China's SCS Strategy Thread

ansy1968

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Interesting, could this be exploited to foster division between Taiwan and Philippines, or for a deal to keep US boats and planes from using Philippines as a military staging ground in an armed reunification scenario? @ansy1968
@Coalescence bro the Philippine adhere to One China Policy, so there is nothing to foster, about the American presence and influence, it will decline gradually as we push vigorously for an Independent Foreign Policy, friends to all enemy to none. Right now we're thinking seriously the Russian offer of cheap oil and we think the Collective West wouldn't sanction us and IF they do we can revoke not only the VFA BUT EDCA as well. That my friend is what Duterte legacy is all about, it unshackle us from being a US vassalage.
 

Coalescence

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@Coalescence bro the Philippine adhere to One China Policy, so there is nothing to foster, about the American presence and influence, it will decline gradually as we push vigorously for an Independent Foreign Policy, friends to all enemy to none. Right now we're thinking seriously the Russian offer of cheap oil and we think the Collective West wouldn't sanction us and IF they do we can revoke not only the VFA BUT EDCA as well. That my friend is what Duterte legacy is all about, it unshackle us from being a US vassalage.
Hell yeah, can't wait to see US reaction to us buying Russian oil, but I do hope the deal goes through, a lot of the prices here are going up because of inflation, even prices for bottles of water have gone up like what the heck.
 

ansy1968

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Hell yeah, can't wait to see US reaction to us buying Russian oil, but I do hope the deal goes through, a lot of the prices here are going up because of inflation, even prices for bottles of water have gone up like what the heck.
@Coalescence bro why BBM as of now haven't appointed a Foreign affair secretary? He may appoint himself like what he did with the Agriculture dep't. Why? he want to hear it from himself what the American will say...lol. Look BBM had a bad experience dealing with the Americans during their Family exiled in Hawaii, now in position of power, he may exact his revenge with gusto...lol
 

tphuang

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Retaliation does not have to be immediate military action. If the U.S. pushed Taiwan into declaring independence, and China took some token commercial boycott and such as retaliation, I don't think the CPC would lose its power as long as the people understand that the government is waiting for a better time to invade. Don't forget that the CPC also have full control of the media they will be going into full spin mode to push their narrative. There are precedence on this. After Chen Shui Bien and the Chinese threatened Taiwan with war, Bill Clinton sent in the carriers and the Chinese backed down. Did CPC lose power over that? In Ukraine, the Ukrainians reneged on Minsk II. Putin bid his time for eight long years. In the meantime, the two republics were being shelled by the Ukrainians. The Russians were assuming that Putin was doing the best he could and were not in revolt over this. Putin did not lose this power over this.
You do realize that Taiwan did not declare independence back then, right? If Taiwan actually had declared independence back then, China would have tried to attack even if they couldn't succeed. If PLA, with its current strength, does not declare war on something they've sworn many years to do, they'd lose all credibility. All the countries in Africa (who often have their own civil war/conflict) would have a harder time supporting China in such a scenario if China let many years pass before attacking Taiwan.

I absolutely see the fear and obsession from the U.S. establishment about losing our hegemony over East Asia. However, there are a lot of issues that are more immediate, things like recession, inflation etc. At the end of the day, we have a democracy where officials are elected. To stay in power, which is primal to everything else, the officials, including the president, has to be elected and they must control the senate and the house of representatives. In this environment, it is very difficult to prepare for such a very high risk action. Obsessing over something is very different from taking action with such high risks(to the continuation of the presidency).
Given the track record of the CIA, if they tell the president that the Chinese only has 300 warheads, would a president be able to take this as fact and make such an important decision based on it? After all, the Chinese are fully capable of making many more over the years. Even if they only have 300 and we manage to take out a big part of China and we lose our biggest 50 cities, that would be a disaster for the president. He would not be able to recover from this. Would he go down this path knowing that in the best case scenario, he would lose his presidency? what is good for the hegemonic power of the country is not always good for the president who must take actions. To take out China as a power that threatens U.S. hegemony, we cannot just drop a tactical nuke on a factory. In the longer term, that would not stop the rise of China. We pretty much have go through with a full nuclear exchange.

Even if we were to take such an action, it would be a huge undertaking and highly unlikely the Chinese would not catch wind of it. We need to mobilize opinions to ensure the public went along with it. We need to push a very reluctant Taiwan into stepping over the line, and Taiwan is penetrated on many levels with Chinese spies.
Why do you think US military is alarmed by China building up its nuclear arsenal? If they didn't think they had a realistic chance to intercept most of the missiles heading over when there is an exchange, why would they get alarmed by the nuclear buildup + HGV/FOB test?

China has to be able to provide deterrence by itself. SSBN is a major part of that. I'm more confident about survivability of submarine in a nuclear exchange vs silos.

Don't get me wrong, I am not against China working with the Philippines to block the U.S. from using their ports. I am just not optimistic that this will succeed. If the U.S. is willing to risk nuclear war, we will find a way to station our ships in the Philippines. Maybe we tell them that this is all an exercise. When the battle begins, is the Philippines going to kick us out? The best they can do is to put up some protest.
So with Philippines, I think this is what they can try. Over the next couple of years, complete negotiation joint exploration with Philippines to calm down the loudest voices in their security establishment. Work toward supplying weapons to Filipino military/police and get VFA/EDCA revoked. Even if things don't got that well, I think it's still reasonable to assume that with the current Filipino administration, Philippines would not allow US to use any of its bases in the time of war. Aside from more friendly admin, they would also know that Chinese missiles can take out any bases with USAF aircraft.

I don't think Philippines will do it, but it would be a huge plus if they can land non-offensive aircraft like tankers, transports and MPAs in Philippines. That actually would be a game changer, because they would then be able to extend the range of MPAs and fighter jet all the way next to Guam. Anytime, USN carries out its exercise in SCS, PLAN would be able to carry out its own exercise next to Guam.

My understanding is that 094 can launch its birds from SCS and be able to reach the U.S. In that case, the safest place for them to be is right under the Chinese carriers.
and the carriers themselves are vulnerable to tactical nukes. So you don't want 094s to be next to the carriers. You just want them to be at a position that can be protected by your MPAs/ASW helicopters and other ASW assets. Remember, carriers protect MPAs and MPAs protect SSBN and carriers. You need to create a safe area where your 094s can patrol.

You want to be able to protect as large of an area as possible. You will station 1 094 around Bohai and 1 or 2 in SCS. During wartime, you will hopefully be able to station another 094 in Philippine Sea. If they can get 2 more 094s into service, then they can probably have 2 to 3 094s doing regular patrol and 4 094s doing so during emergencies. The more, the better. USN has 14 Ohio class SSBNs and Russia probably has similar number of Borei/Delta/Typhoon class in service.

Keep in mind that during early 2000s, Russia pretty much stopped investing in its entire navy except for Borei class. That's how important SSBNs are!

Of course, if they have a few 095s in service by the end of this decade and those 095s are comparable to early Virginia class in noise level, that would make all of this a lot easier.
 

ansy1968

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So with Philippines, I think this is what they can try. Over the next couple of years, complete negotiation joint exploration with Philippines to calm down the loudest voices in their security establishment. Work toward supplying weapons to Filipino military/police and get VFA/EDCA revoked. Even if things don't got that well, I think it's still reasonable to assume that with the current Filipino administration, Philippines would not allow US to use any of its bases in the time of war. Aside from more friendly admin, they would also know that Chinese missiles can take out any bases with USAF aircraft.

I don't think Philippines will do it, but it would be a huge plus if they can land non-offensive aircraft like tankers, transports and MPAs in Philippines. That actually would be a game changer, because they would then be able to extend the range of MPAs and fighter jet all the way next to Guam. Anytime, USN carries out its exercise in SCS, PLAN would be able to carry out its own exercise next to Guam.
@tphuang Sir let me allow you what my country will do, IF there is a conflict in the Taiwan strait, we declare ourselves neutral by proclaiming our adherence to One China Policy, then revoke both the VFA and EDCA saying it doesn't involve us and is not in imminent danger. Therefore the conflict will shift to East Asia with focal point on Okinawa, we're not stupid and its obvious that Japan want the war in our backyard.

Now the question should be ask is Japan serious? with the defense budget that they have I don't think so. We in the region want peace and the hedging is over, we want China participation and containment is not answer. Having said that will Japan allowed itself to be used as a staging point to attack China? Right now China FON is making Japan jumpy, as the years goes by they will be overwhelm. And they're afraid the American may leave, remember Japan is not love in the region, heck NK can destroy Japan using nuclear weapon and they're not afraid to use it. There is a shift in attitude among countries in Asia that China can provide stability in the region and a realization that Collective West hegemony is what causing the disturbance.
 

ACuriousPLAFan

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You want to be able to protect as large of an area as possible. You will station 1 094 around Bohai and 1 or 2 in SCS. During wartime, you will hopefully be able to station another 094 in Philippine Sea. If they can get 2 more 094s into service, then they can probably have 2 to 3 094s doing regular patrol and 4 094s doing so during emergencies. The more, the better. USN has 14 Ohio class SSBNs and Russia probably has similar number of Borei/Delta/Typhoon class in service.

Keep in mind that during early 2000s, Russia pretty much stopped investing in its entire navy except for Borei class. That's how important SSBNs are!

Of course, if they have a few 095s in service by the end of this decade and those 095s are comparable to early Virginia class in noise level, that would make all of this a lot easier.
Realistically speaking, how many SSBNs and SSNs could the PLAN muster in the Western Pacific as of current?

Due to the extreme secrecy of the PLAN regarding their submarine forces, any feasible number regarding China's nuclear-powered submarine fleet is very hard to come by, even by estimates.

Either way, according to @5unrise (i.e. Eurasian Naval Insight), China currently has around 9-12 SSNs and 7-8 SSBNs.

Although realistically speaking, only the 093 SSNs and her variations (093A and 093B/G SSNs) should be counted for operations deep into the Western Pacific. This is because the 091 SSNs is pretty old and very loud, which diminishes their stealthiness greatly and severely compromising their capabilities in fighting against opponents with strong ASW capabilities, i.e. JMSDF and USN.

I choose not to count the Type 032 SSB, because she would most likely be a minor factor in case of a hot war in the Western Pacific.

Furthermore, any reliable estimates on the number of nuclear-powered submarines that China can build per year?

Moreover, is there any plan to have another shipyard to expand China's nuclear-powered submarine fleet?

I believe the key to securing China's future dominance in the Western Pacific would also require a credible underwater presence with greater endurance capabilities to act against the navies of the US and her allies in the region. This demands a sizeable nuclear-powered submarine fleet for the PLAN, and having only Bohai to pump out nuclear-powered submarines seems kind of risky to me.

(As a reference, on average, the US can build 1 SSBN and 2-3 SSNs per year across 3 (now 2) seperate American shipyards)
 
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Michaelsinodef

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Moreover, is there any plan to have another shipyard to expand China's nuclear-powered submarine fleet?
Bohai expansion, can't exactly remember which thread, but it was probably one of the sub threads and somewhat recent discussion as well.
I believe the key to securing China's future dominance in the Western Pacific would also require a credible underwater presence with greater endurance capabilities to act against the navies of the US and her allies in the region. This demands a sizeable nuclear-powered submarine fleet for the PLAN, and having only Bohai to pump out nuclear-powered submarines seems kind of risky to me.

