China's SCS Strategy Thread

[AndrewS]

In China, they are talking about "战略定力“, variously translated into strategic focus, strategic determination, or strategic patience, in a challenging and uncertain strategic environment. It means that China will not be distracted by some noises, and deviate from its long-term strategic plan and direction. At this point, it's believed that the strategic competition with the US is still multidimensional and long-term. It's not some imminent big war. Until it is very clear that it has to kick up the gear.

That doesn't mean China will not take precautionary measures, like the build-up of strategic arsenal, which is a very big deal for China. It's more likely they're doing it more gradually. Plus, Chinese in general are not a loud-mouth, chest-thumping bunch, so we don't know a lot of things until after the fact. But the military gaps between the US and China are fast closing, that much we know.

A lot of media noises these days about war with China on Taiwan etc, are primarily coming from the US side. What they reflect is some deep anxiety, and loss of confidence. These people need to hear the echoes of their voices in order to feel soothed and reassured. American elites are profoundly perturbed and unhinged these days.

Agreed.

So this is how I see Chinese grand strategy these days.

---

It's not like China will go on the rampage and start invading the entire world like an evil Darth Vader as some suggest, or start fomenting revolutions. This is counterproductive to China's economic interests.

The Chinese military voluntarily withdrew from Northeast India (1962) when the road to Delhi was open and from North Korea (1955) when it would have been straightforward to annex the land because the North Korean government and military were shattered. More recently, China continued to occupy Vietnamese territory after the 1979 war, but only withdrew after a decade when a China-Vietnamese settlement was finally reached.

And the Communist Party founding myth for the past 70 years is that it created a strong unified China against nasty colonial powers like the British Empire or Japanese Empire who tried to carve up the country. It's a big stretch to go from this founding myth to celebrating conquest like those nasty colonial empires of the past. These days, the driving goal in China is domestic economic development.

Taiwan fits into this because it is the result of an unresolved Chinese Civil War from 1949. Taiwan is also seen as the spoils of war from the 1898 Sino-Japanese war when Imperial Japan fought the Qing Dynasty. Consider the question of whether the Confederate States of America should have been allowed to exist? Or should Cuba be allowed to host foreign military forces or weapons?

And on the military side of things, Taiwan is the lynchpin of any effort to keep the Chinese military contained in the 1st Island Chain. An independent Taiwan would inevitably host foreign military forces and cement this situation. So any attempt at Taiwanese independence or Taiwan hosting foreign military units will likely trigger China to pre-emptively attack.

But China can live with the Taiwan status quo, like it has for the past 70 years.
There's still at least another 15 years of domestic development and relatively fast growth in China.
In this time, the economic, technological and military balances will shift sharply towards China over this time.
At the same time, China will be a very different place as the generation shaped by the cultural revolution dies out. They will be replaced by a softer generation who grew up after the 1980s.

We can expect to see these trends continue in the following 15 years, with China growing stronger and a softer generation coming of age. But Taiwan will still remain an issue, as it was for the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the Qing Imperial Dynasty before it.

So at some point in the future, I expect a political deal to be reached between Taiwan and China.

This is how I see a Chinese Grand Strategy playing out over the next 20 years.

 

[ansy1968]

Agreed.

So this is how I see Chinese grand strategy these days.

---

It's not like China will go on the rampage and start invading the entire world like an evil Darth Vader as some suggest, or start fomenting revolutions. This is counterproductive to China's economic interests.

The Chinese military voluntarily withdrew from Northeast India (1962) when the road to Delhi was open and from North Korea (1955) when it would have been straightforward to annex the land because the North Korean government and military were shattered. More recently, China continued to occupy Vietnamese territory after the 1979 war, but only withdrew after a decade when a China-Vietnamese settlement was finally reached.

And the Communist Party founding myth for the past 70 years is that it created a strong unified China against nasty colonial powers like the British Empire or Japanese Empire who tried to carve up the country. It's a big stretch to go from this founding myth to celebrating conquest like those nasty colonial empires of the past. These days, the driving goal in China is domestic economic development.

Taiwan fits into this because it is the result of an unresolved Chinese Civil War from 1949. Taiwan is also seen as the spoils of war from the 1898 Sino-Japanese war when Imperial Japan fought the Qing Dynasty. Consider the question of whether the Confederate States of America should have been allowed to exist? Or should Cuba be allowed to host foreign military forces or weapons?

