09V/09VI (095/096) Nuclear Submarine Thread

[Lethe]

I think folks are right to dismiss the idea that the next generation of Chinese nuclear submarines will simply reflect lessons learned from Russian submarine design, products and expertise since the 1990s. At the same time, I think folks are on shaky ground if they are trying to argue that Chinese submarine design has not benefitted from its engagement with Russian products and expertise in the 1990s and beyond. I also think the emotive response to the Akula comparison is unwarranted, mostly because the objection to that analogy fails to recognise how good the Pr. 971 Akula-class design was and is, being the first time that Russian submarine design exceeded the state of the western art across most core metrics of capability. The Pr. 885 Yasen-class boats aren't considered one of the most formidable designs in the world because they embody all these revolutionary technologies, but because they are an incremental step forward over the already formidable capabilities achieved with the Akula-class design. Indeed, from a career preservation perspective, "on par with Akula" is the greatest compliment that an American source can pay without acknowledging that it is likely to be superior to the greater part of the existing US submarine force.

Improved Akula is more 93A or maybe generously speaking first block 93B.

Of course modern Chinese boats will have more modern systems, but in terms of acoustic characteristics this is unlikely given the more limited volume of the 093 design to accommodate quieting measures and new generation powerplants. Though, if the surface fleet is anything to go by, Chinese submarines likely benefit from higher maintenance standards and therefore likely have acoustic characteristics closer to their "reference standard" than contemporary Russian submarines have to theirs...

 

[Biscuits]

I think folks are right to dismiss the idea that the next generation of Chinese nuclear submarines will simply reflect lessons learned from Russian submarine design, products and expertise since the 1990s. At the same time, I think folks are on shaky ground if they are trying to argue that Chinese submarine design has not benefitted from its engagement with Russian products and expertise in the 1990s and beyond. I also think the emotive response to the Akula comparison is unwarranted, mostly because the objection to that analogy fails to recognise how good the Pr. 971 Akula-class design was and is, being the first time that Russian submarine design exceeded the state of the western art across most core metrics of capability. The Pr. 885 Yasen-class boats aren't considered one of the most formidable designs in the world because they embody all these revolutionary technologies, but because they are an incremental step forward over the already formidable capabilities achieved with the Akula-class design. Indeed, from a career preservation perspective, "on par with Akula" is the greatest compliment that an American source can pay without acknowledging that it is likely to be superior to the greater part of the existing US submarine force.

There's nothing fundamentally wrong with the Improved Akula or Yasen. But there is a significant precision manufacturing gap between China and Russia. That gives China a major boost in designing better quieting equipment and components. Saying the early block 093B is on par with improved Akula is hardly an insult to Russia. Those are China's 2nd best subs and are the main line defence in an US attack scenario.

But the late block 093B (I.e. pump jet ones) are at least seemingly major upgrades, like the difference between 052B and 052C. Not a small step up.

Quiet frankly, if China believed in the Improved Akula or something similar as the future of its fleet, it would buy one. Or more likely, buy a Yasen which is even better.

Even if submarine tech is difficult to quantify due to secrecy, it should be clear that in 2023, due to the overall high end state of Chinese industry, experience with world class SSKs and long term experience with near world class SSNs, China is more than confident in making it's own tailor made designs that at the very least equal Yasen, eliminating any need for China to import nuclear subs or their related tech.

Of course modern Chinese boats will have more modern systems, but in terms of acoustic characteristics this is unlikely given the more limited volume of the 093 design to accommodate quieting measures and new generation powerplants.

Speculating it's power plant is quiet or not is random guesses, because it's the black box which can't be cross referenced with other more publicly known technology. Claiming some designers made the reactor volume too low to accomandate the other designers' quieting equipment when we have no knowledge of the size of either is assuming procurement conflicts, but this is completely baseless, there's no rumors or even clues whatsoever about that. The prudent assumption unless proved otherwise by new info would be that the design is made the correct size to accomandate it's equipment and reactor.

Though, if the surface fleet is anything to go by, Chinese submarines likely benefit from higher maintenance standards and therefore likely have acoustic characteristics closer to their "reference standard" than contemporary Russian submarines have to theirs...

 

[Lethe]

There's nothing fundamentally wrong with the Improved Akula or Yasen. But there is a significant precision manufacturing gap between China and Russia. That gives China a major boost in designing better quieting equipment and components. Saying the early block 093B is on par with improved Akula is hardly an insult to Russia. Those are China's 2nd best subs and are the main line defence in an US attack scenario.

I agree that China is today likely in the realm of parity-advantage (i.e. ranging from parity in some areas to advantages in others) across most relevant domains in submarine design and construction, relative to Russia, and that this will have percolated through to 093B to a considerable extent, particularly in the realm of e.g. sensors and data processing. That said, 093 is not only a product of China of the last decade, but also inherits the legacy of China all the way to the early 1990s when much the detailed design of 093 would've been nailed down, including the hull design, powerplant and basic machinery configurations. I would hope that nobody would suggest that China's expertise in the early-mid 1990s was comparable to either USN or Russia (inheriting the achievements of the late Soviet Union) of the same period. If one could simply keep revising 093 into a world-class design, there would be no reason for the 095 program to exist. The third-generation SSN program evidently exists because there are desirable features (such as the full horizontal isolation raft mentioned in the recent, much-maligned paper) or advancements that cannot effectively be implemented on the existing platform. I don't believe it would be surprising to learn that some of the features and characteristics dictating "095" instead of "093C/D/X" may well have been present on the 688I/Akula/Akula II/Seawolf series some decades ago.

But the late block 093B (I.e. pump jet ones) are at least seemingly major upgrades, like the difference between 052B and 052C. Not a small step up.

That a seemingly major upgrade such as replacing the propellor with a pump jet does not earn 093B its own number designation suggests the kinds of fundamental revisions that are to be incorporated in 095, which in turn goes back to my point about 093B being to some extent a product of China in the early-mid 1990s as well as China of the last decade.

In any case, the matter of the pump jet is very interesting. Russia uses pump jets on the Borei-class boats but not on the Yasen-class submarines. Question is why. Pump jets are much less efficient than propellors at lower speeds, which is why non-testbed diesel-electric boats use propellers and why Naval Group

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against the Australian defence bureaucracy's preference for pump jets in the context of the now-abandoned Attack-class program. The relevance of this for nuclear-powered submarines, as far as I can see, is that across an indeterminate range of speeds, the pumpjet-powered submarine will require greater power output from the reactor, and this is likely to have some interesting interactions with the ability of certain advanced reactor designs (including as featured on the Borei- and Yasen-class submarines) to operate under natural circulation beneath a certain ouput threshold. That is to say, there may well be a particular range of speeds wherein the pumpjet-powered submarine has to engage the reactor pumps whereas the equivalent propellor-powered submarine could operate on natural circulation. In such a scenario, you are trading off one type of noise for another, and the analysis of which solution is preferable would be specific not only to the specifics of the submarine design, but also its intended deployment patterns. As we can see, Russia's submarine bureaus have determined that pumpjet works for one design but not another.

 

[Blitzo]

I think folks are right to dismiss the idea that the next generation of Chinese nuclear submarines will simply reflect lessons learned from Russian submarine design, products and expertise since the 1990s. At the same time, I think folks are on shaky ground if they are trying to argue that Chinese submarine design has not benefitted from its engagement with Russian products and expertise in the 1990s and beyond. I also think the emotive response to the Akula comparison is unwarranted, mostly because the objection to that analogy fails to recognise how good the Pr. 971 Akula-class design was and is, being the first time that Russian submarine design exceeded the state of the western art across most core metrics of capability. The Pr. 885 Yasen-class boats aren't considered one of the most formidable designs in the world because they embody all these revolutionary technologies, but because they are an incremental step forward over the already formidable capabilities achieved with the Akula-class design. Indeed, from a career preservation perspective, "on par with Akula" is the greatest compliment that an American source can pay without acknowledging that it is likely to be superior to the greater part of the existing US submarine force.

I don't think anyone is suggesting Chinese submarine development hasn't benefited from russian/post soviet technologies or human resources, but people are pointing out that portraying Russian technologies or capabilities as a rate limiting factor or a peak ceiling capability for current Chinese submarines (let alone future expected Chinese submarines) is a bit laughable.

"On par with Akula" is very much described correctly by THX in their post -- saying the Chinese industry may be able to, by 2030 put into service a submarine that was state of the art for Russia in 1992, nearly 40 years ago.

I do not personally care if it is complimentary or not, but it does strike me as a bit of a put down, if not a cope.

"On par, or superior with expected capabilities of SSN(X)" on the other hand, would be more complimentary, but it is rather indicative that the author couldn't even consider comparing their vision of 09V to a USN submarine of the late cold war era like 688i, let alone contemporary USN SSNs, let alone the likely capability that the PLAN are aiming to compete with (future USN SSN classes).

Of course modern Chinese boats will have more modern systems, but in terms of acoustic characteristics this is unlikely given the more limited volume of the 093 design to accommodate quieting measures and new generation powerplants. Though, if the surface fleet is anything to go by, Chinese submarines likely benefit from higher maintenance standards and therefore likely have acoustic characteristics closer to their "reference standard" than contemporary Russian submarines have to theirs...

Hull volume (in this case, as a result of the double hull design) indeed poses a hard limit, but new technologies (in the overall submarine as a whole) can be not only quieter, but also smaller in volume both by design and by manning requirements compared to legacy designs from the late cold war.

I won't comment on the comparative acoustic cover performance of 09III family with other submarine classes explicitly (you can private message me if you want my thoughts), but let's just say that if Carlson's paper wants to talk about Improved Akula esque performance by 2030, he is probably a bit late by some 15 years.

 

[vincent]

The problem with Carlson's conclusion on the next generation Chinese SSN/SSBN is that it was not based on real data. Like I said earlier, garbage sources -> garbage conclusions.

 

[Blitzo]

The problem with Carlson's conclusion on the next generation Chinese SSN/SSBN is that it was not based on real data. Like I said earlier, garbage sources -> garbage conclusions.

For PLA watching we often have to make inferences and estimates without good sources or information; the problem for Carlson isn't necessarily that he isn't based on "real data" but rather his positions are based on flawed assumptions and peppered by a decent amount of what the kids call "cope".

 

[gelgoog]

delete

 

[Lethe]

I don't think anyone is suggesting Chinese submarine development hasn't benefited from russian/post soviet technologies or human resources, but people are pointing out that portraying Russian technologies or capabilities as a rate limiting factor or a peak ceiling capability for current Chinese submarines (let alone future expected Chinese submarines) is a bit laughable.

"On par with Akula" is very much described correctly by THX in their post -- saying the Chinese industry may be able to, by 2030 put into service a submarine that was state of the art for Russia in 1992, nearly 40 years ago.

I do not personally care if it is complimentary or not, but it does strike me as a bit of a put down, if not a cope.

I agree that it is absurd to imply that China's advancement only reflects technology and expertise gained from Russia. That is a reasonable interpretation of the document in question, which clearly over-reaches in that regard. At the same time, I do think such comparisons need to be taken in context. In this case, I believe the key piece of context that many people are missing is just how highly regarded the late Soviet advancements in submarine technology were, and the extent to which they remain competitive today.

The Trident II D5 SLBM dates back to the same period (i.e. developed 1980s, fielded 1990). JL-2 is clearly inferior to that missile, and we can only trust that JL-3 will finally match or exceed it. If that happens then China will have matched what America achieved some 35 years ago. That would be a fantastic achievement, and a very important one for China given geographical/deployment considerations, because Trident II is still a beast of a missile, just as the improved Akula-class boats remain formidable SSN's that, at least minus maintenance and training considerations, are better in most respects than the greater part of America's SSN force today (which still contains more 688s than Virginias).

To be clear, I think that "Improved Akula" is likely to be a lowball estimate in many respects. But as a lowball estimate, it's not a bad place to be. The next step up is Virginia/Seawolf/Yasen/Astute, i.e. there is only one more step up. I do find it interesting that we hear a lot of public fretting about China's advancements in surface combatants and other fields (even if it is disguised by subsequent copium about e.g. lack of experience), yet there is very little to suggest that USN is concerned about Chinese submarine capabilities (if anything, Constellation having only one helo and no bow sonar suggests they are still taking PLAN submarines rather lightly). Perhaps we are just awaiting 095/096 to prompt a western reassessment of these matters, much as Pr. 671RTMK Victor III and subsequent developments prompted alarm in western circles and a reassessment of Soviet submarine capabilities back in the day.

 

[Blitzo]

I agree that it is absurd to imply that China's advancement only reflects technology and expertise gained from Russia. That is a reasonable interpretation of the document in question, which clearly over-reaches in that regard. At the same time, I do think such comparisons need to be taken in context. In this case, I believe the key piece of context that many people are missing is just how highly regarded the late Soviet advancements in submarine technology were, and the extent to which they remain competitive today.

The Trident II D5 SLBM dates back to the same period (i.e. developed 1980s, fielded 1990). JL-2 is clearly inferior to that missile, and we can only trust that JL-3 will finally match or exceed it. If that happens then China will have matched what America achieved some 35 years ago. That would be a fantastic achievement, and a very important one for China given geographical/deployment considerations, because Trident II is still a beast of a missile, just as the improved Akula-class boats remain formidable SSN's that, at least minus maintenance and training considerations, are better in most respects than the greater part of America's SSN force today (which still contains more 688s than Virginias).

To be clear, I think that "Improved Akula" is likely to be a lowball estimate in many respects. But as a lowball estimate, it's not a bad place to be. The next step up is Virginia/Seawolf/Yasen/Astute, i.e. there is only one more step up. I do find it interesting that we hear a lot of public fretting about China's advancements in surface combatants and other fields (even if it is disguised by subsequent copium about e.g. lack of experience), yet there is very little to suggest that USN is concerned about Chinese submarine capabilities (if anything, Constellation having only one helo and no bow sonar suggests they are still taking PLAN submarines rather lightly). Perhaps we are just awaiting 095/096 to prompt a western reassessment of these matters, much as Pr. 671RTMK Victor III and subsequent developments prompted alarm in western circles and a reassessment of Soviet submarine capabilities back in the day.

So I disagree with parts of your post in two ways.

First, I think you overestimate the capability of the Akula today. It was certainly fairly capable in its day, but in the contemporary age it is not sufficiently capable against modern SSNs and certainly against adversary ASW complexes. The same goes for things like Kilos. There are many platforms that were capable in the past but for various reasons are no longer competitive. For example, leading fighter aircraft in the cold war and late cold war were very capable and often kinematically impressive, but if they did not receive upgrades to key subsystems and aspects (say sensors, datalinking, weapons), then they are just unable to keep up with even half modern lightweight fighters.

Second, is that there are some weapons and platform types which are from past decades which due to the nature of their role in combat, they can still be considered very capable today even though newer variants and significant upgrades exist.
For example, assault rifles like AKs and M4s from the 90s (or even some firearms more distant in the past, even a few types from the 19th century as we can see in Ukraine) are multiple decades old as well, yet they have seen multiple upgrades with newer variants to make them more lethal... But because of the nature of their role in warfare, the older assault rifle and firearms types can still be used in modern warfare without being massively non-competitive if the adversary had more modern rifles if the adversary had other capabilities that were competitive.
Similarly, for things like ICBMs or SLBMs like Trident, they have received significant upgrades in a whole variety of domains over the decades, but if certain key characteristics like range, payload, readiness, sufficient accuracy etc can be attained, then any further gains in capability doesn't necessarily endow the same massive gain in capability that say, an avionics+weapons suite upgrade for a cold war era fighter aircraft does.


.... Going back to Carlson's paper and their assessments of 09V/VI, I do not particularly care about what their specific end prediction here is, but rather that I think they have a number of existing assumptions and flawed methods that make them to assess indicators and evidence in a sensible manner, while also (I suspect) having a preconceived conclusion that they already believe in (this case probably being that 09V will "only" be able to be something like what was cutting edge for Russia in the early 1990s) which causes them to further interpret indicators like they were wearing blinders.
There are likely entire indicators and possibilities which they dismiss out of hand or ignore because it interferes with their existing world view and preconceived conclusion.

 

[gelgoog]

Actually the Kilo was severely upgraded with Project 636. And the Russian Navy seem to consider them still good enough to the point where they ordered several of these boats which are still being delivered. In preference to ordering the Lada or waiting until it is serially produced. Not that long ago the Project 636 was also exported to Algeria and Vietnam not to mention China.
Compared with the original Kilo it has a different propeller, diesel engine, and electronics. 5 posts were eliminated due to improved command systems automation. And it can fire the Kalibr instead of just torpedos.

Not all Akulas are the same either with the latest type being much quieter. And all Akulas were upgraded from the Granat to the Kalibr. The electronics are also likely upgraded.

It remains to be seen if the Type 095 will have more emphasis on Chinese technologies and design or still be done with Russian input. I expect the project to be mainly based around Chinese technologies including the rimless engine.