The War in the Ukraine

[Zichan]

The number of personnel has increased, but has there been a proportional capability to adequately equip those personnel on the part of Ukraine, even including supplies by allies?

Do the Ukrainians have sufficient resources in both manpower and materiel to sustain an offensive in Kharkov and northern Donetsk much beyond the territory they presently have under their control? They also have to factor in the reality that Russia does possess the means to bring in additional reinforcements in substantial numbers to Kharkov and Donbass not inclusive of their mobilized reserves.

Hindsight is 20/20 and in hindsight it was extremely irresponsible of the Russians to have drawn down their numbers so greatly in Kharkov when the Ukrainians were/are not defeated.

We don’t know. Although, equipping them as light infantry should not be a problem. Furthermore, such numbers allow Ukraine to rotate troops faster keeping them fresh and sustaining morale. Some of those poor Russian soldiers have been in the field since December last year.

The US alone has given Ukraine 1.5 million (!) 155mm artillery shells and over 8,500 Javelin missiles. NATO transfers of various anti-tank missiles amount to over 32,000.
Here’s an overview of some of the weapons given to Ukraine:

Source:

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Russia will find it difficult to keep up long term with the collective production capacity of the West.

 

[Biscuits]

We don’t know. Although, equipping them as light infantry should not be a problem. Furthermore, such numbers allow Ukraine to rotate troops faster keeping them fresh and sustaining morale. Some of those poor Russian soldiers have been in the field since December last year.

The US alone has given Ukraine 1.5 million (!) 155mm artillery shells and over 8,500 Javelin missiles. NATO transfers of various anti-tank missiles amount to over 32,000.
Here’s an overview of some of the weapons given to Ukraine:

Source:

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

If one were to say the industrial capability of US is a dwarf compared China, it would also not be wrong to say that Russia's industrial capability is a dwarf compared to US.

So vis a vis Russia, I'm sure that if US prioritizes arms, they will easily be able to supply Ukraine and their volunteer forces with adequate equipment.

But in practice it is not that easy. America's real target is China, if the world's largest economy with a huge bloc of the world's population under them can't be defeated or at least contained, then any US ambitions of imposing their "order" on the world is gone.

Each equipment, each value of currency, each industrial sacrifice sent to Ukraine, is a distraction of much needed resources. The Ukraine front will never hurt China no matter what the result becomes, but it can hurt NATO if they fumble it.

If NATO overcommits their industry and manpower, they will have weakened themselves at 0 cost to China while the latter is just continously growing stronger. So if US mobilize their economy, they need to defeat Russia in the shortest amount of time, but the chances of that are low, and there is no telling how a defeated Russia would even react. Plus there is always a (large) risk that China will put its own industry behind Russia if Russians are being defeated due to NATO openly marching in with state of the art equipped "volunteers".

Then, the situation will turn around. Instead of US fighting Russia to the last Ukrainian, it will be China fighting NATO to the last Russian. This is not favorable for NATO.

The ideal situation for NATO is probably that Russia can be battlefield defeated by light volunteers and donated equipment only, driving Russia deep into the Donbass and away from the South(Kherson, Mariupol area). Then, Ukraine can sign peace with only minimal territorial losses around donetsk and luhansk, while keeping complete access to the black sea. Pushing any further than that, risks involving the whole Eastern bloc.

 

[gelgoog]

Russia will find it difficult to keep up long term with the collective production capacity of the West.

Hardly. The West is having issues supplying Ukraine with ammo in the required quantities for example. And while they handed out Javelin ATGMs and Stinger MANPADS like candy, US production of either system is basically stopped or slow paced at this moment. Ukraine will have to live with what they have. Then there are the typical issues with the current US MIC. While the US is going to finance production of like 10,000 artillery shells a month, and they still haven't ran the competition to expand to that production, Russia can produce 100,000 artillery shells a month or more in state run factories.

What do you think will be cheaper? Russian state run factories with Russian salaries, or US privately run factories with US salaries?

The thing is, the US and NATO in general are not geared up for large production of artillery shells or land based missiles in general, since their air forces are supposed to do everything.

 

[Abominable]

We don’t know. Although, equipping them as light infantry should not be a problem. Furthermore, such numbers allow Ukraine to rotate troops faster keeping them fresh and sustaining morale. Some of those poor Russian soldiers have been in the field since December last year.

