PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency

Minm

Junior Member
Registered Member
That's some high-grade hopium. When the boss is going to attack the vassals don't have the right to disagree. Philippines, although in the periphery, its still empire territory after all
Clearly the Chinese government has that hope, otherwise they wouldn't invest anything in the Philippines
 

plawolf

Lieutenant General
lmao i have been saying all along that those ventures around guam and all that meant nothing cuz in a real conflict it would be questionable if the Chinese navy could get out of FIC, people didnt believe me XD. the only way a Chinese carrier group could be penetrate FIC would be if it transited into the pacific before the war, and hopes that it doesnt run out of supply before a corridor can be established for resupply.

You do realise China has long range missiles as well don’t you?

This would just be a really shit attempt to copy China’s SCS island fortress strategy without understanding, never mind having, any of the core pre-requisites that makes that strategy possible.

Island forward bases are only viable if:
A) the islands have sufficient scale to allow you to deploy a comprehensive, multi-lay, all spectrum defensive force plus support infrastructure and personnel and still have sufficient room for all your forces to move and disperse so they don’t become fish in a barrel to incoming enemy fire.
B) you will ideally want multiple such islands close enough to each other to offer mutual support.
C) have massive, distributed and redundant sensor networks covering the entire region for early warning, long range detection and targeting
D) have a massive, persistent and survivable naval surface fleet presence for support and logistics
E) have close land based aviation support able to surge assets to help defensive and offensive operations
F) have hypersonic long range missile support that can be called in to strike at enemy fleets with short kill chains

The US has few island in the first island chain that even has room for anything more than a few small batteries in fixed locations.

Its surface fleet would be unsurvivable that first island chain distances from the mainland, meaning those islands will be unsupported and will have massive logistical challenges once the shooting starts.

At best, it can forward deploy offensive missile batteries with no or skeleton crews as a first strike option, which given how the US military and western MSM have been projecting about a supposed Chinese Pearl Harbour attack, sounds like precisely what they plan with this. Anything more would be a waste as anything forward deployed on those islands will be obliterated in the opening minutes of any conflict with no realistic prospects of wartime redeployment.

China can counter by permanently forward deploying drones and coast guard cutters to keep those islands under constant watch, with its own defensive and offensive missiles locked in ready to go as soon as the word is given.
 

Biscuits

Major
Registered Member
Philippines might be an US client state, but they have little to no military capability.

A single 052 will be an even match up for their entire navy, and that is speaking extremely generously for the PN.

We're almost certainly far past the point where China is worried about Taiwan being invaded.

The major clue is that if China really was pressed, they could easily follow a 1970s NATO style deployment I.e. openly declare that an American strike in Asia will be met with mass tactical nuke use.

Instead, China is thinking about how to turn US territorial ambitions in Asia into inflicting maximum damage on America.

The more rump states that get roped into US ambitions, the more territory China has a rightful excuse to decolonize. It doesn't even need to be through military action.

When US begins its attack, there's a high chance that states with highly exposed strategical elements such as the Philippines or SK will expel Americans or forbid them from using bases offensively. That by itself drives a huge wedge between US client states and US central government.
 

ansy1968

Brigadier
Registered Member
Philippines might be an US client state, but they have little to no military capability.

A single 052 will be an even match up for their entire navy, and that is speaking extremely generously for the PN.

We're almost certainly far past the point where China is worried about Taiwan being invaded.

The major clue is that if China really was pressed, they could easily follow a 1970s NATO style deployment I.e. openly declare that an American strike in Asia will be met with mass tactical nuke use.

Instead, China is thinking about how to turn US territorial ambitions in Asia into inflicting maximum damage on America.

The more rump states that get roped into US ambitions, the more territory China has a rightful excuse to decolonize. It doesn't even need to be through military action.

When US begins its attack, there's a high chance that states with highly exposed strategical elements such as the Philippines or SK will expel Americans or forbid them from using bases offensively. That by itself drives a huge wedge between US client states and US central government.
First thing first, the Philippine will never allowed the American to use our bases for offensive strike against China, as shown by Duterte we can revoke the VFA agreement with an executive order because it's not a treaty. Second our constitution forbade any basing of foreign troops in the country and third that news is to pressure Marcos in agreeing with US demand and why should we? The way the American enter a negotiation is to badger it with projection without actual fact and made it known publicly that an agreement has been reach which is NOT! You have to ask what is our POV, why broadcast such strategic policy openly that will make our country a target for Chinese attack and reprisal. Marcos may be weak BUT he is not stupid because we know we can't fight and survive. Just look what happen when an electrical problem struck our airport, we're paralysis, what more of an actual attack hitting our critical infrastructure, IF that happen it will bring my country back to the Stone age. The American will find those bases useless before they can arrive and use it. We know our weakness and so do the American and yet they want to rope us in, thanks BUT no thanks.

Airport fiasco: Big probe begins​

According to the DOTr: “The incident that resulted in the loss of power in the system was due to a problem in the system’s electrical network, with its uninterruptible power supply (UPS), which is to be used as backup power supply, also failing (sic). The main cause of the power supply problem is still being determined and is subject for investigation.”
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JANUARY 3, 2023
4 MINUTE READ
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Passengers wait for updates on their canceled flights from the New Year’s Day technical glitch that affected 65,000 passengers at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport. The Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) said flight operations at the premier NAIA Terminals are expected to be fully normalized either Wednesday or Thursday.


THE Department of Transportation (DOTr) said on Monday an oversight office under the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP) will lead the investigation on the technical issues that temporarily paralyzed flights to and from the Philippines’ main gateway on Sunday.
In a separate development, Malacañan Palace assured the public that a “thorough investigation” is now being conducted on the New Year’s Day aviation fiasco following a technical issue involving the radar frequency.
In a statement, the transport department said the CAAP “
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[AANSOO] will be tasked to investigate the incident.”

“AANSOO is an existing office. Part of the function of CAAP is to also act as regulator and oversight for air navigation and air traffic services,” the agency said.
The office is composed of CAAP technical personnel such as aerodrome engineers, electrical and communication engineers, air traffic controllers, pilots, and a lawyer.
On Sunday, a total of 282 flights were “either delayed, canceled or diverted to other regional airports affecting around 56,000 passengers in Naia,” due to a technical issue related to the Communications, Navigation, and Surveillance/Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM) System.
According to the DOTr: “The incident that resulted in the loss of power in the system was due to a problem in the system’s electrical network, with its uninterruptible power supply (UPS), which is to be used as backup power supply, also failing (sic). The main cause of the power supply problem is still being determined and is subject for investigation.”
According to the transport department, the CNS/ATM System is a P10.8-billion project financed by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (Jica) that was completed in October 2017.
It provides various computer-aided safety measures in Air Traffic Control (ATC), and enhances safety through reduction of controller/pilot workloads and human errors.
The new ATM System introduced Air Traffic Flow Management (ATFM) and Air Space Management (ASM) functions, which optimize the use of airport capacity and the efficient use of airspace, hence minimizing delays and allowing more flexible and user-preferred air-route selection. The system commenced comprehensive operations on July 26, 2019.
“CAAP recognizes that the system is already behind when it was first used in 2019 and has made recommendations to the President on improving the country’s air traffic management system,” the statement read.
The Philippine Air Traffic Management Center (ATMC), which houses the equipment to the system, resumed normal operations at 5:50 p.m. on Sunday.
Despite the resumption of normal operations, some flights on Tuesday were still canceled or moved to a latter date.

Palace: Thorough probe​

In a short message to reporters, Press Secretary OIC-Usec. Cheloy Garafil said “a thorough investigation is being conducted by appropriate agencies.”
Flights were either delayed, canceled or diverted to other regional airports affecting thousands of passengers in Naia.
Meanwhile, Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) general manager Cesar Chiong said flight operations at the premier NAIA Terminals are expected to be fully normalized either Wednesday or Thursday, as efforts to return to normalcy swiftly began in the late afternoon of January 1.
This, following the restoration of the Manila air traffic management system as a result of aviation authorities having successfully resolved the power outage problem that affected flights to, from and within the Philippines on Sunday, January 1.
As of this writing, asked if flight operations have fully normalized, Chiong said: “Halos [almost],” and added, speaking partly in Filipino, “but there were a few flights that were canceled due to operational requirements of the airlines. The flights are all so full, so it was hard to accommodate those people whose flights were canceled.”
Chiong apologized for the inconvenience caused by the disruption and thanked the passengers for their understanding, with an assurance that everything is continuously being done to hasten the return to full normal operations.
Philippine Airlines (PAL) spokesperson Ma. Cielo Villaluna said that the total number of affected passengers from their end was 24,000 while the total number of affected flights was placed at 244, comprising 60 percent of the airline’s total scheduled flights on Sunday. Cancellations covered the period mid-morning (past 10 a.m.) up to 5 p.m.
Villaluna explained that it will take some time to fully restore normal schedules “as we reposition aircraft that had been held back or diverted to other airports and adjust flight timings based on revised clearances in coordination with the local authorities.”
In addition to some delays caused by these adjustments, Villaluna said PAL has had to cancel some flights for January 2, 2023 as it continues to closely coordinate with the aviation authorities on the adjustment of flight schedules and clearances, as the authorities work to resolve the temporary problem.
Similarly, Cebu Pacific (CEB) Corporate Communications Manager Romina Yasmin Aguirre said that CEB continues to review its operations following the technical glitch in the ATMS of CAAP.
Aguirre added that consequently, CEB has canceled additional flights and is still working on the recovery of its network and normalizing its operations.
AirAsia Philippines deputy spokesperson Carlo Carongoy said they are implementing additional flight adjustments through a recovery flight on January 3, 2023, “as we strive to normalize the operations in all of our airport destinations.”
“Guests are advised to regularly check registered SMS and email for preflight notifications on flight adjustments. This is beyond our control but AirAsia is working closely with government and airport authorities until we fully resolve the situation,” he added.
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manqiangrexue

