this week, an Indian naval warship, the INS Betwa, slipped off her dock-blocks in a ship repair facility in Mumbai, suffering extensive damage. A Brahmaputra-class guided missile warship, the Betwa was in the process of undocking when the unfortunate incident occurred, killing two sailors and injuring another 15.
It is crushingly embarrassing for the navy and the Western Naval Command to face the ignominy of a 4,000-ton warship turning turtle in a dry dock. The fact that the mishap is only the latest in a long list of serious accidents involving Indian naval ships and submarines is an unsettling truth that naval commanders are finding hard to come to terms with.
As expected, an official inquiry is underway, but given the ship’s size and nature of the accident, it may be several weeks, perhaps even months, before the report is rendered, identifying causes and fixing responsibility. There are many aspects that the board will need to consider. Officials will have to closely examine the undocking plan and ascertain the exact sequence of events leading up to the accident. There are important questions surrounding the distribution of weight on the ship, positioning of personnel on board for necessary checks, and the possibility of a violation of procedures. In the main, the inquest will focus on identifying particular lapses that led to the failure of the hull support mechanism, and whether there was an infringement or subversion of prescribed protocols.
Given the foggy nature of the information at hand, any post-accident analysis would seem highly premature. However, even at the risk of faulty diagnosis, it may still be worthwhile to consider likely possibilities of where things may have gone wrong.
A ship’s undocking is a delicate process and always carried out in a carefully controlled environment. The essential principle followed is simple: allow water to fill the dock in calibrated fashion to allow the ship placed on dock blocks to float itself, without too much external intervention. Weight calculations are scrupulously done, and ballast conditions properly ensured to let the process take place gradually and organically.
Rarely does an undocking procedure dramatically unravel, unless one of the following three conditions occurs. If the dock blocks are improperly assembled or even in poor material condition, they could — in theory — give way, especially at the time when ship’s hull is just beginning to float, causing it to shift on the blocks. Such a possibility, however, is improbable because dock managers and engineers are known to be scrupulous about the quality and assemblage of dock blocks, as well as other supporting infrastructure that supports the ship’s hull during dock-repairs.
The more likely scenario is that the weight calculations were slightly — even if not substantially — off the mark; not enough to be alarming, but sufficient to cause a slight weight imbalance as the ship began lifting off the blocks. As opposed to cargo vessels that have a U-shaped hull, warships have a V-shaped bottom that makes trim (difference between the draft forward and aft) a critical requirement. It is important during the undocking of a ship for the front portion to lift first before letting the aft section float. If the reverse happens, there is likely to be excessive stress on the blocks holding the hull.
Speaking to the media after the incident, Defense Minister Manohar Parrikar that a weight imbalance may have been the reason behind the accident. When a ship undergoes refit, he stated, a lot of machinery is removed; as a result, the balance gets disturbed. The resultant shift in the center of gravity, he suggested, could have caused the accident. The Betwa, however, is not the first ship in refit to have its internal machinery removed. It happens every time a ship is docked for an extended duration refit. Even so, a strict account is kept of the weight and placement of equipment removed and relocated, and also of the resulting load displacement; every time a ship is undocked, personnel involved in the operation have a clear idea of actions needed to keep the vessel on even keel.
There is also a third possibility that the port (left) side of the ship was somehow heavier than the starboard (right), causing the ship to become imbalanced and topple over. This again is an unusual occurrence because weight calculations are made well in advance and correct load distribution certified before the undocking procedure gets underway.
Interestingly, while the captain of the ship is responsible for its safety in harbor and at sea, the dock master assumes responsibility when the ship enters a dry dock. It rests on the latter to orchestrate a safe dry docking and undocking operation, for which he has a trained crew and specialized dry dock equipment. He is mainly responsible for planning, coordination and execution of the entire operation.
This is not to suggest that the ship’s crew is free of all responsibility. Experts say that in a freak one-off, a sea-inlet valve on the port side may not been improperly secured by personnel on board, resulting in the ingress of water during the dock’s flooding, causing a weight imbalance. But this seems unlikely because bottom compartments are always being inspected for leakages during an undocking.
Maybe things got complicated when the water leaking into the ship was noticed after the bottom had been set afloat. This would have required the rear end to be settled back on the block by pumping out water from the dock. If the hull wasn’t positioned on its keel blocks properly then a loss of meta-centric height could have unbalanced the ship.
For some, there are other explanations. As one ship engineer pointed out after the accident, an important requirement for smooth undocking is consistent alignment – making sure the ship is kept still and pointing in one direction. This is accomplished with the help of heavy ropes that keep the ship aligned to the median line. If the water was filling in too rapidly, or if there were strong wind gusts, experts say, the ship’s forepeak could have laterally shifted away from the center, causing excessive strain on the dock blocks.
One suggestion has it that the timing of the incident – 1:50 p.m. — may have something to do with “” Dockyard workers are known to be finicky about lunch timings and sometimes take up to a two hour break for the afternoon meal. They may have been rushing through the undocking procedure with an eye toward lunch hour, or maybe they returned from late from their meal and were in the middle of the undocking procedure when the realization dawned that the tide had turned unfavorable, resulting in a temporary stall in proceedings. By then, the strain on the blocks, or an imbalance in weight, had taken a toll.
And yet, all explanations on offer are at best informed speculation. At the moment, a “technical evaluation” is underway in naval dockyard Mumbai to assess damage to the ship and set it upright. Apparently, foreign experts are being flown in to offer advice on how to salvage the ship. The Chief of Naval Staff (CNS) Admiral Sunil Lanba has expressed his resolve to get Betwa back on its keel and serviceable in quick time.
kwaigonegin
Colonel
Like I postulated in my earlier post I will go out on a limb and say this is more likely a human error than it is an unforeseen mechanical/technical fault.
