Well, from experience of first two weeks, i guess we can do our vlog&first impressions on Iranian ADF.
In both Lion and especially the war of Epstein league, success story seem to be Majid/Ghaem/358(9) series, i.e. low end systems for both IRGC and ADF. They're some of the easiest to disperse, and also some of the newest. Curiously, unlike Yemen (where 358 was the absolute star), in this war Majid/Ghaem are far more prominent（though 358 still scores, and, as usual, managed kills even beyond Iran proper).
Apparently, lessons were learned, and US/IS managed to find operational limitations of 358(9) systems(first time they were effectively countered was in Lebanon, but it was Israel directly intercepting them - which is very rich way of doing things, and isn't applicable overn Iran).
This is by far the most succesful group, and assuming current attrition tempo continues are the best bet for Iranians to achieve something via ADF directly: attrition rate for MALEs is high, and given their non-infinite numbers, persistent armed overwatch will break at some point, and it won't be long. MALEs indeed have proven (yet another time) indespensible, suprisingly survivable, but still - an easiest breaking point.
On the other side - if you're looking at positive Iranian experience to study - go no further than these systems.
Navy systems in current context are irrelevant, though frankly it appears most large ships from both IRGC and IRN were just abandoned and are getting dutifully picked off by drones without much resistence. Nt too surprising, though as a result they're getting picked by systems that they could've attrited. Can't blame them though, when clinging to life rafts in burning water is a predetermined result, trading dozens of lives for several drones isn't exactly attractive.
Large SAMs struggle to survive, but far more crucially for Iran - they struggle to fight back, for a 4th time at this point(Lebanon, Yemen, 2 Iranian campaigns). We have no way of knowing what's going in RF spectrum, but from available footage - Iranian FLIRs appear to be awfully inadequate in IRCCM department - FLIR(not seeker!) readily switches tracking at a first flare drop. This makes ambush hits with available smokey missiles improbable, unless aircraft crew is asleep. 1970s problems.
This doesn't mean they don't have impact - it did take time to establish air superiority over Iran, and it still isn't complete; these systems are dangerous enough to consider them. But honestly speaking, this is a low bar, and almost a dozen known systems or variants hasn't achieved much over what upgraded MIM-23 Hawks with some modern circuitry could.
Bright side for Iran - it appears they still have some at stick, likely hiding in underground fortresses. Assuming drone overwatch will collapse at some point, Iran still may have a shot at restoring some level of operational deterrence. Maybe.
But overall, if your systems aren't up to standard and you know it - i don't know, consider investing more into believable decoys rather than in complete systems. Cheaper, saves resources for where it works.
Main falls of Iranian ADF system are however lying elsewhere: it's ABM and C-PGM.
There are signs of counter-PGM engagements, but their role in reducing delivered weight doesn't appear to be substantial. No ABM engagements were seen at all. Iran tried to develop both capabilities very late on(in 2020s), trying to integrate its ADF assets (from both arms) and achieve some actual protection, but all 3 appear to be horribly delayed, and as such - ineffective individually and when put together.
ABM IAD network is existential against Israel, so is CIWS/C-UAS. Of first, Iran appears to only really have had S-300PMU2s, which were put out of action back in 2024. Of second, Zoubin was only starting getting deployed in 2025 - and few available vehicles were most probably lost or are hiding; the only other system which can do CIWS work - few IRGC Tors and their local derivatives - could do so only if warned in time(and ideally cued, as vanilla Tor search radar is very outdated), which wasn't the case.
IRGC attempts to adapt existing large SAMs to counter-PGM role(25h Khordad) appear to do little; as usual, hard to tell why, but given how Iranian systems tend to get caught - most likely culprit is lack of battlespace awareness.
And of course, underlying lesson for all of it:
Working air force matters. At least something.
