CV-18 Fujian/003 CATOBAR carrier thread


Helius

Junior Member
Registered Member
Do you have the English version?

Here's the pdf source from US Naval Institute -

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And yes, it's not pretty. A few issues of note -

EMALS:
• During the 3,975 catapult launches conducted post PSA through ISE [independent steaming event] 11, EMALS demonstrated an achieved reliability of 181 mean cycles between operational mission failure (MCBOMF), where a cycle is the launch of one aircraft. This reliability is well below the requirement of 4,166 MCBOMF.


• During ISE 8, two separate failures caused individual EMALS catapults to go down for 3 days. One of the failures was attributed to a legacy component.
181 cycles... Yikes! The Navy has somehow managed to make the EMALS even less reliable than the already-abysmal 400 cycles between failures from all the way back in 2016... What the heck?

Advanced Arresting Gear:
• Through the first 3,975 recoveries, AAG demonstrated an achieved reliability of 48 MCBOMF, where a cycle is the recovery of a single aircraft. This reliability estimate falls well below the requirement of 16,500 MCBOMF.

• While in port prior to ISE 9, during maintenance troubleshooting, the AAG system experienced a failure of an Energy Storage Capacitor Bank, which rendered all three engines inoperative. It took the Navy 7 days to investigate the failure and bring AAG back into service by mechanically isolating the failed capacitor bank. The failed parts were repaired during a later in-port period.

• The reliability concerns are magnified by the current AAG design that does not allow electrical isolation of the Power Conditioning Subsystem equipment from high power buses, limiting corrective maintenance on below-deck equipment during flight operations.
The arresting system is in even worse shape than the EMALS... It looks to be a similar if not the same electrical problem that's been plaguing the EMALS - that they simply couldn't isolate failed components, making ad hoc repairs all but impossible without physically cutting off those components from the rest of the system and bringing the whole thing down for days, while flight ops is still in progress... Well, not in progress anymore once that happens, once every 48 landings!

Dual-Band Radar:
• Post-PSA sea-based developmental test events show the DBR still experiences clutter tracks, but to a smaller extent and of a different origin than previously reported. The events also show that CEC [cooperative engagement capability], 56 in certain conditions, provides inaccurate tracking of air contacts. During these events, SEWIP [surface electronic warfare improvement program]57 Block 2 created undesired emitter tracks that could cause the ship to expend more ESSMs [Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles] and RAMs [Rolling Airframe Missiles] than necessary to destroy incoming threats.
Target discrimination seems problematic due to excessive clutter. I wonder what they mean by "undesired emitter tracks" that would compel over-expenditure of missiles.

I certainly hope it was dropped returns of some manner or another from the SLQ-32 vis-a-vis RF signals from oncoming targets, and not false positives due to "clutter issue" like with the DBR so they just spray missiles at the general direction and pray that one of 'em would hit... Bit of a hyperbole on the last, but you get my drift.

• During the August 2020 missile firing operational test on SDTS [self-defense test ship], the system demonstrated good tracking performance of the targets by MFR [multi-function radar] and CEC, and good engagement support by the SSDS [ship self-defense system] MK 2 Mod 6 element, which correctly provided scheduling and weapon assignments. SEWIP Block 2 emitter reporting interfered with optimal engagements against threats. Several problems contributed to the failure of some ESSMs and RAMs to destroy their intended targets.

• Results of live testing completed to date indicate that CVN 78 has limited self-defense capability against ASCM [anti-ship cruise missile] surrogates, but several challenges persist with respect to the efficacy of the ship’s combat system.

• Post PSA through ISE 11, DBR demonstrated a mean time between operational mission failures (MTBOMF) of 100 hours, below the requirement of 339 hours.
The ECM does seem to be the main culprit in bringing the Ford's self-defence capability down. Though the DBR isn't fairing much better either, with discriminating clutter and overall reliability being quite subpar by the Navy's standards, which serves to further justify their decision to move on from the SPY-4, I'd imagine.

Needless to say it'd be interesting to see how the SPY-6 will fair, esp. since the Navy seems so confident in it that they're putting the various variants of the SPY-6 on pretty much every new-build surface combatants across the fleets from AB IIIs to the FFGs to the Fords.

