H-20 bomber (with H-X, JH-XX)

Blitzo

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I never said it is equal size. That is why I proposed 8x YJ-12 vs B-2's 16x JASSM. Regardless of that lets say the missile is not YJ-12, but a more space optimized equivalent of same weight class. I think 8x of those is a good starting point.

If you want H-20 to carry a number of capable anti ship missiles (anywhere from 8-16), that is not unreasonable.
PLA anti ship missile development will only continue from strength to strength and you can expect them to develop a missile that is optimized to make use of H-20's weapons bay dimensions for best effect.

But eight YJ-12s internally would be too difficult and require too much volume, so it is better that it is not further entertained.


Let me repeat again, eight YJ-12s at present is unrealistic.
If you absolutely want H-20 to carry YJ-12 for some reason, then by volume, it may be able to carry four internally maximum at most, maybe only two.

By dimensions, the YJ-12 is similar in footprint to the massive bunker busting MOP bomb which the B-2 is only able to carry two of, by dimensions.
 
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phrozenflame

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If you want H-20 to carry a number of capable anti ship missiles (anywhere from 8-16), that is not unreasonable.
PLA anti ship missile development will only continue from strength to strength and you can expect them to develop a missile that is optimized to make use of H-20's weapons bay dimensions for best effect.

But eight YJ-12s internally would be too difficult and require too much volume, so it is better that it is not further entertained.


Let me repeat again, eight YJ-12s at present is unrealistic.
If you absolutely want H-20 to carry YJ-12 for some reason, then by volume, it may be able to carry four internally maximum at most, maybe only two.

By dimensions, the YJ-12 is similar in footprint to the massive bunker busting MOP bomb which the B-2 is only able to carry two of, by dimensions.
+ Won't be surprised if there is development of dedicated weapons for H-20 and it's intended missions.
 

tphuang

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So, I think we can get past the idea of putting YJ-12 on H-20. The bigger question is what type of missiles can you fit in H-20. Remember, there are restrictions to not just payload weight but also dimensions of internal weapon bay. I think it's fair to say we will see a new generation of missiles that can be carried inside H-20, but would be too large to be carried in a J-20/35 weapons bay. But can be carried externally by a flanker or J-35. If adopted with certain shaping like with YJ-98, I don't think it's that terrible for J-35s to carry 2 of them.

Back to H-20, it has a much higher level of stealth requirement than J-20/35, so you really need everything to be carried internally. We already discussed the need for a VLO subsonic LACM similar to LRASM and probably an anti-shipping version of that. You could probably carry 12 of them inside H-20. The question is whether or not you can carry faster missiles in them. I think HGVs are not in the card. The dimension requirement would be too much. You get more bang for the buck by carrying something like that in a future SSN or a longer ranged PLARF launched HGV like DF-27 or even something launched from H-6N. I do think you can carrying a version of YJ-21 in H20. In Yankees podcast, they talked about how YJ-21 can be made longer, shorter, fatter or skinnier depending on the customer requirement.

If we compare ARRW to LRASM
ARRW is 25.9 inch in diameter -> 65 cm
232 inch in length -> 5.8 m
LRASM is 55 cm and 4.3 m.
To me, Designing a weapon bay that can also fit in UVLS seems quite reasonable. So, I think they can use something with like 80 cm diameter and 6 m in length should be easily doable. With that and latest technology, you can presumably carry 150 kg payload (instead of 150 lb on ARRW) to like 1200 km at hypersonic speed (mach 6 to 8). And you can use both land attack or anti-ship seeker on it like you would on any YJ-21s. Something like this this might weight 3.5t each and you'd be able to carry at most 4 of them internally. That would be quite potent when use in a scenario where you want to target like a capital warship that's sitting in Pearl Harbor naval base.

If they fly a H-20 over HeilongJiang and refueled over the water north of Japan, that's about 6500 km away. a H-20 with 5000 km combat radius carrying 14t payload (just making this up, not sure if plausible), would be able to do this mission and fly back more economically with empty payload and possibly refueling
 

ACuriousPLAFan

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And if Russia prefers to remain neutral in this scenario?
In which case what is to stop B21s coming the other way?
I believe that others in this thread have already provided their answers (in light of recent geopolitical events, that is), so I wouldn't dive any deeper WRT the geopolitical front.

