Future PLAN orbat discussion

AndrewS said:

I understand the reasoning.

But the point is that China achieving greater absolute control near China's coast forces the US to engage in heavy combat where China's forces have an advantage.

And the US doesn't have the luxury of avoiding that offer of combat, as it means abandoning Taiwan or South Korea for example.
If Chinese Army controls Taiwan or South Korea, there is no way that the US can recover them by force afterwards, because they are just too close to China.
Given that China already has a larger economy than the USA, the Chinese will likely build up a larger military in a drawn-out war.

And from a cost competition point of view, land-based forces on the Chinese mainland are far cheaper their US equivalents operating at sea or from distant bases like Guam.

I agree that China eventually should build up a blue-water Navy that can match an Opfor Naval-Air taskforce.
But that is for 2030 onwards when the Chinese economy and military spending have a decisive advantage over the US, and if US-Chinese relations remain bad.
Until then, the focus should be on military capabilities that leverage the geographic advantages of the Chinese mainland.

However, the big exception is fielding a large force of nuclear submarines, which do have the ability to operate and survive globally, to cover vulnerable chokepoints like the Panama Canal.

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I disagree somewhat -- I think the US could and would seek to avoid fighting a war that plays to China's strengths.

Specifically, if I were the US, I would seek to avoid heavy combat in areas where China is strongest straight off the bat -- instead I will degrade those defenses and degrade military production and industry over time (the latter via blockade etc) before launching deeper and more extensive attacks.
Now, this obviously all depends on the specific political objectives and strategic objectives of a hypothetical conflict in question, but I think this idea that the US "doesn't have the luxury of avoiding that combat" is a massive, massive assumption to base future procurement strategy around.


The only truly reliable way to achieve strategic objectives is having a force that is as equally mobile and able to operate at long distances with minimal or no support with the specific goal of locating and destroying opfor mobile naval-air taskforces. If you are able to happen to make such a fight happen at a distance where you can also leverage land based long range air and strike power as well, then that is obviously desirable as it lets you achieve a better correlation of forces.
But if the enemy is intelligent, they will seek to linger at the edges of your land based air and strike capabilities while they launch probing long range strikes to degrade your defenses over time while also interdicting your SLOCs.

Bltizo said:

I disagree somewhat -- I think the US could and would seek to avoid fighting a war that plays to China's strengths.

Specifically, if I were the US, I would seek to avoid heavy combat in areas where China is strongest straight off the bat -- instead I will degrade those defenses and degrade military production and industry over time (the latter via blockade etc) before launching deeper and more extensive attacks.
Now, this obviously all depends on the specific political objectives and strategic objectives of a hypothetical conflict in question, but I think this idea that the US "doesn't have the luxury of avoiding that combat" is a massive, massive assumption to base future procurement strategy around.

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A Taiwan invasion will be launched and decided within 3 months.
South Korea only has 400km of distance to work with. That is within the bounds of a single 3month land campaign.

If both these places are subject to Chinese air superiority, we could expect all their critical infrastructure and transport links to be destroyed, along with an effective blockade in place.
You'd be looking at a matter of weeks before a complete economic and military collapse, and a subsequent Chinese victory which is almost impossible to reverse.

This will force the US to engage against Chinese forces close to mainland China, as the US military doesn't have the luxury of time to gradually degrade Chinese forces and military production. Remember that China is geographically the same size as the USA which is self sufficient in many respects.

So I stand by view that in the short-term, China should focus on absolute air/sea superiority close offshore, using forces based on mainland China.

The only truly reliable way to achieve strategic objectives is having a force that is as equally mobile and able to operate at long distances with minimal or no support with the specific goal of locating and destroying opfor mobile naval-air taskforces. If you are able to happen to make such a fight happen at a distance where you can also leverage land based long range air and strike power as well, then that is obviously desirable as it lets you achieve a better correlation of forces.
But if the enemy is intelligent, they will seek to linger at the edges of your land based air and strike capabilities while they launch probing long range strikes to degrade your defenses over time while also interdicting your SLOCs.

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I agree completely, but it will take at least 2 decades for China to build a large enough navy that can achieve blue water supremacy, which is a very symmetric competition in terms of spending.

And for the next decade, China won't have a decisive edge in terms of economic heft or military spending, so the US will continue to believe that it can complete.

Nor does China have mature aircraft carrier designs and carrier aircraft available yet.