And on the military side of things, Taiwan is the lynchpin of any effort to keep the Chinese military contained in the 1st Island Chain. An independent Taiwan would inevitably host foreign military forces and cement this situation. So any attempt at Taiwanese independence or Taiwan hosting foreign military units will likely trigger China to pre-emptively attack.

But China can live with the Taiwan status quo, like it has for the past 70 years.
There's still at least another 15 years of domestic development and relatively fast growth in China.
In this time, the economic, technological and military balances will shift sharply towards China over this time.
At the same time, China will be a very different place as the generation shaped by the cultural revolution dies out. They will be replaced by a softer generation who grew up after the 1980s.

We can expect to see these trends continue in the following 15 years, with China growing stronger and a softer generation coming of age. But Taiwan will still remain an issue, as it was for the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the Qing Imperial Dynasty before it.

So at some point in the future, I expect a political deal to be reached between Taiwan and China.

This is how I see a Chinese Grand Strategy playing out over the next 20 years.

@AndrewS bro I believed as China rise to prominence the Taiwan question will be resolved, just like what happening in geopolitics, from proud, to anger , anxious to humble. Right now with the ongoing Olympics there is among the Taiwanese a sense of proudness to be a Chinese. As China under Xi is focusing more on Human development rather than outright GDP growth. The Common Prosperity or China Dream is what we all aspire for even IF you're not Chinese. As the Quality of Life improves , China will become attractive and the current policy of openness instead of inclusivity is the right policy. It's a family quarrel, at the end of the day the Child will come home to seek forgiveness and pay its respect.

From Confucius “To put the world in order, we must first put the nation in order; to put the nation in order, we must first put the family in order; to put the family in order; we must first cultivate our personal life; we must first set our hearts right.”

 

[ZeEa5KPul]

Doing carriers in two separate shipyards, back to back, with both shipyard utilizing an even bigger workforce and churning out a carrier every 3-4 years rather than every 5 - that'd take a big bite not only out of the workforce but out of berth capacity as well. Who'd be building commercial shipping then?

This is just as assertion made without any evidence.

The US, during actual cold war arms race built 9 conventional CATOBARs in 12 years but then slowed down to 5 nuke CATOBARs in 15 years.

China is not the US.

@Bltizo, perhaps it's a bit OT here but how do you see the conventional/nuclear mix in your late 2030s 10 CATOBAR fleet?

 

[AndrewS]

Chinese defense spending now is really peacetime spending. In fact, it's even lower than what you normally expect of a great power during peacetime. China spends less than the minimum threshold of 2% of GDP that NATO asks for its member states. China spends the lowest as percentage of GDP among major powers and big countries except Japan.

So China is really not geared towards big time war, and they want to sustain the period of peace development as long as possible. All these accusations about Chinese expansionism or Chinese agressions are smearing campaigns and propaganda from you-know-where.

But that doesn't mean China can not afford or will not increase their defense spending to deter or defeat aggression against her or military intervention in her internal affairs. All these bragging for numerical advantage of 1,000 stealth aircraft over China in a Taiwan contingency, deploying 70% or more of US Navy and Air Force to Asia-Pacific to "deter" China, or the constant salami-slicing on Taiwan, sooner or later, will prompt China to significantly increase her defense spending. By then, we will no longer talk about 3-4 production lines for J-20, or one CATOBAR every five years. For now, it does not appear that China has kicked it into high gear.

At the moment, if China was to undertake a huge increase in military spending, the US would still think that it can compete because the US has a larger economy.

But if the US acknowledges that China has a significantly larger economy, then the US will know it is at a disadvantage in an arms race and more careful in its dealing with China.

I reckon it will be another 5 years before China's GDP grows larger than the US in exchange rate terms. That will come as a huge shock to the USA. The rest of the world expected this to happen at some point anyway, and this event would strengthen the hand of those who want to remain neutral or accommodate China. But expect more gnashing and hand-wringing from the US when that day comes. Then a longer period of time where the US tries to process and understand the situation.

 

[Maikeru]

At the moment, if China was to undertake a huge increase in military spending, the US would still think that it can compete because the US has a larger economy.

But if the US acknowledges that China has a significantly larger economy, then the US will know it is at a disadvantage in an arms race and more careful in its dealing with China.

