History of South American nation inter-rivalry and arms buildup

The Falkland/Malvinas War, or the War of the South Atlantic, Part 9

Island Defenses

After the initial invasion of the islands on April 2nd until the end of the month, the majority of operations consisted of Britain struggling to assemble and move a task force to retake the islands, while Argentina reinforced its positions in the islands. Major combat operations would begin on the 1st of May, 1982.

If Britain was struggling to assemble the forces needed to retake the islands, they at least had the benefit of a few hundred years of expeditionary warfare to guide them as to what was needed, and how to employ it. Even with the shortcomings of the fleet, Britain managed to deploy from the home islands a reasonably well balanced force in a remarkably short period of time. Given the need to locate and modify several merchant ships, this speedy deployment is all the more impressive.
Argentina’s failure to plan for follow on operations, however, led to operational shortcomings that would severely hamper their ability to retain control of the waters around the islands, and ultimately the islands themselves.

There is an old saying in military circles which states: “Mediocre equipment in the hands of a professional can work miracles. The other extreme is a waste of ammunition”


Air lifted Argentine forces on the island

As Argentina grasped that if they wanted to keep the Falkland/Malvinas, they’d have to fight for them, they began a rapid build-up of forces in the islands. The small Argentine air force transport service began airlifting in large numbers of troops. But the limitations of air transport meant that very few of the troops’ heavy vehicles would be sent to the island. Further, as noted above, the failure of Argentina to plan for follow up operations meant that they failed to press into service merchant shipping under their control to move heavy equipment and supplies to the islands while they still had undisputed control of local waters.

While the Argentine Army and Air Force moved roughly a division’s worth of troops to the islands by air, incredibly, neither force attempted to improve the airfield at Stanley to operate fast jets such as the A-4 Skyhawk’s or Dagger’s. As Dr. James S. Corum notes in his excellent commentary regarding the conflict:

“General Galtieri demonstrated a remarkable lack of understanding of modern military operations by insisting that the Falklands would be defended by a large land force, largely composed of half-trained conscripts, with few heavy weapons, cut off from sea supply and completely dependent upon a tenuous airlift capability. He and most of the senior military leaders also seem to have had little concept of the use of modern technology in war. For example, the Argentine Army and air force could have lengthened the airstrip at Port Stanley by 2,000 feet (existing runway was 1200 feet) and forward based the Skyhawk’s and Dagger’s in the islands. On the mainland the Argentines had the engineers, equipment, and pierced-steel planking that would have allowed them to extend the runway within a week or so of starting work. However, to get the engineers, materiel, and equipment to Port Stanley would have required reallocating much of the limited airlift capacity. General Galtieri’s strategy to defend the islands with a large number of ground forces committed all the airlift to transporting troops and ruled out any reallocation—and there was simply not enough airlift to do both. In April 1982, in contrast to General Galtieri’s decision, professional air force and naval officers in the United States and Europe thought lengthening the runway on the islands was the obvious thing to do.”


Pre-invasion airport at Port Stanly

Indeed, had the Argentines maintained control of the waters around the islands through forward basing of airpower, there would have been no need for a large ground force, as Britain would not have been able to land any significant forces without prohibitive losses. Even the most cursory examination of the history of amphibious operations in World War II shows that establishing air superiority over the objective was critical to success. Time and time again, US or British forces would isolate an objective first by airpower, then by naval power, and only then would they attempt to land ground forces. The few times they failed to take that approach led to bloody campaigns such as Guadalcanal.

The Argentine air force did move a fair number of light Pucara attack aircraft into the islands (approximately 24 aircraft), suitable for operations from unimproved airstrips, but turboprop aircraft were likely more a liability than an asset given the hostile anti-aircraft environment they were to face. Other aircraft operated from the islands, such as MB.339 faced the same shortcomings, only to a greater degree.


U.S. Marines extending a runway with steel plates during WWII

By failing to improve the runway at Stanley, the Argentines ensured that they would have to fight for air superiority over the islands. The distance from the mainland was such that virtually every advantage their Mirage and Dagger fighters had was squandered by the need to fly long distances just to reach the islands. Rather than being able to position a combat air patrol over Stanley and force the British Harriers to fly long distance strikes against them, they instead allowed the Royal Navy to operate relatively closely to the Falklands (and by staying about 100 miles east of the islands, they made it even harder for the Argentine air assets to reach their task force). Harriers would have sufficient fuel to operate over the islands for as much as an hour at a time, whereas Argentine aircraft would have only enough time to dash in and run home, lest they run out of fuel. The long range also meant that the Daggers and Mirages could not use their afterburners, and effectively reduced these Mach 2 interceptors to roughly the same speed as the Harriers.


