Again, it doesn't matter if it is designed for the role or not. When you have a situation where they need very single available helicopter then 075 will be used in that role.
While we are it, 056 and 054a are not ideal asw ships also, but they have to use them in that role.
056 and 054a are only not ideal in the sense that there is ever-moving technological progress, and restrictions of doing proactive ASW by surface ships in general.
Otherwise they're pretty close to the golden standard - and they do everything contemporary level of Chinese industry could provide them at the given time.
075 is bad enough for this to just not do it, unless the situation is dire, or unless the whole campaign is won(lost?) and you have nothing else to do with them in the foreseeable future.
When you're preparing for major amphibious assaults(even if you don't have to do them right now) - the situation is the opposite - you need to keep those for imminent use, or risk the whole major operation in a minor job where they will quite likely be lost. Not only them, but
They don't have time to build asw carriers. When are they going to build asw carrier? Have you looked at the geopolitical situation recently?
If you don't have time and enough units - then even more you keep LHDs for exclusively LHD work. Ultimately, China has more than enough surface ASW units, and nearby seas are covered reasonably well with maritime aviation&helicopters working from shore&island bases. If you want go forward - move forward those helicopter bases, capture chokepoints = prepare to do landings.
You are right now limited to just 2-3 complete amphibious groups - your main offensive power -
in an ideal situation. wasting them for ASW is beyond horrible.
And they will be able to knock it out and most likely keep it out of commission for pretty long duration. Occupying it is a whole different ball game because they have a long way to go and there isn't enough air cover to provide asw support.
I am highly sceptical of using medium-range missiles as a long-term suppression tool. Neither it does work against an adapting opponent with a sliver of brains, nor there is enough of those missiles to use them as howitzer shells. Even in the best case scenario it'll shut down Guam as an air/naval base, but not as an MRBM base.
Major landing effort will obviously include its own concentrated ASW screen(to which 075s may indeed contribute), so the point is moot here.
Or you don't provide 10 additional helicopters when you could and loose a carrier or 2 055s.
I frankly struggle to draw a tactical picture where slow&noisy TG with 10 more helicopters(~2-3 in the air) is less vulnerable than the fast
one.
Especially against nuclear submarines, which now can relatively freely maneuver around at silent speeds.
But others, too - every knot down is literally a double-digit increase in the chance that conventional subs will be able to get to intercept.
More helicopters(especially heavy) increase the effectiveness(depth, front) of search, sure, but not in the way you imply.
Basically - you'll increase the volume of search, but at the same time be slow enough&loud enough for subs to react in time - and either evade, or attempt to sneak through. Key opponents(American SSNs and Japanese SSKs) are readily capable of either.
That's nothing compared to ssn threat.
You're wrong. There is nothing more dangerous than a threat underestimated.
And, vise versa, SSNs shall be taken at that they are, nothing more, nothing less. No need to give them a mystical aura of destruction, they're already dangerous enough. But large USUVs are (potentially ofc)
far less detectable(all physical fields substantially lower than even SSK) and can potentially go into places traditional ASW wouldn't even consider as penetrable.
Or you don't provide 10 additional helicopters when you could and loose a carrier or 2 055s.
As was written above - when we're talking about losing something - you're far more likely to lose something by crippling ASW TG with an unsuitable unit. additional helicopters add to other metrics of ASW. That's just the nature of things.
This is why if you're so serious about ASW - start laying down ASW carriers, ASAP.
I have no idea what you are talking about. They have 2 positions they need to be able to choke off. South china sea and east of Taiwan. They need to keep the surface fleet that guard these positions safe. Having additional asw helicopters as part of a large group of surface ships will keep every ship safer.
Ok, now we got somewhere, two locations.
So, if you don't touch straits(the actual chokepoints) and try to do ASW in SCS instead - you don't need an 075 there, you have bases with MPAs(and helicopters). Those will give you more sorties regardless, and for self-defense, as mentioned earlier, it's safe to leave 075 alone than to rely on its helicopters trying to be frigates.
I'd frankly suggest though that control over major shipping straits of Malay barrier, Philippines and Taiwan is a by far the better option.
Thus instead of trying to catch subs within a whole sea, you better ensure that all relevant states won't be cooperating with your opponent(strict adherence to neutrality is enough actually - but it should be verified and ensured that no "whoops Iceland" will happen), and close the straits against unnecessary sneaky trespassers. Twice so because US very openly prepares to do just the opposite - in the worst case you'll have to... well.
WestPAC - even more so, the fleet here is exposed to anything up to major fleet action, and subs operate in a deep sea. Best place for 075, if for some reason it's still there, is to be sent away with other support vessels - and pray. In either case, the very presence of a key forced entry asset here w/o aim for attack(or at least pretending to attack) is a major mistake.
Who told you they are doing this just as a defensive stance? The fleet east of Taiwan will be able to launch a lot of missiles toward Guam. They will be using their missiles to attack all the appropriate bases around Japan. You need a fleet in scs and east of Taiwan to choke off flow of goods to Japan and Taiwan from west and south. Jmsdf will be forced to come at that fleet with everything it has left.
lots of missiles isn't an attack stance. It's a standoff porcupine approach.
Fleet won't be able to choke supply of goods to Japan(if we're at war with Japan - what's the problem with Ryukyus btw?) just by staying east of Taiwan.
(1)Japan has its eastern(cross-Pacific) supply route, too - the major one in fact. If you want to bring Japan to its knees - well, you will need to look there.
(2)Fleet can't stay there for long enough when Taiwan is not captured - and when(if) it is - it isn't needed at all, because Tainan-based aircraft will do the job better than any fleet - simply because land airbase can stay in place indefinitely.
(3)Fleet east of Taiwan can't be focused on blockade and especially ASW sweeps(ASW sweeps around what? in front of what? sweeping open empty ocean, where the only thing for SSNs to attack is you in the first place?). It's indeed a challenge to JMASDF or USN to fight a Mahanian action. Assuming your bait is strong enough(Taiwan invasion) - it'll happen, but it's a completely different topic.