(As a reference, on average, the US can build 1 SSBN and 2-3 SSNs per year across 3 (now 2) seperate American shipyards)
The Bohai expansion would allow for quite a lot more than that.
 

reservior dogs

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You do realize that Taiwan did not declare independence back then, right? If Taiwan actually had declared independence back then, China would have tried to attack even if they couldn't succeed. If PLA, with its current strength, does not declare war on something they've sworn many years to do, they'd lose all credibility. All the countries in Africa (who often have their own civil war/conflict) would have a harder time supporting China in such a scenario if China let many years pass before attacking Taiwan.
My point was, the government back then backed down under the threat from Bill Clinton and there was no revolt. Certainly there will be a damage to the Chinese credibility if they delay the invasion a few years. However, if the U.S. is looking for a confrontation that could go nuclear and the Chinese are not ready, it is still the best course of action. This is especially true if you are going to be ready to roll in just a few short years.
Why do you think US military is alarmed by China building up its nuclear arsenal? If they didn't think they had a realistic chance to intercept most of the missiles heading over when there is an exchange, why would they get alarmed by the nuclear buildup + HGV/FOB test?

China has to be able to provide deterrence by itself. SSBN is a major part of that. I'm more confident about survivability of submarine in a nuclear exchange vs silos.
The U.S. is alarmed that we are losing our nuclear leverage over China. Having a sizeable stockpile plus HGV means there is no way to stop a retaliatory strike from China. There is a lot of uncertainties over nuclear weapons. This is not only true of your adversaries, but of your own capabilities. All these weapons sitting there, decade after decade, how do you know if enough of them will work as designed and not malfunction? The era of MAD with the Soviets is over and we have had many decades where these weapons are no longer top priority. Just think of the uncertainty on a conventional war with weapons that should be straight forward. How many wars turned out just like they planned? Here we have a whole chain of command that has not been stress tested for decades since it is no longer a priority. This puts a huge incentive for the decision makers to not use them unless they have to. Having a less vulnerable SSBN is certain an additional layer of defense for the Chinese, but even the silo based ones are quite a threat. First, incoming missiles are detected far away, which give the Chinese the option top launch them if they believe their silos are going to be taken out. Second, the Chinese has one of the best layered defensive systems facing their oceans, now they have mid course intercept which apparently is successfully tested. Finally, new technology means the silo based warheads are not so easily detonated by an incoming nuclear blast. Another unknown factor, the Chinese are certainly capable of building silos that are undetectable from satellites. There won't even be a construction site on the surface to look at. As I said before, I don't think the 300 warheads number is credible. This all make it very difficult for the U.S. decision makers to go in the direction of a nuclear exchange.
 
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tphuang

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Realistically speaking, how many SSBNs and SSNs could the PLAN muster in the Western Pacific as of current?

Due to the extreme secrecy of the PLAN regarding their submarine forces, any feasible number regarding China's nuclear-powered submarine fleet is very hard to come by, even by estimates.

Either way, according to @5unrise (i.e. Eurasian Naval Insight), China currently has around 9-12 SSNs and 7-8 SSBNs.

Although realistically speaking, only the 093 SSNs and her variations (093A and 093B/G SSNs) should be counted for operations deep into the Western Pacific. This is because the 091 SSNs is pretty old and very loud, which diminishes their stealthiness greatly and severely compromising their capabilities in fighting against opponents with strong ASW capabilities, i.e. JMSDF and USN.

I choose not to count the Type 032 SSB, because she would most likely be a minor factor in case of a hot war in the Western Pacific.

Furthermore, any reliable estimates on the number of nuclear-powered submarines that China can build per year?

Moreover, is there any plan to have another shipyard to expand China's nuclear-powered submarine fleet?

I believe the key to securing China's future dominance in the Western Pacific would also require a credible underwater presence with greater endurance capabilities to act against the navies of the US and her allies in the region. This demands a sizeable nuclear-powered submarine fleet for the PLAN, and having only Bohai to pump out nuclear-powered submarines seems kind of risky to me.

