Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis

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henrik

Senior Member
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A full decouple was always going to happen.... in fact China planned to drop the US like a rock when the time was right, but as like in war you dont always get to choose perfect timing.....

At the very least I do think China is going straight to armed reunification, none of that flyover overland bs or even take some small islands or just take the strait etc etc....

Going straight to armed reunification is a big win for China.
 

jwnz

Junior Member
Registered Member
Either both US and China have full awareness (cahoots) on how this event transpires or they don't (conventional wisdom would suggest lol).

If the former, then there's nothing any pleb can do except sit back and watch the puppet masters do their thing. If the latter, both sides would have near perfect clarity of immediate military intentions. Okay there's a lot of masking and deception in terms of positioning and so on but it's generally visible in adversarial case (latter) to US what China may do militarily and to China what the US may do militarily.

We'd have to assume both sides are acting upon their best information and the best clarity they have on the consequences of planned actions. Therefore whatever is pursued can only be assumed (given the latter) to be the optimal course of action. China is signalling desire to respond even militarily. The US is not signalling the desire to get involved militarily. This would suggest the US (if Pelosi goes through with it) wants the PRC to perform forced reunification or at least respond and gauge how the PRC responds, using Taiwan as the bait.

Somehow this either earns them intel on Chinese military capabilities and how the PRC side is going to act. The US would choose to get involved or not after the fact.

By doing this they would no doubt be condemning China similar to how the information warfare has been waged on Russia. Only the desire here is to fully decouple and an attempt to reverse how dependent on China an increasing number of western nations have become. Obviously this would result in significant inflation in the west including the US but also economically damage China to an unknown extent. Is China ready for fortress China economy conditions and an occupation war in Taiwan?

The cost of this to the US is economic to an unknown extent but medium to long term significantly higher inflation would be a starter. If they do nothing, it would also signal some weakness to partners and allies. A cost the US may be happy to shoulder if they achieve their goals of decoupling with China and economically weakening it?
I don't believe "fortress China economy conditions" should be a concern as it won't be a fortress, the Global South will likely rally with China (except for India of cos) and so will Russia, together between Russia, China, and GS, we would have all we need in terms of natural resources, technologies, miliary capabilities, and markets. The West especially the US can offer paper money, which is increasingly becoming worthless anyway.
 

plawolf

Lieutenant General
If it becomes clear the PLA is going to attack, will the Americans signal as strongly as possible that they will intervene with their military? Would they do it regardless of whether they plan to follow through?

Team Biden has bet everything on China bluffing. They will actively reject any and all intel that points to the contrary. PLA missiles can be in the air and they will still insist it’s only drills.

In a way, they have manufactured the perfect cover and pretext for armed reunification.

They will not believe Xi is not bluffing until mass missile strikes impact all across Taiwan, and even then I half expect them to think that’s the full extend of China’s response. It may take PLA marines hitting the beaches of Taiwan before team Biden finally manages to catch up to reality.

I think the shock will paralyse Biden’s admin for a good many hours in the best case scenario as they scramble with mass cognitive dissonance and ask the military for assessments and options and Milley gets to say, ‘I fucking told you so and now we don’t have a military option that doesn’t result in an outright loss or WWIII’. Once they confirm Nancy is alive, they will probably just decide to cut their losses and pin all the blame on her personally and call it a day.
 

alfreddango

Junior Member
Registered Member
For once, the Jai Hind forum might have uncovered something interesting. Thoughts?

I mean, they respect chinese claims on scs and then send their #3 to taiwan

trying to decipher their motives is important but it puts you in a position where you have to chase them and not advance things at your pace
at the end of the day they're trying to push things and see what happens: now it's up to china to take control of the game, if she really wants to play it
hope they're ready though, cause when you come at the king, you best not miss
 

9dashline

Captain
Registered Member
I mean, they respect chinese claims on scs and then send their #3 to taiwan

trying to decipher their motives is important but it puts you in a position where you have to chase them and not advance things at your pace
at the end of the day they're trying to push things and see what happens: now it's up to china to take control of the game, if she really wants to play it
hope they're ready though, cause when you come at the king, you best not miss
Correct. China cannot afford to halfass it like what Russia did in the Ukraine... Must be committed 100%. Its too late to turn back now
 

Nobo

Junior Member
Registered Member
I mean, they respect chinese claims on scs and then send their #3 to taiwan
Come on. They cant even find america on a map. Little Euro bred guy after getting some german nuclear tech & native american land is acting too tough. I would say both Russia & China should consider a permanent solution regarding that lil guy.
 

chlosy

Junior Member
Registered Member
Kinda a long response.

[POST 1 OF 2]

Well, this begs the question of what condition those nuclear weapons are in, their relative complexity, their efficacy, the time it would take to operationalize them, and the deliverability of them (pertaining to delivery platforms, and their own technical and sustainment characteristics). I did a little bit of work near the beginning of my career on optimizing SLBM salvo profiles, so while I definitely don't have the same level of expertise as I do on PLA systems, I know at least enough about the Russian nuclear forces to point out some of their notable characteristics, and how they differ from the US in some respects. One thing I will say is that the US, for all our flaws, is really serious about maintaining our nuclear stockpile - and we pour enormous amounts of time, money, and effort into ensuring our inventory is absolutely certain to perform as expected.

