Let's play devil advocate then.
If China can easily afford to, why wouldn't China build 90 Aegis destroyers over the next 30 years?
052C/052D Class Destroyers
- Thread starter Jeff Head
- Start date
Let's play devil advocate then.
If China can easily afford to, why wouldn't China build 90 Aegis destroyers over the next 30 years?
Jura The idiot
General
manning issues?
by the way I'm still interested in an answer to the question I posted Yesterday at 8:00 PM
Why should I let you play devil's advocate and concede to you a point which you did not win? Who said China can "easily" afford to build 90 "Aegis" destroyers over the next 30 years? And plus you have forgotten the logistics in the maze of tactics. You have been talking build, build, build this entire time while forgetting the costs of maintenance, not mentioning them even once this entire time. Don't lie and tell me you considered this because you obviously forgot to. The US right now cannot afford to upkeep 90 Aegis destroyers, much less build them from scratch, but somehow you think China could build 90 of them. And upkeep them. Oh wait, not upkeep, since you didn't consider it.
The key point is that China already has a larger economy than the US in terms of actual output. Furthermore at the current growth rate of 6.5%, is set to double in the next 12 years.
So China building and maintaining 90 Aegis destroyers should be easily attained.
You have made no actual case for either the building or the maintenance of 90 Aegis destroyers. You have merely stated various shades of "China is #1 awesome" and therefore "90 Aegis destroyers is easy". One does not necessarily follow from the other, and you have said nothing more in support of this other than China is big, China is badass, China can build ships easy, bla bla bla bla bla. You literally have said nothing of substance this entire thread! This is because you don't have access to the actual details, i.e. the actual costs to build, the costs to maintain, the costs to refuel and rearm, the costs to man, and you have substituted them with fluffy grandiose non-substantial statements in order to try and cover up this painfully clear fact. You've got nothing, and we all know it.
I have actually read the total lifecycle costs for the Arleigh Burke and other weapons systems in a GAO report a few years back.
But let me boil it down to its simplest terms.
In approximately 10 years, China can expect to have an economy which is approximately $40 Trillion USD, up from $23 Trillion USD today. Note that the US is currently at $19 Trillion.
If China continues to spend a modest 2% of GDP on the military, that means China would be spending $800 Billion every year. That compares with the US currently spending $600 Billion per year.
So a very rough method would be to size the Chinese Navy some 30% larger than the equivalent US Navy today.
That would equate to an end-strength of 110 AEGIS destroyers, so China building and maintaining 90 AEGIS destroyers (Type-55 and Type-52) in the next 30 years should be easily attainable.
Last edited:
A little bit more reality:
12 billion $ in 2017, nominal GDP. 8% growth (real growth plus inflation) average would give 25 billion in 2027. But that assumes no slowdown in economy. So a more likely average of 6% growth over the whole period would yield 21 billion. Adding R&D and other expenses over the usually reported defense budget, china spends around 1,6% of its GDP on defense. That's some 330 million dollars (2027 value of dollar) If one wants to say that yuan will still buy more for what it's worth we can add another modifier. Currently it's 90% greater purchasing power, so that's the best possible scenario. More realistic value might be 50 or 60% in 2027, as purchasing power increases in China. So grand total might be something like 510 million dollars in 2027, versus US future defense budget of... who's to know, but if one ads just the inflation it will be around 730 million.
Roughly speaking.
12 billion $ in 2017, nominal GDP. 8% growth (real growth plus inflation) average would give 25 billion in 2027. But that assumes no slowdown in economy. So a more likely average of 6% growth over the whole period would yield 21 billion. Adding R&D and other expenses over the usually reported defense budget, china spends around 1,6% of its GDP on defense. That's some 330 million dollars (2027 value of dollar) If one wants to say that yuan will still buy more for what it's worth we can add another modifier. Currently it's 90% greater purchasing power, so that's the best possible scenario. More realistic value might be 50 or 60% in 2027, as purchasing power increases in China. So grand total might be something like 510 million dollars in 2027, versus US future defense budget of... who's to know, but if one ads just the inflation it will be around 730 million.
Roughly speaking.
Last edited:
Lethe
Captain
But that is not the benchmark, because the US Navy only has large destroyers (and some overgrown OPVs). A fleet of 60 destroyers, 60 blue water frigates, and 60 corvettes would deter the daylights out of USN and Japan.
If we acknowledge that China is to become the world's largest economy and therefore will potentially be able to allocate more resources to its Naval and other armed forces than any other nation, the question is what factors will ultimately restrain Chinese military spending and set an effective ceiling on military capabilities. There are many such factors, most of which are themselves subjects for robust discussion that we cannot adequately dispense with here.
One such factor is perceived necessity. Consider that China's economy today is such that exceeding current US military spending is merely a matter of national will and resource allocation. Nonetheless, China's defence spending remains modest. While it is certainly possible to envision futures in which deteriorating great power relations and other factors combine to result in significant increases in Chinese defence spending as a proportion of GDP, such an outcome is far from inevitable. China has an expansive ideology regarding the place of Chinese civilisation, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region, but there is little indication that this extends to the military realm, i.e. that China will seek an America-style "full-spectrum dominance" based upon an ever-expanding conception of national interests. To be sure that is a hypothesis for the long-term, while in the medium-term (let us say to 2035) China will be focused on securing its definite interests in the Asia-Pacific region. I have no doubt that the "physics of power" will result in a gradual expansion and deepening of China's real and perceived interests, but nonetheless I do not believe that China's conception of its interests will ever match America's expansive visions because with China the ideological and historical circumstances are very different. And China's military force structure will reflect this more limited vision.
Last edited:
No, we have to work in PPP figures which measures actual output.
Look at how the Japanese economy and output is stable at 500 trillion yen, yet exchange rates in recent years have meant the Japanese economy has fluctuated by 50% (4 versus 6 trillion usd)
Last edited: