Lessons for China to learn from Ukraine conflict for Taiwan scenario

[Minm]

I don't think Penghu is that important to serve as the springboard to invade Taiwan with modern weaponry. Maybe so one century ago. Taking Penghu mainly serve 2 purposes.

1. Losing Penghu could really delivered a heavy psychological blow and demoralised the enemy and Taiwanese.

2. Decoy as Taiwanese forces would need to divert their defence to the south leaving other region vulnerable.

I think invasion of Penghu (likely by special force) should be done in tandem with Air campaign and artillery bombardment of the entire operation .

Total sea, air superiority and Penghu should fall under PLA control within 48hr. Beach landing and heli ops will commence thereafter.

Still will depend on the timeline of the operations . Will PLA decide to

1.bypass Penghu and take on Taiwan directly
2. Attack Penghu first before invading Taiwan
3. Attack both Taiwan and Penghu at the same time?

I think probability for option 2 is higher follow by 3.

As for Kinmen, Matsu and dongsha, i think PLA can wait.

Taking Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu (Dongsha and Taiping are less important) is absolutely essential. Taking Green and Orchid islands is also very important. We have to consider the worst case, which is that with massive US support, the main island of Taiwan cannot be conquered and all beach landings fail. China needs to take at least some territory and be able to continue attacking from much closer to the main island. If the campaign fails, but China liberates Penghu, then the islands will be very important in a drawn out war of attrition. Penghu could also be useful for shelling Taiwan and never letting the conflict fully end, which will prevent new investment in Taiwan and won't allow them to rebuild. In the most extreme worst case, if the PLA of today fails but at least takes Penghu, then the next generation 30 years from now won't have to start from scratch.

 

[Sardaukar20]

The main Penghu Island is not small. It is almost 10 km in both N-S and E-W direction. It has a 3000m runway, a harbor that can service cruise liners, and a ROCAF base.

It is almost inevitable that PLA has to take control over the Penghu Islands in the early phase of any reunification campaign. Without totally disabling up front any military capability on the island group, it will be highly risky to movement of PLA soldiers and materials across the Taiwan Strait during an amphibian assault. And if the PLA is able to do that, so might as well take over the Penghu Islands and use them to her advantage.

If the PLA can take Penghu Island with as little pain as possible, then by all means they should do it. The island would serve as a very useful role in supporting the logistics for the amphibious invasion of Taiwan proper. It does make perfect military sense to take Penghu Island. The PLA will get the island, but the timing can be varied.

The PLA should also be aware that the ROCAF would anticipate this. The ROCAF will attempt to commit men, aircraft, and ships to try to deny Penghu Island to the PLA. The PLA could take this opportunity to turn Penghu Island into a force fixing operation, and meatgrinder for the ROCAF. Penghu Island is one of those places that the PLA can bleed the ROCAF of aircraft and naval vessels. The faster the ROCAF bleeds, the better outcome for the PLA in the entire conflict.

Pro-Taiwanese military pundits and arm chair generals are very smug about their assessment about the PLA. They anticipate that Penghu Island will be one of those first places that the PLA must land on. To then turn it into a jump point for the actual landing on Taiwan proper. Hence, they think they can anticipate the PLA's every move; making them think that it is 'easy' to defeat the PLA there and mess up their invasion plan. The PLA should try not to be so direct. Don't follow the enemy's rulebook, just make them think you are. Let the enemy think that Penghu Island is gonna be some kind of epic 'Battle of Guadalcanal' against the PLA. Then let them suddenly wonder why they had committed too much men and assets trying to fight over Penghu Island, while the PLA where making their big maneuvers all around Taiwan. Make them commit the same 'Maginot Line' mistake that the French had made in WWII.

 

[AndrewS]

Day 1), a couple of us estimated they need to launch about 1000 BM/CM/Rocket (from something like PCL-191)/PGMs to disable all the major Taiwanese military bases/communication tower/fuel depot and such.

