PLA Navy news, pics and videos

Totoro said:

upgrading 054a is a must. one could turn a 24+ ship force into a much more capable force within 5+ years (upgrading several a year like USN did with Spruances should be possible, if urgent need arises)

Good thing about hhq16, even in its current form, is the high altitude coverage of the system. Even though of fairly short reach, 054a on picket missions or even a larger task force of 054a out in the front can prevent the enemy from freely using various patrol planes and even small strike packages as they please. They'd still first have to deal with each individual 054a and neutralize it before being able to fly over it onto a more important or more time pressing target.

Kinematic potential of hq16 sized missile is 90+ km, which could be useful but i don't see it as crucial for 054a's or even 054b's role. Somewhat better investment would surely be, as we all seem to agree, better self defense capabilities for the ship. Meaning new radars and actively guided missiles for better defense against saturation attacks. So instead of a four plane strike package, enemy might be pressed into an eight plane strike package per lonesome 054b or upgraded 054a on a picket mission. (actual numbers may be 2/4 or 6/10, but you get my drift)

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One problem I have with the idea of upgrading 054As, is that the most sensible upgrade it could have is to give it quad packed ARH missiles... however, that will also necessitate an upgrade from the sea eagle radar to a new rapid scanning or fixed face AESA most likely.

More importantly, it may also require changing the current VLS to the new common VLS, as the current VLS probably is incapable of carrying quad packed SAMs... though that would depend on the size of the SAM itself, but anything with a range lower than ESSM probably is not very worth it.

Upgrading the primary sensor and also the VLS would necessitate quite a substantial structural and costly change, which is why I'm rather on the fence in regards to how much 054A should be upgraded once they start considering an MLU in coming years... the cost and complexity could make them consider a lesser upgrade route, especially if they have a large number of 054Bs in service by then.

Still, if they have the production space to fit all 24 or more 054As with new radars, VLS, SAMs, in a decade or more's time (along with shipyard space), as well as being able to keep up with producing all the subsystems for 054B, 055 and maybe 052D or an "052E," then giving 054As a quad packed ARH SAM capability would be a no brainer.

IF the current VLS can be modified so it can fire quad packed CAMM sized missiles, even leaving the current VLS would be a viable option. 20 hq16b, 8 rocket propelled torpedoes and 16 camm sized self-protection missiles would be a nice improvement. It doesn't even have to be camm sized. Diameter would be similar, but there's room for an additional booster. Of course all this is hypothetical since we've no idea if such a missile is being developed. There is that mention of the shortest variant of new common VLS. But that's just 3.3 meters long, right? Marginally longer than basic Camm.

Changing radars on 054a is a non-issue i think. Of course a more modern system would be installed. While having 3 or 4 faces on the current mast might be too much top weight - there are options around it. A) making a whole new mast, even if radars themselves are sitting a bit lower. Or better yet -perhap use one from 054b if possible. If 054b itself is based a lot on 054a then a good deal of testing and integration design will have already been done. B) Instead of current twin pesa arrays, upgrade to twin aesa, rotating at 15 rpm - same as british PAAMS. Coupled with active guided missiles it'd give a very modern self defense capability. Arrays themselves can even be somewhat smaller and lighter, as PESA is fairly inefficient at putting its aperture/power into range/sensitivity.

Using the same vls well space, without any enlargement or additonal works to the ship's hull, would yield two currently seen common 8cell vls modules. Or roughly 20 cells total if arranged in some hypothetical new smaller modules.

If rocket torpedoes can be quadpacked - it'd be a borderline decent idea. If not, it'd be wasteful and better to keep the original VLS. 12 hq6 (12 cells), 8 torpedoes (2), 16 camm-likes (2). Plus perhaps 4 more cells? In theory, 8 or more camm likes should fit in new VLS cell though. But i'm really wildly speculating here so maybe i better stop.

Would it be easier to just add 1 or 2 short range SAM in 24-cell launcher than modifying existing VLS to accomodate smaler quad packed SAM ? The existing HQ-16 can be ugraded to a newer variant later on ... just a thought and opinion ...

antiterror13 said:

Would it be easier to just add 1 or 2

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short range SAM in 24-cell launcher than modifying existing VLS to accomodate smaler quad packed SAM ? The existing HQ-16 can be ugraded to a newer variant later on ... just a thought and opinion ...

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HQ-10 is a CIWS, for point defence -- quad packed SAMs like ESSM and even CAMM are SAMs capable of longer ranges and true area air defence.

their roles are quite entirely different, and HQ-10s are better off replacing or supplementing type 730 ciws instead.

From Marine Forum Daily News:

23 May
CHINA
Rumours that the Chinese Navy is planning construction of a larger sail training vessel

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Time to show off what you got ! Let them see. Like they say train as if you are in a fight. Fight as you are in training

A Chinese naval strike group conducted a 48-hour non-stop combat drill in the western part of the Pacific Ocean under the close surveillance of US and Japanese warships, Chinese state media reported on Tuesday.

The drill, conducted on Sunday and Monday, involved some of the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s most advanced warships.

A US destroyer, a Japanese destroyer along with two anti-submarine helicopters followed and monitored the drill from a visible distance, the website of the PLA Daily reported.

The warships were also involved in an exercise in the South China Sea earlier in the month, marking a rise in regional military tensions between China and the United States.

The vessels were from the PLA Navy’s South Sea Fleet and had left a naval base in Sanya, Hainan province, earlier this month.

The strike group conducted an attack and defence exercise off Subi Reef, and the ships also patrolled Chinese-controlled Johnson South Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Cuarteron Reef, Mischief Reef, the Gaven Reefs and Hughes Reef in the Spratly Islands on May 8 to 9.

The next day, the guided-missile destroyer USS William P. Lawrence travelled within 12 nautical miles of Chinese-occupied Fiery Cross Reef in a freedom of navigation operation.

“The types of exercises show the PLA has prepared for the worst,” Ni Lexiong, a Shanghai-based expert on naval strategies, said.

In the most recent drill, the Chinese destroyers Lanzhou and Hefei, frigate Sanya and a team of bombers practiced strikes against the destroyer Guangzhou and the frigate Yulin. A submarine acted as a third-party threat to both sides. Supply ships and early warning aircraft were also involved in the exercise, according to reports.

Both sides opened fire to test their artillery, an earlier PLA Daily report said.

The presence of US and Japanese warships complicated this week’s exercise as both sides had to stay alert for foreign vessels and aircraft while conducting the exercise, the Hefei’s captain, Zhao Yanquan was quoted as saying.

Thomson ReutersMore than 40 ships and submarines representing 15 international partner nations travel in formation in the Pacific Ocean during the Rim of the Pacific

As part of the South Sea Fleet’s annual comprehensive open sea drills, the strike group will move on to do exercises in the Eastern Indian Ocean, where the Chinese navy has not been very active.

Ni said the PLA had to demonstrate its maritime power to other countries as part of China’s broader “One Belt, One Road” initiative.

“Military presence is in itself economically valuable,” Ni said. “It does not necessarily have to be a war. The confirmed military advantage could translate into money, into business projects, and into support in international disputes.”

The report of the drill comes amid rising tensions between China and the US over the disputed South China Sea. Despite this, the Chinese navy will take part in the US-led Rim of the Pacific Exercise, the world’s largest naval drill, off Hawaii in June and July.

Last week, two Chinese J-11 fighter jets intercepted a US EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft.

Improving hardware is only one half of the equation the more important half is training And China has improved the training of her navy in last couple year with more bigger and more realistic exercise. The US navy has take note of this improvement Here is an excellent excerpt of the article but long one I provide the link


Capt. Dale C. Rielage, USN, “

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,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 142.5 (May 2016): 36-41.

Improvements in Chinese Navy multi-mission platforms have seen a focus on realistic training.

In the past decade, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has added significant new capabilities to its order of battle. The average PLAN surface combatant is now a capable, multi-mission platform. The PLAN submarine force is increasingly composed of modern conventional and nuclear units, many employing long-range antiship cruise missiles. The aircraft carrier Liaoning continues steady work as China learns the art and science of naval aviation.

Hardware, however, defines the limits of what is technically possible for a navy. Effectiveness in combat rests on proficiency in employing the tools at hand, and the PLAN understands that fact. The past ten years have seen a major improvement in the scope and complexity of PLAN training that has paralleled the expansion in its missions, operations, and capabilities. This substantial training program is intended to ensure that the PLAN’s expanding arsenal of high-technology weapons can be employed to carry out the missions the PLAN has been given by the ruling Chinese Communist Party. Central to these are high-end naval combat tasks—the fundamentals of fleet action against a foreign navy intervening against People’s Republic of China (PRC) interests. While no training is a perfect facsimile of combat, the PLAN’s proficiency is increasing through this deliberate investment in more advanced and realistic training.

The depth and sophistication of public analysis of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has grown in recent years, reflecting a need to understand the PLA’s modernization and ability to intervene in an increasing range of potential friction points. PLA training has been a part of these studies, but most works have involved changes in the senior-level structures that administer training and on PLA efforts to train for joint warfare. PLA leadership has concentrated on making training more effective and more “joint,” and the PLAN has benefited from changes in these areas. However, while these issues are essential, they do not speak to the basic question of how the PLAN trains itself. …

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Director, Intelligence and Information Operations (N2/N39)
Captain Dale Rielage is the U.S. Pacific Fleet director of intelligence and information operations. He is a career intelligence officer who is in his sixth consecutive tour focused on the Indo-Asia-Pacific.

He began his career as a surface warfare officer, serving on USS Stark (FFG 31) as communications officer, assistant navigator and damage control assistant. Redesignated as a special duty (intelligence) officer, he has served at sea on the staff of Commander, U.S. 2nd Fleet, and as deputy assistant chief of staff for intelligence at the U.S. 7th Fleet in Yokosuka, Japan. Ashore, he served in the Pentagon as deputy executive assistant to the director of naval intelligence, and in the U.S. Embassy, Berlin, Germany, as the assistant naval attaché. From 2006 to 2008, he led the Contingencies Branch of the U.S. Pacific Fleet intelligence directorate. During 2011, he served as senior intelligence officer for China at the Office of Naval Intelligence, a position normally held by a defense intelligence senior leader, before becoming director of the chief of naval operations’ Navy Asia Pacific Advisory Group. He returned to the fleet as assistant chief of staff for intelligence (N2) for Commander, U.S. 3rd Fleet before assuming duties at U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Any details on launch of the "88" sister ship ?

Underway replenishment during the recent naval exercise in eastern Pacific... Dave Axe, please take note of this, along with many earlier photos of underway replenishment in this thread.

(2500 x 1790)