I reckon it will be another 5 years before China's GDP grows larger than the US in exchange rate terms. That will come as a huge shock to the USA. The rest of the world expected this to happen at some point anyway, and this event would strengthen the hand of those who want to remain neutral or accommodate China. But expect more gnashing and hand-wringing from the US when that day comes. Then a longer period of time where the US tries to process and understand the situation.

No it doesn't. China's economy is larger in PPP terms and the CIA at least acknowledges that PPP is the proper measure to use in its World Factbook page on China. CNY exchange rate is determined by fiat, not market forces, whilst USD is overvalued due to reserve currency and trading currency status.

 

[AndrewS]

No it doesn't. China's economy is larger in PPP terms and the CIA at least acknowledges that PPP is the proper measure to use in its World Factbook page on China. CNY exchange rate is determined by fiat, not market forces, whilst USD is overvalued due to reserve currency and trading currency status.

Whilst the CIA and others now acknowledge that PPP is a better measure of GDP, that doesn't apply to much of the US government.

Trump (and others) certainly won't acknowledge this, and remember that Trump is most likely to become President again in 2 years time.

 

[uinahime.chifune]

Agreed.

So this is how I see Chinese grand strategy these days.

---

It's not like China will go on the rampage and start invading the entire world like an evil Darth Vader as some suggest, or start fomenting revolutions. This is counterproductive to China's economic interests.

The Chinese military voluntarily withdrew from Northeast India (1962) when the road to Delhi was open and from North Korea (1955) when it would have been straightforward to annex the land because the North Korean government and military were shattered. More recently, China continued to occupy Vietnamese territory after the 1979 war, but only withdrew after a decade when a China-Vietnamese settlement was finally reached.

And the Communist Party founding myth for the past 70 years is that it created a strong unified China against nasty colonial powers like the British Empire or Japanese Empire who tried to carve up the country. It's a big stretch to go from this founding myth to celebrating conquest like those nasty colonial empires of the past. These days, the driving goal in China is domestic economic development.

Taiwan fits into this because it is the result of an unresolved Chinese Civil War from 1949. Taiwan is also seen as the spoils of war from the 1898 Sino-Japanese war when Imperial Japan fought the Qing Dynasty. Consider the question of whether the Confederate States of America should have been allowed to exist? Or should Cuba be allowed to host foreign military forces or weapons?

And on the military side of things, Taiwan is the lynchpin of any effort to keep the Chinese military contained in the 1st Island Chain. An independent Taiwan would inevitably host foreign military forces and cement this situation. So any attempt at Taiwanese independence or Taiwan hosting foreign military units will likely trigger China to pre-emptively attack.

But China can live with the Taiwan status quo, like it has for the past 70 years.
There's still at least another 15 years of domestic development and relatively fast growth in China.
In this time, the economic, technological and military balances will shift sharply towards China over this time.
At the same time, China will be a very different place as the generation shaped by the cultural revolution dies out. They will be replaced by a softer generation who grew up after the 1980s.

We can expect to see these trends continue in the following 15 years, with China growing stronger and a softer generation coming of age. But Taiwan will still remain an issue, as it was for the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the Qing Imperial Dynasty before it.

So at some point in the future, I expect a political deal to be reached between Taiwan and China.

This is how I see a Chinese Grand Strategy playing out over the next 20 years.

Your concept is very optimistic, but I feel that a peaceful solution is practically impossible.
The Taiwan issue is not only an issue of the first island chain, but also the core position of China's overall strategy. The Chinese know this as well as the Americans, so the Americans will never allow this issue to be resolved peacefully.
In geographical view, China has three potential threat directions. In the 1970s to 80s, the biggest threat came from the north, but after the collapse of the USSR, the pressure declined sharply. Today, the biggest threat comes from the southeast, the US, Japan and SK against China. Half of China's military power is in this direction, and at the same time the third threat from India has commenced to appear. The reason why China ignores South Tibet temporarily, and doesn't want to open up a new confrontation in the southwest as much as possible, is to avoid two-front warfare. Control Taiwan Island can control the lines from Japan and SK to the Oil, thereby forcing them to be more neutral in the strategic, and also solving the problem of SSBN entering the Pacific Ocean. The most important thing is that this also alleviates the need to deploy so many troops in the southeast, so they can be transferred to the southwest to fight against India.