Most fuel depot attacks will have to wait for unpowered munitions to be used instead of more expensive BM/CM/Rockets

For Taiwan, I've got the following figures:

a) 3 oil refineries
b) approx 20 fuel distribution terminals
c) a guestimate of 5000 individual Fuel Distribution Tanks in various fuel depots/terminals
d) 2494 petrol stations

e) approx 20,000 mobile telephone masts
f) approx 1500 telephone (Broadband) exchanges

It also appears that JH-7s were still being produced in 2015, so they still will be around in a 2027/2032 timeframe

 

[tphuang]

And if we assume that only 100 JH-7s are tasked, they could launch [1200 SDB + 300 JDAM-ER] glide bombs every day.
So they could keep the J-16/J-10/J-20 tasked with air superiority.

100 JH-7 launching 1500 PGMs? How? All the JH-7s regiments are retired already from what I can see. The 200 to 250 JH-7A (I think?) will be retiring pretty quickly over the next few years. For missions involving flying a long distance to dropping a lot of bombs, you cannot assume very high availability rate for that. 60 to 70% would be pretty high estimate. 6 PGMs for each JH-7A would be a lot. I wouldn't put such high hopes on JH-7.

The cost of existing extended range guided artillery shells is similar to a JDAM or SDB-1. Yet the artillery shell has a far smaller warhead.

Do you any proof of this? There is a lot of operating costs involved in aircraft sorties that are not there for just setting up and launching artillery shells. There will most likely be more PGM attacks, but they have to balance out the operating cost/availability of aircraft with other missions that are out there.

If we're talking about standoff missiles/PGMs, the JH-7s will be more survivable because they have space for targeting and EW pods, whilst the J-10 doesn't have enough hardpoints. Plus the JH-7 has a lot more range and therefore endurance over any potential battlefield.

I think J-10 has 1100 km combat radius with 3 EFTs. That's plenty. It's also why we have often seen J-10s fly out to Taiwan ADIZ. It has 11 hard points. You can easily carry 3 FTs + 2 PL10s + 4 PGMs + 1 pod. I have not seen JH-7A fly out to Taiwan ADIZ. I don't know how you can say that the aircraft with better maneuverability and EW suite has lower survivability.

Look at the performance figures of glide bombs. 125kg class = 110km, 250kg class = 70km.
Glide bombs trade height for speed.
If you want a 200km range glide bomb, my guestimate is a maximum weight of 30kg. How big a warhead could you put on this?
Note an SDB only has a 16kg warhead.

If they can't get 200 km range glide PGMs by then, 50 to 100 km range ones are fine too.

I would argue land-based JASSMs are cheaper than air-launched JSMs.
Using the J-10 and J-16 as a bomb truck would be a waste, as they should focus on the air-superiority mission.

land based JASSMs are just ground launched LACMs. They don't need new development for that. An improved, more compact and stealthier version of stand off missile compared to KD-88 is definitely needed.

In the timeframe I'm thinking of, J-10/J-11B retirement will already be well under way, so they will definitely be used as bomb trucks. Similarly, J-15s will be bomb trucks. Or in the case of J-16, they will also be tasked with carrying long range weapons like PL-XX that cannot be carried internally within J=20/35. They should have 400 5th gen by 2027 and 900 by 2032.

Ground attacks are pretty important. A lot of air sorties will be for those missions.

If the PLA can take Penghu Island with as little pain as possible, then by all means they should do it. The island would serve as a very useful role in supporting the logistics for the amphibious invasion of Taiwan proper. It does make perfect military sense to take Penghu Island. The PLA will get the island, but the timing can be varied.

The PLA should also be aware that the ROCAF would anticipate this. The ROCAF will attempt to commit men, aircraft, and ships to try to deny Penghu Island to the PLA. The PLA could take this opportunity to turn Penghu Island into a force fixing operation, and meatgrinder for the ROCAF. Penghu Island is one of those places that the PLA can bleed the ROCAF of aircraft and naval vessels. The faster the ROCAF bleeds, the better outcome for the PLA in the entire conflict.

