CV-16, CV-17 STOBAR carrier thread (001/Liaoning, 002/Shandong)

[plawolf]

If PLAN envisions operating larger task forces in conceivable conflict scenarios, then it needs to train using those larger task forces to practice effective coordination of all those assets against likely threat actors, particularly submarines. You can't just throw more ships, aircraft, and submarines out there in a time of war and expect them to coordinately effectively if they have no peacetime experience of doing so. And on the flip side, PLAN submarines need practice operating against larger task forces with sophisticated ASW screens that they may encounter in conceivable conflict scenarios. I can buy that PLAN is still "working up" to such expansive exercises, but I certainly believe that the peacetime training regimen needs to keep pace with how these vessels are intended to be used in prospective conflict scenarios, and to replicate that to the extent that it is practical to do so.

It’s actually the other way around, it’s far more impressive and challenging to be able to form a credible and effective carrier defensive screen with a smaller protective fleet than a larger one.

It’s like you are running a restaurant, it’s pretty easy to keep all the customers fully satisfied if you put a dedicated server at every table, and the job of the servers are also far less demanding the fewer tables they need to manage. But scale back the number of servers and it gets a lot harder as everyone now needs to be able to effectively multitask rather than being able to just focus on one job.

With the likes of the 055 having dedicated fleet command functions, running a large fleet shouldn’t be much of a challenge, since the carriers themselves will also have fleet command functions. Indeed, running a large fleet may well be less taxing and demanding since there should be fewer commands needed to be relayed to the rest of the fleet since all the ships will have set, dedicated roles in a large fleet and probably a few spare ships you can assign tasks at will; whereas with a smaller fleet, re-tasking one ship to perform a different role/task will require all the other ships to adjust roles accordingly to compensate.

 

[Blitzo]

If PLAN envisions operating larger task forces in conceivable conflict scenarios, then it needs to train using those larger task forces to practice effective coordination of all those assets against likely threat actors, particularly submarines. You can't just throw more ships, aircraft, and submarines out there in a time of war and expect them to coordinately effectively if they have no peacetime experience of doing so. And on the flip side, PLAN submarines need practice operating against larger task forces with sophisticated ASW screens that they may encounter in conceivable conflict scenarios. I can buy that PLAN is still "working up" to such expansive exercises, but I certainly believe that the peacetime training regimen needs to keep pace with how these vessels are intended to be used in prospective conflict scenarios, and to replicate that to the extent that it is practical to do so.

They won't be doing normal peacetime CSG exercises with 10 surface combatants as part of its escort fleet until it has a much larger navy, and until they've mastered operating more regular sized CSGs first.

10 surface combatants is basically an entire destroyer flotilla right now. Using that many ships for regular CSG exercises even in terms of availability of ships, is somewhat difficult to comprehend.

Maybe once they have like 60 destroyers with 60 frigates, such exercises would be considered more normalized.

 

[weig2000]

This is a solid article. USNI has better standards for China commentary pieces than most western publications. That said, this bit did make me laugh:



"The carrier operations are less impressive because the planes are too good."

It's a solid article in the sense that it does discuss many aspects of carrier operations and tracks some "cautious" progress by PLAN. And, when it comes to carrier operations, make no mistake, the US is only too proud of and impressed by itself. This was reflected in some of comments made by US commentaries 10 years ago when China's first carrier was commissioned that Liaoning is a "starter carrier" and noted in seemingly understated but eager tone that the US had over 100 years of experiences of operating carriers and had lost tens of thousands of personnels and aircraft during the time (and you can draw your conclusion about the status and trajectory of Chinese carrier operations from the statement, which shouldn't be too hard, I suppose). This article makes similar comments, like comparing the sortie rates of Liaoning with the record set by Ford class, etc.

One should usually read these types of articles by the Americans with the kind of psychology mentioned above in mind: proud, condescending, perhaps just a little bit insecure. They would be wrapped around with quite a bit of professional discussions, with embedded if not sprinkled bias, disinformation and threat thrown-in. Indeed, one can find all the elements in the article's concluding paragraph:

... But the PLAN will continue to push the envelope, needling the United States, pushing to the point of confrontation without crossing the line to war. This is a dangerous game. Inexperienced PLA personnel operating in unfamiliar areas could push too far; it is unknown how the U.S. Navy will respond if they do. ...

 

[Lethe]

One should usually read these types of articles by the Americans with the kind of psychology mentioned above in mind

These biases are part of the "ambient air" of English (particularly American) writings about China, and I'm sure we are all aware of and adept at identifying them. In regard to any specific article, the question is if these biases rise to an obnoxious level that distorts the subject beyond useful recognition and renders the article more a work of propaganda than analysis and discussion. I don't believe that is the case here.