However, assuming that Moscow somehow really gone through a change of heart, and decides to not become so chummy with Beijing anymore. This could set the foundation for Russia to become strictly neutral in the US-China conflict. In that case, there are two scenarios where things can play out, where both scenarios are double-edged swords for both China and the US:

Scenario 1 - Russia stops neither China's H-20 nor US's B-21 from crossing over its territorial airspace other than lodging complaints.
In that case, China could either try to pressure Russia to intercept US B-21s from flying over their airspace (with varying guarantee of success, depending on Moscow's leaning at the time), or that China would rely on their own radars, interceptors and SAMs to detect and intercept the B-21s. Despite this, if Russia does not do anything to stop the US B-21s, then they wouldn't do the same with China's H-20s as well.

Scenario 2 - Russia intercepts both the US B-21s and China's H-20, and warned that the Russian Air Force would shoot them down if they keep violating Russia's neutrality.
In that case, China would have no choice but for their H-20s to deviate around Russia's territorial airspace in their strategic bombing runs against CONUS. One plus for China would be that the US B-21s would have no choice but to take the longer route across the Pacific in order to avoid Russia as well.

In short, Scenario 1 would be the less risky for the H-20s, but would be more challenging for China's stance and maneuvering in the global geopolitical stage. Meanwhile, Scenario 2 would the be less challenging for China's stance and maneuvering in the global geopolitical stage, but it more risky for the H-20s.

But let us go deeper. Assuming that China is facing Scenario 2 where H-20s are barred from entering Russian territorial airspace, and similar to my previous example, the H-20s are based in an airbase somewhere within China's interior. The following would be the shortest routes that the H-20s could take to CONUS.

If the intended targets are on the West Coast of CONUS:
h20s4.png

If the intended targets are on the East Coast of CONUS:
h20s5.png

Compared to the direct routes across Russian Far East or Siberia, the two routes above are certainly longer and would be more exposed to interception by American, Canadian and Japanese forces along the First Island Chain, while bypassing the Second Island Chain completely. Taking these routes would also necessitate refueling the H-20s mid-journey. For conducting bombing runs on the East Coast of CONUS, those H-20s would have to enter Alaskan and Canadian airspaces to launch their payloads, even if those are ultra-long-range standoff missiles.

The reason lies in the first half of both flight routes:
h20s7.png

The H-20s would have to fly along the north side of the China-North Korea border first, until right before the China-Russian border where the H-20s would make a sharp turn towards the southeast and fly parallel to the China-Russia border. And here's the quirk:
h20s8.jpg

The China-North Korea-Russia tri-border meetpoint (illustrated by the pink dot) is located just 18 kilometers from the coast.

This means that China's H-20 can fly across the China-North Korea border and parallel to the North Korea-Russia border towards the Sea of Japan, before turning northeast and fly parallel to the Russian coastline. By doing this, China would also intrude North Korean airspace and fly over the town of Tumangang without entering Russian airspace.

Why North Korea? There are 4 reasons:

1. Beijing, being the powerful supporter & backer of the Kim's family rule for the past 7 decades, would have a greater political leverage against Pyongyang than Moscow. This means that compared to Moscow, it would be easier for Beijing to turn Pyongyang's eyes elsewhere for the H-20s to pass through;
2. The length which spans from the China-North Korea border near the tri-border meetpoint to the endpoint of North Korea-Russia maritime border is only 58 kilometers. The H-20s would only take less than 4 minutes to travel the entire length, assuming that H-20 has the same crusing speed as the B-2 (900 km/h). That distance can be shortened even further if the H-20s coudl fit through that tiny strip of land between North Korea and Russia (shaded in orange);
3. The North Korean military are much more backward and outdated compared to their Russian and Chinese counterparts. This fact is well understood by everyone in the North Korean military watching space. Because of this, even if they know that China's H-20 is intruding their airspace illegally, Pyongyang would have a greater leverage of deniability than Russia by claiming that China's H-20 is "too advanced and too stealthy" for their own (North Korean) radars to detect; and
4. China already has a mutual defese treaty with North Korea from 1961. If Beijing and Pyongyang are worried that the US and her allies may use North Korean airspace to enter China with their warplanes, China can provide assistance by providing early warning radar support and relaying alerts to North Korea, then letting the KPAF warplanes/SAMs to intercept them.

After leaving the North Korean airspace, the H-20s would travel northeastwards along the Russian coastline over the Sea of Japan. Then the H-20s would turn east just before the southern regions of Sakhalin Island:
h20s9.png
In fact, this would be the riskiest part in the first half of the journey. The H-20s have to squeeze across this "bottleneck" Soya Strait between the northern tip of Hokkaido and southern tip of Sakhalin before turning northeast again across the Sea of Okhotsk. I'd have to count on luck for this traverse. If the forces stationed in northern Japan are attempting an intercept, the H-20s can turn towards the Sakhalins.

