Future PLAN orbat discussion

Tam · Aug 26, 2020

Austin Powers said:
Russian navy has always been weak. Japanese navy was vastly superior in the Russia Japan war both in terms of numbers of ships and technology of the ships. Japanese ships had far better optics than Russian ships had and this enabled Japanese ships to hit Russian ships well before the latter can get into range to use their optics.

Not really. The Russian Pacific Squadron of cruisers led by Admiral Makarov held on its own against the Japanese, as they are far more knowledgeable about Eastern waters than the Russian Baltic fleet. If Makarov wasn't unlucky and got killed by a mine, things would have been different. The Japanese Navy wasn't superior in terms of the number of ships and in fact the Japanese were outnumbered. Technologically, the Japanese ships are a collection of ships all built in Europe, there is nothing to say that the Mikasa was better than the Borodino. The Russians also had ships that were built all over Europe, including the UK, Germany and gasp the US. By the way, one US built ship had a familiar name --- the Varyag.

The Russians were exhausted after an incredible journey around the world --- the ships literally came from the Baltic and the Arctic across the world. That's absolutely good seamanship, but they should have rested somewhere before going into battle. This sounded like hubris, pride or machismo on part of the Russian commanders. They also are total newcomers to this part of the world, while the Japanese are fighting near home waters. Another factor is that the Japanese use HE shells on the Russian ships which caused the Russian ships to burn while the Russian shells failed to ignite. The Russian fleet also suffered from having a number of ships that were poorly maintained. The Japanese did have better optics and their shells are of better quality but they also trained better. They also used destroyers and torpedo boats in good effect. Another is their use of the telegraph, and here the Japanese were using their own home developed equipment while the Russians were using German equipment.

Now this is already out of topic.

Lethe · Aug 27, 2020

Tam said:
I don't think China has any offensive capability outside of the first island chain, and investment to defeat the USN in the open ocean on a hot war would be tremendous. China is so way behind in submarine numbers, compared to the USN in terms of nuclear submarines, and that's even assuming you have a submarine equally as quiet as a Virginia. China does not have realistically the resources and the time to confront the USN symmetrically (carrier vs. carrier) in the open ocean, and its not clear that a even a modern quiet SSN can get through a carrier screen (successful carrier group penetrations documented were in fact by SSKs). So the best way to play this game is not to play.

Ultimately, PLAN must be able to threaten the American carrier battle groups and contest control of the sea. If PLAN cannot do that, then at best it is reduced to a passive, defensive escort role that is incapable of securing victory and bringing an end to the conflict, while American assets prowl around the defensive perimeters at will and take advantage of inevitable weak points.

How this is best accomplished is a matter for debate and almost certainly involves a more complex answer than investment in a single platform.

By the way, quiet does not help you when an ASW ship is actively pinging because quiet or not, your sub is still reflecting echoes. How much does an SSN cost versus a Type 055? Do you need to penetrate an escort screen and sink the carrier with torpedoes? Why not just an SSGN in a standoff mode and rain a horde of antiship missiles at the carrier group? But if you're talking about this, would it just be better to have guided missile destroyers and cruisers, or even arsenal ships to do the job?

The success of SSKs against American carriers in exercises is illusory. In reality, SSKs lack the speed and endurance to achieve a firing position in all but most fortuitous and contrived circumstances. SSGNs, on the other hand, are a fantastic idea, and much better than surface action groups because, when cued into the carrier's location appropriately, they have a good chance of being able to achieve a firing position without being detected. A surface action group is going to be detected well before it gets into engagement range and, at worst, the American carriers will simply run away from it at the 30+ knots the carrier group is capable of, positioning submarines and calling in additional airpower to deal with it as they do so. You have to defeat the carriers, and to do that you need initiative, which escorts, SSKs, aviation-capable LHDs and tactical airpower cannot provide. Capabilities that allow you to take the initiative include carriers, nuclear-powered submarines, strategic airpower, robust reconnaissance capabilities (space-, air-, sea- and undersea-based) and the command and control facilities to effectively coordinate them.

Just remember what happened in the Russian-Japanese war. The IJN does not have the resources to defeat the Russian Navy at the home waters of the Russian Navy. It only needs to defeat the Russians near its home waters and that's what they did.

But that's just it: USN will not seek to impose a blockade close to China, they will do it at e.g. the Malacca/Lombok/Sunda straits. They will shut down oil shipments from the Persian Gulf by threat or coercion. Obviously it would be better for the US if it could simply blockade China's coast, but that is no longer realistic. But just because it is much more difficult for the United States to cripple China's strategically sensitive trade going forward than it has been in the past does not mean that the effects on China would be any less devastating, or that the costs exceed what the United States may be prepared to bear in order to maintain and extend its hegemony.

Tam · Aug 27, 2020

Lethe said:
Ultimately, PLAN must be able to threaten the American carrier battle groups and contest control of the sea. If PLAN cannot do that, then at best it is reduced to a passive, defensive escort role that is incapable of securing victory while American assets prowl around the defensive perimeter at will and take advantage of inevitable weak points.

How this is best accomplished is a matter for debate and almost certainly involves a more complex answer than investment in a single platform.

The success of SSKs against American carriers in exercises is illusory. In reality, SSKs lack the speed and endurance to achieve a firing position in all but most fortuitous and contrived circumstances. SSGNs, on the other hand, are a fantastic idea, and much better than surface action groups because, when cued into the carrier's location appropriately, they have a good chance of being able to achieve a firing position without being detected. A surface action group is going to be detected well before it gets into engagement range and, at worst, the American carriers will simply run away from it at the 30+ knots the carrier group is capable of, positioning submarines and calling in additional airpower to deal with it as they do so. You have to defeat the carriers, and to do that you need initiative, which escorts, SSKs, and tactical airpower cannot provide.

You are assuming that submarines can find a mobile carrier group easily. Even an SSN has problems with that.

Submarines have difficulty in being part of a 'sensor network'. It has to stay below the water, and the only kind of RF that will reach deap is very long wave, very low bandwidth kind of communication. If they have to surface, they will lose their invisibility --- subs are not RF stealthy, although some European SSKs are also designed with some radar cross section reduction. When subs have to surface, the low height, small sizes of their surface radar, ESM and communication masts guarantee severely limited ranges in their usage.

That is not an issue with a surface ship. It can be in constant communication with aircraft, drones, satellites and other surface ships as part of a network. Submarines will have a harder time finding a mobile SAG, but connected to drones and satellites, a surface ship network will find it.

Now lets go to the SAG. How much antiship striking power does it have? Are you referring to planes launching subsonic medium sized (Harpoon, YJ-83, Exocet) antiship missiles? On the other hand, longer ranged subsonic missiles such as TASM, LRASM, YJ-62, are about at least 1100 to 1300kg at least, and supersonic AshMs weigh more. These makes large antiship missiles difficult to wield on smaller jets, so that a fighter jet can only mount one. If you want to wield multiples per plane of larger antiship missiles, you have to go back to land based aircraft. Or SSGNs --- which is limited in their network capability. That returns us to the surface warship which enjoys consistent network availability...and the striking power. If a carrier dedicates 24 aircraft for strike with a large antiship missile, the rest for aircover and scouting, that gives you 24 missiles. An entire SAG is hefty cost for a strike of 24 missiles while a single ULVS destroyer can dedicate 24 of its VLS for long range antiship or cruise missiles. The role of a PLAN carrier seems more like being the eyes for the fleet, trying to assure air and spectral superiority to assure finding the targets which the surface ships (or land based ASBMs) to strke. What exactly will a J-15 or J-35 use for an antiship missile? More YJ-83? Does that kind of suck versus a ULVS equipped warship launching YJ-18s? Let's assume you got a LRASM copy, how many Sino-LRASMs can a J-15 or J-35 carry? That is at least a 1100kg per missile. YJ-12? With booster that's around 2,500kg already, without one, I would estimate around 2,000kg. How many YJ-12s can one J-35 or J-15 can carry?

