The War in the Ukraine

Minm

Junior Member
Registered Member
I do not see them taking Kiev. A land bridge from Kharkov to Odessa looks like the goal. That’s what Putin meant for “de-communization.” A land locked west Ukraine will be a impoverished money sink for the west. Think about you think the collective west have the money to bailout Ukraine. Kiev keeps saying they need $3 billion a year to help the government function right now. If they lose the east and south that numbers gets higher. You think the US and Europe will spend 5 or 10 billion a month forever especially we are about to enter an environment of stagflation and recession? West Ukraine will never be an Israel. Israel has ports and a viable economy. Before this war Ukraine was the poorest country in Europe. After this war they will be the Lebanon of Europe but even worst. At least Lebanon has ports. Economically they’ll be finished. It will cost 10s of billions a month to support them. And even if they try to militarized Russia will do airstrikes and missiles to destroy them. West Ukraine will be a bigger version of Gaza. And since it will cost 10s of billions to support the West Ukrainian government the country will always be unstable. And half that money will be gone via corruption. Inadequate govt services which will lead to instability. You really think the west will continue to send advanced weapons to an unstable shithole like a landlocked Ukraine? Not gonna happen. West Ukraine isn’t gonna be like Israel or South Korea. It will be a failed state barely functional with various armed groups fighting amongst themselves for the scrapes.
West Ukraine is going to be an empty wasteland. The EU has given Ukrainians free movement and the right to work anywhere in the EU. We have seen the effects of such policies before. Eastern Germany lost all its young people after reunification because of better opportunities in West Germany. Young Polish and later Romanian, Bulgarian etc workers went to western countries after their countries entered the EU. Many are now able to return as living standards in Poland are improving. This will be very different in Ukraine, especially if the war continues for a few years. Ukrainian workers will fuel economic growth in central and eastern Europe within the EU and partially make up for the European losses from the trade war on Russia. Nobody will invest in West Ukraine if there are periodic air strikes on any remaining infrastructure. Clean water and food distribution are going to be challenging. Disease, poverty and hunger are going to be widespread, if Russia can continue to bomb Ukrainian logistics. Look at other long wars for what happens when the bombs never stop falling. For example, Syria had an outbreak of Polio, a virus that is almost completely eradicated, because there was no more surveillance during the war.


Simple demographics also make the future of the Ukrainian nation very questionable. Ukrainian refugees are already a very large percentage of the (female) population. More than 6.7 million people have left the country (
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) including another million refugees in May. This is out of an estimated pre war population of 37 million, excluding Crimea and the Donbass (
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). As the vast majority of refugees are women and children, they have probably lost maybe a quarter of their female population of 20 million already.

The birth rate in eastern Europe is disastrous, especially in the poorest countries like Ukraine. What do you think a war will do to that? Few people will want to raise a child in a war zone. Ukraine already had far fewer births than deaths before the war, now most of the young women have left and those remaining in Ukraine are less likely to want to have children. So the conclusion is simple, if Russia is able to keep going for long enough, Ukraine is going to run out of Ukrainian nationals and only pro Russian citizens will be left.
 

allyerse

New Member
Registered Member
West Ukraine is going to be an empty wasteland. The EU has given Ukrainians free movement and the right to work anywhere in the EU. We have seen the effects of such policies before. Eastern Germany lost all its young people after reunification because of better opportunities in West Germany. Young Polish and later Romanian, Bulgarian etc workers went to western countries after their countries entered the EU. Many are now able to return as living standards in Poland are improving. This will be very different in Ukraine, especially if the war continues for a few years. Ukrainian workers will fuel economic growth in central and eastern Europe within the EU and partially make up for the European losses from the trade war on Russia. Nobody will invest in West Ukraine if there are periodic air strikes on any remaining infrastructure. Clean water and food distribution are going to be challenging. Disease, poverty and hunger are going to be widespread, if Russia can continue to bomb Ukrainian logistics. Look at other long wars for what happens when the bombs never stop falling. For example, Syria had an outbreak of Polio, a virus that is almost completely eradicated, because there was no more surveillance during the war.


Simple demographics also make the future of the Ukrainian nation very questionable. Ukrainian refugees are already a very large percentage of the (female) population. More than 6.7 million people have left the country (
Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!
) including another million refugees in May. This is out of an estimated pre war population of 37 million, excluding Crimea and the Donbass (
Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!
). As the vast majority of refugees are women and children, they have probably lost maybe a quarter of their female population of 20 million already.

