China Ballistic Missiles and Nuclear Arms Thread

[Suetham]

Some are saying depressed trajectory test (can see view of actual missile in flight in link). Depressed trajectory of an ICBM doesn't make much sense to me, so maybe a JL-3 test possibly?

There are no reasons here to explain the functionality of an SLBM on a depressed trajectory. There are studies of this:

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To answer your question that an ICBM with a depressed trajectory makes no sense, I disagree. I would agree with you 3 months ago, before the Chinese Glide-FOBS(G-FOBS) was revealed to the world, and I just didn't think China was that advanced.

An ICBM with a depressed trajectory has all the qualities of an FOBS. All. By the way, there is an abbreviation of that name, DICBM - Depressed ICBM. Here's an account of that: "Although not truly a space weapon, one other system is often considered in a discussion of space weapons: the Depressed Trajectory ICBM (DICBM). The DICBM does not achieve orpit. It is a ballistic missile placed on a trajectory that has a low aogee resulting in a depression of the entire trajectory.This depressed trajectory results in shortened radar detection ranges, shorter flight times, and some trajectories which can exploit holes in existing detection systems.

The primary area of content appeared to be deployment. The tests the Russians conducted clearly had application to FOBS or DICBM, and the two systems were closely related. Both offer a new dimension to Soviet strategic capability (with inherent advantages and disadvantages), and both may provide a technological base data which could eventually lead to the development of advanced orbital weapon systems. Present US space and missile defense capabilities were inadequate to cope with either system."

Source:

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The FOBS test raised a warning that China will do everything possible to avoid all dedicated ABM screening apparatus in the US and abroad, especially those located in the US. A DICBM has a low apogee because of the depressed trajectory, thus avoiding OTH ABM radars that have a precise resolution at 4,500 km, but at 1,200 km altitude, a DICBM or FOBS simply nullifies these radars by reducing the missile interception window while maintaining invisible on the horizon, not to mention that on depressed trajectories they also lead the missile to a shorter flight time.

The qualities of the DICBM can be found here: "It is a ballistic missile placed on a trajectory that has a low aoge and resulting in a depression of the entire trajectory. This depressed trajectory results in shortened radar detection ranges, shorter flight times, and some trajectories which can exploit holes in existing detection systems."

The development of an FOBS may necessarily lead to a DICBM, as per the Soviet designs of the 60s/70s. Also in the source, read what they say: "During 1968, the Russians again used the SS-X-6 in a DICBM role. The vehicles were launched from Tyura Tam and impacted in the Pacific. Apogee height o£ these tests were 300 Miles, less than the normal apogee height for this system in an ICBM role. These tests continued to cloud the issue on Soviet intent. Clearly, though, the interest and technological capability existed to use space for an offensive weapon system. the element of surprise which might be available from space weapons could significantly complement their strategic offensive capability, neither high costs nor the space treaty will be likely to deter its use."

The apogee of an ICBM with a depressed trajectory is greater than that of an FOBS that reaches an altitude of 150 km, an ICBM will have a greater apogee, probably climbing something around 300 km to 800 km altitude, enough to reduce the window of intercepting the American ABM apparatus, which still suffers from limitations and recurrent errors, not giving the precise reliability that a system of this size proposes.

In a document "Defense Appropriations 1971", they highlight whether they should develop an FOBS or an ICBM with a depressed trajectory due to Soviet advances, as can be seen in the attached image.

The development of the Chinese FOBS is likely to be leading to the development of a DICBM to create new systems of strategic attack, decreasing the numerical vulnerability that exists between the US and China. It is worth remembering that I have no doubt that China, based on the development of FOBS, will develop MOBS (Multi-Orbit Bombardment System/Multiple Orbital Bombardment System) to further reduce this numerical weakness, compensating with qualitative strengthening.

 

[clockwork]

What I don't get is it looks like from the videos even after the apogee and when the missile has curved down the rocket motor is still on and boosting it? Or even if it's off and unpowered it'll still leave a trail like that in the air? You can see that in the downward portion of the flight it's a perfectly straight line. The trajectory does look super short and low in any case. Very strange. Anyone have guesses as to what this was? SRBM/MRBM test maybe? I'm not seeing any discussion of this anywhere else either.
Maybe another miracle weapon that the Pentagon will complain violates physics again.

 

[Ringsword]

There are no reasons here to explain the functionality of an SLBM on a depressed trajectory. There are studies of this:

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To answer your question that an ICBM with a depressed trajectory makes no sense, I disagree. I would agree with you 3 months ago, before the Chinese Glide-FOBS(G-FOBS) was revealed to the world, and I just didn't think China was that advanced.

An ICBM with a depressed trajectory has all the qualities of an FOBS. All. By the way, there is an abbreviation of that name, DICBM - Depressed ICBM. Here's an account of that: "Although not truly a space weapon, one other system is often considered in a discussion of space weapons: the Depressed Trajectory ICBM (DICBM). The DICBM does not achieve orpit. It is a ballistic missile placed on a trajectory that has a low aogee resulting in a depression of the entire trajectory.This depressed trajectory results in shortened radar detection ranges, shorter flight times, and some trajectories which can exploit holes in existing detection systems.

The primary area of content appeared to be deployment. The tests the Russians conducted clearly had application to FOBS or DICBM, and the two systems were closely related. Both offer a new dimension to Soviet strategic capability (with inherent advantages and disadvantages), and both may provide a technological base data which could eventually lead to the development of advanced orbital weapon systems. Present US space and missile defense capabilities were inadequate to cope with either system."

Source:

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

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The FOBS test raised a warning that China will do everything possible to avoid all dedicated ABM screening apparatus in the US and abroad, especially those located in the US. A DICBM has a low apogee because of the depressed trajectory, thus avoiding OTH ABM radars that have a precise resolution at 4,500 km, but at 1,200 km altitude, a DICBM or FOBS simply nullifies these radars by reducing the missile interception window while maintaining invisible on the horizon, not to mention that on depressed trajectories they also lead the missile to a shorter flight time.

The qualities of the DICBM can be found here: "It is a ballistic missile placed on a trajectory that has a low aoge and resulting in a depression of the entire trajectory. This depressed trajectory results in shortened radar detection ranges, shorter flight times, and some trajectories which can exploit holes in existing detection systems."

The development of an FOBS may necessarily lead to a DICBM, as per the Soviet designs of the 60s/70s. Also in the source, read what they say: "During 1968, the Russians again used the SS-X-6 in a DICBM role. The vehicles were launched from Tyura Tam and impacted in the Pacific. Apogee height o£ these tests were 300 Miles, less than the normal apogee height for this system in an ICBM role. These tests continued to cloud the issue on Soviet intent. Clearly, though, the interest and technological capability existed to use space for an offensive weapon system. the element of surprise which might be available from space weapons could significantly complement their strategic offensive capability, neither high costs nor the space treaty will be likely to deter its use."

The apogee of an ICBM with a depressed trajectory is greater than that of an FOBS that reaches an altitude of 150 km, an ICBM will have a greater apogee, probably climbing something around 300 km to 800 km altitude, enough to reduce the window of intercepting the American ABM apparatus, which still suffers from limitations and recurrent errors, not giving the precise reliability that a system of this size proposes.

In a document "Defense Appropriations 1971", they highlight whether they should develop an FOBS or an ICBM with a depressed trajectory due to Soviet advances, as can be seen in the attached image.

The development of the Chinese FOBS is likely to be leading to the development of a DICBM to create new systems of strategic attack, decreasing the numerical vulnerability that exists between the US and China. It is worth remembering that I have no doubt that China, based on the development of FOBS, will develop MOBS (Multi-Orbit Bombardment System/Multiple Orbital Bombardment System) to further reduce this numerical weakness, compensating with qualitative strengthening.

IIRC, a depressed trajectory ICBM was really only pertinent to SSBNs SLBM's being fired in salvoes along the east /west coast of USA -theoretically evading the north polar corridor BMEWS etc in order to gain a first strike advantage-only during the US/USSR cold war stratagems-and I've read alot of these novels as well as open source books etc- not really feasible with MAD.As for recent Chinese test of who knows what-but would be amusing to get WH's/Pentagon's blood pressure boiling with another "copied/not-original/stolen" Chinese wonder weapon!!

 

[bajingan]

With China having the world's largest and most modern HSR network. At the end of 2020, China had 37,900 km of operational HSR, whats the possibility of China developing rail-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile like the russian RS-27 or SS-X-32Zh Barguzin
Imagine HSR mobile icbm, the only kind in the world

 

[Ringsword]

With China having the world's largest and most modern HSR network. At the end of 2020, China had 37,900 km of operational HSR, whats the possibility of China developing rail-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile like the russian RS-27 or SS-X-32Zh Barguzin
Imagine HSR mobile icbm, the only kind in the world

I believe China can easily build a rail mobile DF31A type ICBM but the many excellent roads in China unlike the lack of well-metaled roads in Russia (hence their need for a rail based system) precludes the necessity of PLARF from needing a rail based system urgently and all of China's road mobile systems need to be ensconced deep in the many mountain type bases (if anything else we Chinese can dig and build!!) and (hopefully never) ride out a first strike and come out to hit back at an enemy with MAD lethal force.

 

[Temstar]

With China having the world's largest and most modern HSR network. At the end of 2020, China had 37,900 km of operational HSR, whats the possibility of China developing rail-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile like the russian RS-27 or SS-X-32Zh Barguzin
Imagine HSR mobile icbm, the only kind in the world

I watched a video where this idea was discussed. This was seriously considered by PLA but was ruled out because:

• HSR are all electrified, the overhead wires are a huge pain in the ass for missile train. It would be possible to build a device to brush the wires aside to let the missile through but it invariable leads to more maintenance headache both for the missile force as well as the railway department
• missile train depends on the availability of long sections of railway with little traffic for constant discreet relocation for survivability. Russia has that in plentiful supply in the far east but railway are extremely busy in China with very complex schedule. To suddenly get other train out of the way to let a missile train through is a huge headache for railway traffic control. The amount of civilians involved in shuffling trains to let the missile train roam the network would be so great that it would be fairly vulnerable to discovery by foreign agents

 

[Ringsword]

I watched a video where this idea was discussed. This was seriously considered by PLA but was ruled out because:

• HSR are all electrified, the overhead wires are a huge pain in the ass for missile train. It would be possible to build a device to brush the wires aside to let the missile through but it invariable leads to more maintenance headache both for the missile force as well as the railway department
• missile train depends on the availability of long sections of railway with little traffic for constant discreet relocation for survivability. Russia has that in plentiful supply in the far east but railway are extremely busy in China with very complex schedule. To suddenly get other train out of the way to let a missile train through is a huge headache for railway traffic control. The amount of civilians involved in shuffling trains to let the missile train roam the network would be so great that it would be fairly vulnerable to discovery by foreign agents

I can only imagine a person in China going to work and being "reshuffled" by the authorities as a giant,long tubular covered train with the logo of the PLARF being transported the other way-"Honey I might be late for supper"

 

[Suetham]

IIRC, a depressed trajectory ICBM was really only pertinent to SSBNs SLBM's being fired in salvoes along the east /west coast of USA -theoretically evading the north polar corridor BMEWS etc in order to gain a first strike advantage-only during the US/USSR cold war stratagems-and I've read alot of these novels as well as open source books etc- not really feasible with MAD.As for recent Chinese test of who knows what-but would be amusing to get WH's/Pentagon's blood pressure boiling with another "copied/not-original/stolen" Chinese wonder weapon!!

A depressed ICBM trajectory did not need to be deployed in SLBMs if it was fired via the south pole, avoiding the north corridor radars, even an SLBM using the parabolic trajectory would not be tracked by the American radars, because none of these radars pointed towards the south corridor. Hypothetically, a Russian SLBM that fires an SLBM salvo on a parabolic trajectory of the South Atlantic or South Pacific would not be tracked.

An ICBM with depressed trajectory makes sense because the ABM system needs several layers of tracking to have the right firing solution to intercept the enemy missile, if the tracking window is decreased due to the lower trajectory of a supposed ICBM, the system US ABM will have an even higher rate of intercept uncertainty, so if the missile's tracking window is delayed, the intercept window will also be affected.

To draw a parallel with AShM missiles, it is precisely for this reason that the West generally employs sea-skimming missiles, because the target ship relying solely on its sensors, the anti-ship sea-skimming missile usually has an advantage in terms of reaction time for flying close to sea height and having a smaller signature. The same parallel can be drawn for ballistic missiles, but I am certainly ignoring the disadvantages of the missile performing a depressed trajectory such as reducing its speed, because in this trajectory, it will spend more time in the atmosphere, losing speed due to atmospheric drag and others more, but there are certainly advantages when considering the applicability of the concept.

 

[plawolf]

This depressed trajectory ballistic missile (DTBM for short) test is significant due to the continuous contrail, it looks to me like the entire flight was in atmosphere. This has the following significant ramifications:

- depending on range, this could represent a significant materials sciences leap for China to achieve the required prolonged heat and friction resistance.

- taken in conjecture with China’s recent ICHGV test, these two elements, when taken together, could represent a new weapon that is for all intents and purposes, immune to all current US boost phase and mid course intercepts. Since if China’s new silo fields are filled with such missiles, their position deep within China’s hinterland would make boost phase intercept effectively impossible, while all current US naval mid course interceptors are exoastmopheric and would not be able to intercept the missiles or HGV in atmosphere. That bypasses both US BMD forward deployments in places like SK, and its massive naval potential (which also happens to be the cheapest and most effective intercept methods), and places the US BMD burden solely on terminal intercept. Which is already leaky against IRBMs and would in all likelihood offer little but token resistance against HGVs at best in its current form.

-such technology also has huge defensive potential if applied to Chinese terminal interceptors. Allowing Chinese BMD terminal interceptors to potentially maintain powered flight throughout its flight, giving it better chances against manoeuvring ballistic missiles and HGVs alike.

I think the reduced detection horizon against ground based radar is really an incidental and largely peripheral benefit when modern and next gen early warning and tracking are increasingly going the space based route.

 

[Xizor]

-such technology also has potential huge defensive potential if applied to Chinese terminal interceptors. Allowing Chinese BMD terminal interceptors to potentially maintain powered flight throughout its flight, giving it better chances against manoeuvring ballistic missiles and HGVs alike.

I think the reduced detection horizon against ground based radar is really an incidental and largely peripheral benefit when modern and next gen early warning and tracking are increasingly going the space based route.

But how will the interceptor track the maneuvering enemy HGVs ? It's already difficult to communicate with a HGV itself.
Old Article (2015).

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"When a re-entry vehicle is unable to be connected, the only thing you can do is pray for it," said Xiaotian Gao, a physicist at the Harbin Institute of Technology in China.

Gao and his colleague Binhao Jiang have proposed a new way to maintain communication with spacecraft as they re-enter the atmosphere. The approach might also be applied to other hypersonic vehicles such as futuristic military planes and ballistic missiles.

Communication blackouts with hypersonic vehicles occur because as the craft zips along at five or more times the speed of sound, an envelope of hot ionized air, called a plasma sheath, surrounds it. This plasma sheath will reflect electromagnetic signals under most conditions, cutting off connection with anything outside of the vehicle. However, under certain special conditions, a plasma sheath can actually enhance the radiation from a communication antenna.Gao and his colleagues reasoned that it would be possible to replicate these special conditions in ordinary hypersonic flight by redesigning the antenna. The researchers first analyzed earlier experiments and found that the special signal enhancement could be explained by a resonance, or matched electromagnetic oscillations, between the plasma sheath and the surrounding air. They propose adding a "matched layer" to ordinary communication antennas to create the desired resonant conditions during normal hypersonic flight.

The matched layer works because it acts as like a capacitor -- a type of electrical energy storage unit -- in the antenna circuit, Gao explained. The plasma sheath, on the other hand, acts like an inductor, which resists changes in an electric current passing through it. When a capacitor and an inductor are paired together, they can form a resonant circuit. "Once the resonance is reached, the energy can be exchanged between them steadily and losslessly, like real capacitance and inductance do in a circuit," Gao said. "As a result, the electromagnetic radiation can propagate through the matched layer and the plasma sheath like they do not exist."For the resonance to work, the thickness of the matched layer and the plasma sheath must be smaller than the wavelength of the electromagnetic waves used to communicate, so the approach would be ineffective if the antenna frequency were too high, Gao noted.
The properties of the plasma sheath can change during flight, but Gao and his colleagues believe their matched layer can adjust for these changes if it is made from a material whose electromagnetic properties can be tuned with an electrical signal. "We don't need to know exactly the properties of the plasma layer, but we need to know the ranges for these properties. The matched layer will be adjusted by an automatic control system, so we only need to know the ranges to make sure this whole system can work appropriately," Gao said.

The team is not the first to try to solve the communication blackout problem, but their approach has advantages over other attempts. For example, the equipment needed to implement the matched layer is much lighter than the equipment required by other methods, such as trying to control the electrons in the plasma with an applied magnetic field, or injecting a liquid into the plasma to reduce its electron density. The matched layer approach also doesn't rely on a particular shape of vehicle to work, doesn't consume additional energy and can adapt to changes of the plasma sheath.

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This is just communication. Now imagine detection, active tracking and discernment required to connect a maneuvering warhead with an incoming maneuvering HGV.