Wow the south china sea doesn't look so deep?
China's SCS Strategy Thread
- Thread starter lilzz
- Start date
based on that picture aren't the other three in the second island chain?
its on the other side of the Phillipines so what is the complaint from Carl Zha here exactly?
I kind of pushed the post button too soon, i meant the south china sea doesn't look like such a deep place for submarines to hide in.
Even if those 3 are beyond the Philippines the ships are all outsiders from half a world away except maybe the HMAS Canberra.
China's lack of overseas bases near its enemies prevents it from doing any sustainable FON operations that are threatening enough for the other side to come to the negotiation table. Because, let's face it, if China does FON as well, it should be for the very reason to push the other side to stop with their threats at your doorstep that they are covering with international law and legitimacy.
For this reason, China should maybe take a page out of 1984 and actually go and build those floating fortresses, aka. Semi-Mobile platforms that can work as bases to supply persistent FON Ops. The goal is to have a persistent presence near US waters so that the US can no longer be as nonchalant about Chinese fleet presence anymore.
For this reason, China should maybe take a page out of 1984 and actually go and build those floating fortresses, aka. Semi-Mobile platforms that can work as bases to supply persistent FON Ops. The goal is to have a persistent presence near US waters so that the US can no longer be as nonchalant about Chinese fleet presence anymore.
Maybe when the northern passage in Russia opens up enough they can fuel and stock up in a Russians harbor for some UK based fonops.
Or help Iran, Cuba and Venezuela develop more of their capability so they also function as supply harbors.
This statement was made more towards the US position that they would not recognise the "islands" as being PRC territory proper, and as such we can construe the meaning towards being that they wouldn't hold back on how they might attempt to attack them short of nukes, as opposed to an actual attack on the Chinese mainland where they would. This wasn't unexpected - particularly from a hawkish then-candidate for the presidency - the only seemingly agreeable part of policy both political parties have shared since the mid-2000's.
How they might is an entirely different question, and one far more appropriate for discussion here than political drivel. The Chinese strategy for this likely eventuality derives its roots from A2/AD, though moving forward, the increasing proliferation of a capable surface fleet can only erode at the confidence of USN planners and their options for doing so.
Context, nuance and timing is important.
Great post I 100% agree. Furthermore, the Americans feel casual and confident about basing so much manpower and high-end equipment right on China’s doorstep, and using it to fly within a few miles of the mainland or causally threaten Chinese infrastructure. They know they could, in a war for Taiwan or anything else, destroy massive amounts of military OR civilian infrastructure and set China back decades.
They don’t care that this feels threatening to China, like a bully in a schoolyard their response is essentially ‘what the hell are you gonna do about it’.
The same principle you’ve demonstrated with FONOPs and constant territorial or EEZ incursions right on China’s doorstep (and China applying this back to America and others who seek to do the same), should also apply to the basing aspect.
Which means, China post-haste should be setting up basing in any Latin American countries that will allow it. Cuba and Venezuela certainly would, and I’m sure there are more. Give them that same feeling that they could incur mass death and destruction at any time in a simple conventional war for Taiwan or anything else, instead of the extreme safety they always have felt when conducting their savage brutality abroad.
When there are 100k Chinese troops situated dozens or hundreds of miles from Miami or New York City or Los Angeles, with the ability to utterly wreck havoc on the White House or every skyscraper in Manhattan, or all the suburbs of any major metropolitan area across CONUS, or the production facilities for their Navy, Air Force, Army, then they’ll enter that shocking realization that a bully finally gets when their own nose starts bleeding.
Then the simple ask would be, leave East and Southeast Asia, and the Western Pacific entirely, and we’ll leave the Americas. Or else you’ll have this constant threat in your backyard for the rest of time.
Well here we all are.
After years of discussing the hypothetical, it looks as though the real purpose and strategy is becoming a lot more clear.
For years we have all assumed that this wholly revolved around an armed conflict for Taiwan and the Territorial possession of the South China Seas.
While much of this is clearly the case, it is also becoming evident that it also just as much a smoke screen for a more simple and critical operation. In short to ensure the Chinese SLOC for the duration of a long conflict with its strategic competitors.
Taiwan remains of course a flashpoint, but looks less and less like a battlefield. I say this as we now understand that the US no longer has confidence in winning such a conflict or be prepared to sustain the crippling losses of a victory, both in the initial conflict and inevitable operation to try to hold the Island against sustained Chinese pressure.
It know looks more like the West has moved to a Strategy of long term economic strangulation which would force the PLAN to have to engage much further from its home waters and where the advantages it enjoys there, rapidly diminish.
The role of Taiwan remains the flashpont, but now, not for a conflict for the Island, but to provoke a Chinese Invasion which would justify a full Embargo against China and military Interdiction against its Merchant Fleet.
Yes, lots more to discuss and will do later.
After years of discussing the hypothetical, it looks as though the real purpose and strategy is becoming a lot more clear.
For years we have all assumed that this wholly revolved around an armed conflict for Taiwan and the Territorial possession of the South China Seas.