The US alone has given Ukraine 1.5 million (!) 155mm artillery shells and over 8,500 Javelin missiles. NATO transfers of various anti-tank missiles amount to over 32,000.
Here’s an overview of some of the weapons given to Ukraine:

America is broke like the USSR, and unlike the USSR they can't manufacture. Once their own cold war stockpiles have been dried up they won't be able to do much more.

Whatever they are sending to the Ukraine is being skimmed by corruption. Once the Poles have taken their share, a lot of the rest is sold by Ukrainians to the highest bidder. Neo nazi groups probably get a discount, but Ukrainians will sell to anyone including Jihadists.

It won't be long before we see terrorist groups using some of this gear in a major terrorist attack in western Europe.

 

[Atomicfrog]

So immediately supposedly reported:

Supposedly, Rybar is claiming the Ukrainians had another breakthrough across the Oskil at Lozove. Can we get someone on telegram to verify?

View attachment 98215


Predictions time!

tldr; Ukraine is going to keep having successes until the new troops show up. I would expect Lugansk is next while pinning a lot of Russian troops in Kherson. In Lugansk, I would expect the Ukrainians to rip up the railways as they work their way through, at least near the Russian border. How well the Russians do after the troops show up depends on a few things.

If Russia is going to do the deployment of their mobilization properly, the troops are going to take two to three months to arrive in theater. The reservists being called up are going to need time to drill properly and become cohesive units. That means November at the earliest. November in the Donbas is chilly (6 C day time average and 1 C at night), but relatively dry and snow free. Winter clothing is going to be needed pretty quick. If the reports of the lack of night vision equipment are accurate, fighting in winter will be even more problematic: sunrise is 657 on December 1st and sunset is 1538. The cold weather uniforms and night vision equipment are going to be really needed.

The logistics strain we have seen so far is going to be compounded unless a lot of those reservists are going to be made into lorry/truck drivers. The lack of palletization is going to be major problem still unless the Russian armed forces have fixed that recently. I have not heard the Russian army has done so, but I am willing to listen to correction.

If the troops are properly equipped and trained, I expect the Russians to launch offensives across the border into Kharkov, Lugansk and anywhere else they will have been pushed across the border at. There might even be another yolo to Kiev again. That said, I would then expect the Russian advances to peter out again sometime around the end of February. The Raputitsa will return around then.

The Ukrainians will then attempt chewing up the Russian forces like they did during this year's Raputitsa. If the Russians will have learned from this year's events, the Ukrainians will be less effective at it. Once Genera Mud leaves the field, the Russians could restart offensive actions and reach the Dniepr.

However...

If the Russians do not properly equip their troops and merely throw them into the fight as fast as possible, the Russian mobilization will be a debacle. Give me properly trained troops, not more bodies (or so I would say if I were the Russian commanders). Specifically, I would be asking for more truck drivers and infantry. The former are relatively easy to train, but the latter takes time if they are going to be effective. If the logistics are not fixed, then the increased pressure will be bad. Really bad. That increased pressure could make the whole situation even worse for the Russians rather than better.

If the Russians rush the reservists forward, we will see massive casualties and little, if any, benefit. Ukrainians offensives might slow down, but won't be stopped. There may be mass surrenders rather than retreats. As the Raputitsa takes hold, the poor logistics and poorly trained will get chewed on badly. I would expect the Ukrainians to attempt another round of aggressive advances next summer: they will more of their troops trained in the West in the mean time. If we are going to see western MBTs in Ukrainian hands, it will be in April or May next year.

Those are my predictions: I see a fork here. Either the Russians will sort their issues out and properly deploy the reservists, making gains again, or there are going to be a lot of dead Russian men for little benefit and headed to a probable defeat.

I want to call out people saying the Russians have lost less than 8k dead. There would be no reason to mobilize if the Russians had lost that little, as 32k casualties out of the original 190k troops is a paltry percentage: 16% +/-. The deaths would have been 4%. I've kept my own tracker going and based on destroyed equipment, I get a minimum of 13k dead and based on the equipment losses the Russians are rapidly closing in on IFV/APC and tank losses for 80 BTG...of the original 130. Note: my count does not include infantry very well and, historically, infantry have taken it on the nose the most and losses will be higher.

