CV-16, CV-17 STOBAR carrier thread (001/Liaoning, 002/Shandong)

[Blitzo]

This is a solid article. USNI has better standards for China commentary pieces than most western publications. That said, this bit did make me laugh:



"The carrier operations are less impressive because the planes are too good."

I wasn't sure how to interpret that part of the article.

My understanding is that blue water operations tends to be interpreted as the distance of operations from one's home ports in absolute terms.
Whereas that part makes it seem like if one has a longer ranged carrierborne fighter as part of your airwing, then it isn't a blue water operation?

To be fair, I can understand to an extent that 740nmi could be argued to not be "clear cut" blue water distances, but I don't think it has anything to do with the range of J-15.


Some of the numbers and designations of various missile systems are poor/out of date/incorrect.
And the article also uses the oft mentioned trope of "PLAN being largest navy in the world" based only on ship count which everyone should know by now is a terrible metric.


One thing I would've expected the article to focus a bit more on is the nature in which the PLAN's CSG exercises are probably more about doing open ocean CSG exercises rather than simply focusing on carrier aviation.
There is something to be said for doing naval aviation in the more open ocean of course, but at the same time if it's intensive flight operations that the PLAN wants to do for their pilots, deck crew and so on, then it would likely be that they'd focus on practicing that closer to their land bases first.
But what they can't practice closer to the mainland, is doing long distance maneuvering and CSG coordination and activities over larger expanses of water.

 

[Lethe]

One thing I would've expected the article to focus a bit more on is the nature in which the PLAN's CSG exercises are probably more about doing open ocean CSG exercises rather than simply focusing on carrier aviation.
There is something to be said for doing naval aviation in the more open ocean of course, but at the same time if it's intensive flight operations that the PLAN wants to do for their pilots, deck crew and so on, then it would likely be that they'd focus on practicing that closer to their land bases first.
But what they can't practice closer to the mainland, is doing long distance maneuvering and CSG coordination and activities over larger expanses of water.

I agree; if PLAN were trying to maximise sortie rate to establish a benchmark for what is possible, or as a "stress test" for deck handling operations, maintenance crews, flight coordination, etc. in order to identify where the chokepoints are and if there are deficiencies that can be addressed, it would make sense to conduct that kind of exercise relatively close to shore precisely because accidents and mistakes are more likely when people are asked to operate at their maximum capacity for any length of time. Comparing the sortie numbers observed by JMSDF with a "record" set by Gerald R. Ford is not particularly useful; rather typical numbers for other carriers would be a more useful basis for comparison.

Regarding carrier group operations, clearly PLAN is evolving their complexity over time, but I am still surprised at the low number of escorts present, particularly the low number of frigates. In a real-world conflict scenario I would be surprised if a carrier was operating with fewer than 10 escorts.

 

[Blitzo]

I agree; if PLAN were trying to maximise sortie rate to establish a benchmark for what is possible, or as a "stress test" for deck handling operations, maintenance crews, flight coordination, etc. in order to identify where the chokepoints are and if there are deficiencies that can be addressed, it would make sense to conduct that kind of exercise relatively close to shore precisely because accidents and mistakes are more likely when people are asked to operate at their maximum capacity for any length of time. Comparing the sortie numbers observed by JMSDF with a "record" set by Gerald R. Ford is not particularly useful; rather typical numbers for other carriers would be a more useful basis for comparison.

Regarding carrier group operations, clearly PLAN is evolving their complexity over time, but I am still surprised at the low number of escorts present, particularly the low number of frigates. In a real-world conflict scenario I would be surprised if a carrier was operating with fewer than 10 escorts.

A force of 10 escorts for a single carrier would be probably needed for an actual high intensity conflict, but during peacetime operating with such a large force would be a bit much for now at the stage of CSG complexity the PLAN are likely at.

That isn't to say their CSG they're sending out is low --- 4-5 surface combatants is very credible and about as capable as any navy can put together for a peacetime exercise.

Sending more than an entire destroyer flotilla's worth of surface combatants with carrier as escorts, for a peacetime exercise would be a bit of a waste.


If anything, the escorts they're sending with the carriers for these Westpac forays basically tracks with my own expectations from 3-4 years ago.

 

[Intrepid]

... but I am still surprised at the low number of escorts present, particularly the low number of frigates. In a real-world conflict scenario I would be surprised if a carrier was operating with fewer than 10 escorts ...

I am not surprised, the number of escorts is decreasing over the years, often only three or four ships are visible.

 

[Deino]

Update on that strange rumour ...

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1609848579421769728

 

[plawolf]

I would lol so hard if someone hoping way too hard mistook a mock accident during training exercises as the real thing, just like that one time someone mistook a FOD sweep as signs of ‘major damage’.

 

[Michaelsinodef]

I would lol so hard if someone hoping way too hard mistook a mock accident during training exercises as the real thing, just like that one time someone mistook a FOD sweep as signs of ‘major damage’.

Probably not that unlikely that a training exercise/simulation of a major accident on the flight deck then got seen/reported by the OSINT crowd as being an actual major accident on flight deck lol.

 

[ACuriousPLAFan]

Update on that strange rumour ...

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1609848579421769728

Honestly though, the JMSDF certainly would've tracked Liaoning's movements to death at this point, and even if there really is a "major flight deck accident", yet the JMSDF has nothing but silence from them?

And yet, they have to resort to SubBrief to somehow "leak" the "incident" out to the public?

Guessed I worried too early too much.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1609649969035894784

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1609628644208410624

Turns out he already made his sh1tty video on the 055 unavailable on Youtube, LMAO.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1609652605487091713

Well that didn't hold volume huh?

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1609623616437485570

People: What is your source?

SubBrief:

 

[Lethe]

A force of 10 escorts for a single carrier would be probably needed for an actual high intensity conflict, but during peacetime operating with such a large force would be a bit much for now at the stage of CSG complexity the PLAN are likely at.

That isn't to say their CSG they're sending out is low --- 4-5 surface combatants is very credible and about as capable as any navy can put together for a peacetime exercise.

Sending more than an entire destroyer flotilla's worth of surface combatants with carrier as escorts, for a peacetime exercise would be a bit of a waste.

If anything, the escorts they're sending with the carriers for these Westpac forays basically tracks with my own expectations from 3-4 years ago.

If PLAN envisions operating larger task forces in conceivable conflict scenarios, then it needs to train using those larger task forces to practice effective coordination of all those assets against likely threat actors, particularly submarines. You can't just throw more ships, aircraft, and submarines out there in a time of war and expect them to coordinately effectively if they have no peacetime experience of doing so. And on the flip side, PLAN submarines need practice operating against larger task forces with sophisticated ASW screens that they may encounter in conceivable conflict scenarios. I can buy that PLAN is still "working up" to such expansive exercises, but I certainly believe that the peacetime training regimen needs to keep pace with how these vessels are intended to be used in prospective conflict scenarios, and to replicate that to the extent that it is practical to do so.

 

[Intrepid]

If PLAN envisions operating larger task forces in conceivable conflict scenarios, then it needs to train using those larger task forces to practice effective coordination of all those assets against likely threat actors, particularly submarines ...

We'll see more exercises like this. But it's better to start small and then work your way up. There are still 20 years until the carrier force has reached its intended state of development. Enough time for many exercises that will follow.