US knows China may not be able to take Taiwan island at this point, but sufficient to take Penghui island. Once Penghui fallen, 50% of Taiwan's defense is gone.
China's SCS Strategy Thread
- Thread starter lilzz
- Start date
PiSigma
"the engineer"
What? Mainland can take back Taiwan pretty anytime they want in 2021, just not interested in killing their own citizens even when many are separatists. It's more like US don't want to suffer casualties for an island 99% of Americans can't find on a map (even if it was labelled).
plawolf
Lieutenant General
Pray tell what actual recent actions the US has taken in the SCS that even needs Chinese responses to?
China has won the SCS plain and simple. It now has ultimate escalation dominance in the region provided by military overmatch.
Simply put, if the US tries to start an actual fight in the SCS with China, China not only wins, but wins convincingly, if not overwhelmingly.
It’s only because they have no cards to play in the SCS that America moved to shitstirring with Taiwan, which is what triggered Chinese military flexing to remind America that such moves are not consequences free, and that China can basically retake Taiwan any time it wants.
Yes I'm starting to see this too. It seems to have started happening after the ballistic missile test last year where after the test US went all quiet and Tsai responded with "let's all calm down and make sure there's no accidental discharge."
It then escalated with crossing the midline and again there wasn't really much effective counter from US. From then on you can see China using this sort of threat to counter moves by the US, most recently the sudden cancelling of Kelly Craft's visit after China warned of 灭顶之灾.
I think the strategy is not just Taiwan or SCS, but rather to disrupt the entire strategic balance in the western pacific. US appear the most powerful when they hide behind the curtain and let their lapdogs do all the barking. Taiwan is a means to an end to lure the US into the center stage so people can have a good close look at just how strong the US is. Now that they're doing that they are faced with a sticky situation: if things get out of hand and the shooting start, they are faced with the possibility of defeat in China's turf and thus the complete collapse of first island chain. Or alternatively they can abandon Taiwan and also have the complete collapse of first island chain. That's a gamble the US would rather not bet on, particularly at current time due to pandemic and the economy.
And not to mention, if China bombs the heck out of Taiwan, US gets everything it wants.
Keeping TSMC out of mainland china's hand is their top priority. That's the center point of everything.They could care less about how many in that island dies.
antiterror13
Brigadier
The only thing the US can do in SCS is Subs operation, but China anti sub is advancing quickly every day
TSMC would be useless if the US sanctions it. Semi conductor industry has a very long supply chain. Without the equipment supplied by other countries, including the USA, TSMC can't do much. I would even say that once the US sanctions TSMC, it would be less useful to China's supply chain than SMIC.
Putting the TSMC on the spotlight to be sanctioned by the USA is a double edge sword for both the US and China. It only really depends on when the PRC completes her supply lines from equipment to materials. Once major equipment are on track to narrow down the tech gap, China will deliberately spoil things for TSMC to aid her domestic industries.
Last edited:
As just highlighted by some NYT correspondent, so although this Atlantic Council's article is not dated, guess it's pretty recent. It's interesting to peek into the thinking of the hard liner of the neo-conservative right wing think tank, said to closely tied to the Central Intelligence Agency and the US MIC. This article cover broad areas of interests incl. the military & strategies & geopolitics and so on.
Hopefully some persistent thoughtful members can digest the 85-page pdf writing and give their insights here some time later
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
THE LONGER TELEGRAM - Toward a new American China strategy
By Anonymous | ATLANTIC COUNCIL | Undated
KEY POINTS:
• The single most important challenge facing the United States and the democratic world in the twenty-first century is the rise of an increasingly authoritarian and aggressive China under Xi Jinping. China has long had an integrated, operational strategy for dealing with the United States. The United States has so far had no such strategy with regard to China. This is a dereliction of national responsibility.
• US strategy and policy toward China must be laser-focused on the fault lines among Xi and his inner circle–aimed at changing their objectives and behavior and thus their strategic course. Communist Party elites are much more divided about Xi’s leadership and vast ambitions than is widely appreciated.