After passing through Soya Strait, the H-20s would continue travelling towards the northernmost opening between the Kuril Islands, the Fourth Kurilsky Strait:
h20s10.png
The H-20s would squeeze across the strait before continuing their journey towards CONUS across the Bering Sea.

Once the bombing run is done, the H-20s would backtrack along the same path back to their home bases in China.

I hope this answers your question.
 
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Maikeru

Captain
Registered Member
I believe that others in this thread have already provided their answers (in light of recent geopolitical events, that is), so I wouldn't dive any deeper WRT the geopolitical front.

However, assuming that Moscow somehow really gone through a change of heart, and decides to not become so chummy with Beijing anymore. This could set the foundation for Russia to become strictly neutral in the US-China conflict. In that case, there are two scenarios where things can play out, where both scenarios are double-edged swords for both China and the US:

Scenario 1 - Russia stops neither China's H-20 nor US's B-21 from crossing over its territorial airspace other than lodging complaints.
In that case, China could either try to pressure Russia to intercept US B-21s from flying over their airspace (with varying guarantee of success, depending on Moscow's leaning at the time), or that China would rely on their own radars, interceptors and SAMs to detect and intercept the B-21s. Despite this, if Russia does not do anything to stop the US B-21s, then they wouldn't do the same with China's H-20s as well.

Scenario 2 - Russia intercepts both the US B-21s and China's H-20, and warned that the Russian Air Force would shoot them down if they keep violating Russia's neutrality.
In that case, China would have no choice but for their H-20s to deviate around Russia's territorial airspace in their strategic bombing runs against CONUS. One plus for China would be that the US B-21s would have no choice but to take the longer route across the Pacific in order to avoid Russia as well.

In short, Scenario 1 would be the less risky for the H-20s, but would be more challenging for China's stance and maneuvering in the global geopolitical stage. Meanwhile, Scenario 2 would the be less challenging for China's stance and maneuvering in the global geopolitical stage, but it more risky for the H-20s.

But let us go deeper. Assuming that China is facing Scenario 2 where H-20s are barred from entering Russian territorial airspace, and similar to my previous example, the H-20s are based in an airbase somewhere within China's interior. The following would be the shortest routes that the H-20s could take to CONUS.

If the intended targets are on the West Coast of CONUS:
View attachment 102981

If the intended targets are on the East Coast of CONUS:
View attachment 102982

Compared to the direct routes across Russian Far East or Siberia, the two routes above are certainly longer and would be more exposed to interception by American, Canadian and Japanese forces along the First Island Chain, while bypassing the Second Island Chain completely. Taking these routes would also necessitate refueling the H-20s mid-journey. For conducting bombing runs on the East Coast of CONUS, those H-20s would have to enter Alaskan and Canadian airspaces to launch their payloads, even if those are ultra-long-range standoff missiles.

The reason lies in the first half of both flight routes:
View attachment 102983

The H-20s would have to fly along the north side of the China-North Korea border first, until right before the China-Russian border where the H-20s would make a sharp turn towards the southeast and fly parallel to the China-Russia border. And here's the quirk:
View attachment 102987

The China-North Korea-Russia tri-border meetpoint (illustrated by the pink dot) is located just 18 kilometers from the coast.

This means that China's H-20 can fly across the China-North Korea border and parallel to the North Korea-Russia border towards the Sea of Japan, before turning northeast and fly parallel to the Russian coastline. By doing this, China would also intrude North Korean airspace and fly over the town of Tumangang without entering Russian airspace.

Why North Korea? There are 4 reasons:

