Israel’s diplomatic predicament vis-à-vis China cannot be understood without first examining the profound transformation of China’s discourse on Jews and Israel over the past three decades. The shift has unfolded through three distinct phases that have fundamentally reshaped the environment Israel must navigate today.
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Instead, in May 2023, the embassy mistakenly boycotted a lecture by Professor Yin Gang, one of China’s most consistent advocates of China-Israel relations. Although Ben-Abba later apologized, the incident significantly undermined trust.
This inversion was even more damaging than it first appeared: the embassy openly boycotted one of Israel’s strongest supporters, yet said nothing about Chinese academics who were actively promoting antisemitic narratives on campus and on social media.
For the few Chinese scholars who have long defended Israel in good faith, this sequence of decisions was profoundly disheartening. It signaled that their commitment was neither seen nor valued, while hostile voices were allowed to expand unchallenged and unchecked.
A second weakness lay in the ambassador’s disengagement from higher education. Chinese universities have been playing a central role in shaping elite opinion, yet during Ben-Abba’s tenure, the embassy rarely attempted to cultivate ties. When a campus-wide Jewish Civilization course – the largest of its kind in China – invited her to participate in 2021, the request was declined without discussion.
The embassy only began reaching out to scholars after October 7. Several senior Chinese academics noted privately that the embassy had not contacted them in years, but turned to them urgently once the crisis began. Public diplomacy cannot be improvised but it relies on long-term cultivation, trust, and continuity. None of these were in place during Ben-Abba’s term.
As a result, after October 7, the embassy found itself without any access to the universities and scholars who shape how China understands Israel. Because no academic relationships had been built in advance, there were simply no channels through which Israel could speak to the audiences that mattered most.
These trends – ignoring rising antisemitism and failing to cultivate relationships – combined to create a scandal in April 2022, at an event held at Peking University to commemorate the 30th anniversary of Sino-Israeli diplomatic relations. What should have been a celebratory occasion instead became a moment of embarrassment. A Chinese student attended wearing an Arab keffiyeh as a form of protest. The moderator of the event was a faculty member in Peking University’s Department of Hebrew, who has been widely identified as a prominent promoter of antisemitic narratives on Chinese social media, as documented by Israeli researcher Tuvia Gering. One example included a post arguing that the October 7, 2023 attacks on Israeli civilians were necessary to give Israelis “a relatively normal understanding of themselves.”
A Chinese student wore a keffiyeh in protest during the 30th anniversary event of Sino-Israeli diplomatic relations, while Ambassador Ben-Abba was speaking. Photo courtesy of Yang Meng.
These incidents revealed the absence of basic due diligence: no background checks, no analysis of online reputations, and no risk assessment. The scandal was astonishing for an event marking the 30th anniversary of diplomatic relations. A moment meant to symbolize three decades of cooperation became, through the embassy’s lack of basic vetting and risk assessment, a stage for anti-Israel and antisemitic gestures.
Meanwhile, the embassy’s digital communications after October 7 generated a series of scandals. Numerous official WeChat posts by the Israeli embassy were released with unedited machine translations, resulting in awkward, inaccurate, and culturally tone-deaf messages that conveyed disrespect to Chinese readers.
On the embassy’s official WeChat account, comments containing Hitler avatars were not only left visible but were highlighted as “featured comments,” revealing a remarkable lapse in content review. Screenshot by Yang Meng.
Even more damaging were many incidents in which WeChat posts prominently featured reader comments containing Hitler avatars. Any staff member with even minimal familiarity with global antisemitism should have recognized it instantly. The fact that these comments were highlighted raises legitimate questions as to the cause: whether simple negligence, a complete breakdown in internal review, or even deliberate sabotage by locally hired staff. Any of these interpretations would be alarming.
Similar issues appeared in the Israeli consulates in China. The Shanghai consulate’s public collaboration with the Anti-Defamation League triggered intense online backlash. The Chengdu consulate issued an error-filled public letter that went viral as a joke, further harming Israel’s wartime image. At their core, these incidents demonstrated something deeper: Israeli diplomats did not understand Chinese society at all. They did not know how the Chinese public reads, reacts, or mobilizes online. As a result, the consulates not only failed to communicate but also generated ridicule, undermining Israel’s credibility at a critical moment.
Meanwhile, the embassy continued to have its head in the sand regarding rising antisemitism in China. Ben-Abba mischaracterized the situation during a November 2023 interview with Voice of America, claiming that antisemitism had “subsided.” While she acknowledged that antisemitism had become “a global kind of trend” after October 7, Ben-Abba claimed that “this definitely was never a phenomenon in China. I would even say the contrary is true, what we have seen all these years in China is a very positive kind of attitude to Jews and to Israelis.”
[mostly banters about the ambassador]
So far, the early signs are not promising. The Israeli embassy has still not grasped the political implications of the State of Qatar Chair (the only Qatar center in Asia) becoming firmly embedded at Peking University. Qatar’s institutional presence now shapes Middle Eastern discourse at China’s top university far more actively than Israel itself.
Even more troubling is the deeper paradox that the very Hebrew program Israel once supported has, over the years, come to be anchored by a Chinese scholar widely recognized as a purveyor of antisemitic narratives. What was intended to serve as a bridge of cultural understanding has instead become an incubator of hostility.
Few developments reveal Israel’s strategic blind spots with such painful clarity. Where Israel stepped back, others advanced with purpose; where Israel assumed that goodwill would sustain itself, an entirely different narrative ecosystem emerged. If Israel does not fundamentally rethink its diplomatic posture toward China, it will lose influence and forfeit the ability to define itself, and how its story is told.