Undocking a ship is demanding however it is not overly complex or hard. It just involves a lot of carefully cheorograph steps, calculations and more importantly attention to detail for all involved.
If you ignore or rushed through proper procedures so you can do lunch innocent people die. It's really that simple.
PLAN Ming Class Sub 361, all 70 aboard her were found dead wshich was strange in itself as the Ming type sub carried a crew of 55
"........... Chinese navy officials, also perplexed about the accident, speculated that the mechanical problem was the failure of diesel engines to shut down as the sub prepared to dive. The navy reported that all the sailors appeared to have died at their duty stations, and within a few minutes of each other. This would be the result of such a diesel engine accident, which has been known to happen in the past. But such an incident is rare, as it requires a poorly built or maintained diesel system on board, and a poorly trained and supervised engineering crew to allow something like this to get out of hand. A subs diesel engines require a large amount of air to operate, which is why they are only used on the surface. When preparing to dive, the vents that allow air in, and diesel exhaust out, are closed. If you keep the diesels running after these vents are closed, you quickly suck all the oxygen out of the sub, killing all on board. ...................
Initially, all sorts of theories emerged to explain the sudden death of the crew. One possibility tossed about was that 361 may have been equipped with an Air Independent Propulsion system that was being tested on the surface, had an accident, and released a large amount of noxious fumes that killed 70 people. If such a system was being tested, it could be done more safely with the sub cruising on the surface, but with all hatches closed. Normally, when doing any kind of experimental testing, the hatches between the various compartments in a sub would be closed. But discipline in the Chinese navy tends to be sloppy, and the compartment hatches could have been left open simply because it was more convenient. It is known that at least one of the latest Mings built had an Air Independent Propulsion system. Such a system allows a sub to operate for extended periods under water.
The cause of such massive deaths was also thought to have been something more prosaic, like a battery malfunction (which can produce large quantities of poisonous chlorine gas). Another possibility was massive damage to a torpedo, sending large quantities of poisonous gas through the sub.
But in this case, the most likely culprit appears to be the diesel engine and the control systems that, normally, insure that the engine is shut down when the exhaust and air intake vents are closed before diving. Since the sub was still on the surface when the dead crew was found, an examination of the diesel engine and related systems should indicate if this was the cause of the calamity.
Lethe
Captain
In other words, a case of chalta hai.
@kwaigonegin
I knew I didn't know enough about it. I only thought of point 15 of your twenty points. But we are all aware of a much larger ship that was even more drastically modified and that was successfully refloated. Looking for information on that ship let me find this forum
I knew I didn't know enough about it. I only thought of point 15 of your twenty points. But we are all aware of a much larger ship that was even more drastically modified and that was successfully refloated. Looking for information on that ship let me find this forum
Deadly mishaps underscore the need for faster modernization and expanded U.S. ties.
The commissioning ceremony for the INS Chennai, a Kolkata-class stealth guided-missile destroyer, in Mumbai on Nov. 21. Photo: Associated Press
Dec. 12, 2016 7:07 p.m. ET
Shipyard accidents happen, so perhaps it’s wrong to make too much of last week’s unprecedented toppling in a Mumbai dockyard of the guided-missile frigate INS Betwa, which killed two sailors and could leave one of India’s warships unsalvageable. But given the frequency with which the Indian navy is experiencing similar mishaps, the incident is a reminder that New Delhi has far to go if it’s to project credible power across the Indo-Pacific.
Among the previous accidents was a 2013 explosion in the torpedo compartment of a submarine docked in Mumbai, which killed 18 sailors and sank the ship. A fire on another submarine months later killed two officers and led to the resignation of India’s top navy commander. The Betwa ran aground in 2014 as she was entering the Mumbai naval base.
India is also having a hard time building its own aircraft carriers that would curb its reliance on Russian models and employ technologies developed jointly with the U.S. As the Journal reported last month, U.S. engineers who visited the INS Vikrant carrier under construction in the port of Kochi in February found it years behind schedule, with “no small missile system to defend itself, a limited ability to launch sorties and no defined strategy for how to use the ship in combat.”
An Indian government audit in July scored the Kochi shipyard for having “no previous experience of warship construction.” It also found faults in the Vikrant’s jet-launch systems and gear boxes and assessed that the ship won’t be operational by the 2018 date promised by India’s military.
U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter established several special offices to expand joint exercises, arms sales, technology sharing and other efforts with New Delhi, and the U.S. Congress this month affirmed the Obama Administration’s designation of India as a “major defense partner.” India has been especially keen on U.S. ties since Narendra Modi became Prime Minister in 2014.
But many officials in New Delhi still don’t trust Washington because of pro-Moscow views dating to the Cold War and suspicion of the U.S. relationship with Pakistan. This helps explain why, even after more than a decade of talks, India won’t sign two of the three “foundational” agreements that the U.S. uses to facilitate defense data-sharing and communication with some 80 countries.
Far more is needed to modernize India’s navy, but here’s hoping the Trump Administration continues the work of its predecessors in deepening America’s economic and military ties with India. Concluding the remaining foundational agreements would be a powerful sign from New Delhi that it intends to remain a willing partner.
3 months about for known the recent J-15 accident... i see you ( franckly ) very certain...don' t exist reliability for datas etc... look Deino... with China or changes and big i hope...
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