China Ballistic Missiles and Nuclear Arms Thread

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Insignius

Junior Member
I keep getting the feeling that I'm talking to a wall because people don't seem to understand that the US won't just sit still and keep it's current stockpiles and capabilities if China suddenly gets a thousand or so more nukes. The Cold War era arms races were a few decades ago, have people already forgotten how absurd they were? China intentionally keeps it's stockpile at it's minimum. What part of this is hard to understand? If China does expand it's stockpile, it will be to the minimum that leadership has determined is necessary to avoid an arms race or anything resembling an escalation spiral.

It's genuinely confusing to me, because as a Chinese person, the fact that China's nuclear deterrent policy was so smart was something I was proud of, it shows that the government cares more about improving the livelihood of it's citizens than on weapons that will never be used. The fact that I see so many people here advocating for apocalyptic levels of stockpile inflation is incomprehensible to me. Do you think China should go down the path that made Russia into a wreck, and America into the grotesque military-industrial cancer it is today? Please.

You are speaking to a wall because you are using false equivalence.

There is a qualitiative difference between the US having 7000 nukes versus China's 300, and China having 1000 nukes vs America's 30,000 nukes.

The margin of error for US disarmament strikes against 1000 nukes increases exponentially as compared to the US trying to take out mere 300 nukes, no matter how much more nukes they have in either scenario. More nukes for China will directly translate into more nukes that will survive, no matter how much more the US nuclear arsenal increases. Nuclear whack-a-mole against more moles will not get simpler, even if you increase your hammers.
Bottom line is that China will "win" any nuclear arms-race with the US, since China's only objective is to have a SURVIVABLE second strike capability and not match the US nuke for nuke in a first strike scenario.

And this is why your comparisson with the Cold War nuclear arms race as an example for why China should not increase its stockpile is dead wrong. The USSR maintained a symmetric nuclear doctrine as the US, including requirements for disarmament strikes and tactical use of nukes during conventional war. This is why the USSR trotted down the road of ruinous spending, since they had to match the US nuke for nuke. China, on the other hand, doesnt have to do this: There is no nuclear arms race between China and the US; only China incrementally increasing its stockpile to maintain survivability.
 

W20

Junior Member
Registered Member
China says that the amount of its nuclear arsenal should be compared more or less with "UK and France", for me that is more or less 300 + 300 + 300 = 900 warheads, it's a bit strange to laugh at these serious things but I don't rule out a good sense of humor

we do not know, in any case my impression is that this discussion about quantity perhaps reflects a discussion from years ago, just as DF-41 is the answer to defense systems
 

totenchan

New Member
Registered Member
You are speaking to a wall because you are using false equivalence.

There is a qualitiative difference between the US having 7000 nukes versus China's 300, and China having 1000 nukes vs America's 30,000 nukes.

The margin of error for US disarmament strikes against 1000 nukes increases exponentially as compared to the US trying to take out mere 300 nukes, no matter how much more nukes they have in either scenario. More nukes for China will directly translate into more nukes that will survive, no matter how much more the US nuclear arsenal increases. Nuclear whack-a-mole against more moles will not get simpler, even if you increase your hammers.
Bottom line is that China will "win" any nuclear arms-race with the US, since China's only objective is to have a SURVIVABLE second strike capability and not match the US nuke for nuke in a first strike scenario.

And this is why your comparisson with the Cold War nuclear arms race as an example for why China should not increase its stockpile is dead wrong. The USSR maintained a symmetric nuclear doctrine as the US, including requirements for disarmament strikes and tactical use of nukes during conventional war. This is why the USSR trotted down the road of ruinous spending, since they had to match the US nuke for nuke. China, on the other hand, doesnt have to do this: There is no nuclear arms race between China and the US; only China incrementally increasing its stockpile to maintain survivability.
The credibility of China's no first use policy is partially predicated on China's low stockpile. If China's stockpile grows to a point where this policy is thrown into question, many of the benefits, both diplomatic and economic, are out the window. This may even force China to abandon this policy.
Your second point rests on the assumption that there is any doubt of China's ability to perform a second strike, and that there will somehow be no consequences in a large-scale expansion in the stockpile. Both of these assumptions are false. I have explained why in previous posts. If you disagree on either of these, we have a fundamental disagreement that cannot be overcome. I'd require some very hard evidence to believe otherwise.
The parallels drawn between China and the Soviet Union are relevant because at some point, the lines in terms of stockpile size between ensuring a credible second strike and attempting a counter-force strike blurs. If this becomes the case, there is no real difference between the Soviet Union and China: the result will be an arms race. If this scenario seems unlikely to you, consider a scenario in which the US believes that China's stockpile has grown to a point where it's NFU policy becomes no longer credible. It then begins investing in technologies such as missile defense and ASAT technologies at a massive scale. What are China's choices but to begin a massive increase in stockpile, and spending massive amounts of money into new technologies? Sounds familiar?
 
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quantumlight

Junior Member
Registered Member
The credibility of China's no first use policy is partially predicated on China's low stockpile. If China's stockpile grows to a point where this policy is thrown into question, many of the benefits, both diplomatic and economic, are out the window. This may even force China to abandon this policy.
Your second point rests on the assumption that there is any doubt of China's ability to perform a second strike, and that there will somehow be no consequences in a large-scale expansion in the stockpile. Both of these assumptions are false. I have explained why in previous posts. If you disagree on either of these, we have a fundamental disagreement that cannot be overcome. I'd require some very hard evidence to believe otherwise.
The parallels drawn between China and the Soviet Union are relevant because at some point, the lines in terms of stockpile size between ensuring a credible second strike and attempting a counter-force strike blurs. If this becomes the case, there is no real difference between the Soviet Union and China: the result will be an arms race. If this scenario seems unlikely to you, consider a scenario in which the US believes that China's stockpile has grown to a point where it's NFU policy becomes no longer credible. It then begins investing in technologies such as missile defense and ASAT technologies at a massive scale. What are China's choices but to begin a massive increase in stockpile, and spending massive amounts of money into new technologies? Sounds familiar?
Dynamic is different this time. US no longer 50% of the world GDP anymore... At height of Cold War USSR economy about size of California.. yet soon China real economy will be twice that of USA

Who is going to outspend whom this time?


China is already outspending US on things like infrastructure, roads, highways, high speed train, renewable energy, yet when it comes to nukes and deterrence why all of a sudden the double/different standard...

China needs a strategic defense commensurate to its economic stature and one that reflects its development and growth ambitions

Id rather China spend it on things that boost existential survival rather than buying more US treasuries
 
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W20

Junior Member
Registered Member
that is true: now the US is similar or resembles the USSR from a long-term economic point of view and as an ideological bubble: America is the Truman Show, and we are the spectators

My assessment of the situation of the pieces on the chess board ... makes me lean towards caution as the best strategic option (-2049): youthful impetus is not a good advisor. By this i mean that i fully share totenchan's analysis
 

Sardaukar20

Captain
Registered Member
I keep getting the feeling that I'm talking to a wall because people don't seem to understand that the US won't just sit still and keep it's current stockpiles and capabilities if China suddenly gets a thousand or so more nukes. The Cold War era arms races were a few decades ago, have people already forgotten how absurd they were? China intentionally keeps it's stockpile at it's minimum. What part of this is hard to understand? If China does expand it's stockpile, it will be to the minimum that leadership has determined is necessary to avoid an arms race or anything resembling an escalation spiral.

It's genuinely confusing to me, because as a Chinese person, the fact that China's nuclear deterrent policy was so smart was something I was proud of, it shows that the government cares more about improving the livelihood of it's citizens than on weapons that will never be used. The fact that I see so many people here advocating for apocalyptic levels of stockpile inflation is incomprehensible to me. Do you think China should go down the path that made Russia into a wreck, and America into the grotesque military-industrial cancer it is today? Please.
When the Soviet Union was spending itself to death on defence in 1986. It had a peak nuclear weapons stockpile of 45000 nuclear warheads. I don't think many of us advocates of Chinese nuclear buildup like me would be asking for those kinda crazy numbers. Most of us here would like to see figures of 1000 to 5000. Nowhere near the 45000. We should also note that while China's economy now is stronger than the Soviet Union of 1986. It's military power today is nowhere nearly as powerful as the Soviet Union's of 1986.