NEXT PART TEN: FIRST MAJOR COMBAT OPERATIONS



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The Falkland/Malvinas War, or the War of the South Atlantic, Part 10

First Major Combat Operations
1 May 1982- The Curtain Rises

The first day of May brought the first major combat operations of the Falkland/Malvinas War. The first strike was by the British. In the first of a series of air raids an RAF Vulcan bomber, operating from Ascension Island, and with tanker support, dropped twenty-one 1000lb bombs on Stanley airfield in a pre-dawn attack, an attempted coup de main. It failed to fully render the airfield inoperable (indeed, throughout the campaign, it would continue to operate) but it did some damage, and dispelled the foolish Argentine belief that a negotiated settlement was possible.

Following close on the heels of the air raid, a strike by ten Harriers from HMS Hermes and HMS Invincible hit Stanley airfield and the small strip at Goose Green. Because the Argentines had failed to improve Stanley airfield for use as a base for their A-4 Skyhawks and IAI Daggers, the British were able to launch from a mere 70 miles away. Almost simultaneously, a three ship detachment from the task force closed within 6 miles of shore and began shelling Argentine shore installations.


Airfield at Goose Green

So Argentina knew the British were near the island. What they didn’t know was precisely where. They launched a series of counterstrikes against the Harriers and the main body of the task force, but most jets were unable to locate targets and had to return to base without ever contributing anything to the battle. The task force was far enough from the Argentine mainland that strikes could only reach it with air to air refueling. But Argentina only had two KC-130 tankers, capable only supporting a handful of strike aircraft. Rather than being able to overwhelm British defenses, they instead mounted a few strikes, many of which flailed around in a futile attempt to find the British task force. The Argentine Navy A-4 Skyhawks and Super Etendards could refuel in the air, but the Mirages could not. The extreme range, and lack of tanker support meant that the Harriers would almost always meet the Argentines on roughly equal numerical terms.


KC-130 tanker refueling A-4 Skyhawks

The three ships shelling facilities in the islands were another matter. Argentine jets knew just where to find them. Daggers from the mainland mounted the first of many strikes against British ships in close waters. One British ship sustained minor damage. Another flight attempting to attack the main body was intercepted by Harriers, and promptly lost two jets to AIM-9L Sidewinder missiles. A third jet, attempting to land at Stanley for a fuel emergency was shot down by friendly fire.
A second strike on the ships shelling the islands, by Canberra bombers, was turned back with one Canberra lost, and one badly damaged.

The war had begun. Bombs were falling, and men were dying. But only in small numbers. The next day would be the single bloodiest day of the entire war.

NEXT PART ELEVEN: SINKING OF THE ARA GENERAL BELGRANO


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The Falkland/Malvinas War, or the War of the South Atlantic, Part 11

2 May, 1982- The Sinking of the ARA General Belgrano

The Argentine failure to improve the runway at Stanley Airfield meant other means would be necessary to secure the waters around the Falkland/Malvinas in order to prevent British reoccupation of the islands. We saw in the last part that anti-shipping strikes by Argentine fighters operating from mainland air bases against the British task force began on the 1st of May.

Even prior to that, the Argentine navy (ARA) had sortied two task forces into waters just outside the 200 nm Total Exclusion Zone declared by Britain. The first, northern task force consisted of Argentina’s aircraft carrier, the ARA 25 de Mayo (herself a surplus British ship) escorted by two modern British built Type 42 destroyers. These Type 42 were almost identical to the Type 42′s serving as escorts to the carriers of the British fleet. The ARA 25 de Mayo’s air-wing consisted of A-4Q Skyhawks and S-2E Trackers. The Trackers could be used to find the British task force, which could then be attacked by the Skyhawks. In fact, on 1 May, she tried to launch strikes, but unfavorable winds from the stern left her aircraft unable to launch.


ARA 25 de Mayo with air wing flying overhead.

The other task force, patrolling outside the southern boundary of the TEZ, consisted of the ARA General Belgrano, and two destroyers. The ARA General Belgrano was formerly the USS Phoenix, a Brooklyn class light cruiser. Built in 1938, and serving successfully throughout World War II, she had been sold as surplus to Argentina in 1951. She retained her battery of fifteen 6” guns, and had been modernized and armed with MM38 Exocet anti-ship missiles. Her escorts were both former US Sumner/Gearing class destroyers, which the US Navy had modernized under the 1960s Fleet Rehabilitation and Modernization Program, or FRAM. The ARA General Belgrano had no antisubmarine capability. The two FRAM destroyers, despite being modernized in the 1960s, had only the most marginal ability to detect or defeat modern nuclear submarines.

These two task forces might not have been the most formidable ever sent to sea, but they did represent a genuine threat to the British task force. The British were operating on a shoestring. If either force were able to close with the British, they could wreak considerable havoc.


The ARA General Belgrano was outside the exclusion zone and in the process of returning to base at Rio Gallego when she was sunk.

Accordingly, orders were sent from the Admiralty for the advance screen of nuclear subs to locate and track these two task forces. HMS Spartan was assigned to locate the carrier group to the north. HMS Conqueror drew the southern assignment. HMS Spartan never definitively located the ARA 25 de Mayo. But on 1 May, HMS Conqueror detected and began tracking ARA General Belgrano and her escorts.



The British government’s declaration of the TEZ said that all shipping and air traffic inside the TEZ was liable to attack, including Argentine and neutral shipping. But the British government had also made clear that any Argentine warships and military aircraft were liable to attack if they posed a threat to British operations. After the events of 1 May, the decision was made by the Admiralty to attack the Argentine task groups despite their being outside the TEZ. The mere possibility of the cruiser closing in and firing volleys of Exocets and following up with a cascade of 6” gunfire didn’t bear thinking about. Accordingly, on 2 May, 1982, HMS Conqueror stalked, closed with and engaged the ARA General Belgrano. Because of concerns about the reliability of the advanced MK24 Tigerfish torpedo in the anti-ship role, Conqueror closed to within a mile of General Belgrano, and fired three Mk8 torpedoes. These World War II vintage torpedoes were the old fashioned, straight running kind, and would be familiar to anyone who’s ever seen “Run Silent, Run Deep.” Two of the three torpedoes struck General Belgrano, and she quickly began to sink.


While 770 survivors were eventually rescued, three hundred twenty three lives were lost in this bloodiest single day of the War. Rescue and recovery operations went on for two days. The British made no attempt to interfere. The Argentine surface fleet, stunned by the loss of this major unit, sailed for home. The ARA 25 de Mayo, and the rest of the ARAs major surface units, would spend the rest of the war in port.

In the face of a nuclear submarine threat, the technologically inferior units of the ARA would have been well advised to spend the entire war safely at port. Had HMS Spartan located the Argentine carrier force, she too would likely have received orders to attack, almost certainly with greater loss of life.

Looking back with 20/20 hindsight, rather than trying to perform offensive operations in the vicinity of the islands, the Argentine fleet, weaker in numbers and in technology, might have been better employed trying to interdict the fragile logistical line running from the task force to Ascension Island (similar tactic utilized by the Germans in the Second World War). The British task force needed a regular shuttle service of oilers for fuel and other logistical support to stay at sea for any reasonable period of time. Locating and severing this link would have hamstrung the British fleet and might possibly have allowed the ARA to operate away from the British efforts to track and attack them in turn.

For the expenditure of three thoroughly obsolete torpedoes, the Royal Navy had denied the Argentines the ability to operate at sea. So far the Argentine military had missed several opportunities to deny the British control around the island. It was now down to the Air Force. If the Argentines couldn’t use their land based airpower to defeat the Royal Navy, the islands were bound to be restored to the Union Jack.


NEXT PART TWELVE: SINKING OF THE HMS SHEFFIELD




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Do you know why didn't Argentina acquire more lighter ships (frigates, destroyers, even missile boats ) with Exocet or some other anti-ship missile, considering recent experiences in the world with such armament (conflicts in 70's ) . And yet they held on to older obsolete and manpower intensive ships like Belgrano ?

Also, I noticed lack of shore based anti-ship batteries , except that improvised attempt with Exocet (quite successful actually ) and no attempt of mining locations most suitable for landing (on the land and on the sea) .

thunderchief said:

Do you know why didn't Argentina acquire more lighter ships (frigates, destroyers, even missile boats ) with Exocet or some other anti-ship missile, considering recent experiences in the world with such armament (conflicts in 70's ) . And yet they held on to older obsolete and manpower intensive ships like Belgrano ?

Also, I noticed lack of shore based anti-ship batteries , except that improvised attempt with Exocet (quite successful actually ) and no attempt of mining locations most suitable for landing (on the land and on the sea) .