1. Beijing, being the powerful supporter & backer of the Kim's family rule for the past 7 decades, would have a greater political leverage against Pyongyang than Moscow. This means that compared to Moscow, it would be easier for Beijing to turn Pyongyang's eyes elsewhere for the H-20s to pass through;
2. The length which spans from the China-North Korea border near the tri-border meetpoint to the endpoint of North Korea-Russia maritime border is only 58 kilometers. The H-20s would only take less than 4 minutes to travel the entire length, assuming that H-20 has the same crusing speed as the B-2 (900 km/h). That distance can be shortened even further if the H-20s coudl fit through that tiny strip of land between North Korea and Russia (shaded in orange);
3. The North Korean military are much more backward and outdated compared to their Russian and Chinese counterparts. This fact is well understood by everyone in the North Korean military watching space. Because of this, even if they know that China's H-20 is intruding their airspace illegally, Pyongyang would have a greater leverage of deniability than Russia by claiming that China's H-20 is "too advanced and too stealthy" for their own (North Korean) radars to detect; and
4. China already has a mutual defese treaty with North Korea from 1961. If Beijing and Pyongyang are worried that the US and her allies may use North Korean airspace to enter China with their warplanes, China can provide assistance by providing early warning radar support and relaying alerts to North Korea, then letting the KPAF warplanes/SAMs to intercept them.

After leaving the North Korean airspace, the H-20s would travel northeastwards along the Russian coastline over the Sea of Japan. Then the H-20s would turn east just before the southern regions of Sakhalin Island:
View attachment 102988
In fact, this would be the riskiest part in the first half of the journey. The H-20s have to squeeze across this "bottleneck" Soya Strait between the northern tip of Hokkaido and southern tip of Sakhalin before turning northeast again across the Sea of Okhotsk. I'd have to count on luck for this traverse. If the forces stationed in northern Japan are attempting an intercept, the H-20s can turn towards the Sakhalins.

After passing through Soya Strait, the H-20s would continue travelling towards the northernmost opening between the Kuril Islands, the Fourth Kurilsky Strait:
View attachment 102989
The H-20s would squeeze across the strait before continuing their journey towards CONUS across the Bering Sea.

Once the bombing run is done, the H-20s would backtrack along the same path back to their home bases in China.

I hope this answers your question.
Thanks for taking the time to post this, rather than simply assuming Russia will be China's bezzy mate 4 eva as other posters have. Nations have permanent interests but not permanent allies, who is to say that a future Russian regime won't seek a rapprochement with the West, or at the very least observe a strict neutrality in the case of a US/PRC conflict in order to avoid getting nuked by either of them?

As you point out, crossing NK will be easier in itself but still leaves the problem of getting past Japan. All things considered, I suspect SSGNs are a better way of attacking CONUS conventionally than H20, unless Russia and China enter into some sort of formal NATO-style alliance which permits PLAAF to use Russian bases.
 

ZeEa5KPul

Colonel
Registered Member
Thanks for taking the time to post this, rather than simply assuming Russia will be China's bezzy mate 4 eva as other posters have. Nations have permanent interests but not permanent allies, who is to say that a future Russian regime won't seek a rapprochement with the West, or at the very least observe a strict neutrality in the case of a US/PRC conflict in order to avoid getting nuked by either of them?

As you point out, crossing NK will be easier in itself but still leaves the problem of getting past Japan. All things considered, I suspect SSGNs are a better way of attacking CONUS conventionally than H20, unless Russia and China enter into some sort of formal NATO-style alliance which permits PLAAF to use Russian bases.
Why assume Japan will be America's bezzy mate 4 eva? Nations have permanent interests but not permanent allies, who is to say that a future Japanese regime won't seek a rapprochement with China, or at the very least observe a strict neutrality in the case of a US/PRC conflict in order to avoid getting nuked by either of them?
 

Maikeru

Captain
Registered Member
Why assume Japan will be America's bezzy mate 4 eva? Nations have permanent interests but not permanent allies, who is to say that a future Japanese regime won't seek a rapprochement with China, or at the very least observe a strict neutrality in the case of a US/PRC conflict in order to avoid getting nuked by either of them?
Well indeed. I can envisage a situation where Japan gets its own nukes (to the extent it doesn't already have them) and asks US forces to leave. However, that doesn't solve the problem of H20 having to cross neutral territory to attack CONUS.

We can assume Japan will be either on the US side or will observe strict armed neutrality and attempt to intercept both H20 and B21trying to cross its territory. If Russia is also strictly neutral, that leaves H20 with a problem in attacking CONUS.
 

tphuang

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Well indeed. I can envisage a situation where Japan gets its own nukes (to the extent it doesn't already have them) and asks US forces to leave. However, that doesn't solve the problem of H20 having to cross neutral territory to attack CONUS.

We can assume Japan will be either on the US side or will observe strict armed neutrality and attempt to intercept both H20 and B21trying to cross its territory. If Russia is also strictly neutral, that leaves H20 with a problem in attacking CONUS.
Even if Russia doesn't give the permission to china, china will still be flying h20 over it's air space if it really needed to do so.
 
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