(As a reference, on average, the US can build 1 SSBN and 2-3 SSNs per year across 3 (now 2) seperate American shipyards)
I think they have 6 commissioned 094s at least and will probably have 8 pretty soon. Maybe they get to 10 by the second half of this decade and then I think it's better for them to wait for 096s. Even 8 would probably allow them to have 4/5 in patrol during high tension/war time? And 10 would allow them to regular patrol 3 or 4 and up to 5/6 in emergencies. If you fully load them with JL-3s, that's plenty of deterrence.

They can build 093s a lot faster, but they are going to wait until 095s for mass production. 093s are too small to be quiet. If you listen to Shilao's podcast and Xi Yazhou's comments, you will know how important 095 is.

Right now, the best scenario for China is for America to focus its attention in Europe and building up its forces there. This is working out great for China.
Sending more weapons to Europe and reduced F-35 buys domestically -> less of this in Asia.

Pacific has at least temporarily dropped in priorities for America.

You will note in this piece that USAF in Pacific theater is hoping for more F-35/22s and for more missile defence in Guam. It's not really getting that right now.
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And USN is ordering fewer F-35s, which means USN/USMC can deploy that many F-35B/Cs in Asia
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The NATO's East European expansion is permanent and likely to expand even further. If you are China, you want this Russian/Ukraine conflict to go on as long as possible.

The U.S. is alarmed that we are losing our nuclear leverage over China. Having a sizeable stockpile plus HGV means there is no way to stop a retaliatory strike from China. There is a lot of uncertainties over nuclear weapons. This is not only true of your adversaries, but of your own capabilities. All these weapons sitting there, decade after decade, how do you know if enough of them will work as designed and not malfunction? The era of MAD with the Soviets is over and we have had many decades where these weapons are no longer top priority. Just think of the uncertainty on a conventional war with weapons that should be straight forward. How many wars turned out just like they planned? Here we have a whole chain of command that has not been stress tested for decades since it is no longer a priority. This puts a huge incentive for the decision makers to not use them unless they have to. Having a less vulnerable SSBN is certain an additional layer of defense for the Chinese, but even the silo based ones are quite a threat. First, incoming missiles are detected far away, which give the Chinese the option top launch them if they believe their silos are going to be taken out. Second, the Chinese has one of the best layered defensive systems facing their oceans, now they have mid course intercept which apparently is successfully tested. Finally, new technology means the silo based warheads are not so easily detonated by an incoming nuclear blast. Another unknown factor, the Chinese are certainly capable of building silos that are undetectable from satellites. There won't even be a construction site on the surface to look at. As I said before, I don't think the 300 warheads number is credible. This all make it very difficult for the U.S. decision makers to go in the direction of a nuclear exchange.
Let's make a few things clear. China cannot stop a full US nuclear attack. It's not going to be able to intercept hundreds of ICBMs. It will probably be able to intercept some, but any nuclear exchange would favor US. As such, America is far more likely to use nuclear weapons in the event that it is losing conventional war. I'm not saying America will, but rather China has to build up its arsenal to deter crazy people inside US government.
 

Rettam Stacf

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Reading the last 20 pages or so discussion, I am pretty sure the majority of forum members agree that having a neutral Philippines is of significant importance to an armed reunification with Taiwan. However, there were considerable concern, myself included, of ceding Scarborough Shoal to Philippines in return for Philippines ending VFA with the US.

An idea just popped into mind mind. What if China agrees to cede sovereignty of Scarborough Shoal to Philippines upon successful reunification (peaceful or otherwise) with Taiwan in return for Philippines' immediate termination of VFA. Meanwhile, China can throw in immediate join exploration for oil and sharing of profit thereof, and joint fishing rights etc.

Philippines will lose some of her strategic military significance to China once Taiwan is returned to the mainland. Also, by then, China will gain the use of Taiping Island (currently under Taiwan administration), thus offsetting the loss of Scarborough Shoal as a military base for China in SCS.

What is your opinion ?
 
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