• Preliminary results of EASR’s [enterprise air surveillance radar]58 early developmental testing indicate that electromagnetic interference, tracking performance, electronic protection, and power compliance testing are focal areas for ongoing system developmental work and improvements. Until operationally relevant reliability data are supplied to DOT&E, system reliability remains a significant risk area for EASR. EASR’s combat system integration remains untested.
Spoke too soon. It looks like the Navy has learned nothing from their EMALS woes. Fitting untested primary sensors onto already-built/almost-constructed $13bn capital ships, what could go wrong?


To add, the Ford won't reach her required sortie generation rate either, after the Navy promising that she would. Now they're saying the requirement was unrealistic to "historical levels" to begin with. So they'll just take what they can get during IOT&E and leave it at that. They don't even try anymore...?

Then there's the weapons elevators, which I've intentionally left out, as for that alone they've got 5 pages dedicated to dealing with it. Suffice it to say, the AWE is a special child for sure. Pretty awe-inspiring indeed (pun intended).


It goes without saying the PLAN ought to pay really close attention to the USN's procurement and testing programmes, which I'm confident that they would, and hopefully with the utmost scrutiny to the finest detail, doubly and particularly so at the current and future stages of Chinese carrier development.

It's rather obvious when even the world's most powerful navy and its institutions thereof can encounter such serious and frankly baffling difficulties, with close to 70 years of building and operating supercarriers under their belt to boot, it only goes to show the monumental challenge aircraft carriers are in their own right, esp. with the insertion of new, far from mature and, in the USN's case and hopefully not the PLAN's case, untested technologies where so many unknowns and the neglect from a single or multiple faults could jeopardise the entire programme to such an extent as the Ford even to this day.
 

Hendrik_2000

Lieutenant General
Fu Qianshao talk about the future airwing of Fujian. Nice animation of the future airwing. Click the CC button to get English translation

When Western countries pay attention to China's new aircraft carrier Fujian, they focus on the composition of the carrier-based aviation force. They believe that China's carrier-based aviation force may lead the United States in technology. Audience friends, netizens, friends, Hello everyone, I am Fu Qianshao [Time and frequency of strong national defense] Welcome to subscribe to leave a message. Strong defense time and frequency, bringing you the latest, most unique and in-depth news information, committed to creating the hottest and most cutting-edge military news! Overview of global military information, inventory of the latest weapons at home and abroad More powerful than 003, China has built a new aircraft carrier-based air combat force, leading the United States in technology

 

Lethe

Senior Member
Here's the pdf source from US Naval Institute -

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

To add, the Ford won't reach her required sortie generation rate either, after the Navy promising that she would. Now they're saying the requirement was unrealistic to "historical levels" to begin with. So they'll just take what they can get during IOT&E and leave it at that. They don't even try anymore...?

CVN 78 is unlikely to achieve its SGR [sortie generation rate] requirement. The target threshold is based on unrealistic assumptions including fair weather and unlimited visibility, and that aircraft emergencies, failures OF shipboard equipment, ship maneuvers, and manning shortfalls will not affect flight operations. During the 2013 operational assessment, DOT&E conducted an analysis of past aircraft carrier operations in major conflicts. The analysis concludes that the CVN 78 SGR threshold requirement is well above historical levels.

Nice to see more support for my previous contention that Sortie Generation Rate is overrated as a measure of carrier capability. Or, as I put it more colourfully at the time, that SGR is a bunch of wank.

Ford's SGR requirement was invented to defend the nuclear-powered supercarrier against its post-Gulf War, post-Cold War critics. Instead of beginning with requirements and then working out how best to address them, they started from the desired solution (the nuclear-powered supercarrier) and worked backwards to find what it could do better than alternative platforms such as smaller, more affordable carriers. Thus SGR was elevated to prime importance not because it was actually that important, but because it was a metric by which smaller carriers could not keep up.

So yeah, the collective shrug about Ford's failure to meet its SGR requirement does not surprise me. The metric has served its purpose and can now be de-emphasised if not outright ignored.
 
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Helius

Junior Member
Registered Member
Nice to see more support for my previous contention that Sortie Generation Rate is overrated as a measure of carrier capability. Or, as I put it more colourfully at the time, that SGR is a bunch of wank.