Brigadier
Wake me up when military spending per gdp reaches 3%.
Why 3%? Why not 2.8, 3.5, 4, 5%? What other military secrets do you think China should be honest about and declare?
Until then, all this behaving like a super power or all that, its just a smokescreen.
With hypersonic nukes, ASBMs, the most suitable high combat intensity destroyers, and 5th gen fighters (the most competent in the world, according to some) behind it.
Superpowers are first defined by their military capabilities before anything else.
Uh, no. A true stable contender for a superpower is an economic force before it is a military one. Even the US would look pretty funny if it had no economic sanctions but relied on military threats everywhere. If you get that confused, you'll end up like the Soviets.
Even now, no one is saying that China is a superpower, even with its huge economy.
Actually, I've seen many many articles refer to China as a superpower or rising superpower. I think you can find them very easily with a Google search.
There is a reason for that. If you are not the undisputed military overlord of your region then you dont even have the qualifications to even enter the conversation of being a superpower
No, if you are undisputed, that's being the lone superpower. No one thinks that China is the lone superpower but everyone understands that China is a rival to the US. Two superpowers can rival each other.

I am in no way saying that I don't support an increase in Chinese military budget, but it must be done in a precise, careful and calculated manner and it shouldn't be transparent. The more things the CIA needs to spend resources on figuring out about China the better. It's certainly not, "Pick a higher integer, tell everyone, and let's go!"
 
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ACuriousPLAFan

Brigadier
Registered Member
TELs on the 1st island chain are not the same as TELs in mainland China! the survivability of TELs rests with their mobility and their ability to cover and conceal themselves after firing. There is no room for maneuver on a small island, there is barely any cover. Meanwhile in mainland China there are something like 10k+ 2 lane tunnels that can be used as TEL bases, along with forests, urban cover, mountains, etc.

imagine Russia put Iskanders on Snake Island. Are they as effective as Iskanders driving around in the forest near Belgorod? Not even close. Likewise launchers on Ryukyu islands are useless. Taiwan is both too small and too close. Putting missiles there just means that they get wiped in the first strike.

Philippines is the big threat since it is far away enough where a first strike can't effectively hit them before they launch, you can't intercept them in boost phase, and has substantial cover in jungle, mountain and urban areas. Luckily, Philippines only covers the southern axis. To solve this problem will require some diplomatic wisdom and accepting the fact that there'll be hits getting through, you just have to hit them even harder.

This of course rests on the assumption of effective enemy IRBMs. this does not exist. subsonic cruise missiles just do not react fast enough in a second strike scenario, and flying over the ocean means no terrain masking.
You do realise China has long range missiles as well don’t you?

This would just be a really shit attempt to copy China’s SCS island fortress strategy without understanding, never mind having, any of the core pre-requisites that makes that strategy possible.

Island forward bases are only viable if:
A) the islands have sufficient scale to allow you to deploy a comprehensive, multi-lay, all spectrum defensive force plus support infrastructure and personnel and still have sufficient room for all your forces to move and disperse so they don’t become fish in a barrel to incoming enemy fire.
B) you will ideally want multiple such islands close enough to each other to offer mutual support.
C) have massive, distributed and redundant sensor networks covering the entire region for early warning, long range detection and targeting
D) have a massive, persistent and survivable naval surface fleet presence for support and logistics
E) have close land based aviation support able to surge assets to help defensive and offensive operations
F) have hypersonic long range missile support that can be called in to strike at enemy fleets with short kill chains

The US has few island in the first island chain that even has room for anything more than a few small batteries in fixed locations.

Its surface fleet would be unsurvivable that first island chain distances from the mainland, meaning those islands will be unsupported and will have massive logistical challenges once the shooting starts.

At best, it can forward deploy offensive missile batteries with no or skeleton crews as a first strike option, which given how the US military and western MSM have been projecting about a supposed Chinese Pearl Harbour attack, sounds like precisely what they plan with this. Anything more would be a waste as anything forward deployed on those islands will be obliterated in the opening minutes of any conflict with no realistic prospects of wartime redeployment.

China can counter by permanently forward deploying drones and coast guard cutters to keep those islands under constant watch, with its own defensive and offensive missiles locked in ready to go as soon as the word is given.
I'll combine both to respond together.

The problem is that Snake Island is only one, singular island that stood out like a sore thumb in the northwestern part of the Black Sea, with relatively zero terrain and vegetation cover. Snake Island is also merely 50+ kilometers away from the Ukrainian coastline. Even the PCL-181 can comfortably strike the island from regions around the towns of Vylkove, Lisky, Prymorske and Rasseyka with rocket-assisted projectiles.

Meanwhile, the Ryukyu Island Chain alone has more than one hundred islands, many of which do have sufficient size, topology and ecology to station missile launchers. Even if they are exposed, their numbers alone can make up for that deficiency. Furthermore, the closest populated island in the Ryukyu Island Chain to the Chinese coastline is at least 350 kilometers away, while many of the islands are around 600-800 kilometers away. At those ranges, other than Chinese warships and warplanes, only PHL-191-launched TBMs and Dongfeng SRBMs can reach them.

We aren't yet talking about the major Japanese islands of Kyushu, Shikoku and Honshu, all of which have huge and intertwined mountain ranges, plus plenty of tunnels, valleys and forest cover. For instance, the future variants of the Type 12 SSMs can reach as far as Tianjin and even Beijing from northern Kyushu and the western end of Honshu.

Meanwhile, if the Philippines would like to/forced to join the anti-China coalition during the AR operation, China's holdings in the South China Sea will be seriously exposed to land-based missile strikes from the Filipino Archipelago, of which the Philippines have thousands of islands to offer staging bases for the missile launchers. In this context, Chinese military bases and installations dotted amongst the Spratley Islands risk bringing the same dilemma for the Chinese military planners as the Snake Island had been for the Russian military planners.

On the other hand, this one in particular:
At best, it can forward deploy offensive missile batteries with no or skeleton crews as a first strike option, which given how the US military and western MSM have been projecting about a supposed Chinese Pearl Harbour attack, sounds like precisely what they plan with this. Anything more would be a waste as anything forward deployed on those islands will be obliterated in the opening minutes of any conflict with no realistic prospects of wartime redeployment.

China can counter by permanently forward deploying drones and coast guard cutters to keep those islands under constant watch, with its own defensive and offensive missiles locked in ready to go as soon as the word is given.
I believe this is actually what the US military is planning to do as part of their overall war planning against China in the WestPac going forward into the 2020s.

That is, what if they aren't actually meant to hold ground, but to do island-hopping-style guerilla warfare instead?

Even if those long-range strike missiles aren't being used as first-strike platforms (that is, Japan and the US only militarily intervene sometime later), they are still going to pose serious threats against Chinese warships operating in the entirety of the East China Sea, Bohai Sea and the Taiwan Strait (let alone the Philippine Sea) for as long as they exist along the FIC.

Recall the disposable 5-tube 300mm rocket module for the PHL-191 versus the reusable 4-tube 300mm rocket module for the PHL-191 discussed last month? If China can think of such modularity and disposable usage for their MLRS, what makes the US not being able to come up with the same idea? The idea is for those missile launchers to be discarded/hidden only after one or few times of use, before the skeleton crew (with or without the missile launchers) would move to other islands using military speedboats and/or civilian boats, then rinse and repeat.

China, despite having a massive manpower advantage and a ginormous industrial capacity, does not have infinite resources to toss around. Remember that any attempt of AR over Taiwan is expected to set up a theater of war spanning the size of continents, perhaps even across the entire WestPac, regardless of whether Beijing intends to or not.

Therefore, until China can effectively master the ways and methods to suppress opposing military forces that are intervening China's AR operations along the entire FIC at very affordable prices and very cheap costs to resources and manpower, things are going to remain challenging for the Chinese military planners on how to deal with this situation along the entire FIC.
 
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FairAndUnbiased

Brigadier
Registered Member
I'll combine both to respond together.

The problem is that Snake Island is only one, singular island that stood out like a sore thumb in the northwestern part of the Black Sea, with relatively zero terrain and vegetation cover. Snake Island is also merely 50+ kilometers away from the Ukrainian coastline. Even the PCL-181 can comfortably strike the island from regions around the towns of Vylkove, Lisky, Prymorske and Rasseyka with rocket-assisted projectiles.

Meanwhile, the Ryukyu Island Chain alone has more than one hundred islands, many of which do have sufficient size, topology and ecology to station missile launchers. Even if they are exposed, their numbers alone can make up for that deficiency. Furthermore, the closest populated island in the Ryukyu Island Chain to the Chinese coastline is at least 350 kilometers away, while many of the islands are around 600-800 kilometers away. At those ranges, other than Chinese warships and warplanes, only PHL-191-launched TBMs and Dongfeng SRBMs can reach them.

We aren't yet talking about the major Japanese islands of Kyushu, Shikoku and Honshu, all of which have huge and intertwined mountain ranges, plus plenty of tunnels, valleys and forest cover. For instance, the future variants of the Type 12 SSMs can reach as far as Tianjin and even Beijing from northern Kyushu and the western end of Honshu.

Meanwhile, if the Philippines would like to/forced to join the anti-China coalition during the AR operation, China's holdings in the South China Sea will be seriously exposed to land-based missile strikes from the Filipino Archipelago, of which the Philippines have thousands of islands to offer staging bases for the missile launchers. In this context, Chinese military bases and installations dotted amongst the Spratley Islands risk bringing the same dilemma for the Chinese military planners as the Snake Island had been for the Russian military planners.

On the other hand, this one in particular:

I believe this is actually what the US military is planning to do as part of their overall war planning against China in the WestPac going forward into the 2020s.

That is, what if they aren't actually meant to hold ground, but to do island-hopping-style guerilla warfare instead?

Even if those long-range strike missiles aren't being used as first-strike platforms (that is, Japan and the US only militarily intervene sometime later), they are still going to pose serious threats against Chinese warships operating in the entirety of the East China Sea, Bohai Sea and the Taiwan Strait (let alone the Philippine Sea) for as long as they exist along the FIC.

Recall the disposable 5-tube 300mm rocket module for the PHL-191 versus the reusable 4-tube 300mm rocket module for the PHL-191 discussed last month? If China can think of such modularity and disposable usage for their MLRS, what makes the US not being able to come up with the same idea? The idea is for those missile launchers to be discarded/hidden only after one or few times of use, before the skeleton crew (with or without the missile launchers) would move to other islands using military speedboats and/or civilian boats, then rinse and repeat.

China, despite having a massive manpower advantage and a ginormous industrial capacity, does not have infinite resources to toss around. Remember that any attempt of AR over Taiwan is expected to set up a theater of war spanning the size of continents, perhaps even across the entire WestPac, regardless of whether Beijing intends to or not.

Therefore, until China can effectively master the ways and methods to suppress opposing military forces that are intervening China's AR operations along the entire FIC at very affordable prices and very cheap costs to resources and manpower, things are going to remain challenging for the Chinese military planners on how to deal with this situation along the entire FIC.
How do they supply that vast stretch of small isolated islands? Much easier said than done.

China also just has to increase presence overall. Keep sending coast guard scout ships near the islands in peacetime and fly drones as close as possible with cameras to see where satellites can't. Every time there's a deployment, watch it like a hawk, keep 24/7 drone overwatch. Harass it in every legal way. This takes away the surprise factor.
 

Maikeru

Captain
Registered Member
What PLA really needs to do is to hold CONUS at risk of both nuclear and conventional attack. This requires, at a minimum:

-the silos in the Northern deserts to be filled with ICBMs;
- a huge increase in SSN numbers, all equipped with hypersonic LACM; and
- H20 in service in significant numbers

This I suspect will make the US think long and hard before intervening in a Taiwan scenario and, if it does, to leave off attacking mainland China.
 

CMP

Senior Member
Registered Member
How do they supply that vast stretch of small isolated islands? Much easier said than done.

China also just has to increase presence overall. Keep sending coast guard scout ships near the islands in peacetime and fly drones as close as possible with cameras to see where satellites can't. Every time there's a deployment, watch it like a hawk, keep 24/7 drone overwatch. Harass it in every legal way. This takes away the surprise factor.
They have already and will continue to pre-deploy hidden fuel, food, and munitions caches to islands it intends its forces to resupply from. Guaranteed it has already been doing so in Taiwan, Japan's smaller southern/southwestern islands, and all over the islands in South East Asia (with or without local government knowledge/approval, bribes and threats can achieve a lot). In and around islands near all the sea lane choke points as well.
 

Bellum_Romanum

Brigadier
Registered Member
@ACuriousPLAFan please visit the PPhilippines before you can write soconfidently about what you wrote on how America can plant x,y,z in to the many islands (7,000 plus) depending on the tides.

It's not that simple.
 
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