• The foremost goal of US strategy should be to cause China’s ruling elites to conclude that it is in China’s best interests to continue operating within the US-led liberal international order rather than building a rival order, and that it is in the Chinese Communist Party’s best interests to not attempt to expand China’s borders or export its political model beyond China’s shores.
FOREWORD
by Frederick Kempe
(President and CEO of the Atlantic Council)
Today the Atlantic Council publishes an extraordinary new strategy paper that offers one of the most insightful and rigorous examinations to date of Chinese geopolitical strategy and how an informed American strategy would address the challenges of China’s own strategic ambitions.
Written by a former senior government official with deep expertise and experience dealing with China, the strategy sets out a comprehensive approach, and details the ways to execute it, in terms that will invite comparison with George Kennan’s historic 1946 “long telegram” on Soviet grand strategy. We have maintained the author’s preferred title for the work, “The Longer Telegram,” given the author’s aspiration to provide a similarly durable and actionable approach to China.
The focus of the paper is China’s leader and his behavior. “The single most important challenge facing the United States in the twenty-first century is the rise of an increasingly authoritarian China under President and General Secretary Xi Jinping,” it says. “US strategy must remain laser focused on Xi, his inner circle, and the Chinese political context in which they rule. Changing their decision-making will require understanding, operating within, and changing their political and strategic paradigm. All US policy aimed at altering China’s behavior should revolve around this fact, or it is likely to prove ineffectual.”
The author of this work has requested to remain anonymous, and the Atlantic Council has honored this for reasons we consider legitimate but that will remain confidential. The Council has not taken such a measure before, but it made the decision to do so given the extraordinary significance of the author’s insights and recommendations as the United States confronts the signature geopolitical challenge of the era. The Council will not be confirming the author’s identity unless and until the author decides to take that step.
Of all the elements commonly missing from discussions of US strategy toward China so far, this is the most critical. While US leaders often differentiate between China’s Communist Party government and the Chinese people, Washington must achieve the sophistication necessary to go even further. US leaders also must differentiate between the government and the party elite, as well as between the party elite and Xi. Given the reality that today’s China is a state in which Xi has centralized nearly all decision-making power in his own hands, and used that power to substantially alter China’s political, economic, and foreign-policy trajectory, US strategy must remain laser focused on Xi, his inner circle, and the Chinese political context in which they rule. Changing their decision-making will require understanding, operating within, and changing their political and strategic paradigm. All US policy aimed at altering China’s behavior should revolve around this fact, or it is likely to prove ineffectual. This strategy must also be long term—able to function at the timescale that a Chinese leader like Xi sees himself ruling and influencing—as well as fully operationalized, transcending the rhetorical buzzwords that have too often substituted for genuine US strategy toward Beijing. Defending our democracies from the challenge posed by China will require no less.