Yes, you should be proud that the Chinese government really does care for its people. They have navigated China from the difficult times of the Cold War, to becoming the second biggest economy in the world. And have finally eradicated extreme poverty in 2020. But times are changing fast.

There was a time where the USA can be trusted to behave like a responsible superpower. In 2020, that time has ended. The US is pulling out of every known nuclear arms control treaty bar the NPT. The US have developed new nuclear weapons, new delivery systems, lowering the threshold for using nukes, and more importantly, are hinting of further expanding its nuclear arsenal. Russia saw this, and started introducing its new wonder weapons. Why shouldn't China respond too? With the Donald Trump presidency, and the Covid-19 blame game. China is fast becoming a priority target for USA and other hostile nuclear powers. You can argue that Joe Biden is now the next president, so US-China tensions will not go crazy again. Perhaps Joe Biden may go easier on China, but he will damn sure be rebuilding US alliances and armaments. Then on 2024, Donald Trump or someone worse could win the US presidential election. He inherits this newly rebuilt US alliance and arsenal. How safe do you think it will be for China then? China cannot gamble on the future.

What many of us here are advocating is that China's nuclear defence posture needs to be updated. The US is a declining, and desperate superpower. Its actions increasingly erratic and aggressive. We should add that UK, France, and especially India have also dreams of nuking China. Remember, China has no US-NATO nuclear umbrella to fall back to. China is all on its own. What we want is the same minimal deterrence policy of China, but updated for 2020 onwards. 300 warheads is not minimal deterrence, its laughable deterrence. 1000 warheads is a good number to start forming some minimal deterrence, 2000-3000 is better. China does not need to match or exceed the US's nuclear stockpile of 5000 warheads. China just needs move its threshold of minimal deterrence in accordance to the new threat level. Just have to make sure that MAD is be assured for any of China's enemies stupid enough to play nuclear.
 

Anlsvrthng

Captain
Registered Member
Few SSBN can mop up all Chinese warheads.

As soon as the SSBNs rolls off from the shipyards the Pu reactors needs to be restarted.
 

Hendrik_2000

Lieutenant General
Guys everything is based on estimate nobody know for sure how many nuke China has since they didn't disclose it. Here it is how they estimate the Pu production interesting article
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ESTIMATING CHINA’S MILITARY PLUTONIUM PRODUCTION The range of published estimates of China’s military plutonium production is very broad. In their first book estimating fissile material stockpiles, Albright, Berkhout, and Walker32 estimated that China had produced from 1 to 4 tonnes of plutonium. On the other hand, Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse33 give an estimate of roughly 4 to 7 tonnes with an upper bound of 15 tonnes. The difference in these estimates appears to result primarily from estimates of the power of the production reactors, as we discuss below. We attempt in this section to develop an independent estimate.

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(1) where XPu is the amount of plutonium produced annually (in kilograms per year); C is the capacity factor, which is typically between 0.5 and 1; Pth is the thermal power of the reactor (in megawatts); and β is the amount of plutonium produced per megawatt-day of operation, which depends on the specific burnup of the fuel and thus on the fraction of Pu-240 in the extracted plutonium. For burnups that give a Pu-240 content in the range of 3–6%, the value of β is in the range 9.0–8.5 × 10−4 kg/MWd, or just under 1 gram per megawatt-day (see Appendix A; the value of β for U.S. plutonium production at Hanford was34 8.2 × 10−4 kg/MWd). TJ715-04 SGS.cls April 15, 2003 21:50

Estimating China’s Weapons Plutonium Production 67 The reactor power, the capacity factor, and the specific burnup of the fuel will, in general, change over the lifetime of the reactor. We estimate these quantities based in part on the history of the Jiuquan reactor sketched above, as well as on knowledge of the U.S. and Soviet production programs. Estimating the Reactor Power at Jiuquan There is little reliable information about the power of either of China’s production reactors. For the Jiuquan reactor, Albright et al.,35 assume a reactor in the range of 400–600 MWth. Norris et al.,36 on the other hand, state that the reactor may have been able to produce 300–400 kg of plutonium annually, which would require a maximum power of 1400–1900 MWth, assuming a capacity factor of 70% and 6% Pu-240 content.