But that's just it: USN will not seek to impose a blockade close to China, they will do it at e.g. the Malacca/Lombok/Sunda straits. They will shut down oil shipments from the Persian Gulf by threat or coercion. Obviously it would be better for the US if it could simply blockade China's coast, but that is no longer realistic. But just because it is much more difficult for the United States to cripple China's strategically sensitive trade going forward than it has been in the past does not mean that the effects on China would be any less devastating, or that the costs exceed what the United States may be prepared to bear in order to maintain and extend its hegemony.

I am not sure how SSNs --- the future Chinese SSN may cost well more than a single Type 055 --- can break a blockade. A submarine running at extended periods on top speed loses its invisibility. Coolant pumps need to run for high power output, you are going to have various hydronamic and propeller noises. SSNs may not be able to achieve the speed and position to deal with a mobile strike group without losing their own invisibility.

Carriers alone are not going to have enough striking power. You are going to need VLS, lots of VLS to accomplish that purpose.

Blitzo · Aug 27, 2020

Tam said:
I don't think China has any offensive capability outside of the first island chain, and investment to defeat the USN in the open ocean on a hot war would be tremendous. China is so way behind in submarine numbers, compared to the USN in terms of nuclear submarines, and that's even assuming you have a submarine equally as quiet as a Virginia. China does not have realistically the resources and the time to confront the USN symmetrically (carrier vs. carrier) in the open ocean, and its not clear that a even a modern quiet SSN can get through a carrier screen (successful carrier group penetrations documented were in fact by SSKs). So the best way to play this game is not to play.

By the way, quiet does not help you when an ASW ship is actively pinging because quiet or not, your sub is still reflecting echoes. How much does an SSN cost versus a Type 055? Do you need to penetrate an escort screen and sink the carrier with torpedoes? Why not just an SSGN in a standoff mode and rain a horde of antiship missiles at the carrier group? But if you're talking about this, would it just be better to have guided missile destroyers and cruisers, or even arsenal ships to do the job?

Just remember what happened in the Russian-Japanese war. The IJN does not have the resources to defeat the Russian Navy at the home waters of the Russian Navy. It only needs to defeat the Russians near its home waters and that's what they did.

If you are going to defend trade routes, you need a visible and persistent presence and that's what a surface ship provides. Subs are invisible and they are not persistent.

If you are going to have carriers you need to protect them from submarines too, so that means a corresponding investment in AAW role ships and ASW role ships.

Let me add that historically surface ships are also used to escort submarines. German torpedoboats, which are really corvettes and frigates, often escort U-boats going in and out of the Bay of Biscay. The Soviet Bastion strategy called for a large number of ASW forces, including ships to protect their own SSNs and SSBNs in certain zones. The use of the Type 056 is similar to this strategy, being used to screen for the 093s and 094s at the South China Seas.

I think it is worth treating what we see as current PLAN production trends as being something that will continue forever.

You mentioned in a previous post that you believed the PLAN's persistence with 055 production and its stunted 09III production suggests that "they have their strategic goals and plans figured out" as if that implies they are not interested in a massive SSN fleet.
I think that is remarkably short sighted and is the equivalent of us in 2008 saying that because the PLAN has only produced a couple of 052Bs and 052Cs at that time that it means they do not plan on producing a large and world beating surface combatant fleet.

We have enough rumours to know that the PLAN is looking to build SSNs that are more capable and more advanced, and 09V may end up being competitive. We know -- we can literally see on satellite -- that they have a massive new dedicated nuclear submarine line built up at Bohai. Furthermore, from past PLAN practice, they have never mass produced a new design or a new type of ship unless it was sufficiently capable and competitive for its purposes.