Pro-Taiwanese military pundits and arm chair generals are very smug about their assessment about the PLA. They anticipate that Penghu Island will be one of those first places that the PLA must land on. To then turn it into a jump point for the actual landing on Taiwan proper. Hence, they think they can anticipate the PLA's every move; making them think that it is 'easy' to defeat the PLA there and mess up their invasion plan. The PLA should try not to be so direct. Don't follow the enemy's rulebook, just make them think you are. Let the enemy think that Penghu Island is gonna be some kind of epic 'Battle of Guadalcanal' against the PLA. Then let them suddenly wonder why they had committed too much men and assets trying to fight over Penghu Island, while the PLA where making their big maneuvers all around Taiwan. Make them commit the same 'Maginot Line' mistake that the French had made in WWII.

Well, we have already seen what happens when PLAAF sends aircraft into ROCAF ADIZ. ROCAF just runs out of aircraft pretty quickly. The initial barrage will put most of ROCA assets out of usage for the initial part of war. Along with shore bombardment from naval ships, I think taking Penghu will be quite easy actually. There is basically no where the defenders can hide. The initial part of conflict will involve taking out all the air strips, naval ships, C&C, communication towers and anything of value in organizing counter attacks. PLAAF needs to ensure they can establish complete air dominance very early on. Once they do that, follow on attacks will be a lot easier.

UCAVs when you have complete air control is great, because they have unlimited endurance and can attack any ground troop movements.

Most fuel depot attacks will have to wait for unpowered munitions to be used instead of more expensive BM/CM/Rockets

For Taiwan, I've got the following figures:

a) 3 oil refineries
b) approx 20 fuel distribution terminals
c) a guestimate of 5000 individual Fuel Distribution Tanks in various fuel depots/terminals
d) 2494 petrol stations

e) approx 20,000 mobile telephone masts
f) approx 1500 telephone (Broadband) exchanges

It also appears that JH-7s were still being produced in 2015, so they still will be around in a 2027/2032 timeframe

I was not referring to regular gas stations, but rather fuel depots next to large military bases. I really don't recall JH-7As still being produced after 2010/2011 range. Most JH-7A units were produced before 2009 IIRC. Now, it's possible they produced 1 last batch in 2015 to help make up numbers, but there is no reason to keep it around longer just because 1 regiment is new.

 

[AndrewS]

100 JH-7 launching 1500 PGMs? How? All the JH-7s regiments are retired already from what I can see. The 200 to 250 JH-7A (I think?) will be retiring pretty quickly over the next few years. For missions involving flying a long distance to dropping a lot of bombs, you cannot assume very high availability rate for that. 60 to 70% would be pretty high estimate. 6 PGMs for each JH-7A would be a lot. I wouldn't put such high hopes on JH-7.

When I say JH-7, I do mean all the variants.

If we take 50x JH-7s, each should be able to carry 6 racks with 4 SDBs each. That would be 1200 weapons
If we another 50x JH-7s, each should be able to carry 6 250kg JDAM-ER easily. That would be 300 weapons.

And if you look at the weight involved, it's not actually that much compared to maximum external payload capacity of 9000kg

I'm not too fussed as to whether it is JH-7 or J-16. In the future, yes, the JH-7s eventually be replaced.
But today, there are over 200 JH-7 available and I would expect 150 to still be in service in 5 years time. That is enough to support 100 sorties per day.

Do you any proof of this? There is a lot of operating costs involved in aircraft sorties that are not there for just setting up and launching artillery shells. There will most likely be more PGM attacks, but they have to balance out the operating cost/availability of aircraft with other missions that are out there.

A laser-guided Krasnopol 152mm Artillery Shell is $35K yet only has a 25km range.

The Netherlands was paying $20K for M1156 Precision Guidance Kits to attach to 155mm artillery shells.
Then you have to add the cost of an extended range artillery shell which might have a range of 70km.
If you draw a range circle from Penghu to Taiwan, you can see it doesn't cover any territory on Taiwan. So you'll have to use MLRS rockets or aircraft anyway.

In comparison, standard JDAM kits start at $21K each, and can be attached to 500lb bomb which costs $4K.
SDB-1s cost $40K each.

Yes, aircraft have a lot more operating costs involved than artillery, but for the vast majority of targets in Taiwan, artillery (even located on Penghu) don't have enough range

Well, if the US is involved, an invasion of Taiwan will have to take backseat to the conflict with the US military. There's no other option.

So JH-7s will be focusing on antiship and strike missions outside of Taiwan. But if the US hasn't declared war, then China can spare 100 JH-7/J-16s to launch large numbers of glide bombs. The flight profile involved is really straightforward and risk free. Fly below the radar horizon, then pop up at 110km or 70km, launch the glide bombs, then turn around. It's beyond the range of medium-range SAMs.

I think J-10 has 1100 km combat radius with 3 EFTs. That's plenty. It's also why we have often seen J-10s fly out to Taiwan ADIZ. It has 11 hard points. You can easily carry 3 FTs + 2 PL10s + 4 PGMs + 1 pod. I have not seen JH-7A fly out to Taiwan ADIZ. I don't know how you can say that the aircraft with better maneuverability and EW suite has lower survivability.

I see the JH-7 as having a better EW suite than the J-10.

And the reason why we see J-10s flying out to Taiwan is because there are J-10 units stationed on the coast opposite Taiwan.
The JH-7 units are stationed elsewhere, and as I've outlined, an attack profile using glide bombs is really simple and could be practiced anywhere. And of course, you need to have those glide bombs in the inventory before you really start practicing.

UCAVs when you have complete air control is great, because they have unlimited endurance and can attack any ground troop movements.

I was not referring to regular gas stations, but rather fuel depots next to large military bases. I really don't recall JH-7As still being produced after 2010/2011 range. Most JH-7A units were produced before 2009 IIRC. Now, it's possible they produced 1 last batch in 2015 to help make up numbers, but there is no reason to keep it around longer just because 1 regiment is new.

I think 5-10 years is a workable time horizon.
If you go further, predictions start to get much fuzzier.

Plus in 10 years time, I don't think there will be any disagreement on China having the capacity to conquer Taiwan AND being able to deter the USA from declaring war against China.

 

[gelgoog]

You cannot use laser guided artillery rounds at such long distances. It would have to be a Beidou guided round.

 

[tphuang]

When I say JH-7, I do mean all the variants.

If we take 50x JH-7s, each should be able to carry 6 racks with 4 SDBs each. That would be 1200 weapons
If we another 50x JH-7s, each should be able to carry 6 250kg JDAM-ER easily. That would be 300 weapons.

There are a lot of things that should be possible, but unfortunately not so easy. Wide scale deployment 250 kg dual guidance PGMs that can glide is probably the most realistic option that we can expect in the next 10 years. And that's assuming PLAAF is finally comfortable with Beidou guidance. Currently, we have rarely even seen pictures of them carry more than 1 500 KG PGM. Let's they are holding back more impressive photos. Carrying 6 per JH-7A would still be a very big change from now.

But today, there are over 200 JH-7 available and I would expect 150 to still be in service in 5 years time. That is enough to support 100 sorties per day.

That's rather optimistic. Unless Taiwan declares independence before 2030, I don't see JH-7 playing a role here. Again, most of the current JH-7A units joined service before 2010.

A laser-guided Krasnopol 152mm Artillery Shell is $35K yet only has a 25km range.

The Netherlands was paying $20K for M1156 Precision Guidance Kits to attach to 155mm artillery shells.
Then you have to add the cost of an extended range artillery shell which might have a range of 70km.
If you draw a range circle from Penghu to Taiwan, you can see it doesn't cover any territory on Taiwan. So you'll have to use MLRS rockets or aircraft anyway.

In comparison, standard JDAM kits start at $21K each, and can be attached to 500lb bomb which costs $4K.
SDB-1s cost $40K each.

Again, we haven't seen PLAAF fit guidance kits on dumb bombs. We have definitely seen that fire a lot of dumb bombs with J-10s/J-16s.

I would think they can use a combination of ER shelling or rocket systems. The former covers portion of Taiwan and the latter covers all of relevant targets in Taiwan. You can continuous shelling with artillery, which you can't do with aircraft. You also don't put your aircraft at risk from possible SHORAD or Manpads,

Well, if the US is involved, an invasion of Taiwan will have to take backseat to the conflict with the US military. There's no other option.

Yes, that's why you keep up your shelling with artillery/rocket systems to keep military bases offline and try to best utilize your aerial assets against farther away targets.

So JH-7s will be focusing on antiship and strike missions outside of Taiwan. But if the US hasn't declared war, then China can spare 100 JH-7/J-16s to launch large numbers of glide bombs. The flight profile involved is really straightforward and risk free. Fly below the radar horizon, then pop up at 110km or 70km, launch the glide bombs, then turn around. It's beyond the range of medium-range SAMs.

Yes, if there is no prepositioned US force that can get involved quickly, then PLAAF should make use of its aerial assets to quickly achieve complete air dominance and control the entire battlefield.

I see the JH-7 as having a better EW suite than the J-10.

no possible.

Plus in 10 years time, I don't think there will be any disagreement on China having the capacity to conquer Taiwan AND being able to deter the USA from declaring war against China.

not really. In 10 years, USAF could have a good number of NGAD/B21 joining service while China is still waiting on H20/6th generation join service. We really don't know. The next 10 years are very important for the balance of power in West Pac. It's also a period that I'm mostly concerned about a terrible conflict.

 

[AndrewS]

There are a lot of things that should be possible, but unfortunately not so easy. Wide scale deployment 250 kg dual guidance PGMs that can glide is probably the most realistic option that we can expect in the next 10 years. And that's assuming PLAAF is finally comfortable with Beidou guidance. Currently, we have rarely even seen pictures of them carry more than 1 500 KG PGM. Let's they are holding back more impressive photos. Carrying 6 per JH-7A would still be a very big change from now.

I expect to see wide-scale deployment of both 250kg and 125kg glide bombs within the next 5 years.

They'll have a basic GPS/INS version at low cost. But there's no reason they couldn't add laser guidance for a modest amount.
Then because they already have a SDB-1 munitions airframe, they might as well develop a more expensive SDB-2 equivalent with autonomous attack sensors.

Again, we haven't seen PLAAF fit guidance kits on dumb bombs. We have definitely seen that fire a lot of dumb bombs with J-10s/J-16s.

I would also expect large numbers of JDAMs, given the technology is already here. It's something which they should be doing now.

I would think they can use a combination of ER shelling or rocket systems. The former covers portion of Taiwan and the latter covers all of relevant targets in Taiwan. You can continuous shelling with artillery, which you can't do with aircraft. You also don't put your aircraft at risk from possible SHORAD or Manpads,

Yes, that's why you keep up your shelling with artillery/rocket systems to keep military bases offline and try to best utilize your aerial assets against farther away targets.

If the US is involved, then I don't see a Penghu operation being successful. So there won't be a land base for long-range artillery or standard-range MLRS rockets.

no possible.

The JH-7 has an integrated EW system plus a back-seater who can also operate EW. The J-10 doesn't have this.
Both platforms could integrate the same EW pod. So which platform is likely to have better electronic warfare and jamming capability?

not really. In 10 years, USAF could have a good number of NGAD/B21 joining service while China is still waiting on H20/6th generation join service. We really don't know. The next 10 years are very important for the balance of power in West Pac. It's also a period that I'm mostly concerned about a terrible conflict.

In 8 years time, China should have twice the "stock/inventory" of advanced weapons systems that it has today.
Focusing just on NGAD and the B-21 is the wrong metric. In the 5-10 year timeframe, there will likely only be a handful of these systems.

And beyond 10 years time, I think the Chinese military will be decisively accelerating ahead and leaving the US behind.

 

[bobsagget]

Let's try to have a thread just discussing what the Russians did during this conflict and what can China learn. Please keep nukes and which countries you hate out of this discussion.

I just listened to a shilao podcast on the first day and half of the war and it was quite enlightening as usual. A lot of good topics to think about. I think most of us can agree that China unilterally invading Taiwan right now would be a terrible idea. We also know that China does have its own timeline of when to be ready to invade Taiwan in case things take a wrong turn. So, what are the minimum things that PLA need to do?

To start off, Shilao discussed an exercise PLA had in 2000s where they managed a large scale helicopter operation of Z-9Ws and Mi-17s where Z-9s were performing the escort duties. Basically, the gist is that this lineup of helicopters to assist a beach landing would lead to quite a disaster. Most of the Mi-17s were imported as civilian helicopters and have no armor protection. The Z-9s are extremely light and also have no armor protection. Against any level of Manpad or even high caliber machine guns, the helicopters would suffer huge losses. Which brings us to the currently lineup of Z-10s, Z-20s, Z-8s, and Mi-17. We know that Z-10s have legendarily long range. Z-20s and Z-8s should also be better protected than Mi-17s. However, Z-10s do not have that much armor. It's not a heavy attack helicopter. The amount of armor you see on Z-10ME is probably the most they would ever put on domestic Z-10s. So even though they have a much better protected lineup of helicopters, it's still not great. Their proposal is revisiting the Ka-52 import. They talked about how Ka-52 managed to survive or at least land even after getting struck with missile and the pilots still survived. In early phases of the war, you really need to be able to keep utilizing your helicopters to keep transporting more troops and equipment over the water. The helicopter you have need to keep operating even if it takes a couple of hits. If a Z-10 needs to be out for the rest of the day for repairs after taking some damage in the cockpit, that's a huge problem. The other thing is that you want the helicopter to still be able to make it back to mainland if it gets hit on Taiwan side. With these considerations, a heavy attack helicopters seem to be a huge need for a future campaign. Maybe they can turn Z-20 into an assault helicopter, but it wouldn't be a dedicated attack helicopter. Also, they mentioned that although PLA LH has over 1000 helicopters, they still need more to be able to confidently use them without worrying about taking losses. Again, I think given the outsized importance that helicopters would have in the Taiwan scenario. There is definitely a need for a lot more improvement in their helicopter fleet. That could mean more helicopters or just more capable ones that can survive longer and generate more sorties. I'd think a lot more Z-20s and Z-8Ls and AC-313A military versions are needed for transports.

They also mentioned that Russians really didn't plan their helicopter deployments that well. In the example of the failed attack on the Ukrainian airport on the first day. There really is no excuses not having enough helicopters to rescue the stranded troops afterward. You must plan to have more in reserve in case you take more losses than expected. US military is really good at this. Very rarely do you see America having issues where they do not have enough helicopters when they need item.

The other point they really hammered home is Russia's attempts to control the air space. Again, Ukraine does not have a great air force or air defense, but RuAF could not suppress it. RuAF took out radar stations and probably command centers in the airport, but could not keep runways out of action or even destroy the aircraft hangars. This is a huge indictment on RuAF's inability to sustain operations. They were only performing sorties twice a day. That is really not sufficient to keeping the target air base out of action. In addition, they commented on Russia's lack of success in electronic warfare or SEAD missions. They do not think RuAF improved much in this area since 2008. Again, this is not due to lack of new equipments for RuAF. This points to probably lack of realistic training and slow directions from command centers for additional air raid. In this area, we have seen huge improvements from PLAAF. They've shown a lot of abilities in sustaining large operations into Taiwan ADIZ and controlling Taiwan air space. However, I think for them to really dominate the air space, they will need to be able to ramp this up to an even higher level over a 2 to 3 period in the start of an invasion. To me, that would point to a lot more J-16s and J-20s are needed. They also need to demonstrate ability to raise to an even higher tempo than what they've shown so far. Everything we've seen from PLAAF thus far have been pretty successful. That means they are probably not pushing themselves on these deployments. They have probably tried out these deployments multiples in land before trying them over water. But as they try to improve, I think there is a couple of more levels they can get to. Not just in terms of more sorties and aircraft, but also more joint operations with helicopters and naval ships.

When it comes to SEAD, the podcast also talked about targets in Taiwan that would need to be taken out. They mentioned only 16 major radar stations along with SAMs, 6 E-2K AWACS and naval ships like Kidd class. Those are all things that PLA will need to take out pretty early on or suppress in order to have ROCAF fighting blind. Imo, they will need to continually have EW aircraft presence to not just suppress Taiwan air defense, but also all electric stations, cell towers, internet providers and communication lines. They need to have elint aircraft pick up all communications that Taiwan is having. They need to make sure they can use EW to cut off or confuse Taiwan communications. You should not have things like what we are seeing in Ukraine where people can freely post things from the conflict online. Again, China has made significant progress here, but they need to continue to induct more Y-8/9 EW aircraft + J-16Ds. You cannot demoralize an opponent when they can still communicate with each other and see their head of state performing rally cry.

Another point they mentioned is mobile anti-aircraft solution like Taiwan's Skyguard system. They mentioned how J-16/20 often had more trouble in DACT against HQ-17 rather than HQ-9/S-400, because mobile SAMs can often sneak up on attacking aircraft if they fly predictable routes. To me, this is another major reason they really need a lot more UCAVs. You want your most powerful SEAD aircraft to take out the major air defense systems. However, you still need to clear out the shorter and more mobile air defense system afterward. Helicopters would be in danger against these things. UCAVs with accurate PGMs and high quality sensors would probably be the best tools at tracking these things down and destroying them. Again, I think PLAAF will need to make a lot more investment in this area. These platforms will continue to improve as AI/software technology continue to improve.

Overall, I think there are already a lot of lessons PLA can learn from the Ukraine conflict. There are certain Russian shortcomings in organization, logistics and training that are probably also there with PLA since neither forces have been in large scale conflicts recently. I think they need a lot more joint operations training involving a lot of helicopters, aircraft and amphibious ships and they need to show the ability to support these equipment in forward positions.

On helicopter armor. You are not likely putting a frame hit by a manpad back into service no matter how much armor it has . The point of most armor on helicopters is to only prevent immediate pilot death and to protect the engines. Asides from that any sort of blast from a manpad will put untold stress on the airframe and sub components that would need to be investigated before you even think about getting it in the air again. helicopters are delicate fickle machines that should not be operated where aa is present. Thats why you have combined arms and airland battle theories. You use intel and recon to confirm likely enemy composition and use air units to go into safeish areas for support .

 

[Overbom]

not really. In 10 years, USAF could have a good number of NGAD/B21 joining service while China is still waiting on H20/6th generation join service. We really don't know. The next 10 years are very important for the balance of power in West Pac. It's also a period that I'm mostly concerned about a terrible conflict.

That's funny. There is a reason people are saying that the gap between the US and China is rapidly closing and will never (for the foreseeable future) start growing again.

"Current" as of 2021


And that's for 2025, 4 years later


And now you say 10 years later (assume 2032). Does anyone here really want to update the data to show the difference between the projected 2025 Chinese forces and 2032... Between 2021 and 2025 there was such big difference, imagine what would be the rate of progress between 2025 and 2032.

(The above data are referenced from here)

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