The "thousands of accidents and lives lost over nearly 100 years of experience" argument has always been a red herring. The overwhelming majority of these accidents occurred in pre-4th generation (US nomenclature) aircraft, which had crash/failure rates that were simply absurd by modern standards. From a RAND

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of USAF accident rates: "during the 1950s, there were more than 23.6 aircraft lost on average (excluding combat losses) per 100,000 flying hours. That rate has fallen to 2.3 aircraft lost per 100,000 flying hours during the 1970s and fewer than one aircraft lost per 100,000 flying hours during the 2010–2018 period." Basically, we should expect PLAN to skip 90% of USN's historical "learning curve" in this respect for the simple reason that PLAN is operating more better, safer, more reliable aircraft than USN was when the great majority of those accidents and deaths occurred.

 

[Strangelove]

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China's Liaoning aircraft carrier group returns from far sea training in West Pacific, setting new records

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Published: Jan 03, 2023 09:14 PM

The picture shows the aircraft carrier Liaoning (Hull 16) and other vessels and fighter jets in the maritime parade conducted by the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy in the South China Sea on the morning of April 12, 2018.Photo:China Military

The Liaoning aircraft carrier group of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy has reportedly returned from its far sea training in the West Pacific, where it set new records in terms of aircraft sortie rate, vessels involved in the group and areas covered, as the drills displayed and enhanced the PLA's capabilities in safeguarding national sovereignty and territorial integrity, analysts said on Tuesday.

Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force spotted a PLA Navy flotilla consisting of the aircraft carrier Liaoning, the Type 055 large destroyers Anshan and Wuxi, the Type 052D destroyer Chengdu, the Type 054A frigate Zaozhuang and the Type 901 comprehensive replenishment ship Hulunhu sailing from the West Pacific through the Miyako Strait into the East China Sea on Sunday, Japan's Ministry of Defense Joint Staff said in a press release on Monday.

The Chinese warships entered the West Pacific through the Miyako Strait on December 16, and held exercises in waters east of the island of Taiwan and south of Japan, as well as waters west of Guam before they returned, according to the Japanese press release.

In tandem with the Liaoning aircraft carrier group's return, the PLA also sent a WZ-7 high-altitude reconnaissance drone through the Miyako Strait on Sunday and Monday, marking the first time Japan's Air Self-Defense Force has spotted this type of aircraft.

In the 15 days from December 17 to Saturday, the aircraft carrier Liaoning hosted about 320 fighter jets and helicopter takeoff and landing activities, the Japanese Defense Ministry said. This intensive sortie rate set a record, surpassing the Liaoning's drills in the West Pacific in May 2022 with over 300 aircraft sorties in some 20 days.

By including two Type 055 large destroyers for the first time, observers said the flotilla is by far the most powerful Liaoning aircraft carrier group.

It is also the first time the Chinese aircraft carrier was spotted operating near Guam, meaning that the record-breaking voyage not only broke the first island chain, but also reached the second island chain, analysts said.

The Liaoning is not meant to stay in homeport, and drills in the far sea have become regular and routine, Song Zhongping, a Chinese military expert and TV commentator, told the Global Times.

The Liaoning carrier group has formed complete combat and support capabilities with enhanced vessel-aircraft interoperability, and China now has the comprehensive capability to seize air supremacy and control of the sea far away from its homeland, Song said.

Such trainings will also garner valuable experiences and train talent for other Chinese aircraft carriers, including the country's third aircraft carrier, the Fujian, another Chinese military expert who requested anonymity told the Global Times.

The Fujian aims to conduct tests and sea trials in 2023, Senior Captain Qian Shumin, executive officer of the Fujian, said on China Central Television on Monday.

 

[FairAndUnbiased]

i doubt in actual combat that any chinese carrier can penetrate the first island chain. not that they are not capable but the ways out for them are simply too narrow. Japan and USA simply have to place a few submarines and anti-ship missiles on the islands along the way to close them off. the only way to actually get out for them to already be out past the island chain before the initiation of hostilities.

antiship missiles on those islands have no maneuvering room, and those islands also have little tree cover, so there's nowhere to run or hide. It might as well be a static installation.

 

[by78]

A nice magazine scan.

 

[Temstar]

By the way, when can we expect similar movements by Shandong's own CSG too?

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From latest from Yankee too. Turns out while Liaoning CSG was busy in the Pacific Shandong's strike group in conjunction with a group of H-6 ran a simulated attack run against the Nimitz CSG! This kicked the hornet's nest and resulted in a huge amount if activity from the yanks, That RC-135 intercept by J-11BSH was part of it.

Perhaps this whole thing was a twin CSG exercise to simulate coordinated strike against both Guam and the closest USN CSG at the same time?

 

[Temstar]

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[YES]

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From latest from Yankee too. Turns out while Liaoning CSG was busy in the Pacific Shandong's strike group in conjunction with a group of H-6 ran a simulated attack run against the Nimitz CSG! This kicked the hornet's nest and resulted in a huge amount if activity from the yanks, That RC-135 intercept by J-11BSH was part of it.

Perhaps this whole thing was a twin CSG exercise to simulate coordinated strike against both Guam and the closest USN CSG at the same time?

if Shangdong is in the South China Sea right now, how will it conduct simulated attacks on Nimitz while it's in the Pacific? do you mean Liaoning was doing simulated attacks on Nimitz?