====

As for competing with the USN "symmetrically" -- I would treat that with a level of caution as well.
I think it is very much within the PLAN's capability within the next two decades to develop a force that is at least equal to the USN in a symmetrical way, ship for ship, aircraft for aircraft, sub for sub.
The USN is of course likely to have a more extensive network of international bases, however for a high intensity westpac conflict, the PLAN will be seeking to leverage the much larger warfighting capacity from the PLAAF and PLARF as well to project weapons and sensors and aircraft into the first island chain and beyond, in a way to be able to defeat the forces that the USN can deploy to the region as well as regional USAF and other US forces that may be able to contribute to a fight.
It will be a war of system of systems between each sides services all acting together.

From the PLA's point of view, I think overall they would seek to fight a war of "asymmetrical symmetry," whereby their qualitative and quantitative naval and air forces are at least equal to the enemy, but where they can leverage the fact that the war is being fought closer to their doorstep to allow better multi-domain support and operational tempo and concentration of firepower in the specific region.

For example, preferably this could be something like being able to eventually have a naval fleet whereby they have qualitatively equal but quantitatively superior CSGs and SSNs and SSGNs and SAGs in the region, as well as much more extensive regional long range maritime and land strike capabilities by virtue of mainland based PLARF and PLAAF forces. Airborne ISR and air defense and airborne regional strategic reconaissance is also aimed to be greater by virtue of land based PLAAF aircraft. All of those factors will seek to multiply with each other to produce a superior overall multi-domain force by having forces that are qualitatively "symmetrical" but deployed in a way that is quantitatively superior/asymmetrical with the ability to operate at a higher tempo and concentration.

Outside of the western pacific, if the PLAN wants to operate globally to be able to defend its SLOCs against a high capability opponent in a HIC, the need to have a symmetrical force is even more prevalent, because you will not have the asymmetrical force multipliers of land based PLARF and PLAAF to depend on and your PLAN force will be operating relatively alone.
For that kind of conflict, against a high capability foe that is operating a complex combined arms naval formation (CSGs, potentially supported by a degree of land based aviation as well), the importance of having an equally complex combined arms naval formation of your own is even more apparent.

This idea that surface combatants or surface action groups operating without extensive organic naval aviation support and subsurface support, are somehow appropriate as SLOC escorts, in the modern age when you are up against a high capability foe is absolutely not feasible, in my opinion.
Any surface action group acting as an escort for a convoy or operating in a region as SLOC will find itself quickly hunted down and destroyed by a CSG.

In other words, I think any discussion about the idea of "escorting convoys" or defending SLOCs in the modern age, fundamentally needs to recognize that if you intend to seek to carry out such an action your force should optimally have the ability to fight at least one enemy CSG as well, because that is the kind of force that the enemy will throw against whatever escort force you seek to deploy.

Fundamentally, I think your position and proposal for future PLAN procurement is rests on the premise that the PLAN may not be able to build or develop sufficiently competitive or capable carriers and support bases and airwings at a practical price, and that they may not be able to build or develop sufficiently competitive or capable SSNs, and because of that, they will be forced to procure vessels and systems that are the next best thing -- vessels and aircraft which may be more cost effective, but ultimately suboptimal.

Going back to the first part of your post, you wrote:

Tam said:
I don't think China has any offensive capability outside of the first island chain, and investment to defeat the USN in the open ocean on a hot war would be tremendous.

My reply, and I believe what will end up being the PLA's reply, is:
Yes.

AndrewS · Aug 27, 2020

Lethe said:
Ultimately, PLAN must be able to threaten the American carrier battle groups and contest control of the sea. If PLAN cannot do that, then at best it is reduced to a passive, defensive escort role that is incapable of securing victory and bringing an end to the conflict, while American assets prowl around the defensive perimeters at will and take advantage of inevitable weak points.

I see 2 major assumptions in this statement

Point 1. a Chinese-US conflict will be drawn out.
Point 2. a Chinese victory requires the PLAN to obtain blue-water sea control.

Point 1

If China conquers Taiwan, would the US be willing to spend years to build up the forces required to dislodge the Chinese Army?
We're talking about the modern day equivalent of D-Day or Operation Olympic.