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Great questions. They were in the process of building the Meko series of Destroyer and frigates in cooperation with Germany. This was part of the new military modernization called “Plan Europa” The Mekos where in construction along with the Type 209 and the TR-1700. There was also the new TAM and TAM VCTP which were still on the drawing board.

The only newly acquired weapon system to arrive prior to hostilities was the Super Etendard and the Exocet missile system.
There is a very interesting story behind the entire invasion that I have alluded to in series posted herein. The original plan for the invasion was to take place in place in the beginning of the second quarter of 1983. The thinking was that Briton would not have the Hermes (Sale to India) and that many older frigates and destroyers of the Royal Navy were to be decommissioned. Something that Margaret Thatcher was fighting against, but was a “fait accompli”. Additionally the second type 209 submarine would have been operational.

The time table for the invasion was accelerated due to the deteriorating economic condition in Argentina and the general unrest cause by all of the civilian disappearances cause by the “dirty War”.

Personally I feel that thing worked out the way they were supposed to. If the results were to have been revered Argentina would never have broken free of the grasp of the military dictatorship. There would have most likely have been a war with Chile (due to the military having been emboldened by a victory). Also a defeated (or a draw with) England would have cause serious problems for NATO at the height of the Cold War with the Soviet Union. Very grave consequences indeed.

In regards to the Mining of possible landing sites. Yes this should have been done. Even a small amount of mines in an area would generate concern in the commander’s minds and would allow the defenders to have greater control over the possible landing location.



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The Naval War in the Falkland/Malvinas, Part 12

4 May, 1982- The Sinking of the HMS Sheffield


After the sinking of the ARA General Belgrano, there was no question but that there would be a fight for the Falkland/Malvinas. The Argentine Navy, stung by the loss of life with the sinking of the General Belgrano, had retreated to port. The British task force, operating east of the islands themselves, began operations to prepare for an amphibious landing. Air strikes and naval gunfire missions would prep the landing zone, while SAS and SBS troops performed reconnaissance missions to determine the best locations to make the main effort. While the task force was awaiting the main body of the amphibious forces, they also struggled to gain air superiority above the islands and adjacent waters.

As we’ve seen in earlier posts, the Argentines had far more aircraft available in theater than the British. But operational constraints meant they could not get those aircraft into the fight in large numbers at any one time. Since the Argentines failed to improve Stanley airfield to operate fast jets, they had to operate from mainland bases, only just in range of the islands. By standing off to the east, the British task force was out of range from Argentine strike aircraft unless they were refueled in the air. But Argentina’s best supersonic fighters were not capable of air-to-air refueling, and in any event, Argentina’s only tanker assets were two KC-130 tankers. This imposed a finite (and very small) limit on the numbers of aircraft that could range to the task force in any one strike.

The primary Argentine strike aircraft was the A-4 Skyhawk, but it had no anti-shipping weapons other than free-fall bombs (which meant that one had to fly over the ships to drop bombs on them). The Argentine Navy had been in the middle of transitioning from the A-4Q to the French built Dassault Super Etendard light attack jet. The Super Etendard was carrier capable, and could be refueled in flight. But the big advance was its ability to carry the AM39 Exocet sea-skimming anti-ship missile. But they had only accepted five jets into service, and worse, they’d only received 5 Exocet missiles. British diplomatic efforts prevented the Argentines from securing any more air-launched Exocets on the international market.

The Argentines also had to face the problem of simply finding the British task force. While the task force operated relatively close to the Falklands, that still left an enormous area for them to hide in. Argentina’s only long range patrol planes were two US surplus P-2 Neptunes. These Neptunes had a decent long range search radar and good ability to passively detect the British through Electronic Support Measures (ESM) but were hampered by a lack of spare parts. Argentina had been subject to an embargo since the “Dirty War” against internal dissidents, and spare parts for their surplus US aircraft were unavailable. Indeed, both Neptunes would be withdrawn from service before the end of the war because of this lack of part. This lack of search capability greatly hampered the Argentine ability to attack the task force. In fact, a large percentage of strikes launched were abandoned because they simply couldn’t find the British. Further, the Argentines were having difficulty integrating the Exocet with their Super Etendards. They weren’t certain the weapons would even work.