Implementing such a strategy would require a firm understanding of Xi’s strategic objectives, which include the following:
• leapfrog the United States as a technological power and thereby displace it as the world’s dominant economic power
• undermine US dominance of the global financial system and the status of the US dollar as the global reserve currency
• achieve military preponderance sufficient to deter the United States and its allies from intervention in any conflict over Taiwan, the South China Sea, or the East China Sea
• diminish the credibility of US power and influence sufficiently to cause those states currently inclined to “balance” against China to instead join the bandwagon with China
• deepen and sustain China’s relationship with its neighbor and most valuable strategic partner, Russia, in order to head off Western pressure
• consolidate the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) into a geopolitical and geoeconomic bloc in support of China’s policy ambitions, forming the foundation for a future Sinocentric global order
• use China’s growing influence within international institutions to delegitimize and overturn initiatives, standards, and norms perceived as hostile to China’s interests—particularly on human rights and international maritime law—while advancing a new, hierarchical, authoritarian conception of international order under Xi’s deliberately amorphous concept of a “community of common destiny for all mankind”
The Chinese Communist Party keenly understands Sun Tzu’s maxim that “what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy’s strategy,” and the US should as well. Any US approach must seek to frustrate Xi’s ambitions. That means first clarifying which US national interests are to be protected, together with those of principal partners and allies. This includes the following:
• retain collective economic and technological superiority
• protect the global status of the US dollar
• maintain overwhelming conventional military deterrence and prevent any unacceptable shift in the strategic nuclear balance
• prevent any Chinese territorial expansion, especially the forcible reunification with Taiwan
• consolidate and expand alliances and partnerships
• defend (and as necessary reform) the current rules-based liberal international order and, critically, its ideological underpinnings, including core democratic values
• address persistent shared global threats, including preventing catastrophic climate change
PDF version is also available:
3.79 MB (85 pages)
Hopefully some persistent thoughtful members can digest the 85-page pdf writing and give their insights here some time later
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
THE LONGER TELEGRAM - Toward a new American China strategy
By Anonymous | ATLANTIC COUNCIL | Undated
KEY POINTS:
• The single most important challenge facing the United States and the democratic world in the twenty-first century is the rise of an increasingly authoritarian and aggressive China under Xi Jinping. China has long had an integrated, operational strategy for dealing with the United States. The United States has so far had no such strategy with regard to China. This is a dereliction of national responsibility.
• US strategy and policy toward China must be laser-focused on the fault lines among Xi and his inner circle–aimed at changing their objectives and behavior and thus their strategic course. Communist Party elites are much more divided about Xi’s leadership and vast ambitions than is widely appreciated.
• The foremost goal of US strategy should be to cause China’s ruling elites to conclude that it is in China’s best interests to continue operating within the US-led liberal international order rather than building a rival order, and that it is in the Chinese Communist Party’s best interests to not attempt to expand China’s borders or export its political model beyond China’s shores.
FOREWORD
by Frederick Kempe
(President and CEO of the Atlantic Council)
Today the Atlantic Council publishes an extraordinary new strategy paper that offers one of the most insightful and rigorous examinations to date of Chinese geopolitical strategy and how an informed American strategy would address the challenges of China’s own strategic ambitions.
Written by a former senior government official with deep expertise and experience dealing with China, the strategy sets out a comprehensive approach, and details the ways to execute it, in terms that will invite comparison with George Kennan’s historic 1946 “long telegram” on Soviet grand strategy. We have maintained the author’s preferred title for the work, “The Longer Telegram,” given the author’s aspiration to provide a similarly durable and actionable approach to China.
The focus of the paper is China’s leader and his behavior. “The single most important challenge facing the United States in the twenty-first century is the rise of an increasingly authoritarian China under President and General Secretary Xi Jinping,” it says. “US strategy must remain laser focused on Xi, his inner circle, and the Chinese political context in which they rule. Changing their decision-making will require understanding, operating within, and changing their political and strategic paradigm. All US policy aimed at altering China’s behavior should revolve around this fact, or it is likely to prove ineffectual.”
The author of this work has requested to remain anonymous, and the Atlantic Council has honored this for reasons we consider legitimate but that will remain confidential. The Council has not taken such a measure before, but it made the decision to do so given the extraordinary significance of the author’s insights and recommendations as the United States confronts the signature geopolitical challenge of the era. The Council will not be confirming the author’s identity unless and until the author decides to take that step.
Of all the elements commonly missing from discussions of US strategy toward China so far, this is the most critical. While US leaders often differentiate between China’s Communist Party government and the Chinese people, Washington must achieve the sophistication necessary to go even further. US leaders also must differentiate between the government and the party elite, as well as between the party elite and Xi. Given the reality that today’s China is a state in which Xi has centralized nearly all decision-making power in his own hands, and used that power to substantially alter China’s political, economic, and foreign-policy trajectory, US strategy must remain laser focused on Xi, his inner circle, and the Chinese political context in which they rule. Changing their decision-making will require understanding, operating within, and changing their political and strategic paradigm. All US policy aimed at altering China’s behavior should revolve around this fact, or it is likely to prove ineffectual. This strategy must also be long term—able to function at the timescale that a Chinese leader like Xi sees himself ruling and influencing—as well as fully operationalized, transcending the rhetorical buzzwords that have too often substituted for genuine US strategy toward Beijing. Defending our democracies from the challenge posed by China will require no less.
