Do you have the English version?
Here's the pdf source from US Naval Institute -
And yes, it's not pretty. A few issues of note -
181 cycles... Yikes! The Navy has somehow managed to make the EMALS even less reliable than the already-abysmal 400 cycles between failures from all the way back in 2016... What the heck?• During the 3,975 catapult launches conducted post PSA through ISE [independent steaming event] 11, EMALS demonstrated an achieved reliability of 181 mean cycles between operational mission failure (MCBOMF), where a cycle is the launch of one aircraft. This reliability is well below the requirement of 4,166 MCBOMF.
• During ISE 8, two separate failures caused individual EMALS catapults to go down for 3 days. One of the failures was attributed to a legacy component.
Advanced Arresting Gear:
The arresting system is in even worse shape than the EMALS... It looks to be a similar if not the same electrical problem that's been plaguing the EMALS - that they simply couldn't isolate failed components, making ad hoc repairs all but impossible without physically cutting off those components from the rest of the system and bringing the whole thing down for days, while flight ops is still in progress... Well, not in progress anymore once that happens, once every 48 landings!• Through the first 3,975 recoveries, AAG demonstrated an achieved reliability of 48 MCBOMF, where a cycle is the recovery of a single aircraft. This reliability estimate falls well below the requirement of 16,500 MCBOMF.
• While in port prior to ISE 9, during maintenance troubleshooting, the AAG system experienced a failure of an Energy Storage Capacitor Bank, which rendered all three engines inoperative. It took the Navy 7 days to investigate the failure and bring AAG back into service by mechanically isolating the failed capacitor bank. The failed parts were repaired during a later in-port period.
• The reliability concerns are magnified by the current AAG design that does not allow electrical isolation of the Power Conditioning Subsystem equipment from high power buses, limiting corrective maintenance on below-deck equipment during flight operations.
Target discrimination seems problematic due to excessive clutter. I wonder what they mean by "undesired emitter tracks" that would compel over-expenditure of missiles.• Post-PSA sea-based developmental test events show the DBR still experiences clutter tracks, but to a smaller extent and of a different origin than previously reported. The events also show that CEC [cooperative engagement capability], 56 in certain conditions, provides inaccurate tracking of air contacts. During these events, SEWIP [surface electronic warfare improvement program]57 Block 2 created undesired emitter tracks that could cause the ship to expend more ESSMs [Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles] and RAMs [Rolling Airframe Missiles] than necessary to destroy incoming threats.
I certainly hope it was dropped returns of some manner or another from the SLQ-32 vis-a-vis RF signals from oncoming targets, and not false positives due to "clutter issue" like with the DBR so they just spray missiles at the general direction and pray that one of 'em would hit... Bit of a hyperbole on the last, but you get my drift.
The ECM does seem to be the main culprit in bringing the Ford's self-defence capability down. Though the DBR isn't fairing much better either, with discriminating clutter and overall reliability being quite subpar by the Navy's standards, which serves to further justify their decision to move on from the SPY-4, I'd imagine.• During the August 2020 missile firing operational test on SDTS [self-defense test ship], the system demonstrated good tracking performance of the targets by MFR [multi-function radar] and CEC, and good engagement support by the SSDS [ship self-defense system] MK 2 Mod 6 element, which correctly provided scheduling and weapon assignments. SEWIP Block 2 emitter reporting interfered with optimal engagements against threats. Several problems contributed to the failure of some ESSMs and RAMs to destroy their intended targets.
• Results of live testing completed to date indicate that CVN 78 has limited self-defense capability against ASCM [anti-ship cruise missile] surrogates, but several challenges persist with respect to the efficacy of the ship’s combat system.
• Post PSA through ISE 11, DBR demonstrated a mean time between operational mission failures (MTBOMF) of 100 hours, below the requirement of 339 hours.
Needless to say it'd be interesting to see how the SPY-6 will fair, esp. since the Navy seems so confident in it that they're putting the various variants of the SPY-6 on pretty much every new-build surface combatants across the fleets from AB IIIs to the FFGs to the Fords.
Spoke too soon. It looks like the Navy has learned nothing from their EMALS woes. Fitting untested primary sensors onto already-built/almost-constructed $13bn capital ships, what could go wrong?• Preliminary results of EASR’s [enterprise air surveillance radar]58 early developmental testing indicate that electromagnetic interference, tracking performance, electronic protection, and power compliance testing are focal areas for ongoing system developmental work and improvements. Until operationally relevant reliability data are supplied to DOT&E, system reliability remains a significant risk area for EASR. EASR’s combat system integration remains untested.
To add, the Ford won't reach her required sortie generation rate either, after the Navy promising that she would. Now they're saying the requirement was unrealistic to "historical levels" to begin with. So they'll just take what they can get during IOT&E and leave it at that. They don't even try anymore...?
Then there's the weapons elevators, which I've intentionally left out, as for that alone they've got 5 pages dedicated to dealing with it. Suffice it to say, the AWE is a special child for sure. Pretty awe-inspiring indeed (pun intended).
It goes without saying the PLAN ought to pay really close attention to the USN's procurement and testing programmes, which I'm confident that they would, and hopefully with the utmost scrutiny to the finest detail, doubly and particularly so at the current and future stages of Chinese carrier development.
It's rather obvious when even the world's most powerful navy and its institutions thereof can encounter such serious and frankly baffling difficulties, with close to 70 years of building and operating supercarriers under their belt to boot, it only goes to show the monumental challenge aircraft carriers are in their own right, esp. with the insertion of new, far from mature and, in the USN's case and hopefully not the PLAN's case, untested technologies where so many unknowns and the neglect from a single or multiple faults could jeopardise the entire programme to such an extent as the Ford even to this day.