Hence my view that the focus on blue-water naval capabilities should wait 10 years.
At that point, if relations are still bad, China could mass-produce aircraft carriers in a blue water naval arms race
And the US would have to accept it is facing a Chinese economy perhaps twice the size.

@Bltizo, all I can say is thank every god that China is run by people who think like you and not the "asymmetry" fetishists. If they had their way, the big ticket item would be the Type 22 and the bulk of the PLAN would be 12.7mm guns duct-taped to rowboats.

AndrewS said:

A Taiwan invasion will be launched and decided within 3 months.
South Korea only has 400km of distance to work with. That is within the bounds of a single 3month land campaign.

If both these places are subject to Chinese air superiority, we could expect all their critical infrastructure and transport links to be destroyed, along with an effective blockade in place.
You'd be looking at a matter of weeks before a complete economic and military collapse, and a subsequent Chinese victory which is almost impossible to reverse.

This will force the US to engage against Chinese forces close to mainland China, as the US military doesn't have the luxury of time to gradually degrade Chinese forces and military production. Remember that China is geographically the same size as the USA which is self sufficient in many respects.

So I stand by view that in the short-term, China should focus on absolute air/sea superiority close offshore, using forces based on mainland China.

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Assuming that there is no direct US intervention during those weeks or 3 months, what makes you believe that the US wouldn't wage a war during or after a presumably a successful victory say, over Taiwan?
There's nothing stopping the US from waging months or years of blockade and long range strikes even after a Chinese victory over Taiwan (again, assuming no US intervention in the first place), seeking to gradually wear down PLA naval forces in the region and air forces and air defenses in the region, and then to launch larger scale strikes afterwards, to reverse Chinese gains.

Putting it another way -- I believe the US absolutely may have the luxury of time, and the PLA should be orienting its procurement strategy and future military strategy to account for it as a real possibility.
There's no reason to believe that the US would not have the political resolve to seek to reverse Chinese gains or to wage a longer term conflict. Along similar lines, the prospect of US intervention would also be a real and present consideration for PLA procurement strategy as well.

I agree completely, but it will take at least 2 decades for China to build a large enough navy that can achieve blue water supremacy, which is a very symmetric competition in terms of spending.

And for the next decade, China won't have a decisive edge in terms of economic heft or military spending, so the US will continue to believe that it can complete.

Nor does China have mature aircraft carrier designs and carrier aircraft available yet.

Hence my view that the focus on blue-water naval capabilities should wait 10 years.
At that point, if relations are still bad, China could mass-produce aircraft carriers in a blue water naval arms race
And the US would have to accept it is facing a Chinese economy perhaps twice the size.

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Well, my vision for what I think the PLAN's procurement strategy is one that aims to achieve a minimum quantitative fleet with comprehensive blue water naval capability post 2030, but to develop that kind of fleet requires procurement and R&D to happen now.

Fortunately, many of the same technologies and weapons systems that are relevant for a high tech blue water naval fleet are also directly relevant for high intensity regional conflicts as well.

Bltizo said:

Not to a 1:1 ratio.

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No. It would be at least a one to one ratio. At least one SSN would be covering an SSBN, and it can be more. But not less.

I'm not saying that one shouldn't study from history -- I'm saying your direct comparisons between those naval encounters in the past being directly compared with the PLAN today and into the future in context of contemporary and foreseeable geopolitical basing and positioning and modern technologies means direct comparisons can be confusing if you don't explicitly layout what specific historical measure you're comparing.

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These are not direct comparisons but comparisons in context. Simply said, in war, submarines used to support surface fleet operations never worked, and submarines succeeded best when they operate almost like their own separate branch of the military, independent and allowed to hunt for opportunity on their own. Despite the advances in technology, the experiences of Germany in WW1, Germany in WW2, and Japan in WW2 (failure) point to that.

It is ideal because without an equal or competitive naval force and naval aviation capability, you will be at a targeting and weapons/effects-range deficit.

1. Escorting your surface formations (whether they're SAGs or CSGs) for the purpose of contributing to the formation's ASW capabilities.
2. Conducting independent or small group patrolling activities to contribute to the overall theater naval picture and supplement friendly surface formations fire power against opfor targets (via cruise missiles), and also carrying out independent anti-surface missions when such opportunities present themselves.
(3. Escorting your SSBNs to an extent)

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Nice try, and that's how they will be used. But guess what, these actions are also mainly defensive. #2 is also mainly opportunistic.