Point 2

Heavyweight fighter jets and land-attack cruise missiles have an operating range of approximately 1500km.

Given the geography of the Western Pacific, it is credible for the Chinese military to achieve and maintain absolute military superiority within 700km of the Chinese mainland. And for a no-man's land (which includes an air/sea blockade) to stretch out to 1500km, which would cover the entire 1st Island Chain

So China can achieve its military objectives using land-based assets operating within 700km. For example

1. Taiwan is only 200-400km away
2. Okinawa and the Ryuku Islands are within 500-700km
3. All of South Korea is within 400-700km

Within that space, the Chinese military has both strategic and tactical initiative, and can choose weak points to attack.

And the US has no choice but to try defend all these potential targets.
But the 1st Island Chain has no strategic depth for safe rear area bases and resupply.

---

And if we're talking about a long war, will China force the US Army to fight a land war in Korea?

And if China decides to build a big enough Army, then South Korea becomes an extension of the mainland Chinese landmass, with the Japanese Home Islands only 200km away.

Then it would be credible for the Chinese military to obtain absolute military superiority over part of the Japanese Home Islands, and subject the rest of Japan to continuous attack and therefore cut off Japan from external resupply.

Japan and the other small countries in the First Island Chain cannot survive a blockade, whilst China is a continental sized economy that can trade overland and also intermix the China trade with that of its neighbours in South East Asia.

---

The Australian government white papers project a Chinese economy growing to 2x the size of the US economy in the 2030-2035 timeframe.
So yes, eventually China could build a blue water Navy to control the High Seas, but it is going to take time and money

In comparison, it's quicker and cheaper for China to obtain military superiority over the 1st Island Chain by leveraging geography to field more assets based from mainland China

AndrewS · Aug 27, 2020

Tam said:
I am not sure how SSNs --- the future Chinese SSN may cost well more than a single Type 055 --- can break a blockade. A submarine running at extended periods on top speed loses its invisibility. Coolant pumps need to run for high power output, you are going to have various hydronamic and propeller noises. SSNs may not be able to achieve the speed and position to deal with a mobile strike group without losing their own invisibility.

SSNs don't break blockades.

But SSNs can impose their own blockades in undefended rear areas anywhere in the world.

Think the Panama Canal, Hawaii, Suez Canal, Arabian Gulf, or resupply ships crossing the Pacific.

And I would see Chinese SSNs shadowing US Carriers at a distance, so that other assets know where to target.

Tam · Aug 27, 2020

AndrewS said:
SSNs don't break blockades.

But SSNs can impose their own blockades in undefended rear areas anywhere in the world.

Think the Panama Canal, Hawaii, Suez Canal, Arabian Gulf, or resupply ships crossing the Pacific.

And I would see Chinese SSNs shadowing US Carriers at a distance, so that other assets know where to target.

How will the SSN able to talk with other assets as to where to target?

If you try to surface, you will be detected.

If you use your communications, the signals will be detected, which will triangulate your location and you will be detected.

If you are chasing after a mobile CSG at full speed, your sub may not be as quiet as you want it to be, and you will be detected. Never mind that the CSG has its own ASW screen of helicopters and ships, and a nuclear sub following it.

Tam · Aug 27, 2020

Bltizo said:
I think it is worth treating what we see as current PLAN production trends as being something that will continue forever.

You mentioned in a previous post that you believed the PLAN's persistence with 055 production and its stunted 09III production suggests that "they have their strategic goals and plans figured out" as if that implies they are not interested in a massive SSN fleet.
I think that is remarkably short sighted and is the equivalent of us in 2008 saying that because the PLAN has only produced a couple of 052Bs and 052Cs at that time that it means they do not plan on producing a large and world beating surface combatant fleet.