Implementing such a strategy would require a firm understanding of Xi’s strategic objectives, which include the following:
• leapfrog the United States as a technological power and thereby displace it as the world’s dominant economic power
• undermine US dominance of the global financial system and the status of the US dollar as the global reserve currency
• achieve military preponderance sufficient to deter the United States and its allies from intervention in any conflict over Taiwan, the South China Sea, or the East China Sea
• diminish the credibility of US power and influence sufficiently to cause those states currently inclined to “balance” against China to instead join the bandwagon with China
• deepen and sustain China’s relationship with its neighbor and most valuable strategic partner, Russia, in order to head off Western pressure
• consolidate the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) into a geopolitical and geoeconomic bloc in support of China’s policy ambitions, forming the foundation for a future Sinocentric global order
• use China’s growing influence within international institutions to delegitimize and overturn initiatives, standards, and norms perceived as hostile to China’s interests—particularly on human rights and international maritime law—while advancing a new, hierarchical, authoritarian conception of international order under Xi’s deliberately amorphous concept of a “community of common destiny for all mankind”
The Chinese Communist Party keenly understands Sun Tzu’s maxim that “what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy’s strategy,” and the US should as well. Any US approach must seek to frustrate Xi’s ambitions. That means first clarifying which US national interests are to be protected, together with those of principal partners and allies. This includes the following:
• retain collective economic and technological superiority
• protect the global status of the US dollar
• maintain overwhelming conventional military deterrence and prevent any unacceptable shift in the strategic nuclear balance
• prevent any Chinese territorial expansion, especially the forcible reunification with Taiwan
• consolidate and expand alliances and partnerships
• defend (and as necessary reform) the current rules-based liberal international order and, critically, its ideological underpinnings, including core democratic values
• address persistent shared global threats, including preventing catastrophic climate change
PDF version is also available:
3.79 MB (85 pages)
i think it has been postedAs just highlighted by some NYT correspondent, so although this Atlantic Council's article is not dated, guess it's pretty recent. It's interesting to peek into the thinking of the hard liner of the neo-conservative right wing think tank, said to closely tied to the Central Intelligence Agency and the US MIC. This article cover broad areas of interests incl. the military & strategies & geopolitics and so on.
Hopefully some persistent thoughtful members can digest the 85-page pdf writing and give their insights here some time later
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
THE LONGER TELEGRAM - Toward a new American China strategy
By Anonymous | ATLANTIC COUNCIL | Undated
KEY POINTS:
• The single most important challenge facing the United States and the democratic world in the twenty-first century is the rise of an increasingly authoritarian and aggressive China under Xi Jinping. China has long had an integrated, operational strategy for dealing with the United States. The United States has so far had no such strategy with regard to China. This is a dereliction of national responsibility.
• US strategy and policy toward China must be laser-focused on the fault lines among Xi and his inner circle–aimed at changing their objectives and behavior and thus their strategic course. Communist Party elites are much more divided about Xi’s leadership and vast ambitions than is widely appreciated.
• The foremost goal of US strategy should be to cause China’s ruling elites to conclude that it is in China’s best interests to continue operating within the US-led liberal international order rather than building a rival order, and that it is in the Chinese Communist Party’s best interests to not attempt to expand China’s borders or export its political model beyond China’s shores.
FOREWORD
by Frederick Kempe
(President and CEO of the Atlantic Council)
Today the Atlantic Council publishes an extraordinary new strategy paper that offers one of the most insightful and rigorous examinations to date of Chinese geopolitical strategy and how an informed American strategy would address the challenges of China’s own strategic ambitions.