It's pretty straight forward -- it suggests the PLAN will seek to emulate similar high end blue water surface, subsurface and naval aviation capabilities like the USN.

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Why do you think emulation would be most effective?

You defend your carriers in two ways:

1. Targeting imbalance. Your carrier has fixed wing ISR and maritime surveillance capabilities, while surface ships do not. In a naval battle where both sides are fighting on "even ground," your CSG will defeat your SAG because your CSG has far superior ISR and can actually recon and target the ocean to know where the enemy is in the first place.
2. Your CSG will be able to outrange the SAG because they have fixed wing naval aviation that can deploy long range munitions in addition to the range of the aircraft themselves.

Yes, future surface combatants will obviously have larger and longer range weapons but you still need a targeting solution. On equal ground, your CSG is going to be able to out-reconnoiter the SAG easily. CSGs will have first look and first shoot capability and effectively outrange SAGs.

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Of course, carriers will provide the ISR and the eyes of the fleet. But carriers will also be less and less the hammer. That's what I am saying. When carriers, including drone carries, will serve as eyes and not hammers, that's a case for having enough carriers, but not a case for having more carriers. But even as eyeing and targeting solutions can gradually fall in doubt and replaced by other systems, such as satellites and longer ranged drones, or drones from hybrid ships.

Everytime you put a carrier in the water, you need to put surface warships to protect it, and eventually as the carrier transitions away from its role as the main strike in lieu for cruise and hypersonic missiles, you are going to need even more surface warships.

Well unless some sort of agreement is reached in terms of what future technologies may emerge and what it could mean in terms of future warfighting, debates over future procurement can't exactly be done.

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We are already seeing future technologies emerging.

To clarify -- when I say "surface combatants operating in isolation" I mean surface combatant formations.
Whether it's a single destroyer or an entire SAG of 8+ destroyers and frigates etc.

If those warships are operating in isolation without significant fixed wing support and preferably organic fixed wing ISR, CAP and AEW&C and preferably offensive fixed wing strike capabilities of their own, they will be at a deficit against CSGs or land based aviation.

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This is a case for having enough carriers, but its not a case for having more carriers and too much carriers.

The CSG has the massive advantage of fixed wing AEW&C that is capable of greatly lengthening the effective SAM engagement range of your destroyers and frigates against lower flying targets and providing longer range warning as well.
Not to mention the CSG has fixed wing CAP on station with their own fighters that have airborne sensors and AAMs to contribute to the air defense picture and firepower.

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Not completely. Fixed wing CAP is limited by loiter time, and jets don't exactly have that. CSG fixed wing AEW isn't as good as land based AEW due to the sizes of the aircraft and which directly relates to the size of the radars you will fit in.

But that scenario is flawed to begin with, it assumes the CSG's own CAP hasn't detected and taken out the opfor's airborne recon assets before they are able to provide sufficient targeting data.

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If you are not at war, it doesn't matter if you have your own CAP. In this scenario, the Indians are the first to fire, just like they took the first initiative in that border incursion. The problem is that your own CAP is limited by loiter time, and the Indians have the initiative when to fire. Your own CAP also won't be invincible to OTH low frequency coastal radars the Indians would have that would pick your CAP, and your CAP's signal emissions.

Furthermore, the CSG's own ISR should be able to detect and assemble a targeting solution against the opfor's ships first, given the CSG has far superior ISR and targeting capabilities, meaning the CSG should be able to much easily have the first look, first shoot capability.

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You probably are not aware of your geography because ships coming in and out of the Middle East to the Far East transverse the waters near India as the most efficient route. That means these routes are going to be well covered by land based aircraft, and in this case, the Indians would have equal to superior ISR and targeting assets. Consider the use of ISR with AEW based on modern Boeing or Airbus airframes. A Boeing 787 has a range of 8,800 miles.

Fundamentally, I do not believe that carriers are a liability, but rather they are a necessity.

However, it requires your carriers to be able to achieve a minimum threshold of capability in the first place.
Obviously the current STOBAR carriers are significantly lacking, and 100k ton super carriers that can carry extensive fixed wing tactical combat aircraft and fixed wing AEW&C and ISR aircraft is the goal.

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Overtime I believe carriers past a certain number, may end up being more of a liability. For example, the sheer alternative cost of manning one with over 5000 personnel. In comparison a destroyer like a Type 055 would have about 300. A nuclear submarine would have even less, like about 130.