The birth rate in eastern Europe is disastrous, especially in the poorest countries like Ukraine. What do you think a war will do to that? Few people will want to raise a child in a war zone. Ukraine already had far fewer births than deaths before the war, now most of the young women have left and those remaining in Ukraine are less likely to want to have children. So the conclusion is simple, if Russia is able to keep going for long enough, Ukraine is going to run out of Ukrainian nationals and only pro Russian citizens will be left.
This is very true on the demographic front, this is also why I'm thinking the Russian initial approach was pretty much using military to attempt to coup or coerce the Ukrainian government. Hence why even though their arms were more than enough to target troop concentrations, infrastructure, manufactories, and so forth they barely targetted much early on and lost a huge window of opportunity and the following pushes with no fire support over extended into urban environments inflicted more casualties upon themselves than otherwise if they simply played things by the book doctrinally. However like you said with these demographic issues, I think the RU political leadership had this in mind alongside with considerations of flipping civilian administration just like we saw in the attempts in Sumy, Kharkov and so forth. Things did not go as intended and thus the only choice left when the Russian army actually decides to use fires entails mass destruction and refugees fleeing; I presume many Ukrainians won't even want to come back long term due to there not being much prospects post-war. Once real fighting starts with actual usage of firepower like you said, the destruction involved is immense. Some may always point torwards things like Grozny like it is some unique Russian approach but areas start looking like that once actual firepower of any sort gets used, it's a war afterall.
 

FriedButter

Brigadier
Registered Member
With around 180-200k men, many whom aren't even official big army; a lot of chechens, police, volunteers that join the Pro-Russian Ukrainian forces of DNR/LPR, mercenaries such as wagner and other groups including russians joining chechen organized volunteer units.

I don’t think that is accurate. The initial numbers at the time was 150-200k Russian BTG forces before the invasion. Never heard of anyone saying those 150-200k included the DNR/LPR militia, mercenaries, etc.

The initial phase really boggled my mind with how mediocre the plan was however this current kind of fighting seems very by the book for post 2008 Russian military, especially the way that they are just fighting under artillery and CAS umbrella slowly creeping forward like a snail.

Given that initially, Ukraine did agree to a deal until BoJo stepped in and ripped it apart. Then it may have been a different scenario. However, if the RAND Corp is accurate then it seemed like Russia was following their own style of “warfare” from the start.

3. Given Russia’s conventional weaknesses in a protracted war with a peer or near-peer adversary, it will attempt to use indirect action strategies and asymmetric responses across multiple domains to mitigate perceived imbalances. Russia will attempt to terminate a conflict quickly, using a series of measures that aim to control escalation dynamics.

10. On the ground, Russian tactics will likely reflect a heavy emphasis on massed indirect fires (particularly long-range fires), with the effects of these fires exploited by highly mobile vehicles with substantial direct fire capability.

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allyerse

New Member
Registered Member
I don’t think that is accurate. The initial numbers at the time was 150-200k Russian BTG forces before the invasion. Never heard of anyone saying those 150-200k included the DNR/LPR militia, mercenaries, etc.



Given that initially, Ukraine did agree to a deal until BoJo stepped in and ripped it apart. Then it may have been a different scenario. However, if the RAND Corp is accurate then it seemed like Russia was following their own style of “warfare” from the start.
What the RAND corp (US establishment think tank) said did not happen, the Russians did not use massed indirect fire and instead sent in columns of vehicles into urban environments deep into ukrainian held areas (Along Chernobyl-Antonov airport, Sumy-Kiev, Kharkov). In Kharkov they even sent VDV in light vehicles straight to the city center without the artillery or CAS umbrella. This is even shown in both Ukrainian and Russian footage, such an approach even let the Ukrainians make use of drones and artillery to target such over-extended units to inflict casualties on tightly clustered troops that would not have happened otherwise. It was nice and all to have light vehicles speeding into the city center until a Ukrainian APC arrived alongside with response units. Russian approach also attempted to flip over the administration in that oblast which obviously failed as we even see the result now. This think tank mentions these things that the Russians came up with post 2008, but the thing is that during the initial phase we did not see them take such an approach with mainly attritional fires based fighting. All those columns roling in long lines deep into Ukrainian held territory is not by the book nor does it indicate they even intended to use such a fires based approach. If things were approached by the book, there would be no such maneuvers of largely unsupported, large columns lumped together in a rush where not even the artillery or AA was properly deployed, all those drawings and text about such umbrellas was not used. The mass exercises conducted before this war involved such intricacies however during the initial phase they threw that all out of the window, with my own bare eyes I witnessed through footage how nothing they did in training right before the war started or even in 2014 Ukraine was used, instead it was a mad dash to key urban centers.