Ford's SGR requirement was invented to defend the nuclear-powered supercarrier against its post-Gulf War, post-Cold War critics. Instead of beginning with requirements and then working out how best to address them, they started from the desired solution (the nuclear-powered supercarrier) and worked backwards to find what it could do better than alternative platforms such as smaller, more affordable carriers. Thus SGR was elevated to prime importance not because it was actually that important, but because it was a metric by which smaller carriers could not keep up.

So yeah, the collective shrug about Ford's failure to meet its SGR requirement does not surprise me. The metric has served its purpose and can now be de-emphasised if not outright ignored.
Bit of a belated and expensive admission on the Navy's part, that one.

That is until Congress orders them to find a way to maintain the SGR anyway like having them to keep the Ticos and the LCS around even as they already outgrew their purposes.

From my observations the Congress OCs have this weird tendency to double down on intangible requirements/rationales in order to justify a programme's continued existence. Undertaking expensive and extensive overhauls are fine; even cancelling entire programmes before project approval despite any enormous R&D that might've gone into them.

When it comes to some preconceived criterion that in their view justifies or defines a project's raison d'etre, however, that's when Congress chooses to stubbornly stick to their guns quite readily for whatever reason.
 

weig2000

Captain
All these just further demonstrate that America's military-industrial-complex has long taken on a life of its own. Its existence has become not so much to defend the national security and interest against enemies, but that it often needs enemies to defend its very existence in its gargantuan state.

Before WWII, the US military and defense industry were at best second-rate even though the US then was the world's largest industrial nation and had the largest economy, because the nation's security was not threatened and there weren't a lot of people whose vital interest and livelihood depending on the defense industry. In the post Cold War era, the US no longer faced national security threat and challenge from the USSR, yet it found it's been hard to significantly downside he MIC. In order to justify its existence, it had to repeatedly launch wars of choice and set its goal against hypothetical adversaries thus creating weapon programs with artificial and arbitrary criteria. The corruption and ineffectiveness of many post Cold War weapon procurement programs are the results of this phenomenon.
 

taxiya

Brigadier
Registered Member
To add, the Ford won't reach her required sortie generation rate either, after the Navy promising that she would. Now they're saying the requirement was unrealistic to "historical levels" to begin with. So they'll just take what they can get during IOT&E and leave it at that. They don't even try anymore...?
As I have said in this post

In 2016 USN realized that they must have a redesign. In my opinion, it is probably impossible because solution may introduce newer problem than solved because of the unchanged architect.

In 2021 paper, USN basically realized what I said after years of attempt and forced to accept the reality.

Some times, people have to accept the failure and be brave to acknowledge it and restart everything instead of keep patching the leaking bucket. But I think in the US politics, nobody dare to do that.

I think EMALS needs a total overhaul (fundamental redesign) doing in similar way as China before it can be practically useful. This time, it is 003 being watched by USN closely for lessons and references.
 

davidau

Senior Member
Registered Member
As I have said in this post

In 2016 USN realized that they must have a redesign. In my opinion, it is probably impossible because solution may introduce newer problem than solved because of the unchanged architect.

In 2021 paper, USN basically realized what I said after years of attempt and forced to accept the reality.

Some times, people have to accept the failure and be brave to acknowledge it and restart everything instead of keep patching the leaking bucket. But I think in the US politics, nobody dare to do that.

I think EMALS needs a total overhaul (fundamental redesign) doing in similar way as China before it can be practically useful. This time, it is 003 being watched by USN closely for lessons and references.
China has done a lot of reasearch and practical work by the academia Ma and undoubtedly he has analysed failures of the US EMALS. I am convinced that the China EMALS will work as intented to. We will see when the first fighter jet leaves the CV 003, which will be in about two years. The yanks are watching China's first fighter jet take off, like a hawk!
 

Intrepid

Captain
First jets already took off - from the land test facility.

Problems only become apparent when EMALS has to prove itself in situations that could not be tried with individual launches from an immovable single land facility.

So that takes a little longer than the first tests from the ship.
 

by78

Lieutenant General
Some high-resolution images from the past week. Note that two of these are higher quality versions of previously shared images.

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