Bltizo said:

There's no reason to believe that the US would not have the political resolve to seek to reverse Chinese gains or to wage a longer term conflict.

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There are plenty of reasons. Please, don't make US leadership think in the way of Taiwan green frogs

Tam said:

No. It would be at least a one to one ratio. At least one SSN would be covering an SSBN, and it can be more. But not less.

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What I meant is that they would not be producing SSNs to SSBNs at a 1:1 ratio like what you wrote in #474.

These are not direct comparisons but comparisons in context. Simply said, in war, submarines used to support surface fleet operations never worked, and submarines succeeded best when they operate almost like their own separate branch of the military, independent and allowed to hunt for opportunity on their own. Despite the advances in technology, the experiences of Germany in WW1, Germany in WW2, and Japan in WW2 (failure) point to that.

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I don't necessarily disagree with this, but I'm also not sure how it's relevant to the discussion about future PLAN SSN procurement.

Nice try, and that's how they will be used. But guess what, these actions are also mainly defensive. #2 is also mainly opportunistic.

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If you agree with my vision for how SSNs would be used then what is your issue exactly?

Why do you think emulation would be most effective?

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Because the advantages of fixed wing AEW&C, ISR, CAP and strike in addition to surface escort/action group firepower, means that a surface action group without their own friendly or organic fixed wing air support will be at a significant disadvantage.

Of course, carriers will provide the ISR and the eyes of the fleet. But carriers will also be less and less the hammer. That's what I am saying. When carriers, including drone carries, will serve as eyes and not hammers, that's a case for having enough carriers, but not a case for having more carriers. But even as eyeing and targeting solutions can gradually fall in doubt and replaced by other systems, such as satellites and longer ranged drones, or drones from hybrid ships.

Everytime you put a carrier in the water, you need to put surface warships to protect it, and eventually as the carrier transitions away from its role as the main strike in lieu for cruise and hypersonic missiles, you are going to need even more surface warships.

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I've never suggested that carriers are the most important "hammer" (presumably you mean strike capability) of a future naval formation.

The essential roles that a carrier provides to a naval formation, which I do not see any other ship type replacing in the near future, are:
- ISR, specifically naval; fixed wing aircraft including fighters and UAVs and AEW&C serve in this role of course
- CAP; fixed wing fighters serve the role of countering the opfor's ISR aircraft, to deny them intelligence on where your formation is. CAP of course also allows you to defend against fixed wing air strike packages as well as contribute to the overall AShM defense picture.
- AEW&C; fixed wing AEW&C contribute both to the ISR and CAP picture,by virtue of having a large toting radar at altitude that gives you substantially longer radar horizon and allows longer engagement ranges from your surface ship's SAMs.
- anti-ship/surface strike; fixed wing fighters and UCAVs have the potential to conduct longer range anti ship or anti surface strike missions than surface combatants, and depending on the specific opfor formation they could either be a supplement to the strike capability of the surface combatants or they might be used as the primary strike option (again, it depends on the specific circumstances of the opfor and the environment in question).

Until technologies emerge that change the above calculations for naval warfare, I do not see how carriers can be anything other than optimal and essential in surface navy warfare, especially if the opfor already has a capable carrier force of their own.

We are already seeing future technologies emerging.

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Until such technologies are able to replace the variety of capabilities that carriers bring to the table, carriers will remain an essential part to high intensity naval warfare.

This is a case for having enough carriers, but its not a case for having more carriers and too much carriers.

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Nowhere have I ever written that the PLAN should have "too much carriers".

All I am saying is that carriers remain an essential part of surface navy warfare, and if you have an SAG of surface ships without sufficient air support, it will be at a significant disadvantage against an opposing CSG.

Not completely. Fixed wing CAP is limited by loiter time, and jets don't exactly have that. CSG fixed wing AEW isn't as good as land based AEW due to the sizes of the aircraft and which directly relates to the size of the radars you will fit in.

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A fighter jet's CAP is limited b endurance, and a carrier based AEW&C is smaller and less capable than land based AEW&C -- yes, obviously, and I've never claimed anything opposite to those facts.
But none what you've written here makes a case to suggest that the benefits that carrier based fighter CAP and fixed wing AEW&C are not massive advantages for a CSG versus a SAG that lacks its own friendly air support or organic fixed wing capabilities.