Quick and easy predictive test: if the Ukrainians shred another oblast - looking at you, Lugansk - like done in Kharkov, the Russian army in Ukraine has been hollowed out definitively.

I have been wrong before and will be again. Let's see how wrong I am.

Ukraine are pushing quite hard, with the frontline stalling during the summer they got some time to build up some cohesive troops using conscript as attritable cushions on the front line.

The new build technical vehicules make thier spearhead quite mobile to bypass LPR/DNR trench. We don't see a lot of them destroyed while Ukrainian armored and tank get the blunt of Russian attack.

Way better for them getting ground before the muddy part of fall and when the front is more or less unmanned by the Russian army.

 

[Zichan]

Hardly. The West is having issues supplying Ukraine with ammo in the required quantities for example. And while they handed out Javelin ATGMs and Stinger MANPADS like candy, US production of either system is basically stopped or slow paced at this moment. Ukraine will have to live with what they have. Then there are the typical issues with the current US MIC. While the US is going to finance production of like 10,000 artillery shells a month, and they still haven't ran the competition to expand to that production, Russia can produce 100,000 artillery shells a month or more in state run factories.

Russia was firing 20,000 artillery shells per day in July, according to a report from Britain's Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). Their monthly production capacity would sustain only 5 days of operations.

The world 155mm shell market was worth $3.37 billion in 2021. At an average price of $2,000 per shell, that amounts to about 1.685 million shells annually. According to RUSI Ukraine was firing 6,000 artillery shells a day, which amounts to 2.2 million annually. Given existing stockpiles sizes, and a modest rampup in manufacturing, NATO should not have any difficulty sustaining at least that baseline consumption practically indefinitely.

 

[Anlsvrthng]

Russia was firing 20,000 artillery shells per day in July, according to a report from Britain's Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). Their monthly production capacity would sustain only 5 days of operations.

The world 155mm shell market was worth $3.37 billion in 2021. At an average price of $2,000 per shell, that amounts to about 1.685 million shells annually. According to RUSI Ukraine was firing 6,000 artillery shells a day, which amounts to 2.2 million annually. Given existing stockpiles sizes, and a modest rampup in manufacturing, NATO should not have any difficulty sustaining at least that baseline consumption practically indefinitely.

Smart round cost in the range of several 100 thousand $.

Most likelly the market numbers 90-99% coming from those cost.

The 7500 Excalibur round on its own represent 1-2 billion $.


Means most likelly the number of manucafured round in the few 10 000 range / year.

Most likelly the production lines those can make mass ammount of rounds doesn't exist, only manual work for high value, low automatisation 100k rounds, making few dozen a day.

 

[Botnet]

So immediately supposedly reported:

Supposedly, Rybar is claiming the Ukrainians had another breakthrough across the Oskil at Lozove. Can we get someone on telegram to verify?

View attachment 98215


Predictions time!

tldr; Ukraine is going to keep having successes until the new troops show up. I would expect Lugansk is next while pinning a lot of Russian troops in Kherson. In Lugansk, I would expect the Ukrainians to rip up the railways as they work their way through, at least near the Russian border. How well the Russians do after the troops show up depends on a few things.

If Russia is going to do the deployment of their mobilization properly, the troops are going to take two to three months to arrive in theater. The reservists being called up are going to need time to drill properly and become cohesive units. That means November at the earliest. November in the Donbas is chilly (6 C day time average and 1 C at night), but relatively dry and snow free. Winter clothing is going to be needed pretty quick. If the reports of the lack of night vision equipment are accurate, fighting in winter will be even more problematic: sunrise is 657 on December 1st and sunset is 1538. The cold weather uniforms and night vision equipment are going to be really needed.

The logistics strain we have seen so far is going to be compounded unless a lot of those reservists are going to be made into lorry/truck drivers. The lack of palletization is going to be major problem still unless the Russian armed forces have fixed that recently. I have not heard the Russian army has done so, but I am willing to listen to correction.

If the troops are properly equipped and trained, I expect the Russians to launch offensives across the border into Kharkov, Lugansk and anywhere else they will have been pushed across the border at. There might even be another yolo to Kiev again. That said, I would then expect the Russian advances to peter out again sometime around the end of February. The Raputitsa will return around then.