Written by a former senior government official with deep expertise and experience dealing with China, the strategy sets out a comprehensive approach, and details the ways to execute it, in terms that will invite comparison with George Kennan’s historic 1946 “long telegram” on Soviet grand strategy. We have maintained the author’s preferred title for the work, “The Longer Telegram,” given the author’s aspiration to provide a similarly durable and actionable approach to China.
The focus of the paper is China’s leader and his behavior. “The single most important challenge facing the United States in the twenty-first century is the rise of an increasingly authoritarian China under President and General Secretary Xi Jinping,” it says. “US strategy must remain laser focused on Xi, his inner circle, and the Chinese political context in which they rule. Changing their decision-making will require understanding, operating within, and changing their political and strategic paradigm. All US policy aimed at altering China’s behavior should revolve around this fact, or it is likely to prove ineffectual.”
The author of this work has requested to remain anonymous, and the Atlantic Council has honored this for reasons we consider legitimate but that will remain confidential. The Council has not taken such a measure before, but it made the decision to do so given the extraordinary significance of the author’s insights and recommendations as the United States confronts the signature geopolitical challenge of the era. The Council will not be confirming the author’s identity unless and until the author decides to take that step.
Of all the elements commonly missing from discussions of US strategy toward China so far, this is the most critical. While US leaders often differentiate between China’s Communist Party government and the Chinese people, Washington must achieve the sophistication necessary to go even further. US leaders also must differentiate between the government and the party elite, as well as between the party elite and Xi. Given the reality that today’s China is a state in which Xi has centralized nearly all decision-making power in his own hands, and used that power to substantially alter China’s political, economic, and foreign-policy trajectory, US strategy must remain laser focused on Xi, his inner circle, and the Chinese political context in which they rule. Changing their decision-making will require understanding, operating within, and changing their political and strategic paradigm. All US policy aimed at altering China’s behavior should revolve around this fact, or it is likely to prove ineffectual. This strategy must also be long term—able to function at the timescale that a Chinese leader like Xi sees himself ruling and influencing—as well as fully operationalized, transcending the rhetorical buzzwords that have too often substituted for genuine US strategy toward Beijing. Defending our democracies from the challenge posed by China will require no less.
Implementing such a strategy would require a firm understanding of Xi’s strategic objectives, which include the following:
• leapfrog the United States as a technological power and thereby displace it as the world’s dominant economic power
• undermine US dominance of the global financial system and the status of the US dollar as the global reserve currency
• achieve military preponderance sufficient to deter the United States and its allies from intervention in any conflict over Taiwan, the South China Sea, or the East China Sea
• diminish the credibility of US power and influence sufficiently to cause those states currently inclined to “balance” against China to instead join the bandwagon with China
• deepen and sustain China’s relationship with its neighbor and most valuable strategic partner, Russia, in order to head off Western pressure
• consolidate the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) into a geopolitical and geoeconomic bloc in support of China’s policy ambitions, forming the foundation for a future Sinocentric global order
• use China’s growing influence within international institutions to delegitimize and overturn initiatives, standards, and norms perceived as hostile to China’s interests—particularly on human rights and international maritime law—while advancing a new, hierarchical, authoritarian conception of international order under Xi’s deliberately amorphous concept of a “community of common destiny for all mankind”
The Chinese Communist Party keenly understands Sun Tzu’s maxim that “what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy’s strategy,” and the US should as well. Any US approach must seek to frustrate Xi’s ambitions. That means first clarifying which US national interests are to be protected, together with those of principal partners and allies. This includes the following:
• retain collective economic and technological superiority
• protect the global status of the US dollar
• maintain overwhelming conventional military deterrence and prevent any unacceptable shift in the strategic nuclear balance
• prevent any Chinese territorial expansion, especially the forcible reunification with Taiwan
• consolidate and expand alliances and partnerships
• defend (and as necessary reform) the current rules-based liberal international order and, critically, its ideological underpinnings, including core democratic values
• address persistent shared global threats, including preventing catastrophic climate change
PDF version is also available:
3.79 MB (85 pages)