If you are not at war, it doesn't matter if you have your own CAP. In this scenario, the Indians are the first to fire, just like they took the first initiative in that border incursion. The problem is that your own CAP is limited by loiter time, and the Indians have the initiative when to fire. Your own CAP also won't be invincible to OTH low frequency coastal radars the Indians would have that would pick your CAP, and your CAP's signal emissions.

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If you are not at war and you suffer a surprise attack despite having all of the capabilities to thwart or adequately defend against an attack, then that is a mistake of your military's leadership for not placing your military forces at sufficient readiness and deploying your military forces and your convoy in a way to mitigate that potential threat --- not a problem with the weapons systems themselves.

You probably are not aware of your geography because ships coming in and out of the Middle East to the Far East transverse the waters near India as the most efficient route. That means these routes are going to be well covered by land based aircraft, and in this case, the Indians would have equal to superior ISR and targeting assets. Consider the use of ISR with AEW based on modern Boeing or Airbus airframes. A Boeing 787 has a range of 8,800 miles.

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See above.
Furthermore, even in this scenario you've described, a CSG would offer better survivability than an SAG by virtue of the above carrier capabilities that I mentioned.

Overtime I believe carriers past a certain number, may end up being more of a liability. For example, the sheer alternative cost of manning one with over 5000 personnel. In comparison a destroyer like a Type 055 would have about 300. A nuclear submarine would have even less, like about 130.

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I don't have any disagreement with that. Obviously every navy require a balanced fleet.

Bltizo said:

I don't have any disagreement with that. Obviously every navy require a balanced fleet.

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How many 100,000+ ton Chinese supercarriers do you think is "balanced"? Suppose the US stays with its 11 and China's economy hits all its expected milestones (2x US economy in PPP by ~2030, fully developed by 2050), so no untoward economic constraints.

Bltizo said:

What I meant is that they would not be producing SSNs to SSBNs at a 1:1 ratio like what you wrote in #474.

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They are currently producing 094s right now at the expense of 093. The last few newest nuclear submarines have been the new block of 094 with the last 093A made back in 2015.

If you agree with my vision for how SSNs would be used then what is your issue exactly?

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My issue is Lethe's suggestion surface ship production will lessen for large fleets of carriers and large fleets of wolf packing SSNs.

Because the advantages of fixed wing AEW&C, ISR, CAP and strike in addition to surface escort/action group firepower, means that a surface action group without their own friendly or organic fixed wing air support will be at a significant disadvantage.


I've never suggested that carriers are the most important "hammer" (presumably you mean strike capability) of a future naval formation.

The essential roles that a carrier provides to a naval formation, which I do not see any other ship type replacing in the near future, are:
- ISR, specifically naval; fixed wing aircraft including fighters and UAVs and AEW&C serve in this role of course
- CAP; fixed wing fighters serve the role of countering the opfor's ISR aircraft, to deny them intelligence on where your formation is. CAP of course also allows you to defend against fixed wing air strike packages as well as contribute to the overall AShM defense picture.
- AEW&C; fixed wing AEW&C contribute both to the ISR and CAP picture,by virtue of having a large toting radar at altitude that gives you substantially longer radar horizon and allows longer engagement ranges from your surface ship's SAMs.
- anti-ship/surface strike; fixed wing fighters and UCAVs have the potential to conduct longer range anti ship or anti surface strike missions than surface combatants, and depending on the specific opfor formation they could either be a supplement to the strike capability of the surface combatants or they might be used as the primary strike option (again, it depends on the specific circumstances of the opfor and the environment in question).

Until technologies emerge that change the above calculations for naval warfare, I do not see how carriers can be anything other than optimal and essential in surface navy warfare, especially if the opfor already has a capable carrier force of their own.






Until such technologies are able to replace the variety of capabilities that carriers bring to the table, carriers will remain an essential part to high intensity naval warfare.




Nowhere have I ever written that the PLAN should have "too much carriers".

All I am saying is that carriers remain an essential part of surface navy warfare, and if you have an SAG of surface ships without sufficient air support, it will be at a significant disadvantage against an opposing CSG.




A fighter jet's CAP is limited b endurance, and a carrier based AEW&C is smaller and less capable than land based AEW&C -- yes, obviously, and I've never claimed anything opposite to those facts.
But none what you've written here makes a case to suggest that the benefits that carrier based fighter CAP and fixed wing AEW&C are not massive advantages for a CSG versus a SAG that lacks its own friendly air support or organic fixed wing capabilities.