We have enough rumours to know that the PLAN is looking to build SSNs that are more capable and more advanced, and 09V may end up being competitive. We know -- we can literally see on satellite -- that they have a massive new dedicated nuclear submarine line built up at Bohai. Furthermore, from past PLAN practice, they have never mass produced a new design or a new type of ship unless it was sufficiently capable and competitive for its purposes.

The problem is that I don't see the Bohai shipyard able to produce more than two to four hulls a year. If you have two to three Bohais geared up then you have a case of massive SSN production, but you only have one shipyard. And its not clear if the nuclear submarine production is mainly for SSBNs and not SSNs.

I don't see an SSN getting through a CSG escort screen and launch torpedoes at short range getting away with it.

Do realize that no matter how quiet a sub is, its not immune from pinging. Its like a quiet aircraft doesn't make it active radar immune.

====

As for competing with the USN "symmetrically" -- I would treat that with a level of caution as well.
I think it is very much within the PLAN's capability within the next two decades to develop a force that is at least equal to the USN in a symmetrical way, ship for ship, aircraft for aircraft, sub for sub.
The USN is of course likely to have a more extensive network of international bases, however for a high intensity westpac conflict, the PLAN will be seeking to leverage the much larger warfighting capacity from the PLAAF and PLARF as well to project weapons and sensors and aircraft into the first island chain and beyond, in a way to be able to defeat the forces that the USN can deploy to the region as well as regional USAF and other US forces that may be able to contribute to a fight.
It will be a war of system of systems between each sides services all acting together.

From the PLA's point of view, I think overall they would seek to fight a war of "asymmetrical symmetry," whereby their qualitative and quantitative naval and air forces are at least equal to the enemy, but where they can leverage the fact that the war is being fought closer to their doorstep to allow better multi-domain support and operational tempo and concentration of firepower in the specific region.

For example, preferably this could be something like being able to eventually have a naval fleet whereby they have qualitatively equal but quantitatively superior CSGs and SSNs and SSGNs and SAGs in the region, as well as much more extensive regional long range maritime and land strike capabilities by virtue of mainland based PLARF and PLAAF forces. Airborne ISR and air defense and airborne regional strategic reconaissance is also aimed to be greater by virtue of land based PLAAF aircraft. All of those factors will seek to multiply with each other to produce a superior overall multi-domain force by having forces that are qualitatively "symmetrical" but deployed in a way that is quantitatively superior/asymmetrical with the ability to operate at a higher tempo and concentration.

Fundamentally, I think your position and proposal for future PLAN procurement is rests on the premise that the PLAN may not be able to build or develop sufficiently competitive or capable carriers and support bases and airwings at a practical price, and that they may not be able to build or develop sufficiently competitive or capable SSNs, and because of that, they will be forced to procure vessels and systems that are the next best thing -- vessels and aircraft which may be more cost effective, but ultimately suboptimal.

Actually no.

I might argue it is the surface warship itself that might be the most optimal and cost effect solution because in the end, it is about sinking another ship, and VLS offers the highest density of missiles possible you can bring to the battlespace. Submarines can deal with ships, but not aircraft. Aircraft can deal with ships, but not submarines unless you're ASW helicopters and maritime patrol aircraft. Ships is the only segment that can deal with the trinity of on the water, above the water and under the water all at the same time in the same package.

You can go on and further argue, what kind of antiship missiles carrier strike aircraft can carry and how many they can carry, and at what over all is the 'delivery' cost per missile. Maybe the J-15 can carry four YJ-83 or 2 YJ-83 and two YJ-91, but these don't have the range or the strike power of a YJ-12 or YJ-18. You still have to get to a certain range to use these missiles, YJ-83K at least under 250km, and the YJ-91 half of that. Which means they are going to be at risk with defenses. With the YJ-83 being a subsonic missile, I may also say the ability to overwhelm defenses by sheer speed would fall more to the YJ-12 and YJ-18's advantage, along with the greater damage potential. Even assuming you got J-35s, Tomahawk sized missiles ain't going to fit on your internal bay. Can you be able to confidently say, you can take a J-15, slung a single YJ-62 or YJ-12 underneath the center pod and take off from the carrier. Let's assume you can do so using EMALs, how big is your strike force? 8 jets, 16 jets, 24 jets, each carrying a single big missile.