India is currently comparatively backward in equipment, but it has a larger population and more favorable logistical supply conditions. You can see the distribution of the Chinese Army Group on the internet. China only has 2 Army Groups to maintain the Western Front. Railways and roads were constructed but still not as convenient as India. At the same time, due to various reasons, China's fertility rate is decreasing, and it is also facing an aging population problem. Caste disregards many people's lives, which is very suitable for consumption of strategy in a sense. These are all unfavorable factors. Only by ending the confrontation on the Eastern Front, repeating the war of 1962, and devastating the aspirations of Indians, can it exchange for decades of peace on the Western Front.

And Taiwan is the trigger to end multi-front warfare so that China can always confront one foe. Before the decline of the US, it was still impossible for Europe to tolerate Russia, which makes the defense pressure in the north comparatively small. But wait to solve problems until the decline of the US will confront the problem of mutual suspicion with Russia.

(This is why I think China will not readily disclose the H-20, the H-6X series and ballistic missiles are sufficient to attack the nearby US military base, and the premature disclosure of the H-20 will create strategic pressure on Russia. From Tsarist Russia to the USSR to Russia, the Chinese and the Slavs have intricate history and relationship, which is still affecting the relationship between the two nations. It is incorrect to simply assume this relationship is stable or crumbling. Tsarist Russia massacre the Chinese, and the USSR separated Mongolia, and also supported the China-Japan War, and after this war, Russians looted the Northeast. But after the Korean War, the USSR saw China's performance and provided a rare industrialization transfer for free. After the 20th National Congress of the USSR, it drifted further and further away, and even confronted each other at the border, so that China even indeed cooperated with the US. On the eve of the disintegration, it sold the Su-27 production line and technology to Chinese, and sold a lot of assets after the disintegration. So far, China is still using the modified Su-27. The Russian period was likewise good and bad, now under US pressure so to speak unity. But still not full trust, after all Russians think they are European, while Europeans think they are Asian.)

I personally do not underestimate the power of the US, but this does not mean that the entire time before the decline of the US can be used to solve the Taiwan issue and India issue. The timetable that should be referred to is population aging and industrial capacity. Nowadays, China similarly has the problem of "industrial is not as wealthy as finance" like the US in the 1990s. Maybe it is not compatible with increasing GDP, so these problems should be solved more rapidly before industrial capacity decreases. Therefore, for the next 10 years, if something happens or Americans make something happen, they will inevitably do their best to spend money to get the people above them to die.

My native language is not English and I have not used English for a long time, almost forgot the grammar.

 

[AndrewS]

Your concept is very optimistic, but I feel that a peaceful solution is practically impossible.
The Taiwan issue is not only an issue of the first island chain, but also the core position of China's overall strategy. The Chinese know this as well as the Americans, so the Americans will never allow this issue to be resolved peacefully.

I think we have a different view of how powerful China will be in the future.

If/when China becomes twice or 3x as big as the USA, I don't see how the US military can effectively intervene in the Western Pacific.

In the distant future, it would be the Chinese military looking at an invasion of Guam, if the US decides to go to war against China.

 

[yungho]

Your concept is very optimistic, but I feel that a peaceful solution is practically impossible.
The Taiwan issue is not only an issue of the first island chain, but also the core position of China's overall strategy. The Chinese know this as well as the Americans, so the Americans will never allow this issue to be resolved peacefully.
In geographical view, China has three potential threat directions. In the 1970s to 80s, the biggest threat came from the north, but after the collapse of the USSR, the pressure declined sharply. Today, the biggest threat comes from the southeast, the US, Japan and SK against China. Half of China's military power is in this direction, and at the same time the third threat from India has commenced to appear. The reason why China ignores South Tibet temporarily, and doesn't want to open up a new confrontation in the southwest as much as possible, is to avoid two-front warfare. Control Taiwan Island can control the lines from Japan and SK to the Oil, thereby forcing them to be more neutral in the strategic, and also solving the problem of SSBN entering the Pacific Ocean. The most important thing is that this also alleviates the need to deploy so many troops in the southeast, so they can be transferred to the southwest to fight against India.

India is currently comparatively backward in equipment, but it has a larger population and more favorable logistical supply conditions. You can see the distribution of the Chinese Army Group on the internet. China only has 2 Army Groups to maintain the Western Front. Railways and roads were constructed but still not as convenient as India. At the same time, due to various reasons, China's fertility rate is decreasing, and it is also facing an aging population problem. Caste disregards many people's lives, which is very suitable for consumption of strategy in a sense. These are all unfavorable factors. Only by ending the confrontation on the Eastern Front, repeating the war of 1962, and devastating the aspirations of Indians, can it exchange for decades of peace on the Western Front.