Heavy emphasis on massed indirect fire, through the usage of SPGs, MLRS, alongside with the small portions of tanks and APCs attached to the units does not neccesarily entail rapid exploitation, such units deployed as we see now, in 2014, and so forth need to fight under their artillery and AA umbrella, and require mass supplies of munitions along with conservative use of manuever elements whom act as a shield. This is directly contradictory to terminating a conflict quickly, and is a sledgehammer solution in Ukraine hence why I think it's reasonable to make the educated guess that given how they did not even employ their forces as such, that it was not the initial intent. Otherwise if they employ their forces under such AA and artillery umbrellas, it would just entail massed fires, slowly creeping forward as we see now which is essentially sledgehammering the issue at hand.

As for the 180-200k I handwave such things, as you said the initial estimates from pro-NATO sources was 150-200k. As we see in sources here and from russian social media of returning national guard, and other police there is troop rotation and thus I do not think the Russians are at some kind of peak at 200k when there is casualties, rotations and so forth. I also do not think they can just strip units from commitments on their borders, domestically, and overseas in the long term just for this war. They would need to activate BARs and reserves in a partial mobilization if we are on the topic of the bulking the official army's numbers beyond peacetime commitments. Thus if I were to make an educated guess now (ignoring some of those twitter posts claiming all kinds of precise locations of Russian brigades and battalions with exact manpower counts), their (RU) number of enlisted committed here is fluctuating but is not going to reach anything like 200k alone given the realities of rotations, casualties and replinishment. Hence why I personally bundle in 3rd party manpower into this range. These men are not close to the majority of Russian manpower committed, however it's pretty sizeable hence why I mention the significance of such Ukrainian militias, volunteers (to the extent of constituting a whole all-Russian volunteer unit commanded by Chechens), mercs, and so forth. Otherwise I cannot claim to know exact numbers, and I wouldn't make any assessment on this other than general handwaving until the end of this war when there is more official publications of this war (aside from the US pov where they take Indian claims on Chinese casualties at face value).
 

FriedButter

Brigadier
Registered Member
What the RAND corp (US establishment think tank) said did not happen, the Russians did not use massed indirect fire and instead sent in columns of vehicles into urban environments deep into ukrainian held areas (Along Chernobyl-Antonov airport, Sumy-Kiev, Kharkov).

Am I suppose to ignore the dozens of videos at the initial invasion showing grad systems firing and heavy artillery bombardment on the outskirts of Kiev, Northern, Southern, Donbas region? Or is it only considered massed indirect fire if it used to level entire cities into rubble?

Another thing to consider, the majority of those initial videos were around the cities. We never saw what actually happened on the frontlines in the trenches, plains, and forests far outside those cities because there was no civilians to record it.

As for the 180-200k I handwave such things, as you said the initial estimates from pro-NATO sources was 150-200k. As we see in sources here and from russian social media of returning national guard, and other police there is troop rotation and thus I do not think the Russians are at some kind of peak at 200k when there is casualties, rotations and so forth.

The West claimed 15k casualties in late March and then claimed again the very same 15k casualties by late April. That either means A) they are lying or B) Russian casualties have significantly declined. Couple weeks ago, I heard someone mention that UK officials said that the bulk of the Russian forces has not been committed into the Eastern region. Seems to me that the majority of the heavy fighting has been blunted onto the militia and mercenaries.
 

allyerse

New Member
Registered Member
Am I suppose to ignore the dozens of videos at the initial invasion showing grad systems firing and heavy artillery bombardment on the outskirts of Kiev, Northern, Southern, Donbas region? Or is it only considered massed indirect fire if it used to level entire cities into rubble?

Another thing to consider, the majority of those initial videos were around the cities. We never saw what actually happened on the frontlines in the trenches, plains, and forests far outside those cities because there was no civilians to record it.