The Argentines weren’t the only ones facing challenges. The British had several problems as well. Since their light carriers only carried Harriers and helicopters, they had no Airborne Early Warning (AEW) radar planes to cover the task force. Radar range, particularly against low level targets, is a function of the height of the antennae. The curvature of the earth means that shipborne radar can only detect low flying aircraft at very modest ranges. If the Royal Navy had not decommissioned HMS Ark Royal six years previously, her airwing of Phantom fighters, Buccaneer strike jets, and Fairey Gannet AEW planes would have been vastly more formidable than the airpower aboard the two light carriers. Therefore. Admiral Sandy Woodward had three of his Type 42 anti-air warfare destroyers deployed ahead of the main body to serve as radar pickets. The Type 42s had the best long range air search radars of the task force, and a long range missile system to go with it, the Sea Dart. But if the Argentine came in low enough, the Type 42s might not see them in time to successfully engage with Sea Dart. On the other hand, they were likely to spot any Argentines long before they reached the absolutely priceless carriers of the task force. The frigates escorting the carriers carried the very short range Sea Wolf missile, which was in its own way better suited for this mission. Optimized for quick reaction to close in threats such as jets and anti-ship missiles, Sea Wolf equipped escorts would be cued to inbound raids by the Type 42s, and ready to prevent any attacks on the carriers. The carriers contributed to their own defense as well, by maintaining a Combat Air Patrol (CAP) of two Harriers armed with advanced AIM-9L Sidewinders. Any Argentine intruders detected were in grave danger from these jets. The small number of Harriers in the task force meant they weren’t always able to maintain a CAP, but as much as possible, the patrol was maintained during daylight hours.

Early on 4 May, 1982, an Argentine SP-2H Neptune detected what it thought was the main body of the British task force. Instead, it had detected the picket screen of Type 42 destroyers. A strike by two Exocet armed Super Etendards was quickly launched. The two Super Etendards were able to close within launch range (about 25 miles) of HMS Sheffield. Two Exocets were launched. At about 11:04am local, one of the missiles impacted the starboard side of Sheffield a few feet above the waterline. Most sources say the warhead failed to explode, but others claim it did. At any event, the missile severed the fire main, and started violent fires amidships. Photographic evidence tends to support the contention that the warhead failed to explode. The crew of Sheffield were unable to control the fires. After several hours, the decision was made to abandon ship. Twenty crewmen, mostly in the galley area of the ship, lost their lives. The other Exocet missed and crashed into the sea.


HMS Sheffield was taken under tow, but six days later, progressive flooding from high seas through the breach in the hull caused her to founder.


After the air raid, Argentina actually had no idea if the attack had been successful. It wasn’t until the British Ministry of Defense announced the attack that Argentina realized they had been successful (at least, in attacking a ship, if not the carrier they thought they were attacking). While an open society such as Britain has a responsibility to keep the public informed, had Britain not informed the world of the attack, Argentina might well have concluded that the Super Etendard/Exocet combination still had not been mastered, and foregone further attempts at using their Exocets.

The loss of Sheffield caused navies throughout the world to sit up and take notice. The need to be able to detect and rapidly engage sea-skimming missiles was abundantly clear. Further, the hit to the Sheffield should have been survivable. Every professional navy in the world, and particularly the US Navy, rededicated itself to learning the lessons of damage control, and particularly firefighting at sea. The attack on the USS Stark in 1987 by Iraq (by Exocet missiles, no less) showed that many lessons had indeed been learned. In spite of two devastating hits by Exocets, the Stark survived. Fires ravaged her, but she was saved to serve again.

First blood had been drawn on the British task force. It would not be the last. The British would continue to conduct softening-up strikes on the islands, and a war of attrition was about to begin.

NEXT PART THIRTEEN: SOFTENING UP



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thunderchief said:

Do you know why didn't Argentina acquire more lighter ships (frigates, destroyers, even missile boats ) with Exocet or some other anti-ship missile, considering recent experiences in the world with such armament (conflicts in 70's ) . And yet they held on to older obsolete and manpower intensive ships like Belgrano ?

Also, I noticed lack of shore based anti-ship batteries , except that improvised attempt with Exocet (quite successful actually ) and no attempt of mining locations most suitable for landing (on the land and on the sea) .

Click to expand...

One more point. The Argentine decision to occupy the islands with large numbers of infantry, at the expense of a smaller, balanced combined arms force showed a fundamental lack of understanding of modern warfare by the Argentine junta. Had the Argentine military studied MacArthur’s campaign in the Pacific at all, they would have realized that MacArthur only landed infantry, not to destroy Japanese forces, but instead to seize airfields. The failure of the junta to improve Stanley Airfield to take strike aircraft is stunning, especially given the aggressiveness and skill of the aviators. Basing the strike elements of the FAA there may not have prevented the British from retaking the islands, but failure to do so virtually guaranteed that the British eventually would.