And Taiwan is the trigger to end multi-front warfare so that China can always confront one foe. Before the decline of the US, it was still impossible for Europe to tolerate Russia, which makes the defense pressure in the north comparatively small. But wait to solve problems until the decline of the US will confront the problem of mutual suspicion with Russia.

(This is why I think China will not readily disclose the H-20, the H-6X series and ballistic missiles are sufficient to attack the nearby US military base, and the premature disclosure of the H-20 will create strategic pressure on Russia. From Tsarist Russia to the USSR to Russia, the Chinese and the Slavs have intricate history and relationship, which is still affecting the relationship between the two nations. It is incorrect to simply assume this relationship is stable or crumbling. Tsarist Russia massacre the Chinese, and the USSR separated Mongolia, and also supported the China-Japan War, and after this war, Russians looted the Northeast. But after the Korean War, the USSR saw China's performance and provided a rare industrialization transfer for free. After the 20th National Congress of the USSR, it drifted further and further away, and even confronted each other at the border, so that China even indeed cooperated with the US. On the eve of the disintegration, it sold the Su-27 production line and technology to Chinese, and sold a lot of assets after the disintegration. So far, China is still using the modified Su-27. The Russian period was likewise good and bad, now under US pressure so to speak unity. But still not full trust, after all Russians think they are European, while Europeans think they are Asian.)

I personally do not underestimate the power of the US, but this does not mean that the entire time before the decline of the US can be used to solve the Taiwan issue and India issue. The timetable that should be referred to is population aging and industrial capacity. Nowadays, China similarly has the problem of "industrial is not as wealthy as finance" like the US in the 1990s. Maybe it is not compatible with increasing GDP, so these problems should be solved more rapidly before industrial capacity decreases. Therefore, for the next 10 years, if something happens or Americans make something happen, they will inevitably do their best to spend money to get the people above them to die.

My native language is not English and I have not used English for a long time, almost forgot the grammar.

I agree that the next era of threat against Chinese national security will shift West. India, however, will need a rational to trigger an aggression against China. The Chinese population likely does not view the western border disputes as critical and frankly likely care more about the Amur Basin in the northeast. The Himalayas are a natural border and as much as India would like an independent Tibet, China has easier access to Tibet than India does.

I don't underestimate the US, India, Japan, or Korea and I don't think the CCP wants aggression against any of them. They aim for military parity against to US in the long-term and hope to keep relations leveled in the short-term. It is the US that feels the pressure to act now and 'contain' China. I don't think the H-20 is as big a deal for the Russians as they have their own program.

Once military parity against the US is achieved, everything will fall into place. The critical question is if that military parity is achievable and sustainable.

 

[ansy1968]

I agree that the next era of threat against Chinese national security will shift West. India, however, will need a rational to trigger an aggression against China. The Chinese population likely does not view the western border disputes as critical and frankly likely care more about the Amur Basin in the northeast. The Himalayas are a natural border and as much as India would like an independent Tibet, China has easier access to Tibet than India does.

I don't underestimate the US, India, Japan, or Korea and I don't think the CCP wants aggression against any of them. They aim for military parity against to US in the long-term and hope to keep relations leveled in the short-term. It is the US that feels the pressure to act now and 'contain' China. I don't think the H-20 is as big a deal for the Russians as they have their own program.

Once military parity against the US is achieved, everything will fall into place. The critical question is if that military parity is achievable and sustainable.

@yungho bro when you're weak, you're nothing, IF you're slightly strong, you're a threat, IF you reach parity ,you're a friend , IF you sustain your supremacy , you're his BEST FRIEND even become your servant like what UK is doing....lol.

IF you're asking about the future especially about sustainability, you can look at Ming Dynasty, as China is a keen student of History. They will improved upon it by building a great fleet as a supplement to BRI and its maritime trade routes. Unlike the US which is a global power and wished to maintain it, the Chinese want to secure and maintain its Core interest until the seed they planted ripen. Its the Economy Stupid! Countries follow where the money is, as you get richer you need arms to protect it. The lesson learned from Ming Dynasty, stay engage and open up more and it's looking good with RCEP. As the US now realized it's hard to be a superpower in the era of Multipolar world and a great quote from Frederick the Great "He who Defends everything, defends Nothing".