I personally don't have a very rosy view of post-Soviet Russia's high-complexity technical capabilities in general, and I would be extremely confident positing that Russia's delivery platforms and their ~1600 nominally "deployed" warheads (out of their total ~4300 warheads circa 2020 ((of which, ~2,000 are nonstrategic yield devices)) as reported by Hans Kristenson in
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, who by the way is awesome) are in relatively sustainment-hungry, if still operational, condition. Further, the number of actively deployed/deliverable warheads at any given time is FAR below the inventory size, or even the nominal "deployed" warhead figure.

An easy example, Russian SSBNs (especially throughout the 90s and 2000s) were patrolling at paltry cadences compared to during the Cold War, which left large numbers of SLBMs and warheads essentially mothballed and sitting in storage facilities, rather than being consistently maintained, technically validated, certified, and deployed. Image below displays Russian SSBN (as well as other SSx) patrols from '91 to '06.

View attachment 94669

Of the 10 SSBNs in Russian inventory, 5 are Delta IV (Pr.667BRDM) and 5 are Borei (Pr955) class boats (though 2 of the Boreis are improved Pr955A Borei II class boats).

Both classes carry 16 SLBMs, with Borei-class boats carrying RSM-56 (SS-N-32) Bulava mussiles, and Delta IVs modified to carry the R-29RMU2 (SS-N-23 SKIFF) Layner missiles. These delivery systems are capable of employing 6 and 4 MIRVs respectively, though they have historically carried 4 and 3 respectively due to arms control treaties and limited operational strategic yield stockpile.

Thus, the Russian SSBN force in total hosts:
80x RSM-56 (SS-N-32) Bulava [6x 100-150Kt MIRV]
80x R-29RMU2 (SS-N-23 SKIFF) Layner [4x 100-150Kt MIRV]

This comes out to a total of 800 nominally deployed warheads. However, not all boats are underway simultaneously, which brings us down to ~4 boats at any given time, while the rest are in various maintenance, workup, or other cycles. Splitting it down the middle by class of boat, this gets us a revised deliverable warhead figure of 320 warheads. Certainly not too shabby, but significantly below the nominal figures.

Russian ICBM warheads are also likely maintained at lower snap salvo yields than US equivalents, and those that are available are unlikely to be subjected to the same level of ***constant*** maintenance, validation, and certification processes as US warheads and systems (again, we have invested enormous money, time, and effort into maintaining and validating our nuclear stockpile's efficacy - I seriously cannot stress this enough). First, let's note the composition of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces circa 2020 (when New START imploded and we got our last best count):

- 46x R-36M2 (SS-18 SATAN) [10x 550-750Kt Mod 6 MIRVs] < Silo
- 2x UR-100N (SS-19 MOD 4 STILLETO) [1x Avangard HGV] < Silo
- 36x RT-2PM/RS-12M (SS-25 SICKLE) [1x 800Kt RV] < Road-Mobile
- 18x RT-2PM2/RS-12M1 (SS-27 Mod 1 SICKLE B) [1x 1Mt RV] < Road-Mobile
- 60x RT-2PM2/RS-12M2 (SS-27 Mod 1 SICKLE B) [1x 1Mt RV] < Silo
- ~135x RS-24 (SS-29/SS-27 Mod 2) [4x 150-300kt(?) MIRV] < Road-Mobile
- 14x RS-24 (SS-29/SS-27 Mod 2) [4x 150-300kt(?) MIRV] < Silo

Theoretically, these launch vehicles are capable of deploying ~1172 warheads, give or take (though, while New START was in effect, and potentially even now due to the limited strategic warhead inventory, not all of these munitions are deployed with their full warhead payload). This is a lot, however the number of LOW-relevant, and/or snap salvo systems (those which are capable of launching in the time from when adversary weapons are detected to the mean impact time of nuclear counterforce tasked warheads) is only a portion of this force.

Of these systems, only the following are capable of snap salvo and LOW relevant cue to "coming" envelopes:
- R-36M2 (46x, 460 Warheads)
- RT-2PM2/RS-12M2 (60x, 60 Warheads)
- RS-24 (14x, 56 Warheads)

This is a total of 120 missiles, and 576 Warheads theoretically ready to go on a moment's notice.

When we combine Strategic Rocket Force and Boomer deliverable warhead figures, we end up with a prompt salvo volume of 896 warheads from 156 missiles. Again, not half bad by any stretch, but a far cry from the thousands ostensibly in the stockpile.

It is also worth noting again that these warheads and launch vehicles are not subjected to the same extensive and rigorous maintenance and validation that US systems are. As a matter of fact, the overwhelming majority of US nuclear spending goes into our laboratories (a LOT of money goes into those), reactability validation (sites like National Ignition Facility operate in direct support of nuclear maintenance by simulating reactant behavior as time passes, parts wear out and are replaced, etc - which helps ensure we maintain our warheads in such a manner that we don't compromise their yield), specialized manufacturing facilities (highly specialized materials, radiation hardened components, etc.), and on maintaining, improving, and validating infrastructure such as silos work correctly.

[END POST 1]
How many warheads are needed to start a nuclear winter?
 
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