While much of this is clearly the case, it is also becoming evident that it also just as much a smoke screen for a more simple and critical operation. In short to ensure the Chinese SLOC for the duration of a long conflict with its strategic competitors.
Taiwan remains of course a flashpoint, but looks less and less like a battlefield. I say this as we now understand that the US no longer has confidence in winning such a conflict or be prepared to sustain the crippling losses of a victory, both in the initial conflict and inevitable operation to try to hold the Island against sustained Chinese pressure.
It know looks more like the West has moved to a Strategy of long term economic strangulation which would force the PLAN to have to engage much further from its home waters and where the advantages it enjoys there, rapidly diminish.
The role of Taiwan remains the flashpont, but now, not for a conflict for the Island, but to provoke a Chinese Invasion which would justify a full Embargo against China and military Interdiction against its Merchant Fleet.
Yes, lots more to discuss and will do later.
plawolf
Lieutenant General
I have long been saying that the motivation for the US to escalate the SCS dispute back in the Hillary days was to create both the pretext and the means for it to take military control of the SCS. That is because the SCS is the only place on earth where a trade embargo against China could be implemented without nuking world trade altogether.
But that was another massive strategic own goal by the US, because in doing so it alerted China to its intentions and so China didn’t waste any time or expense to counter with its SCS island bases. That move their has in essence won China the SCS and also nullified the whole AUSKUS move before it even got started.
Had Hillary not jumped the gun moving on the SCS so early, the PLAN would have a real hard time going toe to toe against the USN there even after 003 becomes operational. Because in a pure carrier vs carrier fight, the USN still holds a significant, if not overwhelmingly advantage in both quality and quantity of carriers, carrier fighters and subs.
The SCS island bases adds unsinkable carriers to the equation as well as home ports for swarms of 022s, 056s, SSKs and ASW aircraft; but even more importantly, it allowed China to build up a vast and comprehensive sensor and intel gathering network in the area that will give China information and intelligence dominance in any shooting war in the region.
The geography of the SCS makes the Australians AUSKUS deal even more stupid because their planned future SSNs are going to have to travel significant distances in very shallow waters; which will almost certainly be thoroughly laced with Chinese underwater passive detection networks; all the while being well within range of land based ASW helicopters and MPAs and future ASW drones; before they could reach the deep water core, where the PLAN is building is SSBN bastions.
It would be suicide for them to try to move directly north into the SCS. I think they would need to instead go around all the way up to Taiwan and swing down from that way. But that strategy depends on Taiwan remaining out of Chinese hands for at least the next two decades, which seems increasingly unlikely. If. China takes Taiwan, it shuts that door as well and the SCS will become a true bastion and Chinese lake for PLAN SSBNs to operate with a high degree of safety.
The SCS is essentially a lost cause now for the US.
I think the future US military plan is to try to drag the PLAN into a fight in the Indian Ocean, away from its current SCS meat grinder bastion.
This explains why they have rebranded everything from Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific. And it is in the Indian Ocean that the future Australian SSNs are expecting to fight and where they might actually make a meaningful difference.
This shift in geographical location will also mean a shift in strategic objectives away from total embargo to opportunistic harassment.
Without the geographical limitation of the SCS, the USN could not hope to stop all traffic heading towards China. Instead it will probably just try to inflict as much damage as possible by attacking Chinese flagged merchant ships and conducting legalised piracy by seizing those ships where it can and sinking them where they can’t.
It won’t stop all shipments to and from China, hell, it probably wouldn’t even make that much of a dint in terms of numbers and volumes, but it will be highly politically damaging to China’s standing both internationally and especially domestically. And the US is hoping that will force Beijing to send the PLAN into the Indian Ocean to try and stop the USN and where the USN would have home field advantage in the fight due to Diego Garcia and no doubt the Indians being all over such a mission.
Focusing on the Indian Ocean does makes sense, now that you guess mention it especially if China has taken enough control of the South China Sea. Does it mean that the AUKUS coalition will leave Japan and Korea on their own?
Is that maybe why Japan has brought forward a more neutral prime minister candidate?
Once AUKUS can drop their Korea, Taiwan and Japan allies, they actually can effectively block the Malacca straight without hurting important East Asian allies. Because if AUKUS block the Malacca strait right now they will hurt Korea, Taiwan and Japan more so then they would hurt China given China's expanded trade routes with CPEC and BRI bypassing the Malacca strait.
If I were South Korea I would try find some deal with North Korea and ask Russia to expand the power of Siberia pipeline network into north and south Korea. Japan could see if they can fix ties with Russia for their energy needs might the Malacca strait ever be blocked.
Is that maybe why Japan has brought forward a more neutral prime minister candidate?
Once AUKUS can drop their Korea, Taiwan and Japan allies, they actually can effectively block the Malacca straight without hurting important East Asian allies. Because if AUKUS block the Malacca strait right now they will hurt Korea, Taiwan and Japan more so then they would hurt China given China's expanded trade routes with CPEC and BRI bypassing the Malacca strait.
If I were South Korea I would try find some deal with North Korea and ask Russia to expand the power of Siberia pipeline network into north and south Korea. Japan could see if they can fix ties with Russia for their energy needs might the Malacca strait ever be blocked.