Or you can have a single ULVS ship launch the equivalent of 8, 16, 24 similar missiles in one sitting.

I would even see the role of CVs in the PLAN to be more defensive, providing air cover , AEW, and reconnaissance information for the surface fleet. In addition to interception and air superiority, their best job is to look for the targets, both air and sea. Airborne tankers and enemy AEW would be ideal. If they spot the enemy force, and relay that information to the home fleet. But instead of a modern day Midway like strike where a carrier is hurrying up with a strike wing being loaded with antiship missiles and towed to the catapult, I would rather see your surface vessels opening their VLS and launching wave after wave of antiship missiles to that location. If the enemy is looking to destroy your offensive capability by targeting your carrier, your overall strike lethality is distributed with every ship afloat in your formation.

An SSGN, let's say we convert an 094 so that all its silos are firing U-VLS type missiles. Or let's say a stretched 093X with a back of VLS. Essentially an SSGN is an underwater arsenal ship. You have the question of the sonar's range, and its ability to detect a mobile CSG group and precisely track it at long ranges, much less even identify the noises of the CSG amidst ambient noise over a few hundred kilometers. The best, and most precise long range spotting and tracking information available is still going to be airborne, by patrol aircraft, helicopters, drones and satellite. Your sub still has to be near the surface to obtain this information, and isn't that much different from a U-VLS equipped warship except that it bobs in and out of the water and costs way more as a delivery vehicle. The best purpose I see having an SSN is to fight other subs. Even with a sub loaded with YJ-18 for stand off antiship, like with Yuans or 093, the corresponding density of missile per vessel is low.

I don't see the PLAN going full symmetrical until past 2030 or something. In fact, I would see the fear of a more immediate war and a slowing economy to cause the PLAN to tilt back into being more asymmetric.

AndrewS · Aug 28, 2020

Tam said:
How will the SSN able to talk with other assets as to where to target?

If you try to surface, you will be detected.

If you use your communications, the signals will be detected, which will triangulate your location and you will be detected.

If you are chasing after a mobile CSG at full speed, your sub may not be as quiet as you want it to be, and you will be detected. Never mind that the CSG has its own ASW screen of helicopters and ships, and a nuclear sub following it.

A SSN can deploy a radio buoy with a broadcast delay to cue a rough location.
This has been around for decades.

At full speed, a CSG could cover say 60nm in the space of 2 hours.
That's good enough for follow-on airborne or spaceborne assets that can sweep the area in a few minutes.

---

There's no need to chase a CSG at full speed, because the average CSG speed will be lower.

Remember that the Burke escorts only have a cruise range of 220 hours at 20knots with 1 turbine.
So at full speed with 4 turbines, a Burke would only have 2 days of endurance.

---

Personally, I would task the SSN to go after the ships resupplying the CSG to achieve a mission kill.
They are easier targets and much lower risk

SoupDumplings · Aug 28, 2020

Bltizo said:
I think it is worth treating what we see as current PLAN production trends as being something that will continue forever.

You mentioned in a previous post that you believed the PLAN's persistence with 055 production and its stunted 09III production suggests that "they have their strategic goals and plans figured out" as if that implies they are not interested in a massive SSN fleet.
I think that is remarkably short sighted and is the equivalent of us in 2008 saying that because the PLAN has only produced a couple of 052Bs and 052Cs at that time that it means they do not plan on producing a large and world beating surface combatant fleet.

We have enough rumours to know that the PLAN is looking to build SSNs that are more capable and more advanced, and 09V may end up being competitive. We know -- we can literally see on satellite -- that they have a massive new dedicated nuclear submarine line built up at Bohai. Furthermore, from past PLAN practice, they have never mass produced a new design or a new type of ship unless it was sufficiently capable and competitive for its purposes.

