CV-17 Shandong (002 carrier) Thread I ...News, Views and operations

[FORBIN]

According to wikipedia, the average depth of SCS is more than 1200m. Its central basin is over 5500m deep. This is hardly a "shallow sea" for even the largest submarines.

I stand corrected. I forgot the central basin is abyssal. I thought much of the sea was continental shelf.

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The four 094 are not randomly based to Yalong Bay ...and have minimum three 093 and possible a 4th ... !

But for others threads 094...

 

[weig2000]

By reason of geography, PLAN's SSBNs has to move past the SCS area otherwise they would be very restrictive in the areas of operations and high risk of detection from sensors, sonobouys, SSKs and SSNs. regardless of depth or even thermoclines in the SCS.

The best 'safe passage' to break into the Pacific would be the Luzon/Kyushu gap but that area is littered with SeaWeb undersea array and a host of other sensors not unlike the ones put in the GIUK gap but likely more modern and advanced. That route also takes them far away from mainland air defence and other assets.

On 5 March 2009, the USNS Impeccable was in the SCS very very close to Hainan Islands. Obviously the reason given was monitoring sub activity however ships like that do and can lay undersea sensors and detection arrays. I'm not saying she did but she got buzzed several times and even threaten however I can understand PLAN's concerns.

If PLAN ships are laying undersea sensors and arrays 70 miles off Groton, Bremerton, Kings Bay etc I would presume the USN would be a tad paranoid as well.

SCS is better than Yellow Sea or ECS for China's SSBN patrol and operations. It's got a larger and deeper area of ocean. It's porous but not entirely open to the Pacific or Indian Ocean. It's also not ideal geographically.

The longer term solution, other than developing quieter and more powerful SSBNs as well as longer-range SLBM's which I'm sure the Chinese are working on, is to develop large and powerful carrier battle groups to escort SSBN to the Pacific, at least up to the second island chain. They would need at least six to eight large carriers for that purpose. Taiwan is also a longer term solution, whose eastern shore descends quickly to the depth suitable for nuclear submarines operations.

The above would take at least two decades to fully realize. For now, China would have to rely primarily on its land-based mobile ICBMs (DF31A/DF31B/DF41).

 

[Jeff Head]

Guys, take the SSBN and ICBM comments to their proper thread.

Thanks

 

[PanAsian]

I am not sure if china is going for an SSBN bastion strategy in the South China Sea. For one thing the entire sea is shallow and ill suited for large nuclear submarine operation; and is ringed by less than completely friendly foreign states that can be used to assist in surveillance of the putative bastion. For another, it's not clear if china is developing SLBMs large enough, or SSBNs large enough to house them, to cover the US from the SCS.

Also, to make the small Chinese nuclear deterrence more credible, china should strive to threaten the US from as many directions as possible so as to increase the cost of ballistic missile defense. Doubling down on More or less the same threat tube does not maximize the efficacy of China's nuclear deterrence.

By reason of geography, PLAN's SSBNs has to move past the SCS area otherwise they would be very restrictive in the areas of operations and high risk of detection from sensors, sonobouys, SSKs and SSNs. regardless of depth or even thermoclines in the SCS.

The best 'safe passage' to break into the Pacific would be the Luzon/Kyushu gap but that area is littered with SeaWeb undersea array and a host of other sensors not unlike the ones put in the GIUK gap but likely more modern and advanced. That route also takes them far away from mainland air defence and other assets.

On 5 March 2009, the USNS Impeccable was in the SCS very very close to Hainan Islands. Obviously the reason given was monitoring sub activity however ships like that do and can lay undersea sensors and detection arrays. I'm not saying she did but she got buzzed several times and even threaten however I can understand PLAN's concerns.

If PLAN ships are laying undersea sensors and arrays 70 miles off Groton, Bremerton, Kings Bay etc I would presume the USN would be a tad paranoid as well.

I believe the PLAN is more concerned with defense rather than offense regarding the seas within the first island chain including the SCS. They want to be able to prevent hostiles, especially subs, from operating freely or undetected in that area and threaten the heart of mainland China at essentially point blank range.

 

[kwaigonegin]

I believe the PLAN is more concerned with defense rather than offense regarding the seas within the first island chain including the SCS. They want to be able to prevent hostiles, especially subs, from operating freely or undetected in that area and threaten the heart of mainland China at essentially point blank range.

SSBN's by designed is NOT a defensive weapons platform. It's a deterrent and offensive weapons platform not unlike a carrier actually... but as Jeff alluded, we should move this to anoother thread since it has nothing to do with CV01A etc.

 

[PanAsian]

SSBN's by designed is NOT a defensive weapons platform. It's a deterrent and offensive weapons platform not unlike a carrier actually... but as Jeff alluded, we should move this to anoother thread since it has nothing to do with CV01A etc.

I am talking overall strategy, not specifically about SSBNs.

 

[sangye]

its been more than 3 weeks, no new pictures? please!

 

[Intrepid]

its been more than 3 weeks, no new pictures? please!

Chinese new year from 28 JAN 2017 lasting 15 days.

 

[subotai1]

Chinese new year from 28 JAN 2017 lasting 15 days.

With a week of traveling before and after that time. So, it will be a slow time until the last part of February.

 

[SanWenYu]

Chinese new year from 28 JAN 2017 lasting 15 days.

With a week of traveling before and after that time. So, it will be a slow time until the last part of February.

Probably has nothing to do with the Chinese New Year. The workers building this aircraft carrier are certainly not those seasonal migrant workers. I'd imagine that most, if not all, of them must be hired permanently and be local in Dalian for OpSec clearance. Sure even they can have relatives or friends living remotely to visit during the holidays. But they don't likely all get the luxury of 15 days off. It'd be foolish for the project managers to let that happen.

By the way, in 2017, most employees, public or private, get 7 statutory days off with pay on Chinese New Year, not 15, not 15 plus a week each before and after.