China Ballistic Missiles and Nuclear Arms Thread

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clockwork

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the shortest path between 2 points on a map is a great circle which does NOT look like a line in a 2-D projection of the world.

Here's a google maps link to show you the shortest path along the great circle between two random points on the map, which may or may not be relevant: Hotan, Xinjiang, China and NYC.

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Note the trajectory heading over western Russia, Atlantic and Eastern Canada like I said. Notice total length of trajectory is ~10000 km, well within range of certain rockets.

It has nothing to do with Alaska or the Pacific. It is often shorter to shoot westwards, people only have a mental bias towards shooting east because of how maps are laid out and because that's where other allies of certain countries are located.

If the path doesn't show up just use the measure distance tool on your own.
What I meant was a straight line across the surface of the globe, not on a map. It should always look straight, this is from Hami to NYC:
1658507195272.png
So there's only ever 2 trajectories an ICBM can approach the same target from a given launch point? The shortest distance one like above or the exact opposite direction around the globe (if it's a FOBS), where both the direction of launch and direction of approach would differ by 180 degrees exactly. So it's not possible for the ICBM to approach a target from any other than these 2 directions. For example if the missile launched from Hami wants to travel over Eastern Russia/Alaska it would be launched on an angle maybe 30 or 40 deg more eastward, but then it would have to turn left over halfway through flight over Alaska but that's impossible since it's no longer being boosted at that point. And I don't think it's possible for a rocket to make such a large turn even if it were (not enough fuel)?
 
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FairAndUnbiased

Brigadier
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What I meant was a straight line across the surface of the globe, not on a map. It should always look straight, this is from Hami to NYC:
View attachment 93784
So there's only ever 2 trajectories an ICBM can approach the same target from a given launch point? The shortest distance one like above or the exact opposite direction around the globe (if it's a FOBS), where both the direction of launch and direction of approach would differ by 180 degrees exactly. So it's not possible for the ICBM to approach a target from any other than these 2 directions. For example if the missile launched from Hami wants to travel over Eastern Russia/Alaska it would be launched on an angle maybe 30 or 40 deg more eastward, but then it would have to turn left over halfway through flight over Alaska but that's impossible since it's no longer being boosted at that point. And I don't think it's possible for a rocket to make such a large turn even if it were (not enough fuel)?
You can adjust either an individual warhead or more economically, the warhead bus, midflight somewhat with a mono propellant engine. it will continue coasting in space but execute lateral maneuvers as the engine exerts a vectored thrust on it. That will mean the path is a slight curve. So you can aim a bit off, and then use the thrusters to re-correct the orientation.

This, of course, comes at a great cost of space and weight. and the adjustments are very slight.

Alternatively you can have a waverider glide setup. Gives more maneuverability, comes at greater cost of space and weight, unless you use the waverider as a bus.
 

Rettam Stacf

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Yea, me too. After all, that person holds the "Tata chair" for strategic affairs.
I don't know what kinda chair that is, but i am fairly interested to get myself one of those.

It means that Tellis's salary is either wholly or partly paid for by Tata Group, an Indian company.

Tata Chair for Strategic Affairs​

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The Tata Chair for Strategic Affairs was established in April 2017 in recognition of Ratan N. Tata’s leadership on Carnegie’s Board of Trustees and his role in taking Indian industry beyond its national borders to create a global brand, emphasizing innovation as the hallmark of commercial success, and contributing to the building of U.S.-India ties.
 

ZeEa5KPul

Colonel
Registered Member
To be clear here, my objection regarding Tellis isn't because he's Indian (not directly, anyway). My objection is that he included India in his analysis, which is to be expected given his background. But in including India, he failed the smell test - India has no bearing on China's nuclear strategy because India has no bearing on China's anything. India is an irrelevancy that aspires to be an afterthought in Chinese strategic thinking.
 

Kalec

Junior Member
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The Carnegie Endowment has released a new publication a few days ago detailing the history of Chinese nuclear weapons policy and its transition now that Xi is asserting China's position as a new global superpower. It is a good read for anyone who wants to understand how China has viewed nuclear weapons, their purpose, and doctrine of use both in the past, the present, and the future.

Some tie in to the news back in November about China expanding its arsenal.

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It is a rather long and dry academic read but very thorough.
Although the future nuclear force balances obtaining between China and its major rivals
such as the United States (and Russia) will favor the latter in both quantitative and quali-
tative terms even after the current phase of Chinese nuclear modernization is completed,
Beijing’s capability to inflict horrendous punishment in absolute terms when required is un-
likely to be erased.
It would be too hard to not quantitatively and qualitatively surpass US land based nuclear force.
 

Lethe

Captain
Ashley J. Tellis holds the Tata Chair for Strategic Affairs and is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in international security and U.S. foreign and defense policy with a special focus on Asia and the Indian subcontinent.

Yep, this is exactly who I turn to for insight into China's nuclear weapons policy.

A decade ago I wrote an essay on India's MMRCA procurement and spent much of it rebutting Tellis:

Let us again consider the two basic theses that we have to choose from: first, that MMRCA was first and foremost a political exercise and its result the outcome that best served India’s political (geopolitical, strategic) interests; and the alternative: that MMRCA was a run-of-the-mill IAF acquisition program, its result reflecting performance and financial considerations alone and thus being of no political significance.

In presenting the latter argument, Ashley Tellis notes some curious features of the selection process and its execution: that it was structured so as to exclude value-for-money considerations (the two aircraft that were shortlisted being the two most expensive contenders) and further that in assessing performance the IAF appeared to place a premium on aerodynamic performance (acceleration, turn rate, etc.) ahead of integrated/electronic systems performance. He also notes some inconsistencies in evaluation, with developmental American engines being penalised as such, whilst developmental European radars were not. For Tellis, these factors and others are reasons why American observers should not feel slighted or in any other way discomfited by the result.

This author would suggest a different interpretation: that these apparent flaws in the selection process were deliberate, and indicate that its aim was something other than it appeared to be; that India knew precisely where its interests lay and structured the evaluation process to produce the result that was obtained. Tellis’ thesis is that the evaluation process was multifariously flawed: first, by not taking strategic interests into account; second, by not considering value-for-money in the initial evaluation phase; and third by misconstruing what qualifies as ‘performance’ in the modern combat environment. One wonders what the United States could really have to gain by partnering with a nation that apparently has no idea what it is doing.

Curiously, prior to the down-select that eliminated the American (and Russian and Swedish) contenders, Tellis had little difficulty in identifying those non-operational/financial factors likely to influence India’s decision:

Political considerations, however, will be key in the selection process. In choosing the winning platform, Indian policymakers will seek to: minimize the country’s vulnerability to supply cut-offs in wartime, improve its larger military capacity through a substantial technology infusion, and forge new transformative geopolitical partnerships that promise to accelerate the growth of Indian power globally.

Only when the American aircraft were eliminated from contention did this narrative become unpalatable.
 
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