====

As for competing with the USN "symmetrically" -- I would treat that with a level of caution as well.
I think it is very much within the PLAN's capability within the next two decades to develop a force that is at least equal to the USN in a symmetrical way, ship for ship, aircraft for aircraft, sub for sub.
The USN is of course likely to have a more extensive network of international bases, however for a high intensity westpac conflict, the PLAN will be seeking to leverage the much larger warfighting capacity from the PLAAF and PLARF as well to project weapons and sensors and aircraft into the first island chain and beyond, in a way to be able to defeat the forces that the USN can deploy to the region as well as regional USAF and other US forces that may be able to contribute to a fight.
It will be a war of system of systems between each sides services all acting together.

From the PLA's point of view, I think overall they would seek to fight a war of "asymmetrical symmetry," whereby their qualitative and quantitative naval and air forces are at least equal to the enemy, but where they can leverage the fact that the war is being fought closer to their doorstep to allow better multi-domain support and operational tempo and concentration of firepower in the specific region.

For example, preferably this could be something like being able to eventually have a naval fleet whereby they have qualitatively equal but quantitatively superior CSGs and SSNs and SSGNs and SAGs in the region, as well as much more extensive regional long range maritime and land strike capabilities by virtue of mainland based PLARF and PLAAF forces. Airborne ISR and air defense and airborne regional strategic reconaissance is also aimed to be greater by virtue of land based PLAAF aircraft. All of those factors will seek to multiply with each other to produce a superior overall multi-domain force by having forces that are qualitatively "symmetrical" but deployed in a way that is quantitatively superior/asymmetrical with the ability to operate at a higher tempo and concentration.

Outside of the western pacific, if the PLAN wants to operate globally to be able to defend its SLOCs against a high capability opponent in a HIC, the need to have a symmetrical force is even more prevalent, because you will not have the asymmetrical force multipliers of land based PLARF and PLAAF to depend on and your PLAN force will be operating relatively alone.
For that kind of conflict, against a high capability foe that is operating a complex combined arms naval formation (CSGs, potentially supported by a degree of land based aviation as well), the importance of having an equally complex combined arms naval formation of your own is even more apparent.

This idea that surface combatants or surface action groups operating without extensive organic naval aviation support and subsurface support, are somehow appropriate as SLOC escorts, in the modern age when you are up against a high capability foe is absolutely not feasible, in my opinion.
Any surface action group acting as an escort for a convoy or operating in a region as SLOC will find itself quickly hunted down and destroyed by a CSG.

In other words, I think any discussion about the idea of "escorting convoys" or defending SLOCs in the modern age, fundamentally needs to recognize that if you intend to seek to carry out such an action your force should optimally have the ability to fight at least one enemy CSG as well, because that is the kind of force that the enemy will throw against whatever escort force you seek to deploy.

Fundamentally, I think your position and proposal for future PLAN procurement is rests on the premise that the PLAN may not be able to build or develop sufficiently competitive or capable carriers and support bases and airwings at a practical price, and that they may not be able to build or develop sufficiently competitive or capable SSNs, and because of that, they will be forced to procure vessels and systems that are the next best thing -- vessels and aircraft which may be more cost effective, but ultimately suboptimal.

Going back to the first part of your post, you wrote:

My reply, and I believe what will end up being the PLA's reply, is:
Yes.

Hi Blitzo. From your answer, it seems like the PLA has thought far ahead and is planning to build a highly capable navy in the next 20 years. But do you think they expect to have 20 years of peace? Or will they be focused on short term goals and have multiple periods of mass expansions and strategic adjustments, just in case a war break out before their ideal navy is built? Thanks.

Future PLAN orbat discussion

Tam

Brigadier

Lethe

Captain

Tam

Brigadier

Blitzo

Lieutenant General

AndrewS

Brigadier

AndrewS

Brigadier

Tam

Brigadier

Tam

Brigadier

AndrewS

Brigadier

SoupDumplings

Junior Member