The West claimed 15k casualties in late March and then claimed again the very same 15k casualties by late April. That either means A) they are lying or B) Russian casualties have significantly declined. Couple weeks ago, I heard someone mention that UK officials said that the bulk of the Russian forces has not been committed into the Eastern region. Seems to me that the majority of the heavy fighting has been blunted onto the militia and mercenaries.
The Russians past the first 3 days aside from long range missile strikes, sporadic fires, and other CAS started to bring up their artillery park. However it still doesn't change the fact that they rolled in with long columns where the supply trucks were subject to ambushes and had AA not even fully deployed hence why there was even instances of abandoned AA, destroyed AA in exposed positions. This wasn't any old attack, they simply drove in, otherwise why was there not only VDV driving into a city center, but even gendarmes, riot police speeding on the highway way past any kind of proper fire support just to rush into settlements? This is especially damning when one realizes units like the national guard are more of a support role in a conventional conflict and do a lot of policing, counter insurgency, and are mainly decently kitted infantry that are motorized. Past the initial few days once Russian forces dug into Antonov, you start to see the artillery and AA put in much more work as they were deployed in numbers and where properly deployed leading to much more fires used en-mass. It doesn't make sense to use manuever units like that when they are fairly limited, unless if the intention was different hence why I was suggesting that given such manuevers, negotiations in sumy and kharkov, that the political leadership had a different approach in mind rather than taking a more conventional war approach. The political leadership calling this a "special military operation" wasn't some joke, you can even see the execution that it was more akin to something like the '68 prague operation.

In Donbass things were as usual as you know with how the front was established for 8 years already. Otherwise as I said sending in long columns like this rushing into Kiev is simply not by the book, not by their training, etc. While the initial phase was dragging on I think the approach taken to seize Izium in the first phase is much more indicative of doctrine. What I've been trying to say the whole time is that there's a reason why on all fronts aside from Donbass, the Russians tried to speed through to the extent of throwing VDV straight into a city center, why large concentrations of Ukrainian troops were not targetted when they clearly had the capability of doing so, this was with intent albiet mistaken intent the same mistaken intent as not targetting more infrastructure, troop concentrations, manufactories and so forth to inflict more shock to allow for more concrete breakthroughs and damage inflicted on the enemy. If we cannot see eye on this then I can only just disagree on this point in terms of the Russian approach early on. I personally think it wasn't the worst of results, such rapid advance did let Russia seize the south intact without having to resort to dispersing their troops and actually fight over settlements, though of course along the other axis they had to withdraw yet Ukraine could not even eliminate a Russian unit even in the most over-extended positions (And then the Russians can just withdraw due to being fully mechanized).

There is one thing to attack, but there is another thing to waste maneuver units without proper employment of fires and AA, this is not about leveling entire cities into rubble it is about actually fighting under fire support and not having your rear lines get harassed all the time deep into enemy territory, having actual AA cover, proper flank protection and being dispersed enough so as not to be jam packed on the roads sitting like ducks as in Kharkov, Sumy, and Kiev where there was long columns just being funneled in while Ukrainians are more freely allowed to manuever around which is not the case now with the current fronts. There were Russian troops, special forces placed along flanks, in forests, and so forth from their own retelling and some foreign volunteers mentioning fighting on such flanks, the issue in the end for russian forces was simply intent. As I mentioned they attempted to negotiate around Sumy and Kharkov for example, it did not succeed, those areas are supposed to flip but they simply didn't. It would've been better to seize the majority of these locations as intact as possible but things did not ideally. This doesn't mean a complete failure, it just turns out some things just don't pan out as intended.

As for the rest I am not even disagreeing I just explained why I simply handwaved 180-200k. The numbers you suggested as a range is very similar to mine and I already said I handwave things as they are always fluctuating + no partial mobilization. This is alongside the fact that there are troop rotations and casualties, and if you check what I said previously I don't even think the western claims were close to correct in the first place. I even discuss here the recent BBC article mentioning the low enlisted deaths. This also plays into how there is a sizable portion of the casualties blunted onto mercenaries, militias, and volunteer units as you even mention here. There is no disagreement here and I don't see the point of this, we can handwave these things for now and then just wait for official numbers post war. As for what NATO aligned officials say about the Russian forces there being held in reserve, I don't know however it's plausible, in the end we shall see. Anyways I don't have any contention with you here.
 
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