If you are not at war and you suffer a surprise attack despite having all of the capabilities to thwart or adequately defend against an attack, then that is a mistake of your military's leadership for not placing your military forces at sufficient readiness and deploying your military forces and your convoy in a way to mitigate that potential threat --- not a problem with the weapons systems themselves.




See above.
Furthermore, even in this scenario you've described, a CSG would offer better survivability than an SAG by virtue of the above carrier capabilities that I mentioned.




I don't have any disagreement with that. Obviously every navy require a balanced fleet.

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Let's take that Indian Ocean scenario once again.

Will a SAG be totally defenseless and eyeless without fixed wing cover? Certainly but the fixed wing assets may not necessarily come from carriers.

On three points on the Indian Ocean, its possible to cover our SAG via long range drone or aircraft. One point is Djibouti, one point might be on Peshwadar, and the last point maybe from Bangladesh. Let's say instead of fixed fighter jet patrol and AEWC aircraft we got high loiter HALE drones. It may not be necessary that these AEW drones need to emit radar, which will only give away their position, but listen passively on enemy signals both their communication and their radar.

In the case that you need eyes and ears for your SAG beyond the range of long range land based assets, do you need a full size 90,000 ton aircraft carrier with 5,000 people to serve as your ISR?

You only need a ship with helicopters, which can provide AEW and ASW, supported with long loiter HALE drones, for much less the cost and half the tonnage. That's probably why the Type 076 is on the works.

Potential drone linking on the move arrays on the 054A.

Second picture taken from:

Tam said:

They are currently producing 094s right now at the expense of 093. The last few newest nuclear submarines have been the new block of 094 with the last 093A made back in 2015.

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And we know they have 09IIIB and 09V on the horizon... and all of these recent classes are produced in relatively small runs (SSNs and SSBNs alike), as we know they are not the sufficiently capable or competitive as the PLAN would like

My issue is Lethe's suggestion surface ship production will lessen for large fleets of carriers and large fleets of wolf packing SSNs.

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I don't think he's suggesting surface ship production will be compromised in favour of a fleet of carriers and SSNs but rather that carriers and SSNs will be produced to an extent that is commensurate with the large and capable fleet of surface combatants as well.

Let's take that Indian Ocean scenario once again.

Will a SAG be totally defenseless and eyeless without fixed wing cover? Certainly but the fixed wing assets may not necessarily come from carriers.

On three points on the Indian Ocean, its possible to cover our SAG via long range drone or aircraft. One point is Djibouti, one point might be on Peshwadar, and the last point maybe from Bangladesh. Let's say instead of fixed fighter jet patrol and AEWC aircraft we got high loiter HALE drones. It may not be necessary that these AEW drones need to emit radar, which will only give away their position, but listen passively on enemy signals both their communication and their radar.

In the case that you need eyes and ears for your SAG beyond the range of long range land based assets, do you need a full size 90,000 ton aircraft carrier with 5,000 people to serve as your ISR?

You only need a ship with helicopters, which can provide AEW and ASW, supported with long loiter HALE drones, for much less the cost and half the tonnage. That's probably why the Type 076 is on the works.

Potential drone linking on the move arrays on the 054A.

Second picture taken from:

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Obviously if there is sufficient regional land based air support then the necessity for CSGs are lessened somewhat, however even if we ignore that the PLA currently has no air bases outside of China at present and pretend that such regional overseas airbases did exist, there is still the issue that the political longevity of overseas bases is far from certain (the consent of the host nation is necessary), as well as the fact that depending on the regional adversary in question, your air base if it lacks sufficient regional cover, will just be vulnerable to regional adversary long range strike systems and would be much more vulnerable than the air power provided by a CSG by virtue of the CSG being mobile rather than fixed.

But this scenario requires so many qualifiers to get going that I think getting too lost in the weeds of the hypothetical political assumptions and basing assumptions is far too easy.

My underlying point is that carriers currently provide a surface group a number of essential capabilities (ISR, AEW&C, CAP, aerial strike) that significantly enhances their ISR, offensive and defensive capabilities as a task force.
If you are going up against a naval opfor with carriers of their own or an an enemy with fixed wing support of their own, in waters where you are unable to have sufficiently dense or long endurance friendly land based air support, carriers are an essential capability.