China Ballistic Missiles and Nuclear Arms Thread

Status
Not open for further replies.

Kalec

Junior Member
Registered Member
41 is a lot heavier than 31. Some bridges or roads may not be able to support that weight. I suspect that this is the reason why DF-31A/AG will still be in service for the next decade.
That again, I agree that 41 is a far superior missile and will eventually make up the core of the road mobile TEL force for China.
I doubt PLARF really think they would deploy DF-41 in a manner that they need it to wander alongside the highway.
The more reasonable guess is that PLARF will hide TELs in deep tunnel to withhold the incoming first strike and counterattack with more vulnerable but heavier silo ICBMs.

In a counterattack scenario, PLARF needs to destroy US airports, ports, CVGs, military compounds and major cities in less than 30 minutes, which apparently TELs can't achieve by its own readiness.

DF-41 can't ensure the annihilation of hard targets, so it is to threaten/coerce the soft targets after the 1st round of nuclear exchange. After all, US can only use their SLBMs to target Chinese silos, military facilities in such cases, there might be some cities left untouched. Meanwhile MM3 can't reach the mainland Chinese without reducing its throw weight and airports will be destroyed by silo ICBM or nuclear-armed DF-21 in few minutes. A DF-41 with three 535 warheads and high survivability is far superior to force US to back down after armageddon.
 

bustead

Junior Member
Registered Member
Got to be honest, I am still not a big fan of massive SSBN construction until Taiwan has been taken. The limited area that you can deploy submarines in, combined with high operational costs, do not make that attractive.
Keep in mind that silos can be kept on high alert for prolonged periods of time, submarines need to be overhauled and repaired in the drydocks every 6-12 months. Also, silos are magnets for enemy warheads. Even if they are not loaded, their mere existence is enough to divert enemy attention from other targets to these silos.
 

clockwork

Junior Member
Registered Member
In any scenario where 094's safety is under concern, it will be in a conflict and Taiwan will most likely not have capability to threaten after initial hours. Philippines is unlikely to get involved and risk getting themselves bombed.
I thought the actual issue with chokes for SSBNs is not just being destroyed there but being detected & picking up an SSN tail?
 

FairAndUnbiased

Brigadier
Registered Member
In any scenario where 094's safety is under concern, it will be in a conflict and Taiwan will most likely not have capability to threaten after initial hours. Philippines is unlikely to get involved and risk getting themselves bombed.
US can lay stationary sonar in the strait in secret or send SSNs to patrol there. Philippines or Taiwan don't actually have to actively do anything except not rip up seabed equipment, not mine the strait with indiscriminate mines, or ask too many questions about why there's unmarked buildings on a beach.
 

antiterror13

Brigadier
096 still does not really solve the big problem: entire Yellow Sea and East China Sea are so shallow that SSBN stuck on its end sticks out of the water. That is to say, there is no room for pitch maneuver and rapid diving could result in collision with the bottom. So the only possible place is SCS which is highly contested and still enclosed. In addition they typically have 30-50% availability while silos have 100% availability and TELs have close to 100% availability.

I'd say having a few 094s and 096s to diversify and force enemies to divert tons of ASW resources is a good thing, but unlike US and Russia who have open access to deep water in the Pacific/Atlantic and Arctic, respectively, China does not. The good thing is that China has huge landmass and lots of cover. I suspect ground based ICBMs and TELs will be the mainstay for a long time.

Sea near Hainan is quite deep, and China control 100% that area ... thats why most Chinese SSBN are based in that area

I agree regarding silo and TEL, operating SSBN is risky and expensive. But I think China need to have strong SSBN to complicate the enemy, but having a lot of Silo (even some are empty) and TEL (even some with dummy warheads) are the most cost efficient
 

tphuang

Lieutenant General
Staff member
Super Moderator
VIP Professional
Registered Member
US can lay stationary sonar in the strait in secret or send SSNs to patrol there. Philippines or Taiwan don't actually have to actively do anything except not rip up seabed equipment, not mine the strait with indiscriminate mines, or ask too many questions about why there's unmarked buildings on a beach.

094s are not expected to be moving completely in secret. It's safety is provided by MPA protection and having a surface fleet near by that can protect it from SSNs.

Keep in mind that anything up to 1500 km out (and growing) from China's east coast will be littered with sensors. There is a reason I've spent the past few weeks talking about ASW.

Got to be honest, I am still not a big fan of massive SSBN construction until Taiwan has been taken. The limited area that you can deploy submarines in, combined with high operational costs, do not make that attractive.
Keep in mind that silos can be kept on high alert for prolonged periods of time, submarines need to be overhauled and repaired in the drydocks every 6-12 months. Also, silos are magnets for enemy warheads. Even if they are not loaded, their mere existence is enough to divert enemy attention from other targets to these silos.

Can you guarantee that after an initial wave of incoming nukes that the silos will be operational? Can you guarantee that your BM early warning systems work?

094s are inherently going to be more resistant to a first wave of attack since that large portion of sea from Hong kong to south of Spratleys is entirely jammed up with Chinese ships and underwater sensors and are generally inoperable places for hostile countries in the event of a war. And you can say the same about Bohai/Yellow sea area, although that's a much smaller area.

And we are getting to the point where China can also protect a 094 operating East of Tawain, northeast of Phillipines and south of Ryukus.
 

antiterror13

Brigadier
094s are not expected to be moving completely in secret. It's safety is provided by MPA protection and having a surface fleet near by that can protect it from SSNs.

Keep in mind that anything up to 1500 km out (and growing) from China's east coast will be littered with sensors. There is a reason I've spent the past few weeks talking about ASW.



Can you guarantee that after an initial wave of incoming nukes that the silos will be operational? Can you guarantee that your BM early warning systems work?

094s are inherently going to be more resistant to a first wave of attack since that large portion of sea from Hong kong to south of Spratleys is entirely jammed up with Chinese ships and underwater sensors and are generally inoperable places for hostile countries in the event of a war. And you can say the same about Bohai/Yellow sea area, although that's a much smaller area.

And we are getting to the point where China can also protect a 094 operating East of Tawain, northeast of Phillipines and south of Ryukus.

Silo is only one of the equations, but surely most TEL would survive the first strike. I agree that China need to have strong Silo, TEL and SSBN. SSBN is the most complicated and by far the most expensive
 

Kalec

Junior Member
Registered Member
1657809892616.png
Here is an estimation from FAS on nuke alertness. Clearly silo carries more than half of US nuclear arsenal on hard alert even if MM3 is a 1960s technology whereas D5 is far more superior than MM3 in every meaningful aspects.

Also the high survivability of SSBN is a myth. 1/3 of fleet is in dockyard for maintenance, which will be destroyed in a first strike, another 1/3 is in the pier with half of its crew still tens of miles away and incoming warheads is about to hit in 30 minutes. So what you get is a maximum of 2/3 SSBN fleet has a credible survivability in a LUA scenario.

And China is in an extremely bad position to compete with US on SSBN as you guys have pointed out. 50% survival rate is the best I think of for Chinese SSBN fleets, each with only 12 * 650kt warheads, which two silo can easily achieve.
 
Status
Not open for further replies.
Top