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The Naval War in the Falkland/Malvinas - Part 13

Softening Up

After the attack on HMS Sheffield until the first landings of the main body of troops, the war mostly consisted of the British task force attempting to soften up the Argentine forces on the islands. The carrier task force operated to the east of the islands, launching series of Harrier attacks on known and suspected positions, attempting to shut down Stanley airfield (they were never wholly successful) and inserting Special Air Service (SAS) and Special Boat Service (SBS) teams. The SAS is vaguely analogous to our Special Forces, and the SBS is roughly equivalent to U.S. Navy SEALs. The SAS and SBS teams had a two fold mission.

The first was reconnaissance. Now, the obvious part of this is attempting to locate the Argentine forces, their battle positions, strength and order of battle. A thorough topographical understanding of the islands was also needed, and SAS teams could confirm that available maps represented reality. But as important was a complete hydrographic survey of the possible landing beaches. Britain had a fair idea of some hydrographic features of the islands, such as tides, but amphibious landings leave little room for error, and call for special knowledge of local conditions that even long-time residents would not think to look for. The gradient and composition of beaches, roads and exits from beaches, localized currents in possible landing sites, and the ability of sites to bear military traffic would all be critical information in any landing. Further, even if the teams lucked out and found perfect landing beaches, reconnaissance of all beaches had to be conducted. This would prevent the enemy from determining beforehand which beaches the Brits would land from. After all, why sacrifice the great element of surprise that maneuver from the sea gives you? Secondly, other factors beside the quality of the beaches might dictate landings on less optimal beaches. For instance, if the Argentines had fortified the best beaches to land on, prudence would dictate landing on less appealing, but less deadly, beaches. The wise practitioner of amphibious warfare knows to “hit them where they are not” and then use your freedom of maneuver to hit the enemy at the time and place of your own choosing. The German Army used to say, “Time spent on reconnaissance is never time wasted.” In this case, time spent in reconnaissance would allow the British to do just that.

The second role of these SAS and SBS teams would be to conduct raids. A raid is a surprise attack on a fixed enemy position, with no intent to seize and hold the position for any length of time. That is, get in, hit hard, and get out. Raids by these special operators would yield several benefits. First, they were used to shape the battlefield. By destroying enemy assets before the main body of the landing, the British would be tailoring the conditions of the coming battle to their own needs. One such raid was on 14 May, at an early warning site on Pebble Island, denying the Argentines the ability to spot the British fleet as it closed in to its preferred landing sites. Further, these raids gathered intelligence about the enemy, both hard intel, such as his locations and strength and equipment, but also soft intel such as how hard the Argentine conscript was willing to fight, and his level of training and proficiency. Finally, they established a “moral superiority” over the defenders. With the seeming ability to strike anywhere, any time he chose, the attacker left the defender discouraged and uncertain. If nothing else, it kept the Argentines up all night looking for the SAS and SBS.

Some of these raid occurred of the islands and on the Argentine mainland. An SAS mission to destroy Argentine Jet Aircraft on the mainland crashed in Chile (British had help from the Chilean Government). This accident occurred on 19 May, a helicopter loaded with SAS troops crashed, killing 21 member of the team.

During this time, the Argentine Air Force continued to attempt to locate and attack the British naval forces. The two P-2 Neptunes were withdrawn from service on 10 May due to a lack of spare parts, greatly frustrating their ability to locate the task force. Attempts to use other platforms as maritime patrol aircraft were not very successful. For instance, C-130s were pressed into service as patrol planes. Without proper equipment and training, they struggled to find the British, and one was shot down by British Harriers on 1 June. Until the British closed in on the islands for the landings, the Argentines could do little to attack the task force. When the British did finally make their main effort at San Carlos Bay on the 21st of May, the Argentine Air Force would strike with suicidal courage.


NEXT PART FOURTEEN: THE LANDINGS BEGIN


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The Naval War in the Falkland/Malvinas- Part 14

The Landings Begin

On the 21st of May, after weeks of softening up and reconnaissance operations, the British began landing the first of two infantry brigades. These landings took place on the beaches at San Carlos Water. A quick glance at the map shows that San Carlos Water is across the island from the main Argentine defensive positions, and is also in sheltered waters.




Landings at San Carlos Bay

Landing so far away from the main Argentine defensive positions allowed the British forces to land without having to endure the sort of slaughter that comes to mind in an amphibious operation, such as at Normandy or Iwo Jima. Units were able to land in coherent order, and the flow of their logistical supplies was able to follow immediately upon their heels. The sheltered waters also made landing craft control and operations a great deal easier. Finally, the grounds surrounding San Carlos Water would frustrate any attempt to attack with Exocet missiles. This use of the inherent mobility of the sea to conduct amphibious landings at a place most advantageous to the attacker is one of the hallmarks of modern doctrine from the US Marines, and other sea borne forces.

But the selection of the landing site wasn’t without its drawbacks. While the Argentine ground forces were in no position to offer any serious resistance in their static defenses, they were able to tell just where a sizeable portion of the British fleet was. In addition to amphibious shipping, several frigates were on hand to serve as escorts, deliver gunfire support, and provide radar and missile anti-aircraft coverage for the landings. At last, the Argentines could launch sizeable airstrikes with a good idea of where the British were to be found. And due to the surrounding land masses, the British radar would be unable to pick up inbound strikes until almost literally the last second.

Incredibly, when the Argentines came in, they focused their strikes on the warships, not the amphibious shipping. Had they studied the Japanese Kamikaze campaign in the Philippines and Okinawa, they would have realized that the priority should have gone to the support vessels and left the warships for later. Had they struck any of the amphibious ships, they could have seriously disrupted the landings. In defense of the Argentine pilots, when they crested the hills around the landing zone they were left with literally second to select a target, line up, fly over it, aim, drop bombs and then escape. They did all this while being shot at. They may have had the wrong priority, but when the Argentine pilots began attacking that day, they came in with a stunning ferocity:

Chapter 12:”The British were awed by the courage of the Argentine pilots, flying suicidally low to attack, then vanishing amid flashes of pursuing Sea Cat, Blowpipe, Rapier, racing across the sky behind them. Alone among the enemy’s three services, the air force seemed highly motivated and utterly committed to the battle. ‘We should have been able to work out that any nation which produces first-class Formula One racing drivers is also likely to turn out some pretty good pilots.’” – Hastings, Max: The Battle for the Falklands (1983) Michael Joseph Ltd

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Wave after wave of Dagger and Skyhawk fighter bombers came after the task force in San Carlos Bay. Damage to the British fleet was heavy. Five different British frigates suffered severe damage and where taken out of action.









By coming in at insanely low level, the Argentines avoided the worst of British anti-aircraft guns and missile fire. But they also unintentionally robbed themselves of success. Bombs dropped from jets need to fall a certain period of time before they arm. The Argentines were attacking from such low altitude that 75% plus of the bombs that feel failed to exploded. Still, 500 or 1000 pounds of steel moving at 500 miles an hour causes a fair amount of damage just by the transfer of kinetic energy.

While the Argentines could approach the British task force undetected, they were still attacking into the face of a modern gun and missile armed fleet. Five Dagger fighters, and four Skyhawk bombers were shot down. In addition, four light aircraft based ashore fell to British weapons.

Most air forces would have been stunned by such heavy losses. The Argentines continued to attack.
On the 23rd of May, HMS Antelope, another Type 21 frigate, was struck by two bombs, neither of which exploded. She was badly damaged. That evening, as an EOD team attempted to defuse the bomb, it exploded. Antelope caught fire, and sank the next day.





Finally, on the 24th, the Argentines realized the need to focus on the amphibious ships instead of the escorts. Landing ships of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary came under heavy attack by Argentine jets. RFA Sir Galahad, Sir Lancelot and Sir Bedivere were all damaged by Argentine bombs.




Hulks of the Sir Bedivere, Sir Lancelot

The next day, the Argentine Independence Day, the Argentines mounted a major effort. HMS Broadsword, a Type 22 Frigate, was damaged by a bomb that bounced off the surface of the water, went through her stern, and exited out her side.


Flight camera footage from attack on HMS Broadsword


Sinking of the HMS Coventry

Worse still, HMS Coventry, a Type 42 Destroyer, came under attack by Skyhawks. Two, possibly three 1000 pound bombs exploded, and Coventry went down in about half an hour, with 19 dead, and about 30 wounded.




Atlantic Conveyer with cargo of extra aircraft and material. Second photo after Exocet hit

It wasn’t just the ships in San Carlos water that came under attack. The Argentines again mounted a Super Etendard/Exocet attack on the carriers, now operating north of the islands. Two Exocets were launched at HMS Invincible. One missile failed to guide, possibly after being hit by anti-aircraft fire. The other Exocet locked onto Invincible. Before it could impact, it lost lock, probably due to chaff fired from Invincible. Having lost its target, it acquired a lock on the cargo ship Atlantic Conveyor. Atlantic Conveyor, hastily modified to support RAF Harriers and helicopters and lacking the firefighting and damage control features of a warship, was mortally damaged. Worse still, several aircraft and helicopters aboard, including a Chinook, were lost in fires. The loss of the heavy lift Chinook would be a blow to the logistical operations ashore.

From a strictly Army point of view, there was no great urgency to moving ahead with attacking the Argentine positions ashore. They weren’t going anywhere, and they weren’t going to be reinforced in any substantial way. Better to move deliberately than rush headlong and take unneeded casualties.

But this would ignore a lesson learned at Makin Island, the Marianas and in the Philippines. The landing force must seize its objectives as fast as possible. To delay means that the covering naval forces remain tied down supporting them, sacrificing their mobility, and exposing them to much greater risk of attack.

Finally, I find it almost astonishing that the Argentines failed to mine the waters of San Carlos Bay or the sound. It was an obvious potential landing area, and even a very crude sea-mine field would have frustrated any British attempt to land there. The British would have found someplace to land, to be sure. But any defending commander with a bit of common sense will do all that he can to force his opponent to attack him at a place of his own choosing.

Time for some video. The Falkland/Malvinas War was covered in great detail by the British press, and considerable footage was shot of the action and can be found on YouTube.

NEXT PART FIFTEEN: LAND OPERATIONS



I will now get back to bottling my Malbec

**Off Topic**


The British Are Coming — to Antarctica

(Time Magazine) In politics as in medicine, there are some contagions that spread despite the most prudent vaccines. Witness the news this week that the United Kingdom has decided to lay claim to 385,000 sq mi (1 million sq km) of seabed off the coast of Antarctica, despite being a signatory to the 1959 treaty that was supposed to protect the earth's most desolate continent from the vagaries of international competition.

This infection could be traced back halfway around the globe to the Arctic, where a new competition for sovereignty heated up this summer even as the ice cap shrank, at an ever-accelerating pace, to an alarming new minimum. There it was Russia and its jingoistic jaunt in August to the Arctic Ocean floor at the North Pole that inspired Canada, the United States, Denmark and Norway to freshen up their own claims to the Arctic. Considerable — but still largely uncharted — oil and gas deposits are the attraction, and they become ever more enticing as prices for petroleum soar and exploitation technology improves.

So is Britain playing the role of the Russian bear at the other end of the globe? Not exactly. Six other countries (Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand and Norway) have also laid claims to sectors of Antarctica; those of Chile and Argentina overlap with the British claim. (The United States recognizes none of them, but reserves the right to make its own claim down the line.) Each of those seven claims include coastline, and every coast presents an opportunity under Article 76 of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea: If you can prove that the continental shelf extends out into the sea, you can claim mineral rights out to a maximum of 350 nautical miles. This is precisely what Britain is preparing to do in Antarctica, and it won't be the first: Australia and New Zealand have already submitted similar claims to Antarctic waters to the relevant U.N. Commission.

Nor will the British claim be the last, since all claims under the law of the Sea have to be submitted by the spring of 2009. And that's the point. A spokeswoman for the Foreign Ministry told reporters that London was merely "safeguarding for the future," and that no challenged claim — as the British one is sure to be — can be acted on. But the claim points out the limits of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, and a codicil adopted in 1991. It does an admirable job of protecting the land — banning nuclear material, declaring the Antarctic to be a "natural reserve, devoted to peace and science," and prohibiting any mining — but not the surrounding seas, which support a singular ecosystem ranging from krill to penguin, from seal to whale.

If any country develops the right and the means to drill for offshore oil in Antartica, and particularly if they hit pay dirt, it's not just that ecosystem that could be endangered. So could the ban on mining on the Antarctic continent itself, which can be lifted by unanimous agreement at any time. That is highly unlikely, but just a couple of decades ago, so was the prospect that the ice caps would melt. The British claim, and those that are sure to follow, amounts to a long-shot move that enables resorting to a future temptation. For the sake of Antarctica, let's hope we've got beyond oil and gas before that temptation ever arises.

Click to expand...

This will be the catalyst for the next war in the South Atlantic as Chile and Briton split the Argentine overlapping.



I will now get back to bottling my Malbec