The Ukrainians will then attempt chewing up the Russian forces like they did during this year's Raputitsa. If the Russians will have learned from this year's events, the Ukrainians will be less effective at it. Once Genera Mud leaves the field, the Russians could restart offensive actions and reach the Dniepr.

However...

If the Russians do not properly equip their troops and merely throw them into the fight as fast as possible, the Russian mobilization will be a debacle. Give me properly trained troops, not more bodies (or so I would say if I were the Russian commanders). Specifically, I would be asking for more truck drivers and infantry. The former are relatively easy to train, but the latter takes time if they are going to be effective. If the logistics are not fixed, then the increased pressure will be bad. Really bad. That increased pressure could make the whole situation even worse for the Russians rather than better.

If the Russians rush the reservists forward, we will see massive casualties and little, if any, benefit. Ukrainians offensives might slow down, but won't be stopped. There may be mass surrenders rather than retreats. As the Raputitsa takes hold, the poor logistics and poorly trained will get chewed on badly. I would expect the Ukrainians to attempt another round of aggressive advances next summer: they will more of their troops trained in the West in the mean time. If we are going to see western MBTs in Ukrainian hands, it will be in April or May next year.

Those are my predictions: I see a fork here. Either the Russians will sort their issues out and properly deploy the reservists, making gains again, or there are going to be a lot of dead Russian men for little benefit and headed to a probable defeat.

I want to call out people saying the Russians have lost less than 8k dead. There would be no reason to mobilize if the Russians had lost that little, as 32k casualties out of the original 190k troops is a paltry percentage: 16% +/-. The deaths would have been 4%. I've kept my own tracker going and based on destroyed equipment, I get a minimum of 13k dead and based on the equipment losses the Russians are rapidly closing in on IFV/APC and tank losses for 80 BTG...of the original 130. Note: my count does not include infantry very well and, historically, infantry have taken it on the nose the most and losses will be higher.

Quick and easy predictive test: if the Ukrainians shred another oblast - looking at you, Lugansk - like done in Kharkov, the Russian army in Ukraine has been hollowed out definitively.

I have been wrong before and will be again. Let's see how wrong I am.

Looking alot like an Izyum 2.0. It's interesting that Russia seems to be unable to blunt the Ukrainian salient. A candidate for such a counterattack would be the 3rd Army Corps, but they seem to be MIA after a quick stint in the Kupyansk/Izyum axis.

Worse comes to worse, Russian troops will be able to withdraw from Lyman since Ukraine has not proven themselves to be capable of an encirclement, although Russian troops have had a disturbing record of leaving behind their equipment while fleeing.

All said and done though, there'll be plenty of news articles like "Ukraine takes another key town. Russia has lost this war" or something like that, "mass graves" will suddenly be found, and the international condemnation starts rolling in. Rinse and repeat.

I do hope that with the mobilization, Russia will be able to turn the tables around, but call me a skeptic until there's actual results on the ground.

 

[Botnet]

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Good article demonstrating how Ukraine is suffering unthinkable casualties for little to no gains. Despite all these claims that Russia is going to get pushed out (hint: Not happening anytime soon)

"They are racing to recapture territory before the October rains turn the roads here into impassable sludge." So much so for getting to Kherson, huh?

"The Ukrainian government does not usually disclose casualty figures, but the soldiers and commanders interviewed in the past week portrayed the battlefield losses as “high” and “massive.” They described large offensives in which columns of Ukrainian tanks and armored vehicles tried to cross open fields only to be pounded mercilessly by Russian artillery and blown up by Russian mines."

"One Ukrainian soldier, speaking anonymously because he was not authorized to publicly discuss casualties, said that during a recent assault, “we lost 50 guys in two hours.” In another place, said the soldier, who works closely with different frontline units, “hundreds” of Ukrainian troops were killed or wounded while trying to take a single village, which is still in Russian hands."

'“The problem is that we are advancing with no artillery preparation, without suppressing their firing positions,”' said Ihor Kozub, the commander of a volunteer military unit near the southern city of Mykolaiv."

 

[sheogorath]

I find the claims of the US depots runing dry interesting because according to Patchwork in another thread, the US had so much ammo and weaponry they didn't know what to do with it and could give them away freely because they wouldn't be needed in the Pacific theater against China.