This figure appears to be based on a U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) estimate from 1972, which likely came from satellite photos of the facility. Several other references also give estimates of reactor size or annual plutonium production, but the reliability of these figures is uncertain. A 1969 Sunday Times of London article, written by a journalist who visited China, states that a Chinese source told him that the Jiuquan facility could produce more than 300 kg of plutonium annually.37 A 1985 article in The China Business Review states without giving a source that this plant could produce about 400 kg annually.38 On the other hand, a German study gives a lower figure, stating that the Jiuquan reactor power is 600 MWth and produces 200 kg weapon-grade plutonium per year.39 We note that a 600 MWth reactor could only produce 200 kg of plutonium annually if it operated with a capacity factor of 100%. Assuming a capacity factor of 70% and 6% Pu-240, a 600 MWth reactor could produce only 130 kg of plutonium annually; alternately, producing 200 kg annually would require a 900 MWth reactor.

Jeffrey Lewis is the one who proposed 300 nuclear warhead count
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Based on this Now this guy Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988) and John Lewis Actually work in Chinese nuclear facility in 80 's and he went to MIT for further study and coauthor with Jeffrey lewis the estimate.

Estimating China’s Production of Plutonium for Weapons David Wright and Lisbeth Gronlund1 January 16, 2003 This paper discusses the history of China’s production of plutonium for nuclear weapons, and uses that history and analogies to the production process in the United States and Russia to estimate the amount of plutonium China produced at its two known facilities. That analysis leads to an estimate that China produced 2 to 5 tonnes of plutonium at these facilities before it ceased production around 1990. The paper describes how the analysis was done and what assumptions were used so that a reader can understand how the results are affected by different assumptions or by new information that might become available.

Given the lack of information available about most aspects of China's nuclear-weapon program, the estimate of plutonium production developed in this paper is necessarily rough. However, even a rough estimate is interesting since the size of China’s fissile material stockpiles will influence China's willingness to join a multilateral “cut-off” convention to ban future production of fissile material for weapons or outside of safeguards. History of Chinese Plutonium Production Plutonium is produced by irradiating uranium-238 with neutrons in a nuclear reactor and then extracting the plutonium from the mixture of plutonium, uranium, and fission products that result from the fission of the uranium and plutonium. Thus a production complex must contain a production reactor and a reprocessing facility to separate the plutonium.

China is believed to have produced plutonium for weapons at two facilities: (1) the Jiuquan Atomic Energy Complex (also referred as Plant 404 or the Yumen or Subei facility, after a nearby cityand county), where the first production reactor began operating in late 1966, and (2) the Guangyuan facility (or Plant 821), one of the so-called "Third Line" facilities, which probably began operating in the mid-1970s. Below we first describe the history of the facilities and then estimate their output.

Our discussion of the Chinese production complex draws heavily on information available in the official Chinese history of its nuclear industry,2 and on the work of Lewis and Xue.3 1 David Wright and Lisbeth Gronlund are Co-Directors and Senior Scientists in the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists, and Research Scientists in the Security Studies Program at MIT. 2 Li Jue, et al., eds., Tang Tai Chung-kuo Ti Ho Kung Yeh [China Today: Nuclear Industry] (First Edition) (Beijing, 1987). Selections are translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, US Department of Commerce Joint Publications Research Service, JPRS Report—Science and Technology: China, JPRS-CST-88-002, 15 January 1988 and JPRS-CST-88-008, 26 April 